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For Friends 
Friends! 
In the world and our life there are two 
directions. 
To pursue our satisfaction. 
One construction, other destruction. 
Butfew are builders; while there ... 
Evil forces for destruction. 
While building is exhaustion, and 
Nothing easier than destruction, So ... 
For our joys and relaxation 
With temptation for construction 
Let us seek the difficult. 
Hussain AI-Mousawi 
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SUMMARY 
This thesis has concentrated. on one period of the historical relations which began 
over three centuries ago. Great Britain, or rather Englan~ during the 1620s when 
the Portuguese were still the lords of Musca4 was trying to explore the eastern 
coast of Oman. They made friends· in the Masseera Islan~ but their relationship 
with the Portuguese was not a friendly one. They were welcome~ indeed, by the 
local powers as rivals to the Portuguese in India and in Persia as well as in Oman. 
But despite the generosity of their help, they tried. to strike a balance between the 
ambitions of the local powers and those of the Europeans. The English, for 
example, were reluctant to assist the Persian projects in Muscat against the 
Portuguese. In fact, if the Portuguese were expelled. from there by the Persians, 
then it would be too difficult for the Omanis to occupy it. At the same time they 
offered evacuation for the wounded and the surrendered Portuguese garrison with 
their women and children. The English observed that, after all the people of South 
Persia and of Hunnuz, Arabs or Persians alike, revolted. against Shah Abbas and 
wanted. the Portuguese back, having discovered. them to be the lesser evil. 
English interest in Oman and the Persian Gulf during the seventeenth century 
seems to have been purely commercial. For example, during the sixteen thirties 
and forties stable relations with the Portuguese were maintained., partly no doubt 
a reflection of the marriage between their two royal families, but also because the 
English saw commercial value in establishing good relations with both the 
Omanis and the Portuguese. After the expulsion of the Portuguese, the English 
witnessed the establishment of the first known Omani sovereign in the modem 
world, and the establishment of an Omani Afro-Asian Empire. They established 
good relations with the Ya,aarribeh family; but for some reason they were 
reluctant to establish themselves in Muscat. Probably the Dutch were seen to be 
in a better position while the English were ~stracted. by civil war. But during the 
first half of the eighteenth century English policy seems to have changed., 
probably due to the struggle between various local and European powers which 
took the form of piratical activities on the seas~ in which the Omani Y ~beh 
took part. By the second half of the eighteenth century the English had witnessed 
the downfall of the Y ~aaribeh and Greater Otnan. and the establishment of 
another dynasty in the interior of Oman under Albu Sa.,e~ with the Omani Coast 
in the Gulf ruled by EI-Qawaasem~ highlighting the division of Oman. The 
English found it in their interest to support Ahmed bin S~eed in East Africa., 
against El-Mazaree~ and to keep East Africa under the YaI-bu-Sa,eed rule. They 
found a mutual interest in challenging the Qawaasem of Rasel-khaymeh in the 
Gulf, and their allies the EI-Wahabyeen in Arabia., during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. 
There were several sides to British policy in Oman and the Gulf. First, 
there was the purely commercial interest, though with naval support. Secondly, 
there was the policy. of curbing piracy in the Gulf, until the defeat of the El-
Qawaaasem in the 1830s. Thirdly, there was the policy of keeping the French 
away from the Indian Empire, and safeguarding the sea routes to India., and 
fourthly the suppression of the slave trade, a policy which irritated the slave-
trading Omani businessmen and local people against the British, and which 
allowed the French to interfere in Oman as protector of Omani interests. Finally, 
by the end of the nineteenth century the policy which dominated the region was 
the defence of the N orth-West Frontier. This is the policy which this thesis has 
focused on in studying British relations with Oman. 
In studying an aspect of that policy. this work has focused on the period of 
Sultan Faisal's reign 1888-1913, but for technical reasons it was briefly extended 
to 1920. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, in pursuit of all these policies, 
Muscat's position remained crucial as the nearest port to India and for the sea 
route between India and England. But towards the end of the nineteenth and in 
the early twentieth centuries came an extension of the North-West Frontier policy 
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to the Gulf, with regard to arms trading, and the rivalry of tribes living between 
British India and Southern Persia. In trying to keep control of both the North-
West Frontier and the Persian Gmt: Muscat became a: key point which 
necessitated more influence over the rulers of the place. In addition to that, 
Muscat was associated with the arms trade which turned the port into a centre for 
arms supply to the rebel tribes on the North-West Frontiers of India. In this study 
the first issue focused on was the acknowledgment of the Sultan Faisal by the 
British Government. Faisal succeeded his father Turky after his death in 1888, 
but he was only recognized by the British Government in 1890. The reason was 
that there was fear that Faisal would not be able to resist his uncle's challenge. 
Abdul Aziz bin Sa,eed was himself a very close friend of the British and was well 
qualified and educated, but despite a British policy of non-interference in the 
succession of Sultan Faisal, in practice the opposition to Faisal was weakened by 
the presence of British ships-of-war which on several occasions, during the rule of 
his father Turley, had interfered in favour of the Sultan. The opposition parties 
themselves became weak during Faisal's reign. Sheikh Saleh bin Ali, the head of 
the El-Sharkyeh coalition, father of Sheikh E,yseh, the chieftain of the 1913 
revolution, found that his interests at that moment were to remain on the side of 
the Sultan Faisal and to give up opposition to him in so far as that brought him 
benefits and acknowledgment of his leadership over the tribal coalition. He 
therefore, did not support Abdul Aziz as he did before during the reign of Turky. 
This would allow him to hold a neutral position to benefit from the differences 
within the Al-bu-Sa,eedy's house. This gave the Sultan an air of legitimacy, 
through the support of his people, at least for a while. It also gave the British the 
chance to show that they acknowledged the Sultan according to the wish of his 
people, despite their knowledge about his real position, which was in fact weak as 
he scarcely exercised power beyond the area of Muscat and Mutrah. But their 
acknowledgment did not prevent them from exploiting that weakness; at the same 
time emerged the idea of 'putting Muscat on a definite footing'. 
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This was only too easily arranged. The excessive willingness of the Sultan 
to bind himself completely to Britain caused the British Political Residen~ 
Colonel Ross~ not to lose that chance to anticipate events~ an~ without authority 
being given to him. to conclude a treaty with Faisal. That caused conflict with 
France~ which jointly with Great Britain had declared its respect for Muscat's 
independence. The French complained about the British steps~ which were 
regarded as a violation of the 1862 treaty. But the British tried to get around that 
commitment by combining the Treaty of Commerce of 1890~ which was modified 
in 1891, with a secret declaration, that the Sultan pledge himself, his heirs and 
successors never to cede, to sell, to mongage or otherwise give for occupation, 
save to the British Government, the dominions of Muscat. The French reacted 
quickly, and appointed a vice-consul at Muscat in 1894. The appointment was 
political and aimed to undennine the British desire to put Muscat under their 
protection, but the British decided to anticipate French moves in this direction. 
If one of the British excuses for keeping Muscat under their protection was 
the British Indian subjects and their interests; the French might offer the same 
excuse. They did not have Indians but there were Omani Arabs, from Oman 
itself, Sur and EI-Batneh to whom France had granted its flag as protection for 
their dhows. This practice had, in fact, been initiated in the 1830s, but what was 
new and alarmed the British was the apparent intention of the French 
representative in Muscat to use his influence over those Omani subjects whose 
dhows were protected as a means of bringing pressure on the Sultan himself. So 
questions concerning the French flag were for British officials a serious matter, 
which had to be solved, but the Sultan himself was not in a position to take issue 
with France, without alienating the people of el Sharkyeh. Their use of the French 
flag was valued by them and for the Sultan. To resist its use would drive people 
who were his supponers into the opposition camp. The British, of course, raised 
the flag issue primarily to give the French a hard time in Muscat, and to ensure 
their exclusive influence over the place. The French aim was no less imperial, but 
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they realised that the declaration of a British Protectorate could not be prevented. 
So if the British game was to protect the Sultan they would play on the other si~ 
They would offer protection to his subjects, hopefully to the detriment of British 
policy on the north-west frontiers of its Indian empire as well as in Oman. The 
French flag might, for example, seriously undermine British policy over the arms 
traffic, a question in which the sultan himself took a great interest. 
Eight years before Faisal's succession in 1880, and in an effort to suppress 
the arms trafficking. to tribes north of India, the Government of India took 
measures to prevent the granting of licenses for the export of arms to the Persian 
Gulf ports. These measures were supported by the Persian Government, but it 
soon became clear that their support was limited to exploiting the British 
measures as an excuse for increasing the duty paid on arms and hence their 
income, rather than stopping the arms traffic to the Muscat dominions of 
.Baluchistan (Gawader) altogether. That .necessitated Sultan Faisal's co-operation 
in suppressing the trade there in 1891 after his succession. But the Sultan was 
really in no position to suppress the trade, given his treaty obligations to other 
countries such as France, the U. S. A., Holland and, indeed, Great Britain itself. 
These treaties required freedom of all trade, and arms and ammunition were even 
mentioned in the American treaty. Unless these treaties could be amended 
nothing could be done to suppress the trade. But the Sultan in any case preferred 
to adopt the Persian practice of increasing his income by raising duties on arms 
rather than suppressing the trade in them. That, too, roused opposition from the 
treaty states. 
British Indian officials long debated this problem and came up with the 
idea of putting the Sultan's customs under British direct control. But this idea 
brought out the contrasting British and French interpretation of the 1862 
declaration with respect to Muscat's independence, as well as misunderstanding 
between the Sultan and the British. The Sultan was only too willing to allow the 
British to confiscate arms at sea on board ships flying Omani, Persian and British 
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flags on the assumption that the confiscated arms would then be handed over to 
him. When the arms were confiscated on board the 'Baluchistan' in 1898 by 
British ships, they were, however handed over to British agents and not to the 
Sultan. The Sultan, angry and feeling that he had been misled, decided to 
compensate himself by raising the local customs duties which afflicted British 
subjects and by negotiating with the French to lease to them the cove of Bander 
Jes-sah. The latter move strained British tolerance to its limits. They decided to 
threaten the Sultan with bombardment of his town and palace if the Jes-sah 
session was not cancelled, thus inflicting open humiliation on the Sultan. They 
also interfered in the Sultan's administration, by insisting that he should appoint 
no person friendly to the French and hostile the British. A notable case was that 
of Abdul Aziz er Ruwahi, who had been the French dragoman, and then became 
the Sultan's adviser. But the main obstacle to the British policy of arms 
suppression remained France. British ships of war could never tackle native boats 
flying French colours. 
The case of the Baluchistan undermined British policy in Muscat as 
Britain not only weakened its own friends, but gave France's supporters the 
opportunity to influence the Sultan. This necessitated fresh British diplomatic 
moves and opened a new page of relations between them and the Sultan. For 
example there was a change to a new kind of British representative in Muscat, 
using wise and less rigid diplomatic methods. At the same time, an effort was 
made to improve Anglo-French relations. 
France felt that in the case of the Jessah Coaling Station it had been 
mistreated by Britain, a resentment which might cause severe damage to Britain in 
the long run if not alleviated. A policy of soothing the French without losing 
control over the Sultan to France presented Sir Percy Cox with a complex task. In 
effect he had to ensure that gains of the kind sought by France, like a coaling 
station, were manifestly the result of the British having approved of them and not 
engineered by French influence over the Sultan. So the coaling station was 
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negotiated between France and Britain by the opening of the century, rather than 
France being granted it simply by the Sultan of Muscat. The French were 
satisfied, and the British were happy with their diplomatic success in the matter. 
To reconcile the Sultan required only the resumption to His Highness of 
the subsidy. As soon as that was done, the Sultan expressed his readiness to 
follow British advice, and do his best to convince his people not to fly the French 
colours,. as this was a question which remained unresolved between the two 
pow~ Britain and France. Good relations were, however, restored. with the 
Sultan of Muscat. 
The Sultan failed to convince his subjects not to fly the French flags. 
Moreover His Highness and the British authorities were embarrassed before the 
international, Arab and Omani public opinion by an unexpected item in the Arabic 
newspaper FathuI-Bassaer, which brought the news of the Jessah affair. British 
fingers pointed to the French as being behind that, but the newspaper also 
informed its Arabic readers of the emergence of Germany as a major power in the 
region. 
The French flag question eventually was taken to arbitration before King 
Victor Emmanuel ill of Italy, whose decision at the Hague on August 1905 was 
that France did not have the right to grant Omanis French flags, unless they had 
been protected by France before 1863. But that did not solve the problem 
completely. French Somali dhows became involved in the smuggling of arms into 
Italian and German territories in Africa. 
At the same time, arms smuggling in the Gulf intensified, and became a 
big business, not just for the locals but even for the English officers of steamers, 
belonging to the British Indian Navigation Company. By 1908 most major 
European powers had become interested in suppressing the arms trade. They 
raised the question in the Brussels Arms conference in 1909. But Britain disliked 
any international bodies interfering in Gulf affairs even for the purpose of 
suppressing the traffic. They adhered to the idea that freedom should be given to 
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the Sultan of Muscat to suppress the trade in his countty~ The French stand was 
also that any question with. respect: to Muscat should be: dealt with only by the two 
treaty powers and should not involve: any other states..1bis caused the failure of 
the Brussels Arms Conference. But negotiations between France and BntaiD did 
not anive at any conclusion before 1914 when France agreed to join Britain in 
suppressing the' arms trade-in Muscat 
Britain,. however,. did not wait for that to be achieved. The British 
managed to persuade the sultan to agree to establish a warehouse for arms in 
Muscat-in 1912. This was the immediate reason for the Omanis to revolt against 
the Sultan in 1913, in order to elect a ruler sympathetic to Omani needs, the Imam 
Salem EI-Kharussy. The revolution went on from 1913 to 1920. Oman was 
virtually partitioned between two governments, one led by the Sultan in Muscat 
and on the sea coast, the other under the Imam whose capital was Nezwa in the 
interior of Oman proper. 
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Introduction 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
A GENERAL HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
BRmSH-OMANI RELATIONS 
1620-1744 
Portugal was the first European power to assert its influence in the East after 
Alexander the Great. During the 16th and the first half of the 17th century the 
Portuguese were the masters of Muscat and the Persian Gulf. Throughout that 
period they controlled trade in the ar~ particularly the valuable trade in silk. 
although they were challenged unsuccessfully from time to time by the Turks and 
the Persians. 
From the second half of the 16th century England had both domestic and 
European reasons, together with reasons arising from administrative and 
economic developments during the reign of Elizabeth 1 (1558-1603), for opening 
trade with the East. First, there was the loss of Calais in 1557 to the French, 
which followed the closing of other markets in Europe and which caused the 
collapse of the English wool trade, thus creating unemployment in the clothing 
industry. Secondly, there was a growing number of merchant ships with a 
capacity of 50,000 tons by 1560, while the appointment of John Hawkins in 1578 
by Elizabeth 1 to be in charge of her ships led to the development of ship building 
in a highly progressive way to compete with England's rivals. Thirdly, the 
appointment of William Cecil (Lord Burghley), who became the administrative 
centre of the government, its economic regulator, the architect and designer of a 
new coinage, and promoter of a number of industries which laid the foundations 
of England's overseas power. Fourthly, Francis Bacon, the philosopher, also 
served Elizabeth 1 with his theory that the English were natural traders. Fifthly, 
the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 by the English reduced the Spanish 
superiority on the seas, and marked the rise of English sea power. Finally, there 
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was the rapidly growing population of Englan~ reaching nearly five million by 
1603. 
By the end of the century, one of the English aims was to share in the rich 
silk: trade between India and Persia. In 1581, the Levant Company was formed in 
Englan~ and carried on its operations to India past the Persian Gulf. In 1583 two 
Englishmen, John Newbery and Ralf Fitch, were sent by Queen Elizabeth 1 to 
make a land journey passing through Persia and the Persian Gulf on their way to 
India. In 1591 George Raymond made his first journey to the East round the Cape 
of Good Hope. In 1600 the East India Company was founded, and took over the 
monopoly of the East Indies and India trade. In 1601 the Company initiated its 
first voyage to the East, and the first contact with India was in 1607 after a voyage 
led by William Hawkins!. 
On the Indian sub-continent the English met the Portuguese, who had had 
an old stronghold there for more than a century (1505). Their interests soon came 
into growing conflict with the newcomers, who challenged their monopoly. This 
caused several confrontations in 1615 and 1621, in which the Portuguese were 
defeated. These events offered the English a wonderful opportunity because 
naturally they were welcomed by the natives of the Indian Ocean, Indians, 
Persians and Arabs, especially those with ambitious attitudes. All those who 
opposed the Portuguese policy saw the English presence in the area as a relief, and 
hoped their interests could be protected. This made the English natural allies of 
1. For this account see K. R. Andrews. English Privateering Voyages to the East Indies, 
1588-1595 (Hakluyt Society. 1959). pp. 155. 159; W. Fosrer. English Factories in India, 
1618-1621 (1906), p. 181; M. Ashley, The People o/England, (1982). pp. 75-76. 79, 81-
82. 156; Pierre Vidal Naquet (ed.), The Collins Atlas o/World History. (1987). p.156; G. 
M. Trevelyan. English Social History (1944). pp. 197.201; A. G. R. Smith. Anonymous 
Life o/William Cecil, Lord BurghIey, Research Seminar 1987-88 for Studying a Source 
(Modern History Deparunent, University of Glasgow); P. J. Boden. The Wool Trade in 
Tudor England, (1962). p. 127; M. D. D. Newitt, 'The East India Company in Wesrem 
India'. Journal 0/ Imperial and Commmonwealth History, 14 (1985-6). pt.2, p.8; Capt. 
R.St. P. Parry. The navy in the Persian Gulf,J. R. Un. Serv.Inst. 75 (1930) pp. 314-331. 
For shipbuilding development in England and naval competition with France during the 
late 17th century and the 18th century. see Douglas Johnson. et al (eds.). Britain and 
France: Ten Centuries, (Folkestone, 1980), pp.I40-172. 
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the ambitious leaders of the region and gave them a logical position against the 
Portuguese2• 
In 1615, Thomas Roy was the first English Ambassador appointed in 
India. He laid down the policy which guided the actions of his countrymen in the 
East for more than three centuries to come. In the same year, 1615, the English 
initiated political and trade links with Shah Abbas ofPersia3• 
Section Two 
The Portuguese of Muscat and the English 
Naturally, the English relationship with the Portuguese of Muscat was not a 
friendly one and was similar to that in India. By the 1620s the English were 
engaged in a kind of piracy against the Portuguese vessels of Muscat. For 
example, six vessels between 1620-1621 were seized, among them the ship 
Nestura Senhora under Captain Francisco Mirando of Muscat, and the ship S. 
Antonio which the English renamed M ayflower4. 
As early as the summer of 1621, during the monsoon, the English made 
their fIrst attempt to explore the Omani coast and for that task they used the 
renamed Portuguese ship without declaring their purpose for this exploration. 
However, their hope was to reach the coast of Dufar. Unfortunately they missed 
their target, as they thought that they had reached one of the Kuria Muria islands 
facing the Dufary coast, but in fact it was Ras Madraka (Cape of Madraka), near 
Macera island on the east coast. They "anchored off the island of Macera and 
obtained abundance of water from some pits three quarters of a mile inland. The 
natives were verie tractable and traded goats for rice and calico". They decided to 
2 J. A. Williamson, A Note Book of Empire History, (1942), p.57; J. B. Trend, Portugal 
(1957) pp. 136-37; H. V. Livennore,ANew History of Portugal. (1963), p.l40; C.R. 
Boxer, Race Relations in the Portuguese Empire, 1415-1825, (1963), p. 41; S. Bradford, 
Portugal (1912); H. H. Dodwell (ed.), Cambridge History of the British Empire (1929); J. 
Frayers, A New Account of East India and Persia 1672-1681, (1912), pp. 26-30; R. K. 
Mukherjee, The Rise and Fall of the East India Company (1974), pp. 93-101. 
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stay on the island for the rest of the monsoon, but news came to them from the 
rest of the fleet at Sohar that trouble had broken out in Tyvy against the English, 
and an English Roebuck skiff was sunk and the crew drowned. Accordingly, they 
set sail to rejoin the admiral. They anchored near Ras EI Hadd for a week and 
then left for Chaul on the west coast of Indias. 
In another attempt, they sailed from Sohar, this time along the Batinah 
coast heading for Sur Masira, Raselhadd and Tyvy, again, on the eastern coast. 
But the Muscat Portuguese were aware of the plan, and were watching the 
situation carefully. They followed the English and warned them against using the 
place. Robert Jeffries reported to the Company the following: "the London, 
Andrew, Mayflower, and Primerose went within Cape Rosalgate [Ras-al-hadd], 
and the 7th of June anchored at Tewee [Tywee], where wee had all sortes of 
refreshments untill certayne Portingalls (sent from Mascatte) forbid and defended 
the watering-place; but wee toke yt without asking leave, and thereof had our 
pleasures, and for their dishonestie wee burned the towne and spoyled many their 
date trees"6. It is significant to note that efforts to explore the Omani coast by the 
English took place before the Portuguese expulsion from Hurmuz in 1621-2, a 
matter. which indicates the early English interest there. However the Portuguese 
undermined the English by provoking the local people against them: "by reason 
the portengall[s] came and tooke our surgeon and our boye and incensed the 
cuntry peaple against us, and so wee wayed this daye and went for Soar [Suhar], 
because that Shackalee [Sheikh A,li] hadd promised to be our friende, who is the 
king of Soar and the cuntrye about". It is the first recorded friendship between 
the English and an Omani chief, and it seems that Suhar despite the Portuguese 
influence was independent and had its own Sheikh who could fonn relations with 
others than the Portuguese. However the English did not give up exploring the 
5 Foster, English Factories, 1618-1621, p. 284. 
6 Foster, Eng/ish Factories, 1618-1621, p. 288 
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Eastern provinces of Oman, and in the same month (27 June) they sailed again to 
Sur7• 
But in 1622, after the Persians besieged Hurmuz, the English offered the 
Portuguese a human gesture. They helped in evacuating the wounded Portuguese, 
transporting the surrendering garrison with their women and children, numbering 
3000, to Muscat and Sohar3. 
Section Three 
Muscat's Portuguese Challenge to the Anglo-Persian-Dutch alliance 
In 1623 the Persians decided to go ahead and expel the Portuguese from Muscat. 
They asked for English help but they were reluctant to meet the Persian demand9• 
Even so, the Persians kept on trying to persuade the English to join them against 
Muscat, but were unsuccessful The English seemed not to be interested in the 
Persian project. Observers at that time noticed that if the English did agree to join 
with the Persians in laying siege to Muscat they would need better assurances of 
performance than had been the case at Hurmuz10• It was obvious that the English 
were too aware of Muscat's power. The Portuguese there recruited 7000 men, a 
galleon and many frigates and boats, on the alert against any assault, showing that, 
unlike Hurmuz, the taking of Muscat would not be easy and might be impossible. 
Having understood the Persian desire, the Portuguese detennined to defend 
Muscat. The English turned down another Persian request to attack the place in 
1624. They preferred that their fleet should remain taking defensive action 
against the Portuguese in the Gulf instead of offensive action, but that did not 
prevent them carrying on hunting the Portuguese ships off Muscat. However, the 
Persians did not give up their demand, and they still desired to drag the English 
into their plans. They succeeded in attracting them by promising 900 Tumans, to 
7 Foster, English Factories, 1618-1621, pp. 285-6. 
8 Foster, English Factories, 1622-1623, (1908) pp. ix-x, 34. 
9 E. Prestage, Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations, (1981), pp. 101,109,112. 
10 Foster, English Factories, 1622-1623, pp. xx, 14-15, 166, 181, 186, 188-189; Foster, 
English Factories, 1630-33, (1910), pp. 105, 109,2070,208,241,278-279,288,2950. 
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be paid in instalments of 300 and then 600, payable if they agreed to cooperate. 
The Dutch soon replied positively to the Persian request for their assistance 
against Muscat. In what seems to have been the first test of Muscat's power and 
the first confrontation of its kind at sea in Gulf history, the alliance suffered severe 
damage and loss of life. But that was not enough to dissuade them. They carried 
out a second attack, but the Muscat fleet showed a great performance in dealing 
with the situation and was able to carry out a counter-attack, showing a high level 
of seamanship in warfare. In further heavy fighting with the Muscat fleet, the 
English lost their commander, Albert Backer, who was 'killed on his command 
ship. The alliance in general suffered further heavy losses and great damage to 
their f1eetll. The Great Governor of Muscat, Ruy Freire, who returned in May 
1623 from his English captivity during the Hurmuz campaign, encouraged his 
forces to go ahead and counter-attack. He occupied Larak island and re-
established Portuguese influence in the Straits of Hurmuz. This time he received 
help from local resident Arabs and Persians who were in revolt against the Persian 
government and in favour of the Portuguese, something which it is of the utmost 
significance to note. The Portuguese recaptured Sohar as well when a flotilla 
under Captain Goncalo de Siqeira de Sousa sailed there to expel the Persians who 
had taken further advantage of the Portuguese expulsion from Hurmuz to occupy 
Sohar and Khor Fukkan in the Gulf of Oman12• 
Section Four 
The Portuguese Control of Muscat strengthened 
At Muscat in 1625 a council of war was founded, the first of its kind in Muscat's 
history, to face the threat from the allies. During this period Muscat received 
large supplies of money, timber and munitions for the armada, provisions on a 
scale never seen before. During the whole of the year 1626 the Lord of Muscat, 
Ruy Freire, was busily employed in strengthening the fortifications of his city. 
11 Fos~, English Factories, 1634-1636, (1911), pp. 62, 120, 123, 127-128, 132, 329. 
12 Foster, English Factories, 1624-1629, (1909),pp.x, xxi, 22,42. 
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The purpose was not only to defend Muscat but to carry out attacks to recapture 
Hurmuz in 1627 and in 1635. According to Prestage, Freire prepared for an 
expedition sufficient to recapture Hurm~ and there was every likelihood that he 
would be successful, but something went wrong: Botelho's squadron was shattered 
and partially destroyed by a terrible storm, something which gave the allies great 
help, and brought bad luck to the Portuguese. This made any further attempt to 
recapture Hurmuz impossible13• But the English Company sources reported that 
"Ruy Freire has besieged Onnus for ten months with 18 frigates, cutting off all 
supplies. He wrote to the King [of Persia], offering to buy it, but the latter replied 
'hee had wonn it with the sword and he would defend it"'. It was also reported 
that Ruy Freire was "supported by the Arabs and some revolted Persians, and has 
ruined many of the ports between Jask and Gomboron. He reported to the 
governor of the latter place that the English commanders who took Onnus had had 
their heads cut Off'14. If this was true then the disaster which occurred to the 
Portuguese fleet by the storm came after these events, and the Portuguese were 
expelled again in 1625, having reocupied Hurmuz for eight months. 
Back to the allies. In 1626 several proposals were made for an occupation 
of Muscat by the English; "if a joint attack may be arranged, a stipulation must be 
made that the English are to be allowed sole possession of the castle after its 
capture, leaving the rest for the Persians". But they hesitated in carrying out their 
own proposals as their attempt seemed too hazardous until the Portuguese 
galleons had been destroyed. It was "not desirable to interest the Dutch in such an 
understanding as they would claim to share the profit". So the idea was 
abandoned and the English fleet, which had been prepared for the business, was 
sent back. In 1628 the Persians made another attempt, but the English refused 
completely because they began to think that the Persian king was seeking his own 
ends and never intended any division of the spoils, despite what had been 
13 Prestage. Chapters. pp.l09, 148, ch 3 passim. 
14 Foster, English Factories, 1624-1629, p. 84. 
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contracted in Persia. He might add all that was gained by English assistance to his 
own Persian territory, and it seemed that his ambition was not limited only to 
Muscat but included all Arabia. Secondly: there was nothing great to be gained 
from occupying Muscat. The town was very poor. This English stand benefited 
the Dutch and opened the way for them to come close to the Persians IS. 
Muscat during the 30s of the 17th century saw an extensive increase in its 
strategic position for the first time in history. This period is of great significance 
for the whole history of Muscat and Oman. The second siege of Hurmuz 
transformed Muscat into a key point in the area for the Portuguese (and from 1650 
onwards for the Omanis). In addition to changing the city into a naval and 
military fort, Muscat lords played a significant historical role in defending toughly 
the Portuguese interest in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. They succeeded 
in challenging three powers, the English, Dutch and the Persians. The great leader 
Ruy Freire, the Chaun of Muscat, a military and navigation expert, made the most 
of it. In 1632 Freire showed diplomatic expertise as well when he offered the 
Persians some 600 Tumans, and a trade contract with the English signed by 
himself and the English Captain Waddle. By this move he managed to ease 
tension with his enemies, and to spoil all their efforts and split them, probably for 
a while. One of the allies, the Dutch, was angry since Freire did not make any 
offer to please them, and the benefits went to the English instead. Though the 
Persians got some benefit, it seems that they were encouraged by the Dutch not to 
give up their Muscat occupation project. And here Freire started to gain from his 
diplomatic move. The English in 1632 refused to participate for the reasons given 
above regarding the Persian attitude. The English did not have any special aim at 
that time which necessitated their participation in war operations against Muscat. 
At the same time, they were convinced that Portuguese power was generally in 
decline, and that sooner or later "to join issue with those people and settle a trade 
may prove very beneficial" instead of fighting them. But it is interesting that the 
15 Foster, English Factories, 1624-29, pp. 80-81, 99, 107,163-64,198-99,214,237,311. 
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English did not remain of that opinion. In 1633 they reevaluated the situation and 
found that their stand had proved wrong, and that if they insisted on holding to 
their previous principle, it might lose them ground with the Persians, and the 
Dutch would take over. Finally they decided to join the alliance against Muscat. 
But during this period the Georgians in the north of Persia coincidentally spoiled 
the whole question of Muscat. The Georgians revolted against Persian rule in 
their country and the Persians decided to despatch an expedition against the 
Georgians to restore order. In an engagement with the Georgians in 1633 the 
Duke of Shiraz and his brother were captured and executed, and the Persian army 
was badly defeated in Georgia. This occasion caused troubles and disorder in 
Persia itself. This coincidence was to save Muscat for the Portuguese for another 
seventeen years. The project of attacking Muscat was given up after the collapse 
of the Persian army in front of the Georgians. Perhaps that was welcomed by the 
English; at least they could feel independent in carrying out their own policy 
without the Persian influence. It might allow them to fill the gap which was left 
by the Persian withdrawal for some time l6. 
In 1633, the great leader of Muscat, Ruy Freire had died, and thus another 
period began in Muscat's relations with the English. After this period the English 
gave up any hostile attitude towards Muscat. They decided to maintain relations 
with the Portuguese in 1635, and trade regulation and co-operation went on 
between the two parties. Letters had been exchanged despite the fact that the 
Dutch had not stopped hostilities against Muscat. The English ships started to sail 
and to shelter safely in Muscat harbour (and the relations even went better during 
1637)17. The English acknowledged that the East India Company had been well 
treated by the Muscat authorities, and soon the English started to gain benefits 
from their good relations with Muscat. The ports of Arabia, Persia and India 
16 Foster, English Factories, 1630-1633, (1910), pp. 141,207-208,211,240-241,247,253, 
256,278,279,288,295. 
17 Foster, English Factories, 1634-36 (1911), pp. 120, 123, 128, 132, 147, 185; Foster, 
English Factories, 1637-1641, (1912), pp. 24-25, 135,247,250; Badger, Imams and 
Seyyeds,p.xxiv,64. 
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became open to them. From their side the English even suggested that the 
Portuguese could use their ships for voyages to China. Through all the period 
from 1637 to 1645 the English relations with Muscat were absolutely normal in 
respect to the Portuguese. From now on, English relations over the coming five 
years with Muscat and (Oman) were to move in a parallel direction with the 
Omanis on one hand and the Portuguese on the other18. 
Section Five 
First official English-Omani Relations 1646-1660 
The period between 1646 and 1650 is of great significance. It marks the first 
official communication between an Omani government and the English. Imam 
Nasser Ben Murshid Al_Ya,ruby19 the first Ya,ruby Imam. The King of Euman 
after his general campaign in Oman and after he had taken Sohar from the 
Portuguese. invited the English to Swares, (Sohar) where quantities of several 
sorts of merchandise were available. For example. there were reported to be 
plenty of horses of very good quality which attracted the English. In a report 
dated 19 February 1646, sent to the President of the East India Company at Sura.t 
in India, Philip Wydle and Samuel Wilton submitted draft articles of an agreement 
with the Imam Nasser of Oman. "Sailed from Gombaron (Bander Abbas) 
on January 13, (1646) and six days later reached Bunder Swar (Sohar). Their 
draft articles of agreement were forwarded to the King, who replied that he was 
sending down merchants to buy their goods and his Visseer (Wazir, Prime 
Minister) with full power to conclude an agreement. These duly arrived, and the 
articles were sealed". But the Imam delegates came without cash in their hands, 
and it seems that the deal was not accomplished so "the Wazir expressed great 
regret and hoped that the next monsoon we would send a ship to Bunder Seep 
18 Foster, English Factories, 1642-45, (1913), p.20, 299, 308. 
19 Maciurin, E. C. B. 'Oman and the Trucial-Coast' Australian Q .• Vol. 30 pp. 65-76; on p. 
72 identifies Imam Nasser as 'Said bin Khalifa, Imam of Oman'. 
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(Seeb or, Es-seeb), being one of the Kings ports neere his residence Emaun 
(0man)"20. 
While the English and the Omanis were trying to establish their relations 
and create mutual understanding officially for the first time in history, Anglo-
Portuguese relations in Muscat were not affected. They went on normally both in 
commerce and political relations 21. And about the period 1647-48, a peace was 
concluded between the Imam Nasser and the Portuguese to settle matters between 
the Arabs of Oman and the Portuguese of Muscat22• In this agreement the 
Portuguese agreed to surrender Duba and Mussandam on the Strait of Hurmuz to 
the Imam Nasser. The Imam for his part acknowledged the Portuguese 
sovereignty over Muscat on the condition of freeing the Omanis of all customs 
duties. If the Portuguese could hold on to this agreement they probably would 
stay a long time in Muscat. It proved that their surrendering Duba and 
Mussandum to the Imam was wise, whether they meant it or not, because by that, 
they put the Qmanis face to face with the Persians in the Straits of Hurmuz. This 
action lost the Persians and their allies any legality in claiming that area, and the 
Portuguese were saved a lot of effort in defending the Straits. If the Portuguese 
were farsighted and kept on dealing with the Omanis positively in that way they 
might gain a great benefit going beyond their legal position in Muscat. Those 
powers, especially the Persians, who opposed the Portuguese in the region could 
now be challenged by the growing new strength of the Omanis. This would have 
a great impact on future events and might give the Portuguese a lengthy existence 
in Muscat. 
Giving the Portuguese the right of sovereignty by Imam Nasser over 
Muscat was very important. First, it gave them a legal protection against any 
foreign power. Second, Nasser seemed to prefer to keep the city under the 
Portuguese than to let it be taken by the Persians. He had considerable knowledge 
20 Foster. English Factories. 1646-1650 (1914). pp. 16.27-28. 
21 Foster. English Factories. 1646-1650. pAS. 
22 Foster. English Factories, 1646-1650, p.223. 
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of Persian desires in Muscat. Although they became weak after their defeat in 
Geor~ the Persians soon recovered and did not give up their ambitions. The 
Persians might justify their claim over the place on several grounds. Muscat and 
all the sea coast, before the Portuguese takeover in 1505, had represented a great 
and valuable part of Southem-Persian-based kingdoms, since the ninth century 
(the last was the kingdom of Elkoosyeen of Hmmuz an~ before Islam, the whole 
of Oman 'Mazon' was part of a great Persian Empire). Thus from the Persian side, 
Portugal should be replaced by Persia if at all possible. They never gave up this 
feeling until they achieved their policy in the first half of the next century, as we 
will see later. The important thing in this is that Imam Nasser for his part 
undermined the Persian claim or at least delayed it for some time until Oman 
would be ready and could challenge the Persians. 
Section Six 
The last year of the Portuguese in Muscat, 1650 
However, the Portuguese violated the agreement which was made between them 
and the Imam N asser23. This unwise action and misjudgement contributed to the 
end of the Portuguese in Muscat. It opened an opportunity for their enemies to 
exploit. The Dutch interfered and encouraged the Omanis against the Portuguese, 
offering them arms for attacking Muscat. Accordingly Nasser decided to bring 
the Portuguese existence there to an end. He launched his attack in 1649, in what 
was described by East India Company sources as a most bloody and dismal war, 
which lasted about one year. But Nasser did not live to see the fmal victory. He 
died during his campaign, and was soon replaced by his cousin Sultan bin Saif 
who took over the lead and became the second Ya,ruby Imam of Oman and first 
of Muscat. It does not seem that any peace attempt was made by either of the two 
parties. Finally in January 1650 a major attack was launched under his leadership 
and the Portuguese were severely defeated although the Omanis suffered heavy 
23 Ibid. 
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10sses24• An important factor in the war had been the shift in support by the 
Indian merchant community from the Portuguese to the OmaniS2S. 
Thus Muscat was taken by the Omanis for perhaps the first time after more 
than seven hundred years26. The English Company in 1650 reported that "The 
Imam, a petty Arabian Prince, hat taken Muscatt from the Portingalls; soe that 
now they have not any place of refuge in the Persian Gulfe; and tis to be feared 
will not long in India"27. If the Portuguese had assisted the ambitions of the 
Omanis and worked with them, instead of opposing them, they might have 
remained on friendly terms and very likely become allies against their rivals, the 
Persians and the Dutch. That might have brought a great benefit for them. The 
English neutral position might bring them another benefit, and allow them to 
participate in the region's balance of power. By their international contacts, they 
could then offer a lot of their experience and knowledge, needed by the Omanis, 
and which could be obtainable there in Muscat. And if they preserved their 
friendly terms with them, the English might share many common interests. Thus 
it seems that the Portuguese failed to read the future, but they had given the 
Omanis great service; first, from the early sixteenth century they had assisted 
Persia's independence and kept Oman and all the Gulf region away from the 
Ottoman Turkish invasion, with all its historical, social and religious 
consequences. Secondly, because of their international contacts they assisted the 
Omanis by bringing them the knowledge of this modem interdependent world. 
Thirdly, though Muscat was known before the siege of Hurmuz for its strategic 
position, its strong identity indeed was only consolidated after the Portuguese 
expulsion from Hurmuz. From this point on, maritime powers during that period 
(the Persians, English, Dutch and the Omanis) focused on that city. For about a 
quarter of a century between their expulsion from Hurmuz and their expulsion 
24 Hamilton, A New Account, pp. 43-44. 
25 Allen Jr., Calvin H., The Indian Merchant Community of Masqat', Bui. S.O AS 44 
(1981), pp.39-53. 
26 Foster, English Factories, 1646-50, pp. 293, 310-12. 
27 Ibid. 
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from M~ the Portuguese managed to defend the city against the Persians, and 
that preserved it for the Omanis instead. If the Portuguese had not defended 
Muscat and it had been taken by the Persians, (though one can only guess might 
have happened) certainly it would have altered historical events in Oman through 
that period and might have turned Oman's history in a different direction. 
Fourthly, the Portuguese made Oman and the Gulf region members of the first 
European global Empire, joining them with other differnt nations separating them 
from the Ottoman Turks' influence, thus bringing them into a direct link with 
European interests. and therefore into a broader international context. Anyhow, 
after about one century and a half of Portuguese mastery over Muscat, a new stage 
began in its history, and a new stage of relations between the English and Muscat 
began. 
Section Seven 
EI Ya,aaribeh of Oman and the English 1650-1747 
The English witnesed the expulsion of the Portuguese from Muscat, and the 
establishment of the first Omani Government with international links to be known 
in modern history. 
Immediately after his victory, Imam Sultan bin Saif 1 made overtures for 
commercial intercourse with the English in 1650. The English ship Fellowship 
was invited to Muscat. Her captain was well and kindly received and was offered 
the best house in the town. They attempted to set up a factory in the place. In 
1651 the English traded in rice for dates and horses. In 1659 Mr Matthew 
Andrews, President of the council of the Company, originated the idea of an 
English settlement in Muscat28• The reason was that after the Omani take-over of 
Muscat from the Portuguese in 1650, its strategic position made it an objective to 
both the Dutch and the Persians. "In these circumstances the Arabs, conscious of 
the difficulty of defending the town against attacks from any of these quarters, 
28 Foster, English Factories, 1655-1660,(1921), pp. 225-226, 230-32. 
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were not indisposed to enlist the aid of the English. Immediately after they had 
gained possession. they made overtures for commercial intercourse29". At the 
same time the English had their own reasons to form relations with the new 
regime in· Muscat. Colonel Rainsford was sent to visit Muscat for an agreement. 
But also he was chosen for the visit because of his military knowledge which 
would enable him to make a useful report on the fortifications existing there30. 
His mission was announced to the Company on 12 April. 1659. It was announced 
that after explaining the difficulties of acquiring any of the Portuguese strongholds 
in India. the Company had made "a ttyall to treat with Arrabs about Muscat. upon 
the encouragement wee have received from severall English who have been 
kindly treated and much desire that wee would settle a factory there; which hath 
invited us to entertaine. and send upon a jounk. Colonell Henry Rainsford with 
our letter to the King to treat with him about it". At the same time the position of 
Muscat became so significant in the eyes of the English that there was no place on 
the northern seas which could prove so profitable to them as Muscat. Its position 
not only would enable the English to gain the right to farm the customs in Persia 
but to command all princes thereabouts to give the English good and fair 
treatment. Otherwise the English would have the right to stop their vessels from 
entering the Persian Gulf. ''Wee pray the lard to give a blessing to our endovers 
therin. and hope. if it should not prove succesfull as wee desire. you will not think 
amiss of our good intents therin, being a place wee apprehend would proove in 
several respects of very great concernment unto you"31. Colonel Rainsford visited 
Muscat in 1659 and discussed an agreement with "the King [Imam Sultan bin 
Saif32] drawn up ready to confnme by each signing the contracts: that a casle 
should be deliverd unto English, in which should remaine noe more then 100 
souldiers at present, and part of the town for other English to live in: the customes 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 As early as this period the English Company's records started to call the Ornani Imam 
'Sultan of Oman'; ibid. 
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to be shared. augmented as the English please"33. "A Dutch account (Hague 
Transcripts, ser. i. vol.xxiii. no.639) says that Rainsford told the Imam that the 
English intended to transfer their trade from Gomboroon to Muscat and expected 
a fleet of twenty-two vessels from England to avenge the affronts received from 
the Persians. It is also declared that they proposed to build a fort on the eastern 
angle of Muscat bay"34. But, unfortunately, before the agreement was sealed by 
the Imam, Colonel Rainsford died in Muscat, and his papers were taken by Marke 
Bossley, a young man who accompanied him. So "the king writt unto the 
President, and the Shawbunder [Shahbander] of the place, inviting to another 
treaty, which this monsoon (god willing) we shall endeavour the prosecuting it, if 
not hindered by the Duthch warr or want of persons to send that will be wise and 
carefyll in management, as others to take possession"3s. It was clear that another 
treaty was not to be made, and the English held on to the first one with Colonel 
Rainsford. All that was needed was the sealing of the treaty by the Omani Imam. 
But the Company's president was optimistic; he wrote on 7 September 1659 to 
Roger Middleton, the commander of the Madras garrison, that "if you have any 
comenders or souldiers that can be SPared. or others that will be emplyed in the 
companies service to reside in Muscat, we shall give them entertainment; the King 
of the place having, at the end of last Monzoon, allready graunted us a castle , as 
by his letter apperars, and would have concluded for more privileidges, had not 
the death of ColInel Rainsford hindered the sealing of agreement; which this year, 
if possible we shall rmish ''36. Cr.R.Middleton accepted the Company president's 
proposals and prepared himself for the task, but inconvenient news came from 
Muscat. The president in his letter to the Company on 10 January 1660 reported 
that a delegate had visited Muscat to work on what had been agreed in the year 
before. "But in stead of a performance, the King of the place denyed his promis, 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
3S Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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though hid letter wee have will testifye his falshood. No perswasion that could be 
used by our side sevant could so much as procure another letter. Only the 
Shawbander of the port sent a slight one, that wee might trade as merchants and 
settle a factory, but no possession of fort." The president was disappointed; he 
said "in this affaire wee shall wait your further order, and only more advice that 
wee were soe confident of this benificial place, it being the King first seeking and 
not ours, that not only some money were expended in treaty with him [the Imam] 
but timber wee had bought to build two or three small vessles of 70 or 80 tonns, to 
carry 10 gunns each, that might keep the port and not only force the Persian 
[King] to pay his due part of customes but also take custome of all jounkes at the 
mouth of the Gulph [Gulf] (the port lying soe as the Portugall did"37. He thought 
that it was not a hard thing to command Muscat and asked for the despatch of 
means to make the Omani Imam keep his promises. 'Wee shall wayte your 
commands concerningit, and in the meane tyme, that wee may execute whay you 
order, keepe a faire correspondencie". So a means of force was proposed by the 
president of the Company to be carried on against the Imam Sultan; "we shall 
waite an opportunitye per force to compell him to the same, wee having his 
writing tcomrrme his promises"38. P. Rosso noted that Imam Saif was dissuaded 
by the Dutch from going ahead and keeping his agreement with the English. They 
succeeded in persuading him probably because they had leverage with him by 
virtue of their limited assistance against the Portuguese. Maybe Imam Saif came 
also under pressure from the Omani conservatives (Lu-mtaawa,h), the religious 
party of the interior. It may have been put to him that it would be unwise to hand 
over one of the Muscat forts, for which the Omani people had fought and died, to 
another European power, since only about nine years earlier the Portuguese had 
been expelled from there with great difficulty39. However, using force by the 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 P.Rosso. Oman and Muscat an early Modern History. (1986). p.13; R.D.Bathurst. YU,ruby 
Dynasty in Oman. (unpublished Oxford Ph. D .• 1967), pp. 162-163. 167. 170-175. 
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English against Muscat was mled out. The Company found that Muscat was 
"extremely hot and unhealthy; its occupation would require a garrison of soldiers~ 
which would be both expencive and difficult to maintain; and the local trade was 
of no great value"40. So the project of an English settlement in Muscat had 
vanished and the project received the Company's condemnation41• 
The second half of the 17th century witnessed the birth of Oman. A new 
political state in the modem history of the Persian Gulf region was establish~ the 
first of its kind in the Indian Ocean~ and the first and only Arabic independent 
state in the whole Arab world. It was a sea power and as such was to join other 
sea powers in the region. England's position during this period will be examined 
in the next section. 
Section Eight 
The European challenges 
The French made their first anchoring at Muscat harbour in 1647 before the end of 
the Portuguese era. A French ship was seen in Muscat on her way to Basra 
loading coffee42• Sixty-four years after the establishment of the English East India 
Company, the French founded their own company. In 1664 Colber4 the 
Controller-General of the French Treasury, formally established the French East 
India Company. During this period England became engaged in a naval war in 
Europe with Holland. Trade was disrupted and the activities of the factorieg, 
radically reduced. While the English and the Dutch were engaged in fighting, 
France was to take advantage. It did not take her too long to occupy the 
Coromandel coast from the English in 1672. By 1665 the French showed a 
commercial interest in the Gulf. In 1678 England and Holland signed the treaty of 
Breda to form an alliance between them against France, a treaty, however, which 
was not to exist for long. The Gulf, this ancient waterway, was to become the 
40 Foster. English Factories. 1655-1660. p. 331. 
41 Foster. English Factories. 1655-1660. pp. 333.336. 
42 Foster. English Factories. 1646-1650. (1914). p.171. 
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scene for an international commercial armed ships competition during the second 
half of the century. During the 18th century the struggle concentrated on the 
Indian sub-continent. as will be shown in the next chapter. 
The Dutch had taken advantage of their friendly relations with the Omanis. 
But the Omani Imam preferred to open negotiations with the English and not with 
the Dutch, when a threat was raised against him by the Persians, as shown above. 
The Dutch position in the Gulf region had arisen because their Company 
"received substantial support from the home government while the English were 
left to fend for themselves"43. The English civil wars in the 1640s, which 
disturbed the British Isles as a whole, landed the English factors in heavy debt 
owing to lack of funds. By contrast. the Dutch were sufficiently wealthy to be 
able to offer the English loans. Accordingly the Dutch were free to trade in the 
Indies under the terms of the Munster treaty with the English in 1648. This gave 
the Dutch freedom to concentrate on their relations with Asian powers. But this 
English-Dutch honeymoon soon came to an end when the English came to realize 
that the Dutch commercial appetite would only satisfied at their expense. This 
may be the reason for another war which broke out between Holland and 
Cromwell's England in 1652-3 in Europe. But the war drums in Europe sounded 
heavily in the Gulf. An Anglo-Dutch naval engagement took place in which the 
Dutch decisively defeated the English, and gave warning to all others concerned 
not to deal with English ships44. By this action the Dutch gained total control of 
the Gulf during the greater part of 1653. But in Europe the situation was different. 
The English fleet ruined the Dutch trade and brought it to collapse. This forced 
them to sign a treaty at Westminster on 5 April 1654. But it does not seem that 
things were fmally settled. English trade itself was not to recover before 1667 
when they were left free to pursue trading prosperity after the peace treaty of 
Breda. That treaty was concluded in order to meet the French threat. But that was 
43 Donald Hawley. The Trucia! States (1970). pp.76. 77 
44 Ibid. 
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too late. France became one of the major maritime powers in the Gulf by the end 
of the 17th century alongside others4S• 
The Dutch in the Gulf became weaker by the end of the 17th and during 
the 18th century. Their influence ended in 1766 when their last factories and a 
settlement on Kharj Island were captured by Arabs46. 
However, by the end of the 17th century, Muscat had turned into a trading 
centre in the Arabian Sea as well as a local place for provisions. Muscat in fact 
symbolises the change in Omani maritime activity which affected the character of 
the Omani people of the interior. Despite the fact that the old Omanis of Magan 
or Mazon seem to have had ancient seafaring experience along with other Gulf 
and Indian Ocean people for over 2000 years, Europeans only now started to 
regard them as seafarers rather than a sedentary mountain community of Arab 
tribes. From now onwards, Muscat would extend its attraction for the Omanis, 
socially, commercially, and politically. This city would play in the next century 
and after the most decisive role in modem Omani history. The Sultans of Oman 
became obliged to take the title of Sultan of Muscat and Oman. 
There is still very little available regarding the relations between Omanis 
and the English during this period except that piracy started to grow in the Persian 
Gulf and the Indian Ocean and the Omanis were involved in it However, in an 
attempt to occupy Kung Island and Bander Abbas, the English opposed Saif rs 
action in a joint stand with the Persians and the Dutch. In fact the Omanis as well 
as the people of the Gulf even during the Portuguese rule, never did experience 
piracy. The Europeans were on several occasions engaged in war against each 
other in Europe first, and then overseas. In addition to that, the people of the Gulf 
did not know previously a system of commercial monopoly. Thus piracy was 
started in the Gulf because of the struggle for monopolies and competition 
between the Europeans, each of which encouraged other citizens of the Gulf to 
4S Hawley, Trucial States, pp.76-77. 
46 Phillips, Oman, A History, p. 91; for the Dutch supremacy in the Gulf, see A. J. Cottell 
(ed.). The Persian Gulf States (1981) pp31-33. 
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hold passes issued with their authority in order to monopolise trade between pons 
and to offer security to the vessels of their own passholders47• Those who were 
carrying passes from another country could be subject to attack and confiscation. 
Whether it was liked or not, piracy became an aspect of exercising power and 
monopoly and a matter of gaining more political influence in the Gulf. It seems 
that Imam Saif 1 was part and parcel of this development. 
The Imam Sultan Bin Saif died in 1679/80 and was succeeded by his son 
Bal Arab (1679/80-1692/93)48. In 1681 more Englishmen visited Muscat and 
made valuable notes about it, while in 1684 some shipwrecked English were 
rescued by the residents of Masseera Island49• Mter Bal Arab's death he was 
succeeded by his brother Saif 1 (1692\93 1711\12.) Saif 1 died in 1711\12 and 
was succeeded by his son Sultan II (1711-1718). He inherited a very strong navy, 
and was aggressive. He captured Bahrain Island in 1717 and carried out a policy 
of piracy at sea. Sultan II died in 1718 and was succeeded by his son Saif II 
whose period was one of the most confused in Oman's history. This Imam ruled 
three times! First, he ruled two years from 1720 (when he was still twelve years 
old) to 1722. Secondly, he ruled from 1722 to 1724-25, and, thirdly, from 1727 to 
1744. In between and during all these periods Oman was in total confusion and 
was sinking into a most terrible dispuite among the influential tribes. No one 
could state who exactly was governing the country. During his third reign, lasting 
about sixteen years, he invited the Persians in 1737 to assist him against his 
opponents in a very long civil war which lasted more than ten years between the 
main two Omani factions (the Hinawis and the Ghafris). An opportunity to 
occupy Muscat was warmly welcomed by the Persian King Nader-Shah, since it 
enabled the Persians to achieve their old dream of capturing the city so. 
47 Hawley, Trucial States, p.77. 
48 Clements. Oman. p. 39; Townsend. Oman:Making of a Modern state. (1977), p. 37; 
Phillips, Oman: A History, p. 223. The dates are uncertain. 
49 Fryers, New Account, pp. 155-157. 
50 W. Phillips, Oman; A History, pp.52-56; Clements, Oman, pp.40-41; Townsend, Oman, 
pp.36-37. 
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The El ya,aribeh dynasty lasted for a period of less than one century from 
the date of the Portuguese expulsion, and less then the period of the Portuguese 
existence in MuscaL In 1744 Elbu Sa,eed took over the dynasty in Oman and, 
with the coming of this tribe, the Omanis perhaps stopped fighting each other on 
land, but contests were not over yet at sea. It seems that the civil war had some 
kind of extension which remained active in the form of piratical action amongst 
these Omani rival factions in the Gulf~ which was to translate itself into the 
struggle between the Elqwasem (Ghafris) and Elbu Sa,eed (Hinawis) and to 
involve others, either local or foreigners. The British were to have a great interest 
in this struggle and it was to shape all British policy in the region during the rest 
of the 18th and early 19th centuries, as the next chapter will try to highlight. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE BACKGROUND TO THE MODERN HISTORY OF THE RELATIONS 
BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND OMAN 1744-1856 
Introduction 
As was shown in the general introduction the English interest in exploring the 
Omani coast began as early as the twenties of the sixteenth century. Their 
activities brought them into conflict with the Portuguese of Muscat. Although 
they entered into alliance with the Persians they generally were reluctant to assist 
them in their ambitions to take Muscat from the Portuguese. On the other hand 
the English tried to establish relations with the Omanis directly even during the 
Portuguese period. However there emerged a new power in Oman which caused a 
great upheaval in the history of the region during the second part of the 
seventeenth and the fIrst part of the eighteenth century. That was the power of the 
El-Ya,aaribeh dynasty. The English were interested in establishing relations with 
them but for the reasons discussed above they were not in a position to gain a 
foothold in Oman. After the advent of the El-Ya,aaribeh, and from the second 
half of the eighteenth century, the English seem to have learnt a lot from the 
dynasty, and prepared themselves for a new formulation of their policy in Oman, 
whose purpose was to exclude any other power from influence. During the 
second half of the nineteenth century the British built up an unchallengable 
ascendancy, which reached its peak early in the twentieth century. However to 
highlight this period seems impossible without having understood the background 
to the direct British interference in Oman, either as a result of their own initiative 
or by invitation from their new allies, the El-bu,Saeeds, in the period after this 
family took over in Oman. This acquisition of influence took place in several 
stages and required hard work for the British in order to establish their power. By 
the 1860s, however, Great Britain not only interfered in Omani domestic matters 
but even appointed and acknowledged the Omani Sultans. 
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Section Two 
Britain and Albu Sa,eed 1744-1807 
Ahmed bin Saeed, a famous merchant Waly of Sohar, and one of Imam Sultan bin 
seifs trusted Officers, took over the throne from his brother-in-law Saif by 
cheating the Persians!. He acted as their ally to get their help in consolidating his 
position. He managed to get their acknowledgement as a new Imam of the 
country2. After he had established himself, however, he decided to get rid of 
them. In a planned tactic, he invited the Persian military chiefs to a feast. While 
they settled down to their food he ordered their massacre. Mter that bloody party 
he turned to fight their solders and expelled them from Oman. By this he 
succeeded in establishing his own independence, but at the same time 
consolidated the dynasty. The Omani civil war practically produced two states, 
one in Oman-Muscat under El-bu Sa,eed (the contemporary Sultanate of Oman) 
and another on the Omani coast under the influence of EI-Qawasem of Ra,sel-
Khaymeh on the Gulf: thus the whole administrative and political structure of the 
country was changed. The Omani rulers and Imam Ahmed himself used to hold 
the title of Imam. But it is not clear whether the adoption of that title was a 
reminder of their fellowship to their old master, Imam Ali. The Imamate seems a 
combination of religious and political leadership developed by the Thadi of Oman. 
Ibadism is one of the Khawarij wings, dating from the earliest days of Islam. It 
broke with the main body of Muslims over their insistence that the Khalyphah 
should not be determined in accordance with genealogical considerations but 
1. Townsend, Oman: the Making p.37; Phillips, Oman: a History, pp. 51-54, 62, 223, 305-7, 
651n. 
2. Mohammed ben Abdullah, AI Salmi, and Najy Assaf U,man Taareekhh 
yatakallam,(Oman Oral History), (Damascus 1963); D.E. Long, (ed.), The Government 
and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa (Colorado, 1980); R. Kwnar, 'British 
Attitudes Towards The Ibadyya Revivalist Movement In East Arabia', International 
Studies, 3 (1962) p. 443. A. Crichton, History of Arabia and its people (1852), p. 473; 
Sarhan ben Sa,eed Al azkawy Al Omany, Taareekhh Oman Almuktabas min ketab Kashf 
alghummah Aljame,le akhbaar el ummah (Muscat: Ministry of Heritage and Culture, 
Sultanate of Oman, 1986) p. 149. For the Imamate issue see Kwnar, 'British attitudes', p. 
443; N M.KayJani, 'Politics and religion in Uman', Inst. Mid. East.Stds., 10 (1979), p. 
569; Long, Government and politics, p. 157. 
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should be elected on the basis of merit. Ibadism distinguished itself accordingly 
by its attitude towards the AI-Khilaaphah (the succession) of the prophe4 
Mohammed Ibna-A,bdullaah lbna Abd-ul-Muttalib, (born in A.D 570-630)3. In 
comparison the Es-sunneh (Sunnis) recognize the legitimacy of the four 
successors of Mohammed, namely, the 1st Abu Bakr-es-seddyyk (reigned in A.D. 
630-633), the 2nd U,mar lbna-Abil-Khattab (reigned 633-643), the 3rd U,thman-
Ibna-A,ffan (reigned in A.D. 643-655), and the 4th A,Ii lbna-Aby Talib lbna-Abd-
ul-Muttalib (Muhammed's cousin and son-in-law, reigned in A.D.655-660); while 
ish-Shee,ah (Shee,as) reject all but A,li, as the only Khalyphah and the first Imam, 
and claim, according to their literature, that the succession was taken from him by 
fraud4• They also accused the second Khalyphah U,mar, of being the reason for 
the death of Faatimah, daughter of the Prophet Mohammed, by squeezing her 
between the door of her house and the wall when he forced his way with his 
guards into Ali's house to inforce him paying loyalty. This caused damage to her 
ribs and aborted her baby, and she was even beaten by Umar's servant by his 
order. Her death after was said to be because of thats. The Al-/badey"eh (Ibadis), 
however, accept Abu Bakr and U,mar only, and reject the two others as heretics, 
despite that Ali was their old master and so was partly accepted. In fact this 
statement is correct but matters were not quite as simple as that. Briefly, the rule 
of Mohammed's successors, it seems, was very short and none of them died 
3. Arab World Ministries, (n.d. Loughborough); this is a news letter founded as North 
Africa Mission in 1881. A.D.630=10 A.H. 
4. Al-Sheikh Yousuf Al-Bahrani, Al-kashkool, vol. 1 (n.d.),p. 23. Sheikh Yousufs 
(A.H.1l07-1186= A.D. 1687-1768) family came from Dmz but he was born in Mahooz 
village, in Bahrain, where he completed his education under supervision of the U stad th 
teacher Sheikh Sulaiman Al-Mahoozi. Sheikh Yousuf wrote number of books on 
theology, on Shareea,h and on literature during the 18th century. He was a great traveller 
in Persia and Arabia, and regarded as one of the main authorities on the Shee'ah. He was 
the son of Great Aayatullah, Ahmed bin Ibraheem bin Ahmed b.Saleh b. Ahmed bin 
Asfoor b. Ahmed b. Abdul-Hussain b. Ateyeh b. Sheibeh Al-Drnzi AI-Bahrani: a 
theological challenger, of the late 17th and early 18th centuries in Bahrain; he died in 
A.H.1131=A.D 1713. Sheikh Yousuf died in Karbala'a in Iraq, near the Husani shrine 
and his grave is known there. His book Al Kashkool is in three volumes. 
5. Muhammed Jawaad Abdul-Aziz Al-Shahabi, (e.d.), majmoo' Alriwaayaat Al-fakherah [A 
Number of precious stories] Vol. 5 (n.d.Bahrain); For the same (e.d.) for Faatima's 
doughter (Zaynab)'s Mourning see Al-nawahaat Al-fajeea,h lima'tam-Al-sheea,h [The sad 
mournings-Poems of Sheea,h MaatamJ (n.d.Bahrain). 
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naturally except Abu-Baler, who reigned only two years and three months. U,mar 
was assassinated. He was stabbed by a man called Abu-Lu,Iu,ah, and there is a 
contravercy about his assasination and the powers behind that. U,tJunan was 
killed in a revolt against him arising out of accusations of corruption and fraud, 
and ruled twelve years6• Ali, who ruled four years and about eight months, was 
blamed for U,tJunan's killing because the rebels decided to select Ali to replace 
him, a matter which led AIsay"yedeh (Lady) Aisha, widow of Mohammed, to lead 
an army against A,li in the battle of AI-Jamal. She is definitely not respected by 
the She,ees and in any reference to her they condemned her with the words 
La,natuullahi-A,Iayha (God damn her) while the Sunnis and the !badis would say 
"Radya-llahu- A,nha" (God is satisfied with her), regarding her as AI-Say"Yedeh 
Umm-eI-Muslimeen, the Lady mother of Muslims, though she did not have any 
children by Mohhamed. The EI-Khawarij were loyal to Ali at the beginning but 
they disagreed with him on certain issues, especially the truce arbitration between 
him and the Governor of Damascus, Mua,awiyeh. The ensuing conflicts 
culminated in Ali's assassination by them, carried out by a man called Abdul-
Rahman ibna-Muljam. However the !badi claim that succession to the Prophet 
was dependent upon the will and election of the faithful seems incorrect. The 
succession to the Prophet was based on selection and not election, nor can it be 
hereditary. But this also proved incorrect when Ya,ruby Imams passed their 
power to their family. However after the 4th Kahlypha, Imam Ali-Ibna-Abi-
Talib, (of Hashimy family, or Bani-Haashem), according to the Sheea,h literature 
of the 18th century, there was a fifth Khalyphah who was AI-Hasan ibna- Ali, the 
eldest son of Imam Ali, who died mysteriously after six months of his reign. The 
Shee,ah claim that he was poisoned7. Mua,aawiyeh Ibna-Aby-Sufyan,(died in 
A.D. 677) Wali of Damascus had refused loyalty to Ali when the latter was 
Khalyphah; this resulted in a number of engagements until a truce was signed 
6. Sheikh Yousuf, Alkashkool. pp.276-277. 
7. Hasan's Brother, AI-Hussain, was killed by Yazyd's (Mua.aawiyeh's son) troops in the 
battle of Karbalaa' in Iraq. Hasan and Hussain both are sons of Ali and Fatima. 
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between the two rivals in about A.H.635/36, by which Mua,aawiyeh was left to 
govern Damascus. Mua,aawiyeh took over the whole Khelaphaht formally in 
A.D.660 and embarked on a series of engagements against the Khawarij. He 
established a vast hereditary Empire which stretched from Central Asia right 
through North Africa and Spain during the 60s and the 70s of the 7th century, 
under the EI-Amaweyeen family. He constituted the political position of 
Damascus as capital of his Euro-Afro-Asian empire rather then Macca and 
Madeena, therefore causing loss of power and political influence to those two holy 
Islamic cities, the place of origin of Islam. But despite the change of the political 
situation, the EI-Amaweyeen (7th-8th centuries) as well as the Abbasyeen (8th-
13th centuries) after them did not change the title of Khalyphah, (successor). The 
Sunnees acknowledged Mua,aawiyeh as Khaliphah, despite his changing of the 
Islamic system of succession. 
In Oman the Ya,aarebeh themselves behaved in practice as hereditary 
monarchs despite their religious title. That was because a crucial change in 
Omani social structure happened as a result of Omani imperial expansion in East 
Africa and on both sides of the Gulf under the Ya,aarebeh. This was the rise in 
the political influence of the wealthy coastal merchants who were preoccupied 
with the pursuit of profitable trade. This development in turn led to a gradual 
relaxation of the hitherto rigidly conservative !badi doctrine. The character of the 
Imamate was inexorably changed by the progressive commercialization of the 
coastal regions and became less fundamentalist, more secular and moderate. So 
practically the destruction of the Imamate started during the Ya,aarebeh dynasty, 
and probably before. 
However it was unusual in Arabia for the El-bu-Sa,eed to associate 
their security and policy with a foreign power such as Great Britain. It is not clear 
how relations between the British and the El-bu-Sa,eedys started, but the former 
may naturally have welcomed the new regime since they had become unhappy 
about the sea trade in the Gulf. Ahmed bin Sa,eed, a moderate, was the proper 
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person with whom a deal could be made. He entered into an alliance with the 
British when they were engaged in conflict with pirates in the Gulf. He was 
probably suffering from the hostile acti~ties of his opponents El- Qawaem in the 
Gulf, and the British were able to bring the support he was looking for. There is 
little evidence available regarding details about the relations between Ahmed and 
the British, but it seems that the establishment of British relations with Albu 
Sa,eed was linked to the establishment of British influence on the Indian sub-
continent. The English East India Company's attempt to assume sovereign power 
locally during the late 17th century was frustrated because of the French. For 
their part the French were trying to assume sovereign power for themselves, and 
they were maintaining soldiers and waging wars. In fact, as early as 1627, 
Charles I gave instructions to the Duke of Buckingham that ''The Catholic King of 
France must.. be prevented from extending his dominions over the oceans"s. It 
was felt by him that his enemies the French consistently tried to deprive England 
of her sovereignty over places to which England had given her name "and which 
our ancestors have enjoyed from time immemorial". ''From 1689 to 1815 Britain 
and France were directly at war for fIfty years, not counting periods of masked 
conflict when war was fought through third parties, or of direct hostilities without 
a preliminary declaration of war which will give total of over sixty years"9. On 
the Indian subcontinent it was almost inevitable that both parties should fight until 
one of them destroyed the other. During the 1740s the French proposed neutrality 
with the British in India, so that the situation should not be affected by the wars in 
Europe. The British refused the French proposals. In reaction to this the French 
captured Madras from the English in 1746. In 1747 a French fleet sailed for India, 
but it was destroyed by the English in the Bay of Biscay. In 1748 the treaty of 
Aix-la-Chapelle was signed between England and France. Louisburg in Cape 
Breton was to be returned to France and Madras to be received by the British. 
8. Johnson, Britain and France. p.l40. 
9. Ibid. 
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Even so unofficial war between the two parties was to continue despite this treaty. 
1750 was a turning point in the British history in India. The Indian Prince 
Chandra Sahib attacked Areot. He was in alliance with the French, but both were 
defeated by the British. This victory of the British established their power 
strongly in India, while the recapture of Calcutta in 1757 from the French and the 
Nawab of Bangal was a decisive victory. It laid the foundation of British 
sovereignty in India. Mter 1760 there was no European power to challenge the 
British in India. In 1773 George ill signed an Act of Parliament to organize the 
administration in those parts of India under the British Company. The 
organization involved the appointment of a Governor-General, a Council and a 
Supreme CourtlO• Company rule in Bengal and elsewhere made desirable friendly 
rulers in countries neighbouring India, for example in Oman and Persia. The new 
organization strengthened previous arrangements by the British with both 
countries. At the same time it was to play a political and economic role in 
organizing and serving British interests in the Gulf region, as when in 1778 
Bushire in Persia became the principal centre and home of the British Resident, 
who directed all British consuls in the Gulf. This was significant in influencing 
the political situation throughout the coming century and a half. 
Ahmed gave up power in 1775, seemingly in response to action by his 
son Saeed 1, three years before his death in Rustak. Muscat during Sa,eed l's rule 
became the principal port between the Persian Gulf and India, and the richest and 
most flourishing in the whole Persian Gulf region. It became also a regular port 
of call for British ships. The British stationed warships there several times in 
order to keep watch on piracy. During 1775, the British frigate Seahorse made 
Muscat her base for two months when a famous personality was on board, the 
future hero of the Nile and Trafalgar, Horatio Nelson, who was at that time a 
10. For this account see Mukherjee, Rise and Fall, pp. 93-101; Frayers, New Account pp. 26-
30; Williamson, Note Book, p.57; Trevelyan, English Social History, p. 216. 
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midshipman 11. Ham~ Sa.eed's 1 son, took over the throne in 1784 before his 
father's death from smallpox in 1792. He made a significant turning point in the 
history of Oman when he shifted the capital from Rustak to Muscat in the same 
year and expelled his uncle Sultan from there. This transfer denoted a significant 
change in the intellectual orientation of the Imam. It marked the first step towards 
the conversion of Oman from an isolated Arab State to a maritime political entity 
in intimate contact with liberalizing influences from the external world. This 
marked the beginning of further conflict which was to spread all over the country 
between what was to be known as Muscat, and Oman. Therfore it was not simply 
a shifting of the capital from Rustak, but indeed, a creation of the Muscat state, 
because Sa,eed remained as Imam in Rustak until his death 12. However this 
produced two wings in Omani social life, one of commerce and the other of 
agriculture; this extended to the ruling family as well as other social and tribal 
leaders. In fact Muscat, this Portuguese-equipped and -established city, which 
survived under them for about one century and a half with their churches, bars and 
perhaps personal freedom and purely commercial activities, assisted in 
undermining the traditional life of Oman. It created a different kind of struggle, 
which was to affect life in all the country. Even today the Sultans of Oman are 
proud to take the title of the Sultan of Muscat, proud that Muscat is the capital of 
all Oman and proud of the three great Portuguese forts the Jalaly, the Meerany and 
the Mutrah. This city gave them prestige in the eyes of foreigners and was an 
indication of power in the eyes of their local subjects. It is, therefore, strange to 
find Reute R Sa,eed, in 1929, stating that the Portuguese left no lasting effect 
upon the country. 
That division, however, was to cause further internal problems till the 
middle of the twentieth century. At this stage, however, it did not cause much 
11. R. Coupland. East Africa and its invaders, (1938), p.84; R. Reute Said. 'The Albusaid 
Dynasty in Arabia and East Africa'.J. Cent. As. Soc. 16 (1929). 
12. For more details about Hamad reign until Sa,eed bin Sultan see, Calven H. Allen, Jr. The 
State of Masqat in the Gulf and East Africa, 1785-1829' Int. J. Middle East Stu., 14 
(1982),117-127. 
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concern to British policy makers. The main question for the British by this time 
was the competition with France and the challenge of the power of EI-Qawqasem 
of Ra,s-el- Khaimeh. 
During Hamad's reign Oman soon became diplomatically involved in 
conflicts between France and Britain over Muscat. Muscat became an important 
place for the French who regarded it as the only considerable outlet on the 
Arabian coast. It would facilitate French commercial business in the Persian Gulf 
and the Coast of Arabia and it held the gate to the Persian Gulf13. Hamad was not 
interested in being involved in any conflict which might arise between the 
Europeans in the Indian Ocean. Sometimes, however, he was forced to join with 
the British as when the French attacked a British merchant ship sheltering in 
Muscat harbour in 1779, and wheIll they attacked an Omani frigate Saleh in 178l. 
Hamad ordered an attack on the French ship La Philippine and seized it, but he 
also showed the French his neutrality and his desire to maintain the old 
established friendship. He sent back La P hillippine to them. In return, Hamad 
received a French- built ship, renamed Saleh in 1790, as a way of retaining the 
confidence of the Omanis. He was very impressed by this French action. 
France's interest in Muscat became more clear when an envoy, De 
Rosily, in 1785 visited Muscat seeking permission to establish a factory and a 
French agent. When Hamad died in 1792 his uncle Sultan bin Ahmed, whom he 
had expelled from Muscat, took over (Imam Sultan was the son of the Imam 
Ahmed bin Saeed). In fact the Imam Sultan was a tough man and he had 
experience of ruling since 1784, though not in Oman! He had emigrated across the 
Gulf to Baluchistan during the shifting of the capital to Muscat. In Baluchistan he 
ruled the port and district of Guader which he made a base for attacking his 
enemies in his homeland Oman. He remained eight years there until 1792 when 
he saw his chance to return to Muscat to take over the throne after Hamad's death. 
13. Phillips. Oman: a history, pp.67-68; Coupland. Exploitation pp. 82. 85; Kwnar. 'British 
Attitudes'. p. 444; Kaylani, 'Politics', p. 570, and Clements. Oman, pp. 42. 52. 
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During his reign, the Imam Sultan became a natural ally with Britain 
against his rival Elqauasem of Ra,s-eI-khaimeh14. Six years after taking over, he 
signed his first treaty in 1798 with the British East India Company which was 
represented by its agent Mehdy Ali Khan, the agent in Bushire. In 1800 a second 
treaty was signed by the Imam, this time with Sir John Malcolm, both to confirm 
the first agreement and to allow the first residence of a British gentleman in an 
official capacity at Muscat. This treaty marks the first British diplomatic presence 
in Oman and the first political intervention and entrenchment in Omani affairs. It 
was a triumph for British diplomacy. It was agreed for the first time that enemies 
of both Oman and Britain should not be allowed to use any facilities available in 
both countries against anyone of them. Accordingly, Oman should not give 
France and Holland permission to establish factories or even any kind of foothold. 
Consequently, the French gentleman who had been serving the Imam for several 
years as a sea commander, had to be dismissed and expelled from the country. A 
French ship could not be allowed to enter the cove into which the English ships 
were admitted. The Imam should support the English in any case of hostile 
engagement with the French, but not on the high seas. In the Port of Abassy (also 
Gombroom or Bander Abbas)lS "whenever the English shall be disposed to 
establish a Factory the Imam should have no objection to their fortifying the same 
and mounting guns thereon, as many as they list, and to forty or fifty English 
gentlemen residing there, with seven or eight hundred English Sepoys , and for the 
rest, the rate of duties on goods on buying and selling will be on the same footing 
as at Bssora (Basrah) and Abushehr (Bushire)"16. 
14. Holden Furber, John Company at Work (1948), pp. 69-70, 168; L. Graz, The Omanis: 
Sentinels of the Gulf (1982),pp. 2, 10. Coupland, Exploitation, p. 86; Clements, Oman, p. 
42; Phillips, Oman: a History. pp. 51,69. 
15. Aitchison, Charles Umpherston, A Collection of Treaties. Engagements and Sanads 
Relating to India and neighbouring Countries Vol XI, (treaties relating to Aden and South 
western coast of Arabia, the Arab principalities, Muscat (Oman), Baluchstan and Nonh-
West Frontier Province (1933), p. 269; Phillips, Oman: A History, p. 70. 
16. S. B. Miles, lhe Countries and Tribes of the Persian GulfvoL 1 (1919-1920), p.287. For 
Bander Abbas history and its involvement with Omanis see Hasan-E Fasa,i,. Farsnama-
ye NaseriJ.n Herbert Busse (ed), History of Persia under Qajar rule (New York, 1972), 
pp. 309-315, and for the agreement between the Shah and Sa,eed ben Sultan see the same 
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This treaty was very important. Firstly, it was followed by the defeat of 
the Typu Sultan of Mysore who was killed in his palace in 1799 in an engagement 
against a British force led by Colonel Arthur Wellesley 17. Sultan of Mysore was 
the Omani Imam's friend and was regarded as a French ally, whom Bonaparte 
wanted to contact. Secondly, it initiated a series of treaties which were to 
establish a strong British hold on Omani foreign relations, imposed tighter 
commitments on the Omanis and enlisted their support against Britain's 
competitors throughout the rest of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. Thirdly, it 
represented a British presence in Oman's dominions, not only commercially but 
also in the form of power. Sepoys and guns would now give the British a strong 
hand to impose their policy not only in Oman but in all the Gulf region. Fourthly, 
this treaty indicated how important by 1800 Muscat had become in the eyes of the 
British Indian Government. Muscat by this period became almost exclusively a 
transit port between India and the Gulf. Therefore a strong position here in the 
hands of a hostile power would be a direct threat to the British route to India. 
Fifthly, since the Persian Gulf was the gateway to Mesopotamia and Persia by sea, 
the importance of Oman as the gateway to the Gulf itself became more apparent 
British interest in the Gulf, Persia, and Mesopotamia grew rapidly during this 
period. Sixthly, this treaty, which established an armed British settlement for the 
first time in the Gulf set the stage for British imperialism in the Gulf as a whole. 
It was the first stage in a period of control which was to last for more than a 
century and a half. Oman was the vehicle by which British interest in the Gulf 
was to be administeredl8• 
work pp.316 ,344-366.(note that Sa.eed ben Sultan could be named as Sa,id-Khan, Imam 
of Muscat); Aitchison, Collection XI, pp. 87-88. 
17. See A. W. Lawrence, Captive o[Typu, (1929), pp. 8-10,205. The writer of this thesis 
visited Typu's palace in Mysore in 1983 and saw the place he was killed. 
18. Phillips, Oman: a History p.91; B.C. Busch,Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914 
(1967), p.12; R. Kumar, India and the Persian Gulf Region, 1858-1907, (1965), pp. 443, 
445; Robert Geran Landen, Oman Since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional 
Arab Society (Princeton 1967),p. 165. For more details about 1798 and 1800 treaties 
between Sultan and Britain see Miles, Countries pp. 92-93; Phillip Woodruff, The Men 
who ruled India, Vol 1 (1953), p.20?; Ann Williams,Britain and France in the Middle 
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However, despite this treaty between Imam Sultan and the British, the 
French did not give up trying to be as close to him as possible and trying to 
prevent the British from gaining all the profit. They offered him, for example, 
some assistance in his expedition against Bahrain. This period witnessed bitter 
competition between France and Britain, since most of the other European powers 
had become weak in the the Indian Ocean. This competition reached its peak 
when Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt. Bonaparte sent a letter to the Imam of 
Muscat dated 25 January 1799, informing him about his army's arrival in Egypt 
and offering the Imam Sultan protection for his ships and commerce." write you 
this letter to infonn you of the arrival of the French army in Egypt, and as the 
Imam,s relations were always friendly with the French", Bonaparte assured Imam 
Sultan, "you could be convinced of our desire to protect all the merchant vessels 
you may send to Suez. I also beg you will forward the inclosed letter to Tipoo 
Sahib [in Mysore] at the first opportunity". But the letter did not reach the Imam. 
It was intercepted and seized by a British agent in Mocha19• By this action the 
British cut any further possiblity of communication between France and the 
Omanis and also seized the occasion to safeguard their position in the Indian 
Ocean and the Persian Gulf, at least for a while. But the British did not sit quiet. 
In the same year as Napoleon's letter to Imam Sultan and after its interception, the 
British acted quickly. Their Resident at Bushire wrote a letter to Saif bin Hamad, 
the acting regent of Oman during the absence of Sultan, asking him to preserve 
the friendship between Oman and Britain, and to esteem the English goverment as 
a soul by which Muscat could breathe and to get rid of the French. Certainly Saif 
did not fully understand what the British letter was all about. The British were 
very concerned about the French ambitions in the Indian Ocean, which the letter 
East and North Africa ( 1968), p. 69; G. S. Misra. British Foreign Policy and Indian. 
Affairs, 1783-1815 (1963), p.69. 
19. Phillips, Oman :A History, pp.71,I09; Sir Reader Bullard, Large And Loving Privileges 
(1960), p. 32; Miles, COWltries, p. 290; Graz, Omanis, pp.10-12. ; J.B.Kelly, The Legal 
And Historical Basis of the British Position in the Persian Gulf, Middle Eastern Affairs, 
Nol St. Anthony's Paper, N04 (1958), p. 127; Kumar,India,p. 144; Kaylany, 'Politics'. 
Coupland, Exploitation, p.71. 
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did not explain. They took the occupation of Egypt as a serious matter and a 
warning bell with the objective of ousting the British from India, from Cairo by 
way of Suez as Talleyrand put it. Egypt, he said, was only the first stage of an 
advance to India. The French did· not keep their desire a secret, and Muscat, if it 
had come under their influence, would have done a wonderful job. In fact, the 
Egyptian campaign of Bonaparte focused London's attention on the Gulf as a vital 
link between India and Europe20. Unless the Gulf were to fall into French hands, 
the principal regional power had to be tighdy controlled. One of the means 
whereby the British sought to strengthen their influence in the region was an 
alliance with Imam Sultan Bin Ahmed. 
Throughout much of the late 18th and early 19th centuries Muscat was 
at the top of the agenda for both Britain and France in the region, especially after 
the decline of the Persian Safaweed Empire21• British policy at that time was to 
contain France's ambition, and keep French ships and solders away from India22• 
The treaties of 1798 and 1800 with the Imam provided that an English Resident 
should stay at Muscat through whom all intercourse between the two states should 
be conducted and that the friendship of the two countries Oman and Britain should 
remain for ever. However Sultan had reasons of his own for seeking alliance with 
a foreign power, and with the British in particular. Muscat, since ancient times 
had had direct links with the west coast of India, and commercial relations 
between both coasts was a matter of an everyday life. To disturb those links 
meant to disturb Oman's commercial life. In fact it was a daily exchange between 
all of south-eastern Arabia and India, providing Arabia with many of its 
necessities. This same historical commercial power of India provided the British 
with an instrument of ascendancy in Oman. The English spoke about Muscat 
dependence on the Indian trade as early as 1647 when on 8 September, John 
20. For the aim of Napoleon see Johnson, Britain and France, p.156. 
21. Phillips Oman : a History, p. 71; Kelly 'Legal And Historical', p. 127;Kumar, India, p. 
144; Kaylany. 'Politics' p. 571; Coupland, Exploitation pp.10, 71. 
22. Malcolm C. Peck, The United Arab Emirates: a Venture in Unity (Boulder, 
Colorado,1986); Aitchison, Collection XI, p.2; Kelly,'Legal and Historical', p 128. 
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Spiller reported to the English Company that "subsistance of Muscat depends 
wholly one the trade of this city [Ahmed Abad in India]"23. 
Thus Muscat played an important part in British policy in the Gulf 
during the nineteenth century. It possessed considerable commercial resources, 
situated on the trade routes to India from Arabia, Persia and Africa. But the 
Indian trade formed the greater part of these commercial activities, and the British 
used their position very effectively. Secondly, Oman was increasingly coming 
under attack by the W ahabbis of Arabia, who found support for their movement 
from those Omanis who were disloyal to the (El-bu-Sa,eedy) family, or even from 
some of Albu Sa,eed themselves who were dissatisfied with the rule of their own 
relative. The Wahhabis managed to form a kind of alliance with the EI-Qwasem 
of Ra,s-el-Khaimeh and the Omanis of the trucial coast. For this reason Sultan 
was in need of foreign support to assist him, not only against an external threat, 
but an internal one as well. Those who disliked the government and opposed the 
policy of Sultan would certainly welcome any outside threat even from his own 
family members. This pattern recurs at different stages in Oman's history when 
one party brings support from outside to assist its claim. It happened during the 
Islamic and the Ya,aaribeh periods and is still the case. In 1800 Oman was 
attacked by the Wahabbis of Arabia who occupied the Buraimi oasis. Sultan ran 
to the English asking for help and he got it. If the French had hurried to assist 
Sultan the situation might have been different. In a counter-attack by the British 
and Sultan's forces, they defeated the Wahabbis in the first direct engagement for 
the British in Arabia. But the price for that victory was high. In reply, the 
Wahabbis's allies reacted quickly. Sultan was attacked and killed while he was 
sailing in the Gulf on his return journey from Basrah to Muscat in 1804. He had 
lost his life and the British lost a great friend who had first signed with them a 
historic treaty. The British suffered other severe losses in the same year when 
nine British ships were attacked in the Gulf. The killing of Sultan inaugurated a 
23. Foster, English Factories. 1646-1650. (1914), P 153. 
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new period in Oman's international relations, a period which would decide all 
Oman's future in the 19th and much of the 20th century. This new era started with 
Sultan's son, Sa,eed. 
Sa,eed bin Sultan ruled Oman three years after his father's death in 
1804. His cousin's son Bader bin Hamad ruled Oman as a regent during those 
three years. Sa,eed took over the throne after he stabbed him to death with his 
dagger in a seemingly friendly conversation in 1807. The British sources noted 
that Sultan was succeeded by his two sons, Salim and Sa,eed, reigning jointly, but 
Sayid Salim died in 1821 and then Sa,eed continued to rule the country by 
himself. It is not known what exactly was the role of Salim. 
Section Three 
The Imam Sa,eed bin Sultan; first stage, 1807-1822 
From the beginning Sa,eed had to face several challenges at home, in the Gulf and 
the Indian Ocean. Like his father those challenges led him to think of a reliable 
ally already to hand, namely the British, with whom his father had signed a treaty 
and whose help would be most effective. For their part, the British began to suffer 
from hostile activities in the Gulf. It happened that the problems of Sa,eed came 
from the same source as those of his father. As a consequence of his friendship 
with Britain he brought on himself hostility not just from local powers but from 
the French. To satisfy a request by the British, Sa,eed ordered the French ship 
Vigilant out of Muscat. The British attacked and captured the ship after her 
departure from the harbour. The French saw those measures taken by Sa,eed 
against their ship as a collaboration between Sa,eed and the British Government of 
India against their interests and, therefore, an abandoning of Oman's neutrality. 
On top of this Sa,eed's father's previous rejection of a French Resident in Muscat 
still upset the French. For these reasons, therefore, the French took action against 
the Omanis on the high seas, and eight Muscat merchant ships were attacked near 
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Ceylon in retaliation24• The French reaction caused Sa,eed great alarm since it 
could cause serious damage to his commercial activities with bad consequences at 
home. It led him to take the following steps. Firstly, he tried to ease tension 
between himself and the French, regain their confidence and friendship, thus 
avoiding their hostility and any further 10sses2S. Secondly, he sought British 
protection against the French so he could face them in case of further 
confrontation. From the British side Sa,eed's move caused them great surprise 
since they never expected such a request from him. They knew how strong and 
challenging a navy he owned. So the Government in Bombay gave a limited 
response to Sa,eed's appeal It only offered him trade protection against French 
privateers, since the French were too weak to attack Muscat and the British would 
not gain advantages from the active co-operation of the State of Muscat. 
It however appeared that Sa,eed was threatened by a danger even more 
serious than that of France. The Wahhabis of Arabia presented a real challenge. 
He tried to use the treaties which were signed between his father and Britain 
1798-80, which declared that the enemies of one state to be the enemies of the 
other, in the sense of obligation on the part of the British government to aid him 
against his enemies in Arabia. But the British reply was that the treaty with his 
father was not intended to have reference to any situation other than that created 
by the war with France. The British reluctance to meet Sa,eed's full demand 
suggested that they did not take into consideration the threat he faced in Arabia. 
This led Sa,eed to try the alternative of linking his fortunes with France and 
repairing his damaged relations with them. He sent his delegate, Maajid bin 
Khalfan, to Port Louis on the Isle of France in the Indian Ocean on 16 June 1807 
with full authority to sign a treaty of amity and commerce with the French 
Governor. Undoubtedly this approach was a success for the French in Muscat and 
24. Townsend, Oman, pp. 40-41; Phillips, Oman:A History pp. 17,71,73. P. Tuson (ed.), 
British Policy In Asia: India Office Memoranda, B IS, F12; Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 
108-112,114-116. 
25. For details about Oman and French relations during the 18th-19th centuries see Norman 
R Bennet, East African History, vol 3 (ed) Daniel F. McCall ch 6, pp. 149, 164 (Boston). 
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a success for Sa,eed's diplomacy. But Sa,eed did not get all that he wanted. For a 
still unclear reason they hesitated to assist him against his Arab enemies, the 
Wahhabis. This pushed him again towards the British camp. In fact, he wanted 
the kind of help which only the British could give for his country and his own 
throne. However his approach to the French served his diplomacy. The British 
did not want him to go back to France or any other power which might threaten 
their position in India so they decided to take account of his anxiety and offer him 
the support he needed. In fact the situation in the Gulf was causing great 
inconvenience to the British, and Sa,eed and Muscat could provide much help to 
the British men-of-war. This fact linked the interests of Britain and Muscat and 
led them to take common action against a common enemy26. 
Meanwhile, during 1807-1813, the British gained a diplomatic success 
on the North-West frontier, namely in Persia and Afghanistan. They established a 
permanant embassy in Tehran. But in the Gulf they had suffered enough losses 
since 1804 when nine British ships were attacked. In 1805 a British trading boat 
was captured and all its crew put to death and in 1808 the British ship Minerva 
was captured. Accordingly, British trade increasingly came under threat. Britain 
was determined to crush this threat because of its dangerous impact on imperial 
communications and India's frontiers, so co-operation with Sa,eed was desperately 
needed. Sa,eed, for his part, lost patience and tried his luck in initiating his first 
attack against his rivals the EI-Qawasem in Ra,s-el-Khaimeh. But they put up a 
brave fight and defeated him. Captain Seton, the British Agent in Muscat, and 
Major-General Sir John Malcolm urged that the support of Sa,eed was in British 
interests. When Sa,eed launched his second attack against EI-Qawasem in 1809 
he supposed that he was carrying it out with the full co-operation of the British. 
But the British retreated and left him alone to be defeated for the second time. 
Certainly this was disastrous for Sa,eed and his situation became dangerous. He 
26. See Kelly, 'Legal and Historical', p. 127; Coupland. Exploitation, p.119. 132. 135.; Reute 
, Rudolf Sa.eed. Saeed bin Sultan, 1791-1856 (1929), p. 22. Reute was the son of 
Princess Salma. daughter of Sa.eed Bin Sultan. 
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was most disappointed and his confidence in British assistance was severely 
weakened. In another diplomatic move he decided to approach his grandfather's 
old enemi~ the ancient lords of Oman, the Persians, since they too suffered from 
the twin alliance of EI-Qawaasem and EI-Wahh.aabe"yeen. From the Persian side 
they probably found also that the time was convenient now to renew their old 
policy of imposing their influence in Oman, a dream of two centuries ago when 
they tried to take Muscat. They decided to help Sa,eed by sending a large force to 
Oman under the command of Sa,di KhanZ7. There was another offer of help to 
Sa,eed, this time from Muhammed Ali of Egypt, who sent a message to Sa,eed for 
an alliance against the Wahhabis. But Muhammed Ali did not take steps to help 
Sa,eed in coping with his severe losses. In addition the Persian assistance does 
not seem to have fulfilled his desire, although they may have fought beside him. 
It was argued that he discovered a plot had been made by the Persians to arrest 
him, so he got rid of them as soon as possible. 
Sa,eed had reached a situation which can be summarised as fol1ows:-
his disappointment with British assistance was acute; his alliance with the 
Egyptians was probably impracticable because of their geographical distance; his 
discovery that the Persians had their own policy in Muscat was worrying. At the 
same time he was under severe pressure from his rivals the Qawasemees. He felt 
both threatened and disappointed. 
Facing all these difficulties, he decided to play another card and try to 
conclude another alliance with the apparently more trustworthy France, now under 
the new regime of the restored Bourbon monarchy. He renewed trade relations 
and signed a convention on 30 March 1817. This agreement with France 
demonstrated how Sa,eed could play a successful diplomatic role. He gave a 
signal to the Government of India that he could bring their old competitors into 
their own arena, and that he could trust the French and depend on them. From the 
27. Low, CR. History o/the Indian Navy, 1613-1863, (1877), p. 320. Ch X and Ch XI are 
very important for Oman and Gulf History from 1767 to 1824. Gerald Graham, Great 
Britain in the Indian Ocean (1967),p 24; Landen, Oman, p. 167; Reute, Saeed, pp. 24-36. 
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British side, despite the end of the threat fonn Napoleon, they did not wish to see 
Sa,eed go funher. It seems reasonable to assume, given their subsequent action, 
that they concluded the following: Sa,eed should not be allowed to develop his 
relations with France. The news came that the Wahabbies of Arabia had suffered 
a severe defeat in front of the Egyptian anny of Mohammed Ali. Consequently 
Ra,s-el-Khaimeh would be weakened without the support of the Wahhabies. In 
the British view the Gulf was now to be cleared up, and they should not allow this 
opportunity to go to France. The time was ripe for a diplomatic move to regain 
the confidence of Sa,eed. For Sa,eed himself the time was right to take his 
revenge, probably for his father's murder, but definitely for his defeats and losses 
at the hands of the Qawasemees. For him, the Wahabis defeat in Arabia was a 
great relief. It allowed him to try again and challenge Ra,sel-Khaymeh and her 
brave sea warriors. He could go now and settle his dispute with them. The 
Government of India now decided to co-operate with Sa,eed and to carry out a 
new policy of asking the Egyptians to join in the effort against the common 
enemy. The Egyptians refused the British proposals for forming an alliance, since 
their cause was not in the Gulf but in Arabia, but Sa,eed himself welcomed the 
British proposals. For Sa,eed now it was time not to use his diplomacy with the 
Qawasem but his power. So he did not want to lose the chance to defeat his and 
his family's old enemies who had challenged the El-bu Sa,eed's since the 40s of 
the last century. If this question was not settled then it might end in Muscat itself 
with unpredictable consequences. In 1819 the British Government of India 
gathered its sea power and with full co-operation from Sa,eed attacked Ra,s-el-
Khaimeh. After a long and bitter fight with heavy losses in lives and property, 
they occupied it, and defeated the Qawasem in 1820. By this and by attacking 
Bander Lingeh on the Persian coast and Shinas on the El-batneh coast, Qawasem 
influence was completely destroyed in the Gulf. 
Sa,eed was delighted with the defeat of the Qawasem, but he left all 
other things to be dealt with by the British for their own benefit, despite the fact 
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that he might have been able to restore the unity of Oman since his rivals were 
now not united. Even Sheikh S"Sakar AI-kaasemy decided not to join the party 
which opposed Sa,~ an~ ind~ he turned against the Wahabbies of Arabia 
and was jailed by them. Sa,eed showed that he was a skilful diplomat who could 
co-operate and deal with both the British and the French, but he failed to do the 
same with his own country's people, and so failed to reunite his country, Oman. 
He did not combine his expensive efforts to defeat the EI- Qawasem with an 
historic aim of imposing his country's reunification on the chiefs of the Omani 
truce when it became possible, thereby establishing a Greater Oman under his 
leadership. Sadly he lost that favourable chance. 
Britain, after the defeat of the Qawasem, soon started to put this victory 
to useful effect, by imposing the first treaty on the chiefs of the Omani trucial 
Coast to stop hostile attacks against British ships and abolish so-called piracy in 
the Gulf. Hwmuz came under Sa,eed's control. Yet soon after the problem of 
Ra,s-el-Khaimeh was settled when the Bany Bu Ali, an Omani tribe of Sarqiyah of 
Oman East coast province, rose up against Sa,eed and his allies28. They murdered 
an English interpreter in Lashkharaah. Sa,eed himself led a joint British-Omani 
force to punish AI-Bu-Ali. On this occasion Sa,eed gave the British every 
assistance his country could afford. In 1820 fighting took place between the 
Anglo-Sa,eedy force and AI Bu Ali who was defeated. 
The confrontation of Ra,sel Khaimeh and the AI Bu Ali tribes marks a 
significant development in Oman's history as well as the Gulf region as a whole. 
As from 1820 Greater Oman politically went in two different ways, though these 
separate paths had started in fact after the civil war and the emergence of the EI-
bu-Sa,eed. From this point, the division of the country was firmly constituted, and 
under British influence one portion developed to what is known now as the 
Sultanate of Oman and the other the Oman Trucial coast, which eventually 
became the United Arab Emirates. The British joint operations with Sa,eed 
28. Aitchison, Collection. p. 288; Miles, Countries, p 325. 
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against Al-Bu-Ali were to drag them into more commitments in defending the El-
Bu-Sa,eedis and increased the British intervention in the domestic affairs of 
Oman. It increased British influence upon Sa.eed himself and contributed to the 
decline and the destruction of Sa,eed's Omani Empire. In the Gulf the British 
patrolled the region from 1822 and they regulated their position with the 
conclusion of a series of treaties and settlements. In the process they acquired 
extra-territorial rights in the Arab States under British protection. and also in 
Oman. Sa,eed, after the Ra,s-el- Khaimeh and Al-bu-Ali battles 1820-1822. 
gained a good deal in the short term but for Oman the consequences were 
disastrous. Sa,eed was firmly seated on his throne. at least while under the 
protection of the British Government of Bombay29, and passed on this dependence 
to his children and grandchildren. Through his steady loyalty to Britain he was 
able to build a commercial empire based on Zanzibar. The British realized that 
Sa,eed wanted their protection for his own throne and to enable him to carry on 
his own commercial business. Captain W. F. Owen. who visited Muscat during 
Sa,eed's reign, found Sa,eed himself the chief merchant in the city. He found also 
that he could borrow money largely from the Banyans to whom he fanned certain 
revenues. The government of India was fully informed about Sa,eed's commercial 
activities and desires. so they offered him all that he wished. But what did they 
want from him and what was the impact on Oman? It is to this question that we 
now turn. 
Section four 
Sa,eed bin Sultan; second stage, 1822-185630 
Between 1822 and 1856 British-Omani relations were to take a different shape. 
Oman from now on was to fall into the British sphere of influence and in 1822 the 
29. Reute, Saeed, pp. 37-39, 518; Graham, Indian Ocean. p. 234. 
30. In the year 1835 Sa,eed received an American delegate in Muscat headed by the 
Commander Edmund P. Kennedy. For the description of that visit see, W. S. W. 
Ruschenberger, Narrative of a Voyage Round the World, 1 (1838) pp. 91-151. 
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British Resident at Bushire took the title of Resident in the Gu1f31. His duty 
became political and he became in overall charge of British interests in the Gulf 
area, including Muscat. In the same year Britain started to impose restrictions on 
the slave trade in Oman and for this reason they concluded a treaty with Sa,eed for 
the suppression of slavery. In the beginning it was a limited restriction, that 
slaves should not be carried to or sold to Christian nations. Any Arab merchant 
ship carrying slaves would be regarded as being against this treaty and the ship 
accordingly would be seized by the British and taken into Muscat for punishment 
by Sa,eed. With this treaty Sa,eed allowed British influence on himself and his 
dominions to grow rapidly. It established a precedent which underlined the 
British intention to preserve their essentially political status in the Gulf. Several 
treaties had been signed between Britain and the local Sheikhs, which gave 
Britain the right to prevent maritime disorder, police the Gulf and mediate in 
disputes between the Gulf states. In the 20s and increasingly in the 30s Britain's 
influence began to grow rapidly in Sa,eed's dominions in Africa. 
On the North-West Frontier of India, in what was known as the first 
Mghan war, British troops were sent to Mghanistan in 1839 to counter a Russian 
threat. They occupied Cabul, and captured the Mghan Muhammed Dost32• But 
their defeat after two years by the Mghans initiated a series of challenges to 
British power in India especially towards the end of the century. This had a direct 
effect on Oman on acount of the anns trade issue by the time of the second 
Mghan war of 1879-1880. Meanwhile, however, in Oman, a treaty of commerce 
was signed between the British and Sa,eed, and then further articles were added33 
31. Reute, Saeed, pp. 40-143; Bin Ruzaik. Humaid bin Muhammed bin BakheeL Al Fathul 
Mubeen (Ministry Of Heritage, Oman, 1984) ,pp. 532-535; W. F. W Owen, Captain, 
Narrative of voyages to explore the shores of Africa, Arabia and Madagascar, voL 1 
(1833) p. 340-341; Kenneth Ingham, History Of East Africa (1962), p,8. 
32. Dost Muhammed, said to the Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough: "! can't understand 
why the rulers of so vast and flourishing an Empire should have gone across the Indus to 
deprive me of my poor and barren country". R. B. Mowat, A Short History of the British 
Empire (1933), p. 200. 
33. Coupland, Expioitation,p.119; Clements, Oman pp.43-44; Philip K.Hitti, The Near East 
in History: A 5000 years story (Princeton, New Jersey, 1961) p. 470; Townsend, Oman, 
p. 43; Landen, Oman,p. 172. Aitchison, Collection, pp. 289-290. 
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. They gave power to seize any ship carrying slaves, and to punish anyone trading 
in slaves as a pirate if he carried Somalis for sale. In 1845 Sa,eed signed another 
treaty, this time one which insisted that he should stop any export of slaves from 
his dominions, and any offender should be put under the severest penalties. 
It is a strange phenomenon that Great Britain concentrated on the 
suppression of the slave trade despite the fact, according to Eric Williams, that in 
England itself slavery provided one of the main streams of capital accumulation 
which financed the industrial revolution34• Why was this so? The reply is that 
Britain since the last quarter of the 18th century, had experienced a concentrated 
debate about slavery. The question of the slave trade was seriously raised in the 
house of commons in 1772. In 1788 a report was submitted for the abolition of 
the slave trade. In 1789 the voices became even stronger for the abolition of the 
trade. In 1807 an Act was passed for the abolition of the slave trade, and in 
August 1833 the most important one, namely the Act for the abolition of slavery 
throughout the British colonies. "Whereas divers persons are holden in slavery 
within divers of his Majesty's colonies, and it is just and expedient that all such 
persons should be manumitted and set free". So that was imposed on Sa,eed as 
well. 
Undoubtedly, the abolition of the slave trade was to have disastrous 
consequences on Sa,eed's economy and, needless to say, on his local political 
situation. The slave trade was the basis of the Omani economy and an integral 
part of the structure of Omani society. Sa,eed himself wished to please the British 
as an insurance for his continued rule but Sa,eed's subjects lost one of their basic 
exports so they started to show disloyalty to him and his friends the British. This 
34. Landen, Oman, p.169,168; A. Wyatt Tilby,Britain in the Tropics. 1527-1910, Vol IV 
(1912), p. 178; Denis Judd, The Victorian Empire. 1837-1901 (1970), p.95; E. Williams, 
Capitalism and Slavery, (1964), p. 52; M. B. Brown, Economics of Imperialism, (1978). 
For more details about slavery suppression and the debates in Great Britain, see, W 
Plumb, Great Britain. Foreign Policy and the Span of Empire 1689-1971, Vol. 3 (New 
York, 1972), pp. 1973-2035. 
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dissatisfaction was to produce another political problem and one which would 
profit the French. 
The French saw this discontent as a chance to inte1Vene with the 
Omanis and allow the export of slaves in their vessels and also offer protection for 
those who kept the business going. This was welcomed by the Arab merchants, 
tribal chiefs and the local leaders of Zanzibar who carried on the slave trade. The 
disloyalty of Saeed's subjects was to have some impact on the disturbances in 
Oman which developed after Sa.eed. and to lead to disputes even among the 
ruling family themselves. Muscalt then became the stage for dramatic events. 
Britain carried out slave suppression through gun-boat diplomacy supported by 
the ubiquitous Royal Navy in its most classical form3s• 
In 1840 Sa.eed shifted his capital from his homeland Oman to Zanzibar. 
In fact between 1832 and 1837 he spent most of his time in his African base rather 
than in Muscat. Whatever could be said about his move it did not help Oman at 
all. It was a grave mistake, forcing the Omanis to look at a tiny colony far on the 
African coast as their capital. Sa'eed by this step governed Oman from East 
Africa instead of governing East Africa from Oman. By this step he put Oman on 
the second level socially and politically, and his relations with his own homeland 
were weakened. His reign also witnessed a decline in economic activities in East 
Africa36• 
Just two years before his death, in 1854 he signed a deed of cession of 
the Kuria Muria islands off the south Omani coast at Dofar with Captain 
Fremantle, the commander of H.M.S. Juno. Accordingly Sa.eed granted the 
islands to Queen Victoria. "From the humble Saeed bin Sultan, to all and every 
one who may see this paper, whether Mahomedans or others... I hereby cede to 
35. Aitchison, Collection, pp. 292-301; Clements, Oman, pp. 43-44. 
36. Bennet, Ch 6, P 152; Judd, British empire, p. 95; Coupland, Exploitation p. 293-299; 
Townsend, Oman. p 43; Bin Ruzaik, Imams and sayids, p 643; Ahmed Humood Al 
Ma,ammery. Oman and East Africa, p. 167; Aitchison, Collection, pp. 301-302; L.C.S. 
Arnold Wilson, Taareekhh Al khaJeej (the History of the Gulf) translated by Mohammed 
Ameen abdullah (Ministry of Heritage, Oman, 1985), p. 171. 
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Queen Victoria the above mentioned islands. to her possessions or her heirs and 
successors after her. In proof whereof I have hereunto affixed my signature and 
seal. on behalf of myself and my son after me. of my own will and pleasure. 
without force. intimidation. or pecllIlliary interest whatsoever .... "37. 
In the Gulf the Persians captured Bander Abbas in the same year as this 
treaty. Sa.eed was unable to recapture it and his friends the British did not assist 
him. He also lost Hurmuz and Kishim Islands. The decline of the Omani Empire 
had, indeed. started before Sa.eed's death and he himself sowed some of the seeds 
of decline. Before we end our consideration of Saeed's period. which alone could 
fill a whole thesis. it is worth shedding some light on his local policy in its relation 
to his foreign one. because this too had a great effect on Oman's future. even 
down to the present. 
Sa.eed's policy created a growing community of foreign immigrants in 
the country. Indians. of course. had long been engaged in trade and high finance, 
gathering all commerce into their own hands and thrusting out native operators. 
But during Sa,eed's reign Omanis were pushed out of business and ignored by 
their own government. Sa,eed in the 30s and the 40s weakened his navy since it 
was required no more. He depended on British sea power. He drastically reduced 
what had been the largest fighting force in the Gulf. A British naval observer had 
recorded that if it should ever occur to Sa,eed to contend for naval supremacy in 
the Indian Ocean, the British would find him a very difficult foe with whom to 
deal. In the 40s he began to recruit Baluchi people instead of Omanis for his 
force. The Omanis no longer bore arms for the Muscat government. In the 
interior of the country (Oman) the Omanis found themselves abandoned by their 
state. a matter which produced some kind of co-operation or loyalty to the 
Wahhabis of N ajd and which produced a series of disturbances and risings against 
the El-bu-Sa,eed ruling family in Oman. These revolts could have toppled the 
regime if there had not been British support for Elbu Sa.eed during the second half 
37. Aitchison, Collection, p.272; Phillips, Oman, p. 130. 
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of the 19th and early 20th centuries38• That also led the country into great 
confusion which even extended to the ruling family. 
In 1856 Sa.eed died on his ship Victory near the Seychelles Islands. On 
his death, his Afro-Omani empire was divided. Zanzibar was separated from 
Muscat. Thuwaini, Sa.eed's oldest son was to rule as Sultan of Muscat and his 
brother Maajid was to rule as Sultan of Zanzibar, and the East coast of Africa. A 
new stage of Omani history and Anglo-Omani relations had been initiated39• 
Conclusion 
British policy towards Oman during the El-bu-Sa,eed period seems linked first 
with the establishment of British influence on the Indian subcontinent; secondly, 
with curbing the EI-Qawasem and the Wahhabis influence as a local challenger in 
the Gulf and Arabia; thirdly, with the weakening of Oman's position at the same 
time; fourthly, from the international standpoint, with Britain's dislike of any 
European power competing with her in Oman and the Gulf area. The keystone of 
British policy in the Gulf had, indeed, since at least the end of the eighteenth 
century been a concern with western Indian frontiers and generally to safeguard 
the British empire in India. From the eighteenth century until the early twentieth 
century the power which Britain most feared on the sea was France. But this was 
parallelled by the fear of a Russian threat in central Asia and Afghanistan, which 
during the 19th century led to two wars there. But in Oman the major challenge to 
Britain was from France. However, after the death of Imam Sa.eed bin Sultan, on 
10 March 1862, a Declaration was signed at Paris between Great Britain and 
France, respecting the independence of Muscat and Zanzibar: "Her Majesty the 
Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the 
Emperor of the French, taking into consideration the importance of maintaining 
the independence of His Highness the Sultan of Muscat and His Highness the 
38. R J Gavin, The Bartle Frere Mission to Zanzibar, 1873' Historical Journal, 5 (1962),pp. 
122-23; Miles, Countries, p. 354. Philips, Oman, pp. 108-109. 
39. Graz, Omanis p. 13; Townsend, Oman, p. 43; U,man wa Taareekhhuha al-bahree (Oman 
Navigation History) p 85; Clements, Oman, p. 44; Coupland. Exploitation, p. 30. 
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Sultan of Zanzibar, have thought it right to engage reciprocally to respect the 
independence of these Sovereigns "40. This treaty was to be the basis of Franco-
British relations in Oman throughout the rest of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. This treaty would be brought out at any subsequent time by either 
Britain or France for asserting a claim or resolving a problem. It was to rule 
Anglo-French relations in Oman. 
40. Aitchison. Collection. p. 304. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
BRITISH RECOGNITION OF SULTAN F AISAL BIN TURKY 
1888-1890 
Introduction 
The reign of Sultan Faisal bin Turky was an unusual one in Oman's history. It 
was overloaded with notable events, even for a country in which local disputes 
were endemic. No sooner was one fight between tribes settled than another was 
likely to break out. Sultan Faisal came from an environment where his relatives 
fought each other in pursuit of their own interests, with fathers killing sons, sons 
killing fathers, and brothers fighting with brothers in competition for influence 
and for the throne. This kind of 'Shakespearian drama' was nothing new for the 
Albu Sa,eeds Imams and their predecessors El-Ya.aarebah, but the Faisal period 
was significant not simply because of such heroic events. Not only can the events 
be much better understood because the differences between the interests of the 
parties now can be traced and clarified but, above all, because great power 
involvement in those events made Muscat affairs not merely of local concern but 
of international importance. 
Section Two 
Social and Economic Background 
Though largely a tribal country, Oman's imperial past from the l650s till the 
1850s had created a commercial bourgeois class within a framework of quasi-
feudalism. But it was also a society in which ownership of the grazing lands was 
held in common by the members of the tribe, though nominally owned by its 
Sheikhs. When some dispute arose the Sheikh could settle matters between 
members of his tribe, and by his permission other tribes which might come under 
his influence could also graze on his tribe's land. This access had existed for 
many centuries and the meat trade in the towns that developed from it was of 
great economic importance. A sheikh could impose taxes on his tribal members 
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in return for his protection and he could also punish any of them for wrongdoing. 
In the case of general ownership (AI-Awqaj) of fanns, arable or orchard, family-
inheritance-ownership (wakf-a-dhurryeh) and mosque-ownership (waqf-aI-
masjeti) could be found, and the water supply from the (aI-ajlaJ) canal system had 
been communal since the heyday of the Persian Empire. But in general most farm 
ownership rested unquestionably with the Sheikh, or a wealthy person, and those 
who worked on the farm were either slaves or free farmers with wages. At the 
same time, the farm owners were likely to be seen working alongside their farm 
workers and slaves. A person who carried on farm work could at the same time 
run a commercial business, run shops, own ships, appoint agents, have clients in 
the coastal towns and pay taxes to the Government of Muscat. While doing so he 
might also pay taxes on imports from Bombay and Africa. Those imports 
included loads of rice, spices, sugar, coffee, other foodstuffs, fabrics, catering 
items, fishing and farming materials, tools for local industries and other 
commodities for trading and local consumption l . Alternatively, he could buy all 
his requirements for the same purposes from his British-Indian agent in Muscat 
and the coastal towns. 
The traditional Omani tax, the 'zakat', was a payment on home produce. 
The 'zakat' almsgiving according to Islam is one of five essential practices which a 
good Muslim should follow: 1, Creed 2, Prayer 3, Fasting 4, Almsgiving 5, 
Pilgrimage. The 'zakat' "is the legal alms and sodeque is [an offering] made at 
specific times but also covering general almsgiving". Zakat is due provided a 
person is ... "1) A freeman. 2) A Muslim. 3) Of sound mind. 4) An adult. 5) In 
complete ownership of his or her wealth. 6) In possession of such wealth which is 
over and above the requirements to satisfy the essential needs of the possessor and 
those legitimately dependent upon him or her. 7) Free from debt. 8) In 
possession of a defined quantity of wealth for one complete Hijrah year"2. "It is 
1. F.054/35, report, British consulate, Muscat, 4 OcL 1904. 
2. Abdul Rehman Ansari, Zaka-h The Religion Tax of Islam, (Brief Guidelines), Islamic 
Propagation Centre, (Binningham n.d.) 
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reckoned as two and half per cent of one's net wealth. It is collected by people 
especially appointed for the task and should be used for poor relief, which may 
include enabling someone to make their pilgrimage"3. In the past, when the Ruler 
of Oman, as Imam, was representing both the secular state and the religion, the 
Zakat was probably paid more willingly than it was to the Sultans. The Imam, 
therefore, experienced less trouble in the collection of it, though it is not known 
on what the Imams were spending it4. If they distributed it to the poor and the 
homeless, in other words used it for social maintenance according to Islamic 
instructions, then they were following what Islam meant by the 'zakat'. If not, 
then they were exploiting the 'zakat' for their own political purposes, though the 
Imam could still claim that he was taking the 'zakat' in return for looking after the 
nation and defending their religion. But the 'zakat' under the Sultan's rule lost its 
religious and social connections, and no longer served religious purposes. It 
became a joke and lost its reputation since it was collected to help not the 
desperately poor but the Sultans of Muscat! The zakat "simply amounts to an 
exercise, which is for the most pan only paid in centres where the Sultan is 
represented by a Wall, [Governor] and where the Wall was strong enough to 
collect it"s. Sultan Turky, Faisal's father, had been allowed by the British 
Government to introduce the zakat in 1885, and it had since remained a 
recognized institution6• But in the case of the interior of the country, the Wall had 
much difficulty in imposing it. The tendency, therefore, was to endeavour to 
collect the 'zakat' at the ports, where caravans could be detained by the Sultan 
until the 'zakat' was paid, and Faisal continued this practice. But the 'zakat' varied 
from place to place, for example at Es-Seeb and Barkeh, the Sultan farmed it out 
to the highest bidder. At SSoor and Ja,/aan in Esh-Sharky-eh, Oman's Eastern 
3. Arab World Ministries. News letter, founded as North Africa Mission 1881 (n.d. 
Loughborough). 
4. F.0.54{33, no. 276, Cox to For.DepL, GOVL India, 22 June 1903. Major P. Z. Cox was 
the Political Agent at MuscaL 
5. Ibid. 
6. F.O.54{35, report, British consulate, Muscat, 4 OcL 1904. 
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provinces~ the Chiefs claimed part of the dates for themselves and in most cases 
they refused to pay duties at all~ defying both the Sultan's Wall and the customs 
farmer. Faisal feared to take any action against them because of their possession 
of French papers7. The Yaal Sa,ad tribes in the North~ were immune from the 
levy of the 'zakat' on their export of dates since the Sultan was also unable to 
collect itS. 
What was British involvement in this matter? It is interesting to note 
that when the Sultan imposed the zakat at the ports as shown abov~ some of the 
British-Indians claimed that the dates had been bought by them as a crop and were 
entitled to immunity as British property, thereby in effect, helping the Omani 
tribes to frustrate the Sultan's efforts to collect taxes. The quantity of dates 
coming into Muscat was limited and there was keen competition among the 
British exporters for the acquisition of them9• The British obtained their supplies 
in three ways. Firstly, they could employ a trustworthy local middleman who, 
provided with considerable sums of money, went during the off-season to the 
interior of Oman where he bought, from persons he knew, the whole or a portion 
of the crop which they hoped to produce in the next season. He paid them either 
the whole or part of the price in advance. For his pan, the Omani grower agreed 
to consign his product to the middleman when the time came. On the arrival of 
the dates at the ports of Muscat, accounts [mally were adjusted, and the consignee 
paid the duty, but he could charge it to the consigner in his account if he wanted10• 
Secondly, the grower could consign his product to his British-Indian agent and 
banker in Muscat, who, if he was himself a date exporter, would buy the dates for 
himself, or sell them in the local market. For that he received and credited his 
client's account with the proceeds, after deducting his own commission, and the 
7. Ibid. 
8. F.O. 54/33. no. 276. Cox to For. Dept. Govt. India. 22 June 1903. 
9. Ibid. See also P.O. 54/33. Hamilton to F.O .• 20 Aug. 1903; Sultan of Muscat to Cox. 17 
Rabi-ul- Awal (12 June 1903); no.274. Cox to Sultan of Muscat. 17 June 1903; tel. Cox to 
Govt Ind .• 17 July 1903; tel. no. 1646-E .• For. Sec .• Simla. to Cox. 21 July. 1903. 
10. F.O. 54/33. no. 276. Cox to Govt Ind.. 22 June 1903. 
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customs duty paid11 • Thirdly, in some cases the British agent could send someone 
to the date groves during the gathering period and buy with cash on the spot, then 
bringing them into Muscat where he himself paid the duty. 
After the Portuguese expulsion from Muscat in 1650, or probably 
before that, the Indians, Muslims or Hindus, seem to have carried on business as 
agents for the Omanis on the Muscat coast. During the period of the Omani 
Imams Elya,aaribeh, Muscat became an important commercial centre for the 
whole of Arabia, despite losing its political status, since it was still not the capital 
of Oman. The Elya,aaribeh did not fill the political vacuum in Muscat after the 
Portuguese and they were rarely to be seen there acording to Engelbert 
Kaempferl2. But after the coming of the Albu Sa,eedy family in 1744, Muscat 
seems to gain both political and commercial status, linking the old to the modern 
history, when it became the seat of the ruler and the capital of Oman. 
Imam Hamad bin Sa,eed, grandson of the man who established the Al-
bu-Sa,eed dynasty, shifted the capital from Rustak to Muscat (as discussed in 
chapter two) but it was his uncle Sultan bin Ahmed who fIrst aroused interest in 
Muscatl3, when he was Waly there during his father's lifetime. He escaped to 
Baluchistan when his nephew Hamad shifted the capital, but he returned to take 
over the city after Hamad's death. 
It is very important to realize that until this period none of the Omani 
rulers took the title of Sultan but only that of Imam. Sultan bin Ahmed by 
coincidence gave his name Sultan, which had no titular signifIcance, to his son 
Sa,eed. Sa,eed himself never used the title of Sultan but only that of Imam 14. It is 
very likely that the use of Sultan as a title emerged from the reading of Sa,eed's 
name as 'Sa,eed bin Sultan of Oman' Perhaps the English order of names, the 
11. Ibid. 
12. G.Weisgerber, 'Muscat in 1688: Engelbert Kaempfer's Report', The Journal of Oman 
Studies, 5 (1979), pp. 95-101. Engelbert Kaempfer was one of the few travellers to Asia 
in the seventeenth century to have left us a description and drawings of Muscat. 
13. R. Hughes Thomas (ed.), Arabian Gulf Intelligence, selections from the records of the 
Bombay Government, New Series, No.XXIV, 1856 (N.Y., 1985), p. 171. 
14. For the Albu Sa,eed Family see the writer's previous chapter. 
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emigrant communities in Muscat and Zanzibar, and the expansion of Sa,eed's rule 
over about a half century played a significant role in Al-bu-Sa,eed taking Sultan 
as a title, which exists until today. In fact the Omani rulers of Muscat and 
Zanzibar only officially took the title of Sultan after the death of Sa,eed, 185615• 
The Imam Sultan bin Ahmed however left a strong state, and gave 
Muscat a strong position but his son Sa,eed preferred Zanzibar on the African 
coast as his capital. He consumed all his father had created in Muscat and ruled 
more or less like a property owner for his own personal gloriya, rather than a 
historical leader, leaving to his successors a crumbling state, and having alienated 
his own society and caused great damage to Oman's and Muscat's history. 
However the Albu Saeed ruler who was resident in Muscat started to 
represent generally the commercial class be it of Omani origin, other Arabs 
(Bahranis) or British, French, Portuguese, Indian, Baluchis, Armenians, 
Georgians, Africans or Persians. 
In fact this was consistent with Muscat's political, social and economic 
development since the thirteenth century (1265) and probably before, as an 
important part of the kingdom of Hurmuz, ruled by the El-koosy family. Muscat 
became a centre of entirely commercial activity and revenue, notably 
cosmopolitan in its links with southern Persia across the Strait, and with India and 
Africa across the Indian Ocean. Arab mixed with Persian Shee,ah seem to have 
15. Even before that the Al-bu Sa.eed family, who are Hinawi Abadies, seem also to have 
adopted the title 'Seyyed', perhaps to impress the Shee,ah Arabs community of Muscat (of 
the old Hrmuz kingdom) who would not have accepted their rulers as Imam, and who at 
least in their social affairs, were ruled by their own real Seyyeds of A-l-aI-beyt. The title 
Imam has three different meanings. For the Shee,ah it means the Twelve Imams, 
equivalent of Saints, all of whom were dead, except the last one 'Al-Mahdi almuntadhar' 
who disappeared, and no Imam emerged after him. For the Sunnies Imam means simply 
the Sheikh or priest of a Mosque, or congregation, as it is in Arabic literature. For the 
Abadies, Imam means a secular and religious ruler. The late Zeidies, Kings of Yeman, 
called themsleves Imams. The title Seyyed is used in all Arabia. Persia and India to 
distinguish people who are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad's family of Ali and 
Fatima. (A-l-al-beyt), either being Priests or Commoners. But also the title Seyyed can be 
used as the equivalent of Mister, Owner, Master, or Sir in Arabic literature, but not by 
any means as in Om ani tradition, which always distinguished notables by the title Sheikh 
and rulers by that of Imam. 
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some domination there throughout that period, before the Portuguese arrival 
which conferred a unity beyond that of tribe or nation under Persian intluence l 6. 
The Portuguese took over the political and economic power from the 
Hurmuzians and ruled Muscat for about a century and a half (1508-1650), 
bringing with them the social values of early modem Europe together with its 
expertise in architecture, commerce, navigation, and administration, and above all 
a spirit of adventure. They gave Muscat its first direct links with Europe and with 
the first global Empire in the world, making Muscat in effect a member of this 
'International Club'17. At the time the most likely alternative to Portuguese 
domination was that of the Ottoman Turks. 
The Portuguese seem to have kept on good terms with the ruling family 
of the kingdom of Hurmuz18, so that old values of the kingdom were by no means 
totally replaced by the new European values. Conflict between Islam and 
Christianity seems to have been avoided, and despite some difficulties the two 
cultures managed to coexist for a long period. The Portuguese presence in the 
Gulf gave assistance to Shah Ismae,yl who established the fIrst Shee,e,y Empire in 
Iran and the Gulf in opposition to the Sunny Ottoman Turks, undermining their 
claim to be the new successors to the Prophet, while establishing the modem 
Persian identity 19. His effort along with the presence of the Portuguese seem to 
have saved the Arabs of the Gulf from Turkanization. Apart from the Gulf and 
16. Salil Ibin Razik [Ruzayk], transl and ed, G. P. Badger, Imams 0JJd Seyyids of Oman 
(Hakluyt Society, 1871), p. xx: "Oman was twice invaded from Persia. once by the people 
of Sheeraz, A.D. 1265, and again a few years later by the Amir Mahmud-bin-Ahmed,el-
Kusy, from Hormuz, on the mainland of Kerman, the seat of a petty principality, of Arab 
origin, which for the time being was subverted by the Moghuls, but was subsequently re-
established on the Island of Jerun, Zarun, since called Hormuz. The kings of Hormuz 
continued to claim jurisdiction over the seaboard of Oman [Muscat] up to the beginning 
of the sixteenth century. " 
17. W. de G.Birch, (ed.), The Commentaries of the Great Alfonso Dalboquerque, Second 
Viceroy of India, (Hakluyt Society, 1875), II pp.76-93. 
18. A friendly letter was sent to Abenader [Abe-Naader], the king ofHurmuz from 
Dalbuquerque. Birch, Commentaries, pp. 119-120. 
19. Sayed Amir Ali, 'Persia and Her Neighbours', I.Cent. As. Soc., V (1918), pp.85-104; in 
1518 Duarte Barbosa identified Shah Ismae,yla as Xeque Ismael in his book. An Account 
of the Countries Bordering on the Indian Ocean 0JJd their Inhabitants, (Hakluyt Society, 
1918) I, pp. 82-87. 
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Arabi~ in which the Arabic culture was preserved, exept those of self otonomy 
the Turks turkanized the entire Arab world, and both the Shee,ah and the Christian 
Arabs under them were badly treated. This may explain the great number of 
Shee,ah theologians, authors and other intellectuals, and their enormous amount of 
cultural production during the Safawi era. The Island of Bahrain seems to have 
been the centre of this culture~ There were over a hundred authors in Bahrain 
Island alone and over eighty in Al-Ehsaa and Al-Kateef' and more else where' 
During the course of the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries the great Bahrani 
author and bibliographer (Sheikh-) Yousuf bin-Ahmed Al-Mahoo~ (Al-Bahrani) 
and the bibliographer (Sheikh.,)Ali bin-Hasan Al-Bladi,(-Al-Bahrani) left for us 
two expanded and invaluable bibliographies for the Shee,ah Theologians and 
authors20. Some of them very old but most of them were of the 16th and 17th 
centuries. This shows that the Shee,ah Arabs of Bahrain in particular enjoyed a 
flourishing and mature culture during the Safawi period and that Arabic culture 
was highly developed by them. Certainly Bahrain had been culturally very rich 
throughout recorded history, but this tiny island, during the 16th, and 17th, 
centuries seems to have been not only in the van of Arabic culture in the Gulf but 
perhaps of the entire Arab world. It is interesting to note that the influence of 
Bahrani intellectuals and theologians (Ulama') Originated from the Safawi era 
was not confined to their small island but extended throughout the Gulf region, 
south to Muscat and north to Iraq, eastward to the Persian coast and westward to 
the rest of Arabia until the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries21• This did not 
seem to offend the Persian nationalism of Shah Ismae,yl Al-Safawi or of his 
20. See AI-Sheikh A,Ii Sk. Hasan AI-Blaadi AI-Baluaani, Anwar Albadrain: fy Traajem 
U,lama' AI-Katyfwal-Ahsaa'wal-Bahrain, [The Two Full Moons: in a Discussion of the 
Thealoginians ofKatyj. Ahsaa' and Bahrain] (Kum, A. H. 1407=1988); AI-Shaykb 
Yousuf bin-Ahmed AI-Bahrani, Lu'lu'atu-l-Bahrain fy AI-e'iaasaat wa-traajim Rijaal Al-
Hadeeth [Pearl of Bahrain in Certification and Analysis of AI-Hadeeth Authorities] 
(Bairut, 1986). 
21. Ibid; Abdil-Haadi AI-Fadly, Neyl-il-amaani Dywan AI-Sheikh Hasan Al-Demestani. 
(Obtaining wishes: Book of Poems of the Sheikh Hasan Al-Demestam), (n.d. Bahrain); 
this also includes a number of other poets; Alhaj-AI-Sheikh Abdil-A,dzym Alrabye,y, 
Dywan AIrai:rye.y (n.d. Bahrain) a poetry book. 
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successors, and the Arabs of Bahrain shared his hostility towards the Turks while 
the Portuguese in Muscat too saw in Shah Ismae,yl an unexpected ally against the 
Turks. In Muscat, however the Shee,ah influence, seems also flourished. when the 
city came under Nader Shah rule by the midth of the 18th century before the 
coming of Albu Sa,eed. 
It is a tradition in Dufar to use the red dot on the forehead either by the 
male or female. This perhaps indicates some kind of ancient Hindu cultural 
influence. 
The place which is known locally now as Ddareeh" Byl7y Mariam 
(Lady Mariam Shrine) in Qalhat inside this place which represents a square room 
there still can be seen Gujurati writings on the wall above one of the shelves. 
Either these writings dates from the ancient town of Kalhat in the Persian Empire 
period or the Kingdom of Hurmuz it is possible that the Indians' presence in Oman 
was continued for a long time. 
In Muscat the Indian Community enjoyed. worshipping their Hindu 
deities, and burning their dead in absolute freedom. This was naturally carried on 
during the Portuguese era, but it was a privilege granted to them by the 
Elya,aaribeh Imams as a recognition of their support for the Omani advance 
against the Portuguese22• Indian culture undoubtedly was influential; its 
fingerprints on the whole social life in Muscat and Oman cannot be missed. 
Due to the political circumstances Christianity obviously suffered a 
setback in Muscat after the Omani occupation but at the same time there was no 
unpleasant event recorded between the Hindus, Christians and Muslims of 
Muscat, indicating that all interests were preserved and matters were carried. on in 
harmony. 
By the time of the arrival of the Albu-Sa,eed in power, Muscat had 
already developed in a manner very different from that of the tribal towns of the 
22. Allen Jr., Calvin H.: 'The Indian Merchant Community of Masqat' Bull. S.OA.S., 44 
(1981),39-53. 
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interior of Oman. And despite the Elya,aaribeh ~ the Hurmuzian and 
Portuguese influences in the city were still there~ while Indians had been in 
Muscat long before they became British citizens. So the natural function of the 
Omani ruler in Muscat was to sustain this glorious city's commercial history, 
based on a mixture of traditions, cultures, classes, races, religions and languages, 
with all that meant in terms of openness, freedo~ and flexibility for moderate 
secular kings to relax in and enjoy23. Major Gray, British Consul in Muscat 
(1904-1908) reported" that fourteen languages are spoken daily in the bazaars of 
Muscat and Mutrah and if Arabic dialects were separately considered, this number 
would be greatly exceeded", and he named the fourteen languages as "Arabic, 
Persian, Baluchi, English, French, Swahili, Somali, Hindustani, Sindi, Gujrati, 
Portuguese, Pushtu, Armenian and Turkish"24. With the Arabic language Swahili 
has also special status in Oman because it is not only spoken by the Africans but 
by those Omani Arabs who emigrated for a while to East Africa or have business 
there25. Amongst them were members of the ruling family. The Sultans, 
however, found themselves representing the interests of all those people with 
multi-cultural backgrounds and dealing with the representatives of such powers as 
the Indian rulers, Great Britain, France, Holland and the USA, with whom they 
23. Sir Edgar Collins Boehm, The Persian Gul/ and the South Sea Isles, (1904), p. 6; 
W.Phillips, Oman a History, p, 136. Clements, Oman, p. 20. 
24. W. G. Gray, Trade and Races of Oman', in Mythic Society 2 (1911), pp. 60-61; Muscat: 
Report/or the Year 1912-13 on the Trade o/Muscat (1913) [Cd. 7048-14], p. 5. 
25. In addition to this fact the Omani emigrants to East Africa, despite their strong Arabic 
culture, and despite being representatives of old colonial power (Oman), used the Swahili 
language instead of the Arabic and they lost most of their Arabic background. In recent 
times there has been a great number of East Africans who claimed Omani origin, and 
bore Omani tribal titles, by right or by fraud and therfore the right to return to Oman, 
bringing with them a fresh Swahili language, from different parts of East Africa: 
Rawanda, Borondi, Kenya, Tanganika and Zanzibar, and it is spoken widely in Oman 
today. In Muscat the Baluchi, Persian and the Sindy languages are also widely used. 
Other than that there are local languages which are still alive in Oman: the Shih"hi, of 
Shihuhh Omani tribes of Musandam, on the strait of Hurmuz; the Jabbali, similar to 
Amharic in Dufar; the Hursusi, similar to Arabic in the desert of Jeddet-el-Harasys, in 
Rub-el-Khali desert (the empty quarter). To know more about the Shih"hi language, see 
Bertram Thomas, 'The Musandam Peninsula and its people the Shihu' J. Cent. As. Soc. 
16 (1929), 71-85, and for the Baluchi language, see Demetrius Boulger (ed.), 'Baluchistan 
and the new Indian Province', Asiatic. Q. Rev., V (1888), pp.54-64, and C.E. Yate, Col. 
'Baluchistan' Proceed. en!. As. Soc., 14 (1906), pp. 3-39. 
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had established diplomatic relations and signed commercial treaties. They came 
under various influences and sought foreign recognition. Therefore the Omani 
Imams (then Sultans) became distinguished from those Shaikhs of the interior by 
this type of non-tribal society. They depended on the loyalty of their State miltary 
and labour force. Their income rested upon their international reputation, political 
and commercial commitment, imports and exports, customs and taxes, and on 
their involvement in the policy of the colonial powers26• Like their predecessors, 
apart from the Ya,aarebeh,. the Sulltans of Muscat mainly ruled only the coastal 
regions of the country, leaving the interior to the traditional tribal leaders who 
resisted commercial innovation as well the Sultan's exercise of sovereignty and, 
consequently, the right of taxation. The Sultan's function was likely to be similar 
to that of the Hurmuzian kingdom and the Portuguese. They were only lords of 
the country's ports, and did not have to respond to the influence of the El-
Ya,aaribeh in the interior. They did not rule the Omani trucial coast at all, they 
simply inherited part of the Portuguese and the Hurmuzian political influence at 
Muscat. But despite the dependence of the Sultans on commercial activities and 
taxes from the ports, they could not avoid friction and conflict with the tribes 
about, for example, taxing their crops when reaching ports under the Sultan's 
direction. In addition, there was the innovation of an economic system based on 
capital investment. Interest on loans, Riba or Sood in local Omani, for example, is 
completely forbidden in Islam but the Sultans allowed it. This was contrary to 
Islamic instruction, and had its impact on the political system. It caused conflict 
between the old religious and political philosophy, by which an Omani 
government should be led by an elected Ibady Imam who forbade that practice 
and whose power base was entirely tribal, agricultural and religious, and that of 
26. H. W. Maclean, Trade with Muscat Region, (H.M.S. O. 1904), p. 5.; Muscat Report for 
the Year 1912·13 on the Trade of Muscat ( 1913) [Cd. 7048-14],.p. 5.; F.O. Confidential 
Print (9161)[4920] No.1.'Memonmdum respecting British Interests in the Persian 
Gulf Jan. 1914. 
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the Sultanate (monarchy) with a base that was capitalist. commercial and non-
tribal 
Industry was essentially manual. involving family work~ mainly in 
boat-building, clay. Omani-halwa sweets. textiles. fish. salt, oil. lime and dates. 
leather crafts and work by blacksmiths and goldsmiths. Some of these activities 
could be carried on by local Arabs and others by immigrants. Baluchis, Persians. 
Indians. and freed slaves. 
When any of the Albu Sa,eed family took control he had to keep the 
above facts in mind, as did any rival from the Sultan's family. In general, the 
Sultan's function in fact was complicated. As lord of the ports he had to hold the 
balance between the tribal and commercial interests, between the maritime 
powers, especially the British. and the powers behind him in the Arabian desert. 
If he miscalculated he would suffer the consequences from both sides. 
Sultan Faisal seems to have been in a situation like that. To understand 
the circumstances in which he succeeded his father Turky after the-Iatter's death in 
1888, on the recommendation of the British Government, and to understand his 
relations with foreign powers, it is necessary to examine the era after his 
grandfather's death. 
Section Three 
Immediate Historical Background 
The period after 1856 saw the decline of Sa,eed's Empire, as discussed in chapter 
two. The British favoured the independence of Zanzibar, under Majid, from 
Muscat, under Thuwaini, and hence the division of their friend's kingdom. But 
the Sultan of Muscat, Thuwainy, did not accept the separation because Zanzibar 
was much richer than Muscat, and its loss was a greater blow to him than that of 
southern Persia. It would be difficult to maintain his government on the limited 
resources of Oman so he decided to retain Zanzibar by force. In 1858 he 
mobilised his navy for this purpose, but the Government of India immediately sent 
62 
Colonel Russell in H.MS. Punjab to stop Thuwainy's expedition before it 
reached Zanzibar. 
In Zanzibar Bargash. another son of Sa,eed, led a coup right after his 
father's death to takeover from his elder brother Majid, but the Government of 
India interfered and persuaded him that Majid should role first27• 
Having prevented Thuwainy from going ahead with his Zanzibar 
project, the British Government of India desired to maintain peace and stability in 
an area lying on the sea route to India and to safeguard it. This objective became 
the keystone of British imperial policy in the region. To carry out this policy 
required the exercise of influence on the seas adjoining India. It required a 
network of British Residents backed up by a strong navy. Gunboat diplomacy 
was of prime importance. But why was India so important during this period? 
India supplied some of the essential raw materials required for the industrial 
revolution in England, and offered an ideal market for British manufactures at the 
same time. To safeguard this route was of great importance and an appropriate 
policy would be carried out to satisfy the imperial desire. and that meant keeping 
both Muscat and Zanzibar under its influence. 
The British Government of India realized the economic loss caused to 
Oman by the Zanzibar separation. but they offered a solution that Zanzibar should 
make an annual payment to Oman as a subsidy of 40.000 Maria Theresa dollars28• 
This was a most disgraceful position for the Omani rulers of Muscat to accept. 
27. Thuwainy's son Hamed ruled Zanzibar after the death of Bargash. (see chapter five; The 
case of Abdul aziz); subsequent rulers of Zanzibar were his descendants down until 
Sultan Jamsheed of Zanzibar, who is living now in exile in London after the Zanzibar 
coup in 1965. For the situation in Zanzibar after Saeed's death see, Mudlhakldraal 
Al,Ammeerah Salemeh ebnat Alsayyed Sa,eed bin Sultan, Sultan muscat wa zinjibar. 
(Memoirs of Princess Salma, the daughter of the Sayyed Sa,eed ben Sultan, The Sultan of 
Muscat and Zanzibar) (Oman, 1985),p.160. Ministry of Heritage publication. Salma, 
known also as Emily Reute, was mother of Reute Sa,eed, the biographer of his 
grandfather. Phillips, Oman: A History.p 136; Clements, Oman, p 20. There was a 
saying of the people of Zanzibar which illustrates their bad feeling about Bargash: it says 
(in Arabic) /cad blana-allalul, be thalathatin; albaklcu, wal-bargootlul, wal-Bargaslul. 
(From heaven, three plagues God threw on us. Fleas, bugs, and the Bargash) 
28. Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 14,20-37; Townsend, Oman, p. 43; Judd, Victorian Empire, 
p.95; Brown, Economics, p. 84; R. P. Dutt, India Today, (1940), p. 105; Clements, Oman, 
p. 45; Phillips, Oman: A History, p. 8. 
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This ruling of Lord Canning. the Governor-General of Indi~ did not last very 
long. The payment was suspended by Majid after his economic collapse. The 
British,. consistent with their imperial policy. decided the payment would instead 
be made by the Government of Indi~ so as to avoid any possible conflict and to 
promote the consolidation of their political paramountcy in the Gulf. Their policy 
from now on depended on skilful diplomatic expediencies to preserve strategic 
positions like Muscat29• 
In 1864 and 1865 the Government of India concluded two agreements 
with Thuwainy for an ~perial telegraph line, which should be protected in the 
areas under Muscat control both in Oman and Baluchistan. 
During the second half of the 19th century Muscat was hit by a severe 
commercial depression because of: (1) separation from the old source of wealth in 
East Africa, so that the country fell into internal political trouble: (2) the removal 
of Omani dominance over the Gulf region, and the shifting of the centre of 
international interest from Muscat to Aden, by the opening of the Suez canal, had 
deeply contributed to Muscat's problem30• 
Between 1864 and 1868 the city became almost bereft of trade and the 
economy of Oman totally collapsed. This made it difficult for Thuwainy to 
consolidate his power over the country. 
Thuwainy was killed while he was asleep in 1866. He was murdered 
by his son Salem. His assassination came when he was preparing to march 
against the Wahhabis of Arabia, who had raided his territories. Soon after 
shooting his father, Salem forcibly consolidated his position of power in Oman31• 
29. B. R. Pridham, Oman: Economic and Strategic Development, (1987), p.8; Aitchison, 
Collection, pp. 305-7. 
30. Gavin, 'Bartle Frere Mission', p. 123; Landen, Oman, p.13; Hitti, Near East, p.471. In the 
year 1840 the West Indian and Far East mail service had begun; for that and for steam 
navigation development, see A. Redford, Economic History of Eng/and 1760-1860 
(1960), P 99; Pauline Gregg, A Social and Economic History of Britain, 1760-1965, 
(1965), p. 109. 
31. Alsalmi, Uman Tareekh, p. 167; Wilson, Persian Gulf, p.173; Captain P. H. Colomb, 
Slave Catching in the Indian Ocean, (1873) pp. 120-23: the author saw Sultan Turki in 
his exile in Bombay. 
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Having no alternative, the British government of India recognized Salem as Sultan 
of Muscat. Turky, another son of Sa,ed and who was jailed by his brother 
Thuwainy, was released from his jail and was determined to overthrow his 
nephew Salem, but the Government of India interfered and took Turley to exile in 
Bombay. Salem did not last more than three years when he was forced to leave 
Muscat after a revolt led in 1869 by Azzan bin Qais. his brother-in-law and one of 
Ahmed bin Sa,eed's descendants. This time the Government of India did nothing 
to help Salem; instead they offered him a vessel to escape in and a place of exile. 
Nevertheless, with this revolt British-Omani relations took another turn. 
Overall the period between 1862-1891 was marked by a gradual 
extension of the British influence in Oman32, but at the end of the sixties this 
influence seemed threatened with takeover by the Imam Azzan, and the British 
Government feared general uncertainty in the whole region because of the 
religious orientation which shaped Imam Azzan's government and its possible 
links with Arabia's fanatical religious movement. Although Azzan was from the 
Albusa,eed family, he did not take the secular title of Sultan unlike the previous 
two rulers Thuwainy and his son Salem, but retained the religious one of Imam33. 
When Imam Azzan overthrew Salem, Turley, father of the future Sultan Faisal and 
currently held in Bombay by the Government of India, was released and given 
significant help to recruit forces from different parts of the Gulf. He also received 
support from his brother Majid of Zanzibar. Pelly, the British Resident in the 
Gulf, supported Turky by all means possible. By this support Turky managed to 
attack Muscat from the EI-Batneh coast. He reached Mutrah Walls and engaged 
with Azzan's force, Azzan himself being killed at Mutrah in 1871. The battle 
between Azzan and Turky witnessed the bloodiest conflict between two rivals of 
the Albu Sa,eed family, one of them was to be Imam and the second was to be a 
32. Bathhurst ,'Maritime Trade and Imamet Government', Arabian Peninsula: society and 
politics. ed, Hopwood. D.(1972), p.18. 
33. For more details about the British stand towards the Imam Azzan see, Ravinder Kumar 
,'British Attitude Towards the Ibadyyah Revivalist Movement in East Arabiya', 
International Studies. (New Delhi) 3 (1962),443-50. 
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sultan on the throne of Muscat34• But the Sultan had won Muscat in that 
competition. 
A dispute broke out between the British political agents and officials in 
the Gulf and Bombay on the one hand and the Viceroy John Lawrence in Calcutta 
on the other. No reports about Turky's attack at Muscat were passed on from 
Bombay to Calcutta until Turky's operation against Azzan had ended. After 
hearing that, the Viceroy of Indi~ John Lawrence~ protested angrily against the 
absence of information, and complained to London about his subordinate's 
behaviour in Bombay3S. He requested that the whole control of frontier policy 
should be put firmly in the hands of the supreme government. However this 
problem was solved~ and general agreement was reached between London and 
Bombay that Turky should be supported. Money was the only means by which 
Turky could survive~ and the British provision of that would put Muscat under 
effective British control. But where should the money come from? One possible 
way would be to renew the old Zanzibar subsidy arranged by Lord Canning for 
Thuwainy of Muscat from Maajid of Zanzibar after the death of Sa,eed bin 
Sultan36• The British decided to use their influence with the Sultan of Zanzibar to 
restore payment of the subsidy indirectly, through Foreign and India Office 
channels. Eventually the Sultan of Zanzibar agreed to pay and the problem was 
solved in such a way as to put Muscat totally in the hands of the British Indian 
Government. The subsidy was used effectively to dictate British policy to the 
Omani Sultans not only on foreign relations but even on domestic and 
administrative matters. 
34. Phillips, Oman a History, p. 142; Wilson, Taareekh Al Khaleej [The History of the Gulf] 
p.173; Mohammed bin Abdullah AI Salmi and Najy Assaf,(in Arabic) UMAN 
TAAREEKH YATAKAILEM, [Oman oral History] (Damascus,I963), p.I68-169; 
RJ.Gavin, The Bartle Frere Mission to Zanzibar, 1873', The Historical]ournal, 5 
(1962), pp. 125, 131. Imam Azzan bin Kias lies in a cemetery in Haret Esshimal in 
Mutrah beyond the fish market Sook Essamek now Qaboos Harbour. 
35. John Lawrence was Viceroy of India from 1863 ti111869. 
36. For the Zanzibar question see, Ravendar Kumar ,'Dismemberment of Oman and the 
British Policy Towards the Persian Gulf, Islamic Culture,.36. (1962), 8-19. 
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In fact during that period it became particularly important to keep 
Muscat under British control. In the first place they had now reason to fear 
Ottoman penetration of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean because the 
opening of the Suez Canal gave their Navy an opening to the South East of the 
Islamic world and an opportunity to interfere in a sphere of British influence. 
This penetration might take advantage of nationalist and religious feelings in 
0man37. Secondly the Persian Gulf had become of crucial significance for British 
imperial strategy. The fact was that before the middle of the century steam 
navigation had started to revolutionize communications in the world, extending 
the involvement and interests of many powers around the globe, reducing 
travelling time between the continents, and bringing unprecedented complications 
which could make even small domestic issues of international concern. Britain as 
a world power and as an innovator of that new energy was in the vanguard of this 
revolution. From 1840 a British mail service by steam navigation from London to 
India and the Far East was initiated and the Gulf (Oman in particular) was at the 
centre of the mail route to India. Later, likewise, when the telegraph was founded, 
Oman and the Gulf became a strategic junction for the imperial telegraphic lines 
constructed between Europe and India. At this time too, a new steam navigation 
system, was founded in the Persian Gulf region as well and it also became of great 
commercial importance for Britain. At the same time this modern communication 
system could connect the Gulf area with other powers of the world such as 
Germany, France, Russia, and the USA which could threaten British ascendancy 
in the region, especially in the Indian Ocean38• Due to these circumstances the 
British Government sought to consolidate its political and diplomatic influence in 
the Gulf. Oman was the prime example. The British exercised what was known 
as indirect rule. This policy when carried out in Oman, especially by Edward 
37. Gavin. 'Bartle Frere'.pp. 126-34.218. 
38. F.e.Danvers. 'The Sea Route to India' and The Persian Gulf Route and Commerce'. 
Asiatic Quarterly Rev5 (1888). pp. 21-3 and 412-13. 
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Ross., the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, was so explicit as to leave no doubt 
about it at all 
Turky was a completely loyal and firm ally of the British. In 1873 he 
signed a fresh agreement with Britain to forbid slave trading entirely. It was clear 
that the agreements concluded wtih his father Sa,eed did not work. The signing of 
this treaty increased the weakness of Muscat's economy which Britain was trying 
to sustain and it resulted in more Omani migration to Zanzibar. It also produced a 
severe political problem for Turky and subsequently his son FaisaI. Soon after the 
signing of this treaty unrest in Turky's possessions in Baluchistan on the north 
west frontiers by the Baluchi. tribes had begun. They revolted because of the 
collapse of their business. This also made the situation on the north-west frontier 
of India more complicated. The Baluchi tribes attacked commercial caravans, and 
British telegraph offices, cutting the imperial telegraph line in 1875. W. Phillips 
noticed that Turky had signed the treaty for his own benefit, having been bribed a 
total of 60,000 Maria Theresa dollars by Sir Bartle Frere. But the slave trade did 
not stop39. Five years after Turky's death, during his son Faisal's reign, the 
Political Resident at Bushire wrote a letter to the Secretary of State to the 
Government of India on 25 March 1893 informing him of seven slaves having 
been imported from Melindi on the East African coast into Oman in 189240. 
Turky's policy was hated by his own people, who did not stop revolting against 
him. Without British support against his own subjects he would have been 
overthrown, and his family's rule brought to an end. He was fully assisted even 
against his own family members, for instance his brother Abdul Aziz. In 1874 the 
Sultan Turky had been unable to cope with a rebellious cousin, Ibraheem bin Kais. 
Accordingly, British subjects suffered from the consequent disturbances. The 
39. For this account see, Landen, Oman, pp.213, 231-233, 262ff., 270, [Landen's book was 
translated into Arabic by Mohammed Ameen Abdullah under Uman munthu 1856 
masseeran wa maseera. Ministry of Heritage Oman]; Frank A.Clements. Oman: World 
Bibliograp/ry. (Oxford 1981),p. xii. Phillips, Oman: a History,pp. 143,147; Wilson, 
History of the GuIf,p. 173; Aitchison, Collection. XI pp.308-309. 
40. F.O. 54/26 Political Agent in Muscat to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 16 
March 1893. 
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British fleet took active measures against Ibraheem's force, shelled them out of 
their fort at Messen,ah town on the coast and exacted an indemnity from them as 
compensation to British subjects. In 1877, the tribal coalition of El-sharkeyeh 
under the leadership of El-hurth attacked Muscat and Mutrah. The Sultan was not 
in a position to protect himself, so H.MS. Teazer interfered to assist the Sultan in 
defending the town of Muscat from the sea, thereby causing the rebels to retire. In 
1882 and 1883 Mutrah and Muscat were attacked again by Abdul Aziz bin Sa,eed 
and the Sultan appealed to the Political Agent for help, and the P hiIomel shelled 
the rebellious camps, thus preventing their advance into Muscat41• In 1886 
Ibraheem bin kais attacked Sowaik, another town on the coast and captured its 
fort. Immediately the Resident proceeded to Sowaik and warned Ibraheem that if 
he did not withdraw peacefully the British Government's interference would 
become inevitable. Ibraheem thereupon pulled out from Sowaik42• 
Turley and the British were sincere friends apart from only a slight 
dispute over British Indian subjects resident in Muscat who were evading customs 
duties. Turley regarded the Indian muslims (Lawatyeh) as his own citizens and 
treated them according to the rules which Omanis had to follow in the matter of 
customs duties. But the Government of India insisted that the Lawatyas were 
British subjects. The customs issue was revived by the Government of India 
during the arms trade dispute in 1898-1899 during the reign of Faisal. In 1873 
Turley had signed an agreement which gave the British political agent 
jurisdictional rights over subjects of the native states of India residing in Muscat43• 
Before the end of Turky's reign the anns trade had already started between 
Birmingham and Muscat and the British suggested restriction on anns importation 
into Muscat in 1888 in respect to the situation on the North West of India. On 12 
41. F.O. 54/27, Govt ofInd. F. D., secret external, 8 Sep 1890; No. 69 EncL 1, Major 
C.E.Yate to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 23 Feb. 1890; The Persian Gulf 
Administration reports. vol. Ill, No. 140, Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Ross to Charles Grant 
,Sec. Govt Ind. F.D., 17 July 1884. 
42. F.O. 54/27, Muscat Political Agent to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 23 Feb. 
1890. 
43. Phillips, Oman: a history. p. 143. 
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July 1888 Colonel E.C.Ross. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, wrote to the 
Secretary to the Government of India's Foreign department about a suggestion 
giving the Sultan Turky power to restrict importation of arms and ammunition 
into Muscat's territories. But the matter was not taken seriously and was left to be 
dealt with as and when the occasion should arise44-
Section Four 
The Challenge to the Sultan 
The Sultan Turky died on 3 June 1888, and his son Faisa! assumed the 
government4S• But he was not recognized until 1890 by the British government as 
Sultan. According to British sources, Faisal's succession took place without 
advice or assistance from officers of the Government of India, and his recognition 
as new ruler only came when it had become clear that his elder brother did not 
oppose him and that no other aspirants were able to oust him46- His ability to 
maintain his position for a year and nine months justified his recognition47• From 
the beginning he expressed his wish to rely on British advice and to administer his 
government in such a way as to keep on friendly terms with Great Britain. 
Theodore Bent has provided us with an account of Faisal's succession: "The way 
in which F eysuI obtained possession of the Sultan's palace on his father's death, to 
the exclusion of his brother is curious. F eysuI said his grief for his father was so 
great that his feelings would not admit his attending the funeral, so he stayed at 
home while Mahmoud [Muhhammedj went, who on his return found the door 
locked in his face". Mr Bent, who saw Sultan Faisal twice during his childhood 
and during his adulthood when he became Sultan, explained why the elder brother 
Muhhammed [Mahmood] could not be Sultan of Muscat: he was the son of a 
negress, and therefore could not be considered a suitable person to inherit the 
44. F.O. 54/25. No.218, encl. 5, (Bushire), Ross to Grant, 12 July 1888. 
45. Nabil. M. Kailani, 'Politics and Religion in Uman: Historical Overview', J. Middle East 
Stud., 10 (1979), 567-579; Aitchison, Collection, p.278. 
46. F.O. 54/27, 1.0. to F.O., 25 May 1891. 
47. F.O. 54/27, Tel., Viceroy to F.O., 13 May 1891. 
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throne of Muscat48. He was according to Colonel Ross9 the Political Residen4 
"somewhat disqualified by appearance9 manner, &c'9 from becoming ruler of the 
Muscat State9 and was, more or less with his acquiescence9 put aside"49. But this 
was not the only reason. Muhhammed bin Turley seems to have been considered 
by his own father, Sultan Turky unfit to hold Muscat. During his father's reign in 
18849 he had been given a chance to rule at Suhar but he showed his incapacity for 
that taskso• 
News of Faisal's succession came in The Tunes on 8: June 1888~ in an 
extremely brief announcement which did not even name him or his father. 
"Bombay June 7th. The second son of the Sultan of Muscat has peaceably 
succeeded to the SultanSl". However the Sultan telegraphed to the Queen and the 
Viceroy, informing them of his taking over and soliciting their protection. He 
wrote to the Political Agent in Muscat trusting that the friendship which used to 
exist between the British Government and his father might be continued with him. 
He offered to carry out orders steadfastly, and solicit the protection and favour of 
the British Government in whom was his trustS2• He undertook to be guided in all 
important matters of policy by the advice of the British GovernmentS3• The Sultan 
also communicated with the Chiefs of his own country, writing to them to 
announce his assumption of power. He received from most of them replies of 
loyalty and no problems occurred during his succession. The local powers who 
had opposed his father were uncertain as to whether or not the British Government 
would maintain the same policy of support promised to his fathers4• In fact the 
48. Thedore Bent and Mrs Theodore Bent ,southern Arabia (1900), pp.56-57. 
49. Ross to Sir H. M. Durand, 21 June 1889, in The Persian Gulf Administration Reports 
1873-1890, (Archive Eds.,1986),p. 5. 
50 F.O. 54(17, Resident to For. Dept., Govt. Ind., 17 Nov. 1884; no. 166,29 May 1888. 
51. The Times, 8 June 1888. 
52. F.O. 54(17, Major C. E. Yate, Political Agent, Muscat, to the Political Resident in the 
Persian Gulf, 23 Feb. 1890; Wilson, History (1902), pp. 174,428; R. Albusaid-Reute, 
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54. F.O. 54(17, C. E. Yate, Political Agent, Muscat, to the Political Resident in the Persian 
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British Government's recognition was not at first accorded to Faisal, possibly 
because the way in which he had assumed power might produce conflict with his 
brotherss. After his assumption of power, the Sultan himself was in dread of his 
brother Muhammad, and the two never met without their own escorts to protect 
them from each otherS6• But the real threat did not come to the Sultan from 
Muhammad, who finally accepted his younger brother's succession without 
demur, but came from his uncle, Abdul Aziz bin Sa,eedS7• 
On 1 July 1888 Abdul Aziz did claim the throne of Muscat. In a letter 
to the Resident he expressed his hope for support from the British GovernmentS8• 
On 12 July the Resident replied that the interests of the British government were 
essentially concerned with the maintenance of tranquillity and the prosperity of 
the people of Oman under rulers of their own choiceS9 •••• 
On 10 August Abdul Aziz wrote an interesting letter to Lieutenant-
Colonel Mockler, the Political Agent in Muscat, expressing his views about his 
position and about the Omani people. "If the people of Oman had regulations or 
even sense to understand the advantages and honour and ease that would accrue to 
them from choosing by them of rulers who would strengthen the pillars of their 
kingdom, improve their country, attend to the welfare of the people, and 
endeavour to direct them for their good, as is the custom amongst other people, 
they would doubtless be in the greatest prosperity and peace such as is the desire 
of the great Government". He did not agree with the British Government that the 
Omani people should elect their own rulers, denying their capacity to make that 
kind of choice, because, "in the condition of the people of Oman there is great 
difficulty, for, what are the people of Oman except miserable animals, who follow 
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anyone who calls them, who tum with every breeze, who are unillumined by the 
light of learning." He ask~ ''how can one expect them to have the knowledge 
and ability to choose fit rulers ?". He explained the psychological and political 
attitude of the Omanis towards their Governments or rulers, which could mislead 
observers, including the British. He said that the Omanis were two-faced behind 
their appearance of loyalty, fleeing from rulers and from laws as they would from 
a lion. But their truly "highest desire is that one should rule over them who is 
weak in intellect, poor in judgement and without energy,. who. will neither 
command nor forbid, so that each one may be a separate ruler and engage in strife 
and the spreading of discord, that there shall be no one to stop them, that the 
strong may oppress the weak, then will the land and its stock be ruined; and such 
are their doings at present (may God's wrath not ovenake them)". It is clear that 
he meant by this not only the ordinary Omani people but their tribal leaders. He 
asked again, "how can there be expected from people in such condition good 
deeds and the choosing of rulers fit to guide them?" He answered "it was absurd to 
expect that, for they were utterly lacking in good deeds and integrity, but by 
nature imbued with evil and strife, and when I saw that matters had come to this 
pass from the abundance of strife and the growing boldness of lawless persons I 
perceived that the resumption of the law of God and the suppression of 
innovations, the restraining of the tyrant and the protection of the oppress~" was 
necessary. He gave himself the responsibility of bringing the people to a state of 
discipline so as to achieve his aim of securing their and the country's tranquillity, 
by the deeds which would give him most propinquity to God and it was his duty 
to achieve this with God's assistance. It was however impossible for him to 
accomplish his desire and he accused the British Government of misunderstanding 
his intentions and stressed how far he would go. If only Britain would 
"understand my desire and intentions and see that I have drawn the sword to 
accomplish them, they will certainly excuse me, since they will know that I only 
desire what is right and to improve the condition of Oman". Finally he appealed 
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for assistance to restore order in the country, and he could not believe that "the 
English Government, which is one of the most glorious and is the greatest of 
civilized powers, should in the case of a people who have reached the point of 
ignorance and stupidity and wretchedness that the people of Oman have now and, 
if able to tum them into another path and give asistance for their benefit, be 
anything except desirous to hasten to do so". He believed that, "the people of 
Oman are their neighbours and very much in need of the assistance of the Great 
English Government". Finally he demanded from the Resident: '1 ask you to 
kindly inform me whether I shall receive assistance from the Great Government in 
doing what I propose for the settlement of Oman". He assured him that if the 
British Government was pleased to give him only a little help he would be able to 
accomplish it easily and without any bloodshed60• 
Abdul Aziz did not receive a positive response to his appeal from the 
British Government. One year later on 13 July 1889 he wrote to the Political 
Agent in Muscat and the Resident in Bushire informing them of his intention of 
attacking Muscat61• He trusted that his undertaking would be accorded support by 
the British Government. On 29 July he led his force towards Muscat with some 
aid from EI-Hijryien, but he was defeated near the Kazah-pass by the Sultan's 
troops, and he was compelled, as his followers dispersed, to retire to his 
headquaners in Samad al-Sha,n62• In January 1890 Abdul Aziz made another 
attempt but he did not succeed in bringing about co-operation with the 
El,sharkyeh co-alition under the Sheikh Saleh bin Ali, and he failed to get enough 
supporters for his campaign. Sheikh Saleh bin Ali had supported Abdul-Aziz's 
campaign against his brother Turky due to ill-feeling against the Sultan, but now 
after the death of Turky, his zeal perceptibly had cooled. Shaikh Saleh now had 
no wish to see Abdul-Aziz in power. as he once had done. Saleh had established a 
60. F.O. 54/27, Translation of a letter from Seyyid Abdul Aziz to Lieutenant-Colonel 
Mockler, Political Agent, Muscat 1 Dil Hujj 1305=10 Aug. 1888. 
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position of power and influence which he was not prepared to give up for the sake 
of Abdul Aziz. As it was he could place himself in a position to control the 
balance between the two rival parties63• With him were the Chiefs of the people. 
Their aim was to maintain a division of power so as to prevent anyone of the 
Albu Sa,eedi wings becoming strong enough to tax them all with impunity, and 
yet at the same time to retain in their hands a lever sufficiently powerful to extract 
benefits and money for themselves from the Sultan when an opportunity should 
come~ Shaikh Saleh then rebuffed Abdul-Aziz and he showed his alliance, 
support and friendship for the Sultan by informing him of Abdul:..Aziz's coalition 
proposals. ''His Highness Sayid Feysal, now believing in the rumours, lost no 
time in reinforcing the garrisons of Muscat and Muttrah, whilst Sheikh Saleh sent 
a direct message to the chiefs in charge of the several passes to prepare for the 
enemytt64. So Abdul Aziz had only the support of another Al-Busa,eedy party 
with only a few followers under Hamud and Sa,ud, sons of the late Imam Azzan, 
and a small party under Sheikh Humood el-Jahhafi, a freebooter. Failing to 
recruit supporters for his bid he went to Rustak seeking the hospitality of 
Ibraheem bin Kais Brother of Imam Azzan and head of another religious party. 
Major C.E. Yate, the new Political Agent in Muscat, was surprised that 
these two persons had never met before and at their forming an alliance against 
the party of Albu Sa,eeds of Muscat, given the differences in their views as to of 
the kind of Government which should be established in Oman. From his letter to 
British Officials, it was apparent that Abdul-Aziz, though a believer, wanted to 
rule as a secular Sultan and not as Imam, while Ibraheem was ambitious to have 
the religious title of his Brother Azzan and to rule as an Imam. So each sought 
power for himself according to different ideological assumptions and each became 
convinced that victory was impossible by his own efforts alone. They began to 
think in terms of cooperation. But, according to the Political Agency, although 
63. F.O. 54(2.7, Resident to For. Dep., Govt. Ind., 29 May 1888. 
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Ibraheem had given a friendly welcome to Abdu-Aziz, he had no intention of 
giving him any active support. If that was the case then it may explain why those 
two rivals were not able to meet together before. But, as we saw, the political 
situation had changed in Oman after the death of Turley, as rival groups 
everywhere made alliances, dissolved alliances, or fought one another according 
to what best suited their interests at the time. The friend of today could become 
the enemy of tomorrow and vice versa. Thus in Oman the old alliance between 
AbduJ: .. Aziz and Sheikh Saleh of Oman Eastern province diminished while the 
new alliance between Abdul Aziz and Ibrahee~ despite their differences, 
developed. 
What would each gain from the other? Since 1887 it was supposed by 
British officals that in the event of such a coalition Ibraheem would make the 
price of his support for Abdul-Aziz's claim for the throne of Muscat the cession of 
Sohar or possibly of all the Batinah coast. That might be a fair division between 
the two which could fulfil their ambitions and also keep them away from each 
other. Perhaps the British noted the agreement of 1839 between Abdul Azyz's 
father Imam Sa,eed bin Sultan and his cousin Humood bin Azzan' Ibraheem's 
uncle killed his son Seif' fearing his ambitions65• In this event, neither Abdul-
Aziz nor Ibraheem benefited. The Chiefs coalition, on the other hand, was more 
successful. The chiefs of Oman Eastern province carried out their new policy of 
holding the balance between the power of Abdul-Aziz and Ibrahim and the power 
of Faisal. In their campaign against the new alliance of Ibraheem and Abdul-Aziz 
in Rostak the coalition of EI-Sharkyeh Chiefs initially showed their support for the 
65. The treaty was signed through the mediation of Captain Hennell, the British Resident It 
even distingushed subjects of Humood (bin Azzan I, bin Qais I bin Ahmed bin Sa,eed) 
from those of his cousin (Sa,eed bin Sultan bin Ahmed bin Sa,eed). The British 
Government entered in an engagement with Humood's son, Seif in 1849, who, it seems, 
took over Suhar from his father, for the abolition of the slave trade in Suhar. Fearing his 
fmal desire, Humood killed his son Seif, and ruled Suhar again but his rule did not last 
there. Thuwainy, the future Sultan of Muscat, had arrested Humood and kept him in 
Muscat prison until he died in 1850 (Thuwainy, later, himself was killed by his son Salem 
in Sohar). Qais II, Humood's brother and Azzan ITs (Imam) and Ibrheem's father raised 
against Thuwainy but then he was persuaded to retreat and to accept the offer of ruling 
Rustak and probably Ibri. For more details see Aitchison, Treaties, pp. 285 .. 86, 320-322. 
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Sultan and their willingness to accompany and fight beside him. They recruited 
their men and sent them to fight under the leadership of the Sultan. But when 
things began to look difficult they pulled out, and the Sultan's expedition was 
abruptly brought to an end. They had managed to get all they could out of the 
Sultan, but they had no intention of fighting or of ousting Ibraheem. When the 
Alliance made a fresh advance against Muscat, the Chiefs and their troops came to 
support the Sultan. They flocked into Muscat, lived in free quarters and got all the 
money they could, but, according to the British source~ even if the Sultan himself 
had been attacked, not one of them would have stirred hand or foot to drive the 
attackers away. That situation cost the Sultan dear; more than a lakh of rupees, 
which went to the benefit of the Chiefs in the shape of food or presents. 
At the same time the Omani people's attitude towards the Sultan and the 
response Abdul-Aziz received during his campaign proved that he was wrong in 
his judgement that the Omanis, because of their illiteracy, would follow anyone 
prepared to lead them. If that had been true he should have succeeded in his 
campaign to assume the throne of Muscat. Such opinions were strange about the 
people he wanted to rule. He did not fail simply because he did not have the 
money to purchase the tribal leaders adherence, as the Sultan had managed to do 
for a while, but seems he to have failed to win over the Omanis by his own 
personal qualitie@ The opinion expressed in the Persian Gulf Residency about 
Abdul Aziz personally was that he was a little too much of an autocrat, but best 
fitted, by education, to succeed his late brother on the throne of Muscat. If so 
what went wrong with him and why did the British government not support him? 
The reasons were as follows: 
1: Abdul-Aziz had no son. So, in the event of his death without an heir, 
the succession might again be disputed, and fresh difficulties would arise. 
2: Sultan Faisal bin Turky had a son and had no problem of that kind . 
He had governed for a year and nine months, and though he was not experienced 
66. F.O. 54(27, Political Res. to For.Sec., 29 May 1888. 
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at first. he was managing to solve some of his problems in time. He also did his 
best to meet the wishes of the British Government "and he appears to meet the 
promise to be able and willing to fulfil all the conditions we require". 
3: In showing the Sultan merely their nominal support the Chiefs party 
in fact strengthened Sultan Faisal's political position in the eyes of the British 
Government. It appeared to them that the majority of the people of Oman had no 
wish to disturb Faisalts Government. Accordingly they concluded "that in 
recognizing Saiyid Faisal we shalI be giving effect to the wishes of the chiefs and 
people of the country 67". 
4: The British subjects, both Hindu Baniyan and Muslem Khojas, or 
Lawatiyeh as the local Omani called them, were confined entirely to the coast 
towns and held the trade of Oman in their hands. The value of the property they 
owned amounted to many lakhs of rupees. Any plunder by the Qmanis from the 
interior would impose heavy losses upon them. Therefore British policy as far as 
these British subjects were concerned, "seems to be principally concerned in 
securing a ruler able and willing to give effect to the wishes of the British 
Government, and strong enough so to fortify and hold the coast towns as to give 
due protection to our subjects therein68". 
Abdul-Aziz made a lot of effort to incite the people of Oman to revolt 
against the Sultan but he ended in frustration, a result which indicated the 
weakness of his cause. He took refuge with Sheikh of Abu-Dhaby, H.HZayid 
bin-Khalyfeh, and finally in April 1890 he proceeded to Bushire, where he was 
interviewed by the Resident, Colonel Ross, and deported to Bombay69. This 
outcome was probably an acceptable enough solution to Abdul-Aziz himself for 
several reasons; First he had decided not to return to his old headquarters of 
Samad-e-Sha,n because the situation of this town in the centre of the country 
67. Ibid. 
68. Ibid. 
69. Govt. Ind., For. Dept. to Major A. C. Talbot, 20 July 1891, in The Persian. Gulf 
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without easy access to the sea could mean isolation and blockade there Secondly, 
Samad-e-Sha,n would be poor compensation for one who had desired to make 
himself ruler of the country. Thirdly, Samad was poor in comparison to the El-
Baatn.eh coas~ El-Sharkyeh or EI-JabeI-EI-Akhdar (the Green Mountain) 
provinces of Oman. Fourthly, in returning to Samad he would not have received 
the same degree of support that he had before as he have would been seen as a 
failure. Finally, going to Bombay did have possible compensations. He would be 
in a safer position under British government protection. He would not be out of 
touch with events and he might make Faisal uneasy: the Sultan w~ indeed, 
supported by the British Govememnt but he too had its potential backing in that 
should circumstances change he might be appointed through British support as the 
Sultan of the country, as his brother Turky had been. So the chance of being 
Sultan after being in Bombay was better than being at Samad-e-Sha,n in Oman 
proper. Moreover sailing from Bombay to Muscat could be quicker than 
travelling within Oman. In fact, after eight years, relations between the British 
government and the Sultan deteriorated, opening up precisely such a possibility in 
1898. Abdul-Aziz was a very likely successor as Sultan in place of Faisal if there 
was no better alternative, such as the son of Faisal, Taimur. However, Abdul Aziz 
seems to have been a danger not to Faisal alone but also to the Sultan of Zanzibar. 
"In 1891 the Sultan of Zanzibar offered him an allowance of Rs.600 a month, on 
the express conditions that he did not attempt to go to Zanzibar, or to apply to the 
Sultan for more money. He was advised by the Government of India to accept 
this offer, and was warned against disturbing the peace of either Zanzibar or 
Muscat70•'1 
70. Aitchison, Collection. p. 278. 
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Section Five 
The recognition of the Sultan 
After it had become clear that Abdul-Aziz was giving up his resistance, the British 
Residency inclined to think that the time had arrived "when we may in all fairness 
give Saiyid Faisa! the benefit of our support by formal recognition, and the fact of 
our doing so would have a good moral effect in itself, and would, moreover, 
strengthen Saiyd Faisal's hands and help to check the tendency to disturbance71". 
This was to be carried out in the form of active support simiIar to that given to his 
father. It should not be limited to Muscat and Mutrah. but to all the sea coastal 
towns inhabited by British subjects. This policy, if carried out, would maintain 
the advantage to the British which they had possessed through the administrative, 
commercial and customs services along the coast. Accordingly any attempt by 
Faisal's rivals would be resisted by the British Government72. But the British, in 
contrast to the time of Turky, started to be aware of the rights of direct 
interference in Oman's political situation because," by the armed intervention of 
the British Government, the probability is therefore that future rulers of Muscat 
will always be more or less dependent on our support, whoever they are". So they 
measured their action in Oman, "by the limitation of armed interference as a rule 
to the protection of British interests, and by careful avoidance of all interference 
in internal affairs". They also put limitations on how far the Omani ruler could go 
in asking for British support and to depend on himself as much as he could. "The 
ruler, however, ought not to be led to rely too entirely upon us or to neglect 
defensive measures, while his power to take advantage of our support to use 
oppressive measures is limited by the little actual hold he really has over the 
interior of the country". This policy became clear during the revolt of 1895, when 
the Sultan had to fight by himself to defend his capital Muscat and received no 
direct support from the British73• So the acknowledgement and support Faisal 
71. F.O. 54/27, Resident to For. Dept., GovL Ind., 9 Nov. 1893. 
72. F.O. 54/27, For. DePL, GovL Ind. to Resident, 9 Feb. 1896. 
73. F.O. 54/27, Muscat Agent to Resident, 17 Oct 1895. 
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would receive would be on. this basis. For how long did they carry out that new 
policy of no direct interference? Or was it the kind of partial commitment to be 
carried out or not as necessary? Briefly, the answer is that the British carried on 
interfering into every aspect of Oman till the second half of the twentieth century, 
and the Omani Sultans carried on relying on British support and on finance by 
British subjects, whenever there was resistance by the Omanis against their 
regime. 
However the British this time found no alternative for the Muscat 
succession but to acknowledge Faisal and to carry on subsidizing him by 
Zanzibar's 40,000 dollars annually to enable him to hold his power over Muscat. 
Without that he could not well carry on the administration. It was necessary for 
British interests that de facto Government should be strong enough to maintain 
good order in Muscat and Mutrah74• But the initiative of recognition came from 
the Political Agency in Muscat. On 23 February 1890 Major C.E. Yate, the 
Political Agent in Muscat, wrote to Colonel E.C. Ross, the Political Resident in 
the Persian Gulf; "I have the honour to address you on the subject of the 
recognition by the Government of His Highness Said [Sayyed] Faisal as Sultan of 
Muscat." In his recommendation to recognize Faisal formally, Major Yate 
suggested that the opportunity should be taken to place "our relations with the 
Muscat Government on a more definite footing, that is to say, that we should seek 
such treaty conditions as would constitute England the paramount power7S". The 
Resident fully supported Major Yate's suggestion and his estimate of the political 
condition of Oman, namely that "both Chiefs and people are actuated by sordid 
mercenary objects, coupled with the resolve to gain their objects and maintain the 
real power in their own hands by a 'trimming' policy", therefore meant that "we 
have to deal with matters as they are not as they ought to be". But the Resident 
remarked that the Political Agent in Muscat was mistaken in believing that the 
74. F.O. 54/27. Resident to For. Dept.. Govt. Ind.. 20 June 1888. 
75. F.O. 54/27. Ross to For. Dept.. Govt. Ind .• 30 March 1890. 
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subsidy was to be continued in any circumstances. The Resident's understanding 
of that question was that the subsidy could be continued to any ruler of the Muscat 
State if he was acceptable to the British Government. In other words, the subsidy 
should not be regarded as a right for an Omani ruler but as a privilege. The 
Resident had special reasons for recommending payment of the subsidy to Faisal, 
before his fonnal recognition, but now the situation had changed and Faisal had to 
prove his loyalty to British interests. The Resident realized that the strategic 
position of Oman put it on a special footing as regards to British interests, and 
neither France nor any power could with justice deny that Oman fell legitimately 
within the sphere of British influence. The Resident's view was that there was no 
reason to apprehend any diminution of that influence. He therefore wrote the 
Government of India supporting the recognition of Faisal, adding ''1 therefore 
would adhere to my opinion that it would be undesirable to impose any special 
conditions when recognizing Faisal as Sultan of Muscat76". 
On 27 March 1890,the Viceroy's Foreign Secretary sent a telegram to 
the Resident: "recognition of Faisal approved and special conditions not 
desired''77. Receiving this approval the Resident crossed the Gulf to Muscat in 
the Indian Marine ship Lawrence,and arrived there orr 6 April. He told Faisal the 
news. It I am instructed to inform Your Highness that it affords His Excellency the 
Viceroy and the Governor -General of India in Council much pleasure to 
recognize your Highness as Sultan of Muscat, and to continue with Your Highness 
the same relations of friendship as have existed between the two States from the 
time of Saiyd Sa,eed -bin Sultan to that of Your Highness's late father, Saiyid 
Turley. His Excellency the Viceroy hopes that Muscat and Oman will enjoy peace 
and prosperity under Your Highness' rule". He went on , "it is a gratification to 
me to convey this message to the son of my late honourable friend Said Turki, to 
whom it was my welcome duty to make a similar intimation nearly twenty years 8-
76. Ibid. 
77. -F.O. 54(27,For. Dept. Govt Ind. to Resident. 27 March 1890. 
ago". He ended "I beg to tender my own best wishes and felicitations to your 
Highness on this occasion and those of the British officers present". Faisal replied 
to the Resident requesting him to convey to the Viceroy the expression of his 
respectful acknowledgments. He said; "my intention is to maintain to the full the 
same relations as existed with the British Government in the time of my father; 
and to act up to all the engagements undertaken by my father and his predecessors 
in the Government of Muscat". Sultan Faisa! went on; "it is my earnest desire to 
be guided in all important matters of policy by the advice of the British 
Government and to so conduct the government as to secure the continued 
friendship and approbation of His Excellency the Viceroy and the British 
Government"78. 
This was a very special occasion for Faisal~ one which he had been 
waiting to celebrate for a long time. It was certainly a special occasion and 
celebration for Muscat's people as well after the fighting which overshadowed the 
country for a long time. This is what the Resident reported about the occasion of 
the Sultan's recognition, "Her Majesty's Ship Mariner being in harbour, Captain 
Arbuthnot, R.N., and some of his officers as well as Captain Chandler and officers 
of the Lawrence accompanied me with Surgeon Jayaker to the Palace, where 
Sayid Faisal received us in Durbar, and in the presence of His Highness's brothers 
and the principal inhabitants the announcement was made by me verbally, and 
afterwards read aloud by the [British] Agency Moonshi. A salute of 21 guns was 
fired from the Lawrence in honour of the Sultan, and afterwards the forts and 
shipping were decorated with flags791t. The British Government approved the 
Resident's proceedings in Muscat for the recognition of Faisa! as Sultan80• The 
Resident for his part suggested Ita kharita from His Excellency the Viceroy to His 
Highness Saiyid Faisal would be opportune, and would certainly be the cause of 
78. F.O. 54{l7, Resident to the For. Dept, Govt. Ind., Pwport of address to His Highness 
Sayid Faisal, and His Highness' reply, Apr. 1890. 
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much gratification to the newly recognized Sultan 81". The suggestion was 
accepted. On 23 May 1890 Lord Lansdowne, Viceroy and Governor-General of 
India, sent to his 'Honoured and Valued Friend' Sultan Faisal a very friendly letter. 
He wrote "I have read with pleasure the reply of your Highness to the 
communication addressed to you at my request by Colonel Ross, on the occasion 
of Your Highness's formal recognition by the Government of India as Sultan of 
Muscat". The Viceroy assured the Sultan, "I shall always feel the greatest interest 
in alI that concerns Your Highness's welfare and the prosperity of your dominions. 
I desire to express the high consideration, & c~ 82". With full recognition by the 
British Government of India Faisal would sit more securely and comfortably on 
his throne and be better able to face his opponents either from his own family or 
others. Abdul Aziz was under British guard in Bombay, while his friend Sheikh 
Humood El-Jahhafi left Ibraheem in Rustak alone and went back to EI-Sharkey-
eh83• In May His Highness Sayyid Faisal, went with his brother in the Sultanee 
steamer to Soor where he arranged meetings and solved problems between tribes 
in the vicinity, an indication that his standing was such that he could act as judge 
between his people. However, although the social and political situation was 
peaceful and friendly, and the people of Muscat managed to entertain again and 
enjoy some tranquillity, the Sultan and his people were afflicted by natural 
misfortunes. While the sounds of the Sultan's festival drums and songs perhaps of 
leywa, Soma, and Rasfah were still fresh in people's memories in Muscat, and 
about only two months after his formal recognition by the British, a cyclone 
visited the city on 8-9 June 1890, causing much loss of life and property through 
the powerful winds and floods. Over 700 persons were killed on land and sea, 
Muscat was greatly damaged and people panicked. Eye witnesses saw houses 
falling, and date trees in the interior badly damaged. Native shipping severely 
81. F.O. 54/27, Resident to the For. Dept, GovtInd., 23 Apri11890. 
82. F.O. 54/27, Lansdowne to Faisal, 23 May 1890 .. 
83. Talbot to For. Dept, Govt Ind., 20 July 1891 in The Persian Gulf Administration Reports 
1890-1899. vol IV, (A.E.1986).p.15. 
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suffered. People thought it was their last day 84. Moreover from the political side 
there was another storm waiting for the Sultan strong enough to blow him out of 
his throne. For only five years did the Sultan enjoy peaceful relations with the 
Chiefs of EI-Sharkey-eh. They then surprisingly found a new ally on the Eastern 
coast of Africa in 1895. The generator of that storm was Faisal's cousin the Sultan 
of Zmzibar Haamid-bin-Thuwaini, who decided to reunite his grandfather Saeed's 
Afro-Asian Empire under his sovereignty. It was only the bravery of his wife and 
the help of the British agent which allowed the Sultan to escape to Jalaly Fourt 
and save his life8S • 
Conclusion 
The British government had not been confident of Faisal's capacity to 
survive had Abdul Aziz persisted with his resistance. By giving up in 1890 Abdul 
Aziz helped Britain to recognize Faisal as Sultan. But giving Abdul-Aziz refuge 
in Bombay was not only for keeping him under watch, or for his own protection 
but probably also to show the Sultan two things: firs4 that Great Britain alone was 
responsible for preventing a revival of his threat to the Sultan, and, secondly, that 
any action of his harmful to British interests might mean a revival of the threat. 
When the Sultan's relations with the British Government deteriorated nine years 
after his recognition, Mead, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, suggested 
in 1899 to the Government of India that "the arrival of Abdul Aziz-bin-Saeed, the 
84. Ibid; The Times 10 June 1890. Mahfoodah bint Muhammed bin Nasser AI Hamadani. 
the writer's grandmother remembers this as one of the Most important occasions during 
Sayed Faisal's reign; her father. Muhammed bin Nasser. was accused of assisting the 
1895 rebellion by allowing the tribes to use his house as a station from which to attack the 
Sultan's palace. a matter denied by her; the house was certainly used during the dark. but 
that was beyond the knowledge of her father who welcomed the tribes as just friends. and 
who was taken by surprise. as the Sultan himself did. After the revolution was over his 
house was searched and all the belongings were thrown outMuhamrned bin Nasser was 
forced to exile in Zanzibar were he died leaving behind his family in Muscat Her brother 
Saleh bin Muhammed bin Nasser who later worked with Sultan Taimur bin Faisal. was 
killed by the Sultan himself. in a 'friendly joke' by a seemingly empty pistol. in Soor-town 
sometime before his abdication in 1932. 
85. Phillips. Oman: a History. p. 149. The writer's private information is that. when the 
Sultan escaped to Jalaly the Banyans (Hindus) and the Khojas (Muslim Shee,ahs) 
supplied the Sultan with food and ammunition by boats from Mutrah and helped his 
confrontation against the rebels. 
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Sultan's uncle, on the Oman Coast, would probably be the signal for a general 
rising against Saiyid Feyusal-bin-Turky, for his unfriendly attitude towards the 
British. If the Government of India decide not to stand in the way of Abdul-A~ 
it will, I believe, be easy to make satisfactory arrangements with him, for he is 
said to be eager to return to Muscat as Ruler, and his long residence in India has 
given him a far more accurate conception of our power and sense of justice than 
his nephew possesses." The Resident said that it ought to be "known that the 
British Government will not be averse to a change in the person of the Ruler of 
Muscat, and will not support Sayid Feysul against his uncle;. should the latter 
decide to renew his claims to the throne"86. However it was thought that Abdul 
Aziz was too old to be a Sultan while Faisal had a son who could succeed him. 
Probably French opposition was also a factor. 
By the turn of the nineteenth century Muscat became in all but name a 
British protectorate and the Albu-Sa,eed the instrument of imperial machinations, 
while at the top of the Omani political and economic system were many British 
nationals. The Government of India exploited the Sultan's weakness as much as 
possible, limiting his foreign relations in such a way as to serve only British 
interests. The next chapter will try to highlight aspects of this. 
86. F.O. 54/29, Political Resident to Govt. Ind., 21 May 1899. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PROJECT FOR A BRITISH PROTECTORATE OVER MUSCAT 
1890-1895 
Introduction 
The historical background to the idea of a protectorate over Muscat could be 
traced from as early as 11 February 1873. The story began when the Government 
of India brought to the attention of the government in London that the Turkish 
authorities in Yemen were trying to induce the Chiefs of certain tribes near Aden 
to acknowledge the supremacy of the Ottoman Sultan in Istanbul. The British 
government "expressed their opinion that any interference on the part of the 
Turkish Government with those chiefs who had treaties with or received stipends 
from us was most dangerous to our interests at Aden and should most 
peremptorily be prevented." Accordingly they suggested, "if Her Majesty's 
Government considered such a course desirable, to take the Chiefs directly under 
their protection, and to engage to defend them from aggression". The Duke of 
Argyll, the Secretary of State for India, informed the Viceroy of India that the 
Foreign Office wished for distinct proof of the right to take the Yemen Chiefs 
under protection. However, much correspondence took place before compromise 
proposals were worked out making possible an agreement with the Turks. "The 
Government of India accepted these proposals, but recommended an extension of 
the Protectorate scheme by including within it certain tribes occupying portions of 
the Hadramaut Coast north-eastwards between Aden and Muscat territory". They 
recommended, "that a small sum of money should be spent in establishing once 
for all an effective protectorate over the Arab tribes from Sheikh Saiyid to the 
frontiers of Oman, thus excluding all chance of foreign interference in Aden or 
between Aden and Muscat". If an agreement could be made with the Turks, well 
and good. "If not, we would lay down the limits of our protectorate without their 
consent, and would require them to respect it". It soon became obvious that such 
an agreement was impossible, and the proposals were not pressed to a conclusion 
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in consequence of a report from the British Ambassador at Istanbul that the Sultan 
would feel considerable irritation and anxiety if he heard such an agreement was 
to be suggested. So the proposals in that shape were kept in reserve, and the 
matter was delayed for about seventeen years till after the Sultan Faisal's 
recognition in 1890 by the British government l . 
Section Two 
The Unauthorized Treaty 
Right after the Sultan's recognition by the British Government, Colonel Ross, the 
Political Resident, took his reward from the Sultan. He concluded with him a new 
commercial treaty which seems to have been the price of recognition of the Sultan 
in the same month (April 1890). It is interesting to note that this was done even 
without any authority given to him either by the Government of India or by the 
India Office. He sent four copies to the Government of India, two in English and 
two in Arabic, all bearing the signature of the Sultan and himself, for ratification2• 
As was mentioned above, Colonel Ross was not given authority to sign 
the treaty on H.M.Government's behalf, but during the time of Sultan Turky, on 
November 15 1887, he had been given authority to ascertain whether the Sultan 
would be prepared to accept revision of the old commercial treaty following the 
provision of the new commercial treaty with Zanzibar. A draft of the proposals 
was sent to the Resident which with certain alterations would be acceptable3• But 
the Resident misunderstood the instruction and carried out negotiations and signed 
1. Tuson, British Policy, 11, D/11-14. 
2. P.O. 54/25, Ross to Cunningham, For. Dept, Govt. Ind., 23 Apr. 1890; Talbot to For. 
Dept., 20 July 1891, The Persian Gulf Administration Reports, volA, 1890-1899, 
(Archive Editions, 1986), 
3. P.O. 54/25, Ross to For. Dept, Govt. Ind., 1 Sep 1887, 14 Oct. 1887; Crawford, For. 
Dep., Govt. Ind. to Political Resid., 5 Nov. 1887; Political Resid. to For.Dept., 
GovtInd.,5 Nov. 1887; and Draft Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
between Her Majesty and His Highness the Sultan of Muscat; enc1.4 in no. 1076-E, Sir H. 
M. Durand, For. Dept, Govt. Ind. to the Political Resid., 28 May 1888; Political Resid. to 
For. Dept., Govt. Ind., 12 July 1888; enc1.6 in no.1654-E., W. H. Cornish, For. Dept., 
Govt. Ind. to Political Resid., 15 Aug. 1888. Later it was suggested by the Resident that 
the question of imposing restriction on arms and ammunition into Muscat territory might 
be left to be dealt with as occasion arose. India agreed with that. 
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the treaty on behalf of Her Majesty's Government after Turley's death, with the 
new Sultan Faisal. The government of India, and the India Office, though they 
regarded Colonel Ross as having exceeded the instructions given to him, 
considered that despite the absence of authority on the part of the Political 
Resident to act in the matter as Plenipotentiary, it did not necessarily vitiate the 
transaction and they would recommend that the treaty be accepted and ratified. 
Lord Cross, Secretary of State for India, informed the Foreign Office about the 
issue, and asked "to be favoured with the views of the Marquis of Salisbury in 
respect to the terms of the proposed treaty and upon the question whether its 
execution should be considered undesirable by the absence of sufficient authority 
on the part of the Political Resident. If it is not validated, His Lordship as at 
present advised, is inclined to support the recommendation of the government of. 
India that it should be accepted and ratified in its present form4" However the 
Government of India asked the Home Government whether that treaty was 
considered undesirable. They could regard it as an informal preliminary, and the 
Resident could be empowered to enter into a treaty on the terms set forths. 
Although the Government of India sent to the Home Government the 
unauthorized treaty which the Resident had signed with the Sultan, they criticised 
the Resident for misusing his authority. H.S. Barnes, Deputy Secretary to the 
Government of India, notified the Resident, "that the usual formalities have not 
been observed in its execution. No authority had been conferred upon you as 
Plenipotentiary of Her Majesty for the purpose of negotiating the treaty". He went 
on: "the proposed treaty [was] to enable you to ascertain whether the Sultan was 
prepared to accept the amended draft. If you had submitted the accepted draft to 
the Government of India for the purpose of having the copies engrossed, an 
opportunity would then have been afforded to the Governor-General in Council to 
obtain for you the neccessary authority to conclude the negotiation". He also 
4. F O. 54/25, I. O. to P. 0.,9 Oct 1890. 
5. p.o. 54/25, For. Dept, Govt Ind. to Cross, 8 Sep. 1890. 
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noticed that in the last article of the signed copies of the treaty, there was an 
erasure which had not been initialled by the Sultan and by the Resident. He 
insisted that any alteration in an engrossment of a treaty should be initialled by the 
contracting parties before signature6. 
In London at the India Office, too, Lord. Cross was inclined to support 
the ratification of the treaty in its present form 7. The India Office found some 
cases similar to the present case, such as the cession of Heligoland, which not 
only was signed by Sir P. Anderson without any full power, but contained no 
ratification clause. Sir E. Malet, who also signed it, did have full power himself, 
but there are also many cases where treaties have been signed without any full 
power at all. If it was thought expedient to uphold such treaties, they had not been 
invalidated on that acount. In the case of Resident Ross, although he was not 
empowered to sign a treaty in the Queen's name, there were numerous instances 
which could be cited in which this has been done for one reason or another. It 
could be therefore proceeded with in the present instance if the treaty was 
considered satisfactory. Their view also was that the commercial department 
would no doubt report positively on the commercial stipulation which seemed 
satisfactory. The India Office made a number of general observations about the 
treaty. First, there was the absence of a clause "providing for the period of the 
duration of the treaty which would therefore when ratified be interminable, 
because that is undesirable in Commercial treaties. The omission could be 
fOImally ratifed, by a statement in the protocol of the Ratification". They 
suggested 12 years for the duration of the treaty, with one year's notice thereafter 
of termination. Secondly, nothing was stated "as to what becomes of the existing 
convention of the 31 May 1839. If it has lapsed it would be better to say so, and 
this also might be done in the same protocol". Thirdly, the Order in Council of 
November 4 1867 was considered sufficient to enable the consul to act under 
6. F.O. 54/25, H.S.Bames, For. Dept, Gov. Ind., to the Resident, 4 Sep. 1890. 
7. F.O. 54/25, no.l09, E.148. Commercial Treaty with Sultan of Muscat, 9,10 Oct. 1890. 
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Articles 13 to 17. Fourthly, the second paragraph of Article 12 was probably in 
excess of legal powers8• 
The Foreign Office debated the question thoroughly and also consulted 
the Order in Council which gave sufficient power to enable the Consul to act 
under articles 13 and 17. It was also thought that the phrase 'British Law' in the 
'Order' was not correct, it should be 'English law', but then it was noted that there 
was nothing wrong in this as it was an ordinary form for an act under foreign 
jurisdiction Acts of that era (1867). In addition the Foreign Office was concerned 
very much with the question of Deserters from ships-of-war, a matter raised by 
the India Office as well9• The Admiralty should first be consulted. With some 
powers the British Government had "treaty stipulation for the mutual surrender of 
deserters from ships of war but, if there is no act of parliament enabling the Queen 
to give up such foreign deserters, a writ of Habeas Corpus would protect them 
and we [the British Government] could not fulfil our part of the contract The 
Foreign Deserters Act 1852 applied only to seamen deserters from foreign 
merchant vessels alien within H M's dominions. (The territories of the East India 
Company being now of course included in that term). Therefore this section had 
no application at all to foreign seamen deserters (whether from men of war or 
merchant vessels) which are lying [in the] international waters other than that at 
the time". The government must consider the paragraph entirely apart from any 
provisions of the Foreign Deserters Act. In the case of Muscat the British 
Government could only promise that "in the case of men deserting from ships of 
H.H. the Sultan or his subjects, and who have taken refuge on board of a British 
vessel in harbour or in the house of a British subject on the shore of Muscat, the 
British consular official or in his absence the Captain or house occupant, shall 
unless there is reason to the contrary, take the necessary steps to cause to quit the 
vessel or premises for the purpose of being returned to the Sultan's authorities." 
8. Ibid. 
9. F.O. 54/25, (intern), 28 Oct 1890. 
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As to the writ of Habeas Corpus, even if it were applicable it would not prevent 
the Captain of a man-of-war turning an unauthorized intruder out of his ship or, to 
use the more elegant phraseology of the draft treaty, taking the necessary steps to 
cause him to quit the vessel. But 1; was there any power to surrender deserters 
from ships of war who took refuge in British territory? And 2; what was the legal 
position of a British ship in a foreign port? The reply to the first question was that 
there was no power to surrender deserters from ships of war who take refuge in 
British territory, and to the second question that a British ship of war, even in a 
foreign port, is strictly speaking British territory. But the Foreign Office wanted 
to be sure of the power of the British Commander in such cases, for instance as to 
expelling from on board intruders without authorized powers. The Foreign 
Deserters Act 1852 gave no power to surrender deserters from foreign ships of 
war, but the act was a legal power whereby deserters could be surrendered from 
British ships of war. Though "such may possibly exist; if it does not. a man 
deserting from a ship of the Sultan and taking refuge on board a British ship of 
war in the harbour at Muscat could scarcely be surrendered as provided in article 
12". 
The home Government found that there was no objection to the treaty 
on commercial grounds. But it was bound to consult the Admiralty and the 
Colonial Office for their observations 10. Also it was suggested that the duration of 
the treaty should be limited and the commercial treaty between Oman and Great 
Britain of 31 May 1839 should be superseded by the new one. It should be stated 
that the old one would cease to be in force as soon as the new treaty came into 
operation. A more important suggestion was to insert a clause stipulating that 
there should be no cession of any part of the Sultan of Muscat's dominions to any 
foreign power except Great Britain. That should be made as a declaration on the 
exchange of Ratification. 
10. F.O. 54/25 .• Foreign Office minutes on the question of Commercial Treaty with the 
Sultan of Muscat, 9,10,17,20,27,28 Oct 1890. 
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While this was being discussed another suggestion was on its way to 
the India Office from the Government of India, for a protectorate over Muscat. 
Section Three 
Proposed Protectorate Over Muscat 
Five months after Faisal's recognition by the British Government and while the 
treaty was still being discussed in London, the policy in India towards Muscat 
seems to have crystalized and an explicit proposal was made to place Muscat 
under British protection. In 1890, a suggestion was made to the Government of 
India to place relations on a more definite footing at an opportune time perhaps by 
a declaration of formal protection. Opposition was expected from France, which 
jointly with Britain had declared its respect for Muscat's independence in 186211. 
When on 8 September 1890 the Viceroy of India, Lord Lansdowne, wrote to 
Cross explaining his views, he suggested a preliminary understanding with 
France. "Her Majesty's Government are in a position to judge of the validity of 
any objection that France might raise to the establishment of a British protectorate 
in Muscat, to assess the cost at which such objection could be removed, and 
consequently to decide whether it is worth while at the present time to move at all 
in the matter". He mentioned four cases in which the British Government had 
assumed the role of a protecting power. First, on the death of Sa,eed bin Sultan in 
1856, Lord Canning had decided that Muscat and Zanzibar should remain 
separate, thereby solving the dispute between Sa,eed's two successors, his sons 
Majid of Zanzibar and Thuwainy of Muscat He had also ruled that Zanzibar in 
return for remaining independent should pay 40,000 crowns annually to Muscat. 
This payment went on until the time of Faisal. Secondly, no Sultan of Muscat had 
been able to establish himself effectively since the time of Imam Sa,eed bin Sultan 
without ftrst obtaining the recognition of the British government, whereas such 
recognition had never been sought from any other foreign government Thirdly 
11. Briton Cooper Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967) 
pp.18-19. 
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"between 1866-1881, the Government of India several times intervened in the 
dynastic disputes of the Muscat State. Oaimants or pretenders were interned in 
India, were prevented from attacking a reigning Sultan, were given allowances, 
and were otherwise dealt with as only a power, recognized as possessing practical 
supremacy, could deal with such people". He gave examples, during Sultan 
Turley's reign, when Great Britain was the only power to help him against his 
rebellious subjects in 1874, 1877 and 1883. Finally, the Dutch Treaty with 
Muscat provided conclusive evidence, in that the Dutch requested British c0-
operation in negotiating it: "the Captain of the Netherlands' corvette Batavia who 
was in charge of the treaty, left it in the Resident's hands, and Colonel Prideaux 
sent it to the Political Agent at Muscat to negotiate with the Sultan". 
There were other reasons for suggesting a Protectorate. Lansdowne 
pointed out that British trade with Muscat had far exceeded that of any other 
European or American country. He calculated the number of the British subjects 
resident in Muscat as out of proportion to those of any other nations. Great 
Britain, moreover, was the only country which had telegraph interests in Muscat. 
He concluded, that policing of the Omani coast had been exercised for many years 
past by Her Majesty's ships alone12• 
This was the case which was made by the Government of India for a 
protectorate over Muscat. Cross referred the matter to the Foreign Secretary, 
supporting and quoting the points raised by the Viceroy. When British relations 
with Muscat for nearly a century past were taken into consideration, a declaration 
of a formal protectorate could be justified at the earliest convenient opportunity. 
Neither France nor any other power could with justice deny that Muscat fell 
legitimately within the sphere of British influence. Regarding the declaration of 
1862, this had been modified in 1890 by French recognition of an exclusive 
British protectorate over Zanzibar, so if that was possible in Zanzibar, "it is 
advisable of withdrawing altogether from the declaration .. , and establishing an 
12. F.O. 54(27, Govt. Ind. For. DepL to Cross, 8 Sep. 1890. 
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exclusive British protectorate also over Muscat". It must be left to Salisbury to 
decide the appropriate time and the occasion on which" to try and win French 
agreement to this13• The Viceroy also wrote privately to Viscount Cross 
suggesting a secret Convention with Muscat attached to the commercial treaty by 
which Sultan Faisal should place the management of his foreign relations in 
British hands. 
At the Foreign Office, Thomas Sanderson did not agree with that view. 
He did not see how such an agreement could be kept secret, as soon as the Sultan 
had any foreign relations, which must be under his own operation. Though at 
present he had none, and he supposed that the convention would really be 
designed to prevent the Sultan having any treaty with other countries, the 
convention would be a departure from the agreement with France. He preferred 
not to attack the question at present, but for it to be kept in reserve for a future 
negotiation with France. Lord Salisbury agreed with Sanderson's view. On this 
matter Sir Percy Anderson asked Sir E. Hertslet whether there was any 
engagement with Muscat preventing the Sultan from ceding his territory to any 
foreign power. Hertslet replied that he was not aware of any engagement, but he 
did not see why a provision should not be attached to the new commercial treaty 
that the Sultan would never sell or mortgage, save to the British Government, any 
portion of his dominions. He did not think this could be protested against by the 
French as being a violation of the declaration of 1862. The Treaty department in 
the Foreign Office agreed with Hertslet's suggestion as a wise step that would 
secure the British Government till the time came for assuming a protectorate over 
Muscat and confirmed that it would not be in breach of the 1862 declaration. 
Some suggested proceeding with the matter secretly, but most of the arguments in 
the Foreign Office supported the views of Hertslet that a declaration should 
accompany the commercial treaty. 
13. F.O. 54/57, 1. O. to F. 0.,9 Oct 1890. 
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In a private internal letter Sanderson wrote to K. Neil at the India 
Office that he would receive an official answer to the letter of 9 October which 
recommended withdrawal from the joint declaration. He repeated Lord 
Salisbury's opinion who found it "hardly practicable to enter upon the subject with 
France just now and would prefer to reserve it till a more favourable opportunity". 
Salisbury thought also that "there are obvious objections to the proposal for a 
secret convention or article stipulating that the Imam [the Sultan] should place the 
conduct of his foreign relations in our hands". If a protectorate was "contrary to 
the Declaration this agreement would be equally so. It would be impossible to 
keep it secret. These things always come out and [at] the most inconvenient 
moment". Sanderson pointed out that such an agreement could only be kept secret 
by not taking advantage of it, in which case it might as well not be made. Since 
the Sultan had no foreign relations. Salisbury thought that "it will be better to do 
our best to preserve that blissful condition of things and to postpone the 
protectorate till we can assume it openly and completely" 14, So the idea of 
protection survived but was to be realised only at a convenient time. with French 
consent. In a secret letter dated 16 October 1890 sent by the Foreign Office to the 
India Office. Salisbury promised that in negotiations on other matters with France, 
he would bear in mind the views expressed by Lord Cross and the Government of 
India in relation to Muscat, but that an approach was not advisable just thenIS, 
Nevertheless. in a subsequent letter on 24 October 1890. Salisbury took up 
Hertslet's more modest suggestion, He wrote that "the commercial treaty between 
Great Britain and Muscat which was inclosed in your letter of the 9th September 
would apparently offer an opportunity to propose to the Sultan a Declaration in 
which His Highness should engage that neither he nor his heirs and successors 
would cede, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any portion of his 
Dominions save to Her Britannic Majesty's Government". This would not be 
14. F.O. 54(27. Sanderson to Neil. 15 Oct 1890. 
15. F.O. 54(27. 1. O. to F.O .• 16 Oct 1890. 
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open to interpretation on the part of France as being a violation of the Declaration 
of 1862. Lord Salisbury further assured the Government of India that the 
commercial treaty would be ratified despite its lack of authorization16• In reply 
Viscount Cross agreed with the proposed Declaration by the Sultan as to 'non-
cession of territory'. He told the Foreign Office that he would inform the Viceroy 
that, when the ratification of the new commercial treaty entered into with the 
Sultan was announced, steps would be taken for obtaining from him a Declaration 
to the effect indicated17• This completed the Commercial treaty's formal 
examination by the Foreign Office through its African and Treaty Departmen~ 
but before ratifiaction could take place the views of the Colonial Office and the 
Admiralty were sought18• 
Section Four 
The Treaty and the Declaration 
On November 11890 Salisbury contacted Lord Knutsford of the Colonial Office, 
laying before his Lordship a copy of a "Treaty of Friendship, Commerce ,and 
Navigation, Between Great Britain and the Sultan of Muscat signed at Muscat 
[in] April 18, 1890". The Government of India having recommended that this 
treaty should be accepted and ratified, Salisbury enquired whether Knutsford had 
any objection to offer from the colonial point of view to the stipulations contained 
in the treaty 19. On 7 November 1890 the Colonial office replied that Lord 
Knutsford had no objection to offer, but pointed to the need for correction of two 
names in the treaty: that in the colonial article for words 'the Dominions of 
Canada' and 'Cape' should be substituted the words 'the dominion of Canada', and 
'The Cape of Good Hope'20. This Colonial Office observation was followed by 
Foreign Office corrections. For example, in articles 15 and 17, there was a 
16. F.O. 54(17, Salisbury to Govt Ind. (Secret), 24 Oct 1890. 
17. F.O. 54(17, 1. O. to F. 0., 30 Oct 1890. 
18. F.O. 54(17, 1. O. to F. 0., 31 Oct 1890 
19. F.O. 54(17, F. O. to C. 0., 1 Nov. 1890. 
20. F.O. 54(17, C. O. to F. 0., 7 Nov. 1890. 
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reference to 'British law', that should read 'English law'. Also in article 4, 3rd line, 
the word 'vessel' should read 'vessels' and in Article 6 the word 'manner' should be 
inserted21 • 
In a letter, dated 3 Nov. 1890, to the Admiralty Lord Salisbury pointed 
out that: 1-,"a doubt has been expressed whether H.MGovernment have the 
power to carry out the stipulation of article XIL in so far as they might include the 
surrender of deserters from ships of His Highness the Sultan who might take 
refuge on board of a British ship of war in harbour". He asked his opinion on the 
above point. 2-, there was the question of "the nature of any instructions under 
which the commanding officer of H.M. ships of war could take steps for the 
expulsion from H.M. ships of persons who have taken refuge therein"22. 
On 10 Nov 1890, the Admiralty replied with regard to first point that 
"article 12 requires much consideration, as cases might arise in which it might act 
very prejudicially as regards fugitive slaves, for instance, the owner of a slave 
who had taken refuge on board one of H.M. Ships might obtain his surrender, and 
thus lower the prestige of H.M.ships in the eyes of slave owners and slaves". 
Therefore the Lords Commissioners recommended that the article in question 
should be omitted. With regard to the second point "as Commanding Officer of 
one of H.M.ships is in supreme command in all matters relating to the ship he 
commands, no instructions are required to enable him to exclude or expel anyone 
from his ship whose presence on board he may consider undesirable23" • The 
Foreign Office did not agree with the Admiralty that article 12 should be entirely 
omitted, but only the last paragraph of it. The first 'portion' of the article they 
considered "may be of use to us and is open to no objection". In view of various 
criticisms of the treaty, the best thing would be to suggest to the India Office that 
a new treaty should be signed in place of the old one. For that the following 
points should be taken into consideration; that the last part of article 12 should be 
21. F.O. 54(15, F. O. to 1. O. (cont),II Dec. 1890. 
22. F.O. 54(15, no. 559, F. O. to Admiralty, 3 Nov. 1890. 
23. F.O. 54(15, Admir. to F. 0., 10 Nov. 1890. 
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omi~ errors mentioned by the Colonial Office should be corrected, a 'No 
Cession Declaration' was to be added to the new treaty and there should be 
inserted an article as to the cessation of the convention of 1839. and a duration 
article24. 
On 15 November the Foreign Office consulted the Board of Trade who 
saw no objection to the course which Lord Salisbury proposed to adopt as set 
forth in the draft letter to the India Office which accompanied his letter2S• "The 
Board of Trade note with satisfaction that 5%. import duty which this country has 
enjoyed under the Treaty with Muscat of 1839 is continued by the proposed 
Treaty. for although the direct trade between the United Kingdom and Muscat is 
extremely small, the trade of the latter with India of some importance "26. 
In their letter on 11 Dec. 1890 to the India Office. the Foreign Office 
listed first the Colonial Office corrections to the treaty. They then drew attention 
to Article 12 which might give rise to great difficulties. as the legal power of this 
country extended only to the surrender of deserters from merchant vessels, but the 
first two paragraphs of the Article would be useful, if the Sultan would agree to 
retain them without the last paragraph. If the Sultan would not consent to this, the 
whole of Article 12 should be taken out of the treaty according to the Admiralty's 
suggestion. The treaty should remain in force for 12 years from the date of 
exchange of ratification, and thereafter tenninated at 12 months notice. Since all 
these changes were required it would be best to instruct Colonel Ross, the 
Political Resident, to conclude a fresh treaty containing the necessary 
amendments. It would be considered whether it would be the best to propose that 
the Declaration of 'Non Cession' should be inserted in the treaty itself or should be 
made in a separate Declaration. But in contrast to the duration of 12 years for the 
'Commercial Treaty' the separate Declaration could take a permanent shapeZ7. On 
24. Ibid. 
25. F.O. 54(25. F. O. to Brd. Trd.. 15 Nov. 1890. 
26. F.O. 54(25. F. O. to Brd. Trd.. 9 Dec. 1890; Brd. Trd. to F.O .• 9 Dec. 1890. 
27. F.O. 54(25. 1. 0 .• to F. 0 .• 11 Dec. 1890; 1. O. (internal) 9-30 OcL 1890. 
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1 January 1891, India Office decided on the negotiation of a new Treaty to replace 
the old one signed in April 189()28. 
Section Five 
The French Complaint 
In 1891 a diplomatic exchange took place between the British and the 
French Governments in regard to the Muscat question. The British Government 
raised with the French Ambassador in London the possibility of assuming a 
protectorate over Muscat. That approach brought into play a new issue, as the 
French not only challenged the British desire for a protectorate but their 
intervention over Sultan Faisal's succession, the British Government being 
accused of helping Faisal to succeed his father. On 29 April 1891, Lord Salisbury 
sent the British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Lytton, a letter recording a 
conversation with the French Ambassador in London, in which M. Waddington 
made his complaint29. Waddington's complaint, in particular, was that a change 
had been made in the succession to the throne of Muscat under the advice of the 
Government of India. French suspicions were reinforced by the idea of the 
assunption of a British protectorate over Muscat. Accordingly the British attitude 
was seen by the French as in contravention of the Anglo-French Agreement of 
1862 respecting Muscat's independence3o• On 4 May Lord Salisbury contacted 
the India Office about this new issue, requesting Viscount Cross to furnish him 
with any information about the Viceroy's contacts with the 'Imam' Faisal at the 
time of his recognition31• Cross lost no time in telegraphing to the Viceroy of 
India the substance of Waddington's complaints. Salisbury was told that when the 
late Sultan Turky died in June 1888, "his second son Syud [Seyyid] Faisal 
assumed the government without advice or assistance from the officers of the 
Government of India, who only recognized the new ruler in March 1890 when it 
28. F.O. 54/25, I. o. to F. 0., 11 Dec. 1890, and 2 Jan. 1891. 
29. F.O. 54/27, Salisbury to Lytton, 29 Apr. 1891; I. o. to F.O. (Conf.), 4 May 1891. 
30. F.O. 54/27, Cross to Salisbury, 25 May 1891. 
31. F.O. 54/25, F. O. to I. O. (Cont), 4 May 1891. 
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had become clear that his elder brother did not oppose him and no other aspirant 
was able to oust him". It also would be seen that "as far back as 1881 while the 
late ruler was alive the Government of India declared that the succession to Syud 
Turki should be settled by the Chiefs. and the people of the country". Those facts 
did not support, Cross maintained, the remonstrance of the French Government32• 
No interference had taken place in respect of the succession. The Foreign office 
replied to M.Waddington in these terms33• The Viceroy in his telegram of 13 May 
1891 to the India Office, expressed surprise at the the French complaint, "I don't 
know to what the complaint refers," he went on, "possibly Abdul Aziz, who is in 
Bombay, may have appealed to the French"34. 
Section Six 
The 'Non-Cession' Declaration and· the new treaty 
On 2 September 1891 Viscount Cross forwarded "for deposit in the archives of the 
Foreign Office, the original copy of the Declaration, dated the 20th March, By His 
Highness Seyyid Feysal bin Turky bin Sa,eed, Sultan of Muscat and Oman35". 
The Declaration began: 
'Praise be to God Alone' 
"The object of writing this lawful and honourable Bond is that it is 
hereby convenanted and agreed between His Highness Seyyid Feysal bin 
Turky bin Seyyid, Sultan of Muscat and Oman, on the one part, and Colonel 
Edward Charles Ross, Companion of Star of India, Her Britannic Majesty's 
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, on behalf of the British Government, 
on the other part, that the Seyyid Feysal bin Turky bin Saeed, Sultan of 
Muscat and Oman, does pledge himself, his heirs and successors never to 
cede, to sell, to mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British 
Government, the dominions of Muscat and Oman or any of their 
dependencies. 
In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable Bond 
Seyyid Feysal bin Turki bin Saeed, Sultan of Muscat and Oman, and Colonel 
Edward Charles Ross, Companion of Star of India, Her Britannic Majesty's 
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the former for himself, his heirs and 
successors, and the latter on behalf of the British Government, do each, in the 
32. F.O. 54/25, 1. O. to F. 0.,4,25,26 May, 1891, (French Government Complaint of British 
Interference in Succession.) 
33. F.O. 54/27, Tel., Viceroy to 1. 0., 13 May 1891. 
34. Ibid. 
35. F.O. 54/25, 1. O. to F. 0.,2 Sep. 1891, (Treaty with Muscat, 20 March 1891); Aitchison, 
Collection, p. 279. 
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presence of witnesses affix their signatures on this ninth day of Shaaban one 
thousand three hundred and eight(a.H.) corresponding to the twentieth day 
of March(A.D.) 1891." 
Signed by If Seyyid Feysal bin Turki bin Saee<4 Sultan of Muscat 
and Oman. (And) E.C.Cross, Colonel, Political Resident in the Persian 
Gulf.Ratified by His Excellency 1the Viceroy and Governor General of India, 
at Simla on the twenty third day of May 1891.(and) H.M.Durand, Secretary 
to the Government of India Foreign department"36. 
On 17 September 1891, Cross forwarded to the Foreign Office the 
modified Commercial treaty which had been concluded with the Sultan of Muscat, 
with certain alterations found to be necessary in the Arabic version initialled by 
the Sultan himself. He requested the Foreign Office that when the treaty had been 
ratified, one copy of the treaty might be forwarded for transmission to his 
Highness the Sultan37. However Lord Salisbury was not completely happy about 
the treaty. He observed in a letter to the India Office on the same date that 
"Colonel Ross has followed out the instructions contained in our letter to the India 
Office of 11 Dec. 1890, except as regards the article providing for the termination 
of the treaty". He suggested before that an article should be inserted to the effect 
that the treaty was to remain in force for 12 years from the date of the exchange of 
ratification and was to be thereafter terminable at 12 months notice, given by 
either party. He pointed out that article 23 in the signed treaty dealt not with the 
termination but only with the revision of the treaty. He suggested that the treaty 
should be subject to revision by persons appointed on both sides for this purpose, 
who should be empowered to decide on and adopt such amendments as 
experience should prove to be desirable. The matter of termination might be dealt 
with when the ratifications were exchanged38• The Foreign Office assured the 
India Office that in the protocol of exchange it was understood that under article 
23 of the treaty either of the high contracting parties could terminate the treaty 
after 12 years and after giving 12 months notice39• Copies in English and Arabic 
36. Aitchison, Collection, (Agreement regarding the cession of territory by the Sultan of 
Oman), pp. 317-318. 
37. F.O. 54/25, 1. O. to F. 0., 17 Sep. 1891; Aitchison, Collection, pp. 310-16; F. O. 54/25, 
Govt Ind. For. Dept. (Secret) Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between 
Her Majesty and His Highness the Sultan of Muscat 189l. 
38. F.O. 54/25, Salisbury to I. 0.,17 Sep. 189l. 
39. F.O. 54/25, F. O. to I. 0., 3 Octl89l. 
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of the protocol were sent to the Foreign Office on 22nd April 189240• The treaty 
was to be laid before Parliament with the Protocol of exchange41. 
Copies were also sent to the Board of Trade and the Colonial Office. 
The Colonial Office drew attention to Article 21 of the treaty which provided for 
the accession of the Self-Governing Colonies. The Colonies which expressed a 
desire to be included in the operation of the Commercial treaty were: Natal, 
Queensland, the Colony of Newfoundland, and Canada; all requested that the 
necessary notice be given to His Highness the Sultan by Her Majesty's 
representative in Muscat for accession of the treaty of 19 March 18914Z• "As 
regards to other colonies specially named in Article XXI of the convention: 
Victoria, Tasmania, Western Australia, and New Zealand do not desire to adhere 
to the Convention, and no intimation has been received as to the wishes of New 
South Wales and South Australia". The list of Colonial accessions was also laid 
before Parliament43• 
Section Seven 
The French Reaction 
France reacted quickly while the British commercial treaty with Muscat was 
going through these procedures in the United Kingdom, and therefore Lord 
Salisbury's 'blissful' Muscat position was ended. On 24 April 1893, the Persian 
Gulf Residency Agent translated a report that a French ship with three French 
Consuls for Muscat, Bunder Abbas, and Oman was expected in two months time, 
40. F.O. 54/25, Govt. Ind. For. DepL to Cross, (Secret), 30 March 1892; Lansdowne., P. P. 
Hutchins., A. E. Miller, Viscount Cross to Salisbury, 22 Apr. 1892. 
41. F.O. 54/25, no.86, I. O. to F. 0., 22 Apr. 1891, (Muscat Treaty of Commerce, The Sultan 
of Muscat Ratification). 
42. F.O. 54/25, C. O. to F. 0., 3 Sep. 1892, Muscat Commercial Treaty, (Natal Colony); I. O. 
to C. 0., 8 Sep. 1892, Muscat Commercial treaty (Queensland); Sadler to Muscat PoliL 
Ag., 11 Nov. 1892; no.3, Jayaker. Muscat POliL Ag. to Sadler, 14 Nov. 1892; Sadler to 
Jayaker, 15 Dec. 1892; C. O. to F. 0,4 Mar 1893, Muscat Commercial treaty, (Canada), 
Muscat Commercial Treaty Accession of Colonies. For the treaty and the list of the 
Colonies which acceded under article XXI, see Parliamentary Papers C-6638, 1892. 
Treaty Ss. 1894. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Between Great 
Britain and Muscat, Signed at Muscat, 19 March 1891. (H.M.S.O, 1894). 
43. F. O. 54/25, C. O. to F. 0., Muscat Commercial Treaty Accession and Non-Accession of 
Colonies, 21, 22 Feb. 1894. 
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since there were French subjects requiring French representation. No French 
consuls had been appointed before, because there had been no French subjects in 
those places44. If that story was true, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf 
blamed M.Chapuy, who lived at Bunder Abbas, for his suggestion to the French 
authorities during his recent visit to France4s. On 17 June 1893, the Resident 
reported that in the course of a conversation he had with Monsieur Gues, the 
French Vice-Consul, he learned that the latter was probably destined for Muscat in 
the event of the French Government establishing a Consulate at that place, but that 
it had not yet been decided. "M. Gues told me that he did not understand why 
importance was attached in France to his Government being represented at 
Muscat; and I gathered from what he said that he did not seem to think that French 
interest in that quarter necessitated such an appointment."46. The Government of 
India took the matter seriously and informed the Home Government in a secret 
letter dated 18 July 1893 of the appointment of a French Vice-Consul at Muscat. 
The appointment, they said, appeared to be due to political, rather than to 
commercial, considerations, and French protection to Omani dhows using French 
flags was expected47• In London, although they regarded the case as still 
hypothetical, the Foreign Office considered whether to ask the French in a 
friendly manner if they contemplated such on appointment and whether they 
might agree to abandon the idea, but they decided against such action unless asked 
to do so by the Government of India48• But the Foreign Office communicated 
with the British Embassy in Paris who reported that M. Ottavi had been appointed 
but he had not yet left Paris for his post49. 
On 11 June 1894, Major Sadler, the Political Agent at Muscat, reported 
to the Residency that, "the post-master had received a communication from the 
44. F. o. 54{l7, Translation of a Report by the Residency Agent. at Lingah, no.62, 24 April 
1893. 
45. F.O. 54/27, Talbot to GovL Ind. For. DepL, 9 May 1893. 
46. F.O. 54/27, Hayes Sadler. to GovL Ind. For. DepL (Conf), 17 June 1893. 
47. F.O. 54/27, Lansdowne to Earl of Kimberley (Secret), 18 Jui. 1893. 
48. F.O. 54/27, I. O. to F. 0., 10 Aug. 1893; 1.0. (InL), 29 Sep., 1 OcL 1894. 
49. F.O. 54/27, F. O. minute, 9 Jul. 1894. 
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French Consul-General in Bombay, informing him that the French Government 
had appointed a Vice-Consul at Muscat, and requesting him to retain all letters 
adressed to that officer pending his anival". The Vice-Consul was M. Paul 
Ottavi, who had been lately serving as Dragoman in the French Consulate in 
Zanzibar and he shortly expected to be in Muscat. The Political Agent asked the 
Sultan if he had received any communication from the French Government 
relative to the appointment of a consular officer at his court. The Sultan assured 
him that he had not, and he wished to know from the Political Agent about the 
duties of the French consul in Muscat, as the French had no subjects there. The 
Sultan drew the Political Agent's attention to the question of the Suri dhows and 
the French flagSO• The Resident, F.A. Wilson, on his part reported the matter to 
the Government of India on 29 June 1894, and followed that with another 
interesting letter on the next day about the complication which might reasonably 
be expected to follow the establishment of a French Consular representative at 
Muscat. Despite that the Government of India believed that the Sultan was in a 
position to enforce his authority and jurisdiction over his subjects, it seemed more 
than doubtful whether he had adequate influence over them. According to the 
Resident, the Sultan was considerably disturbed at the prospect of these 
difficulties and so had appealed to the Political Agent for advice and guidance as 
to the course to be pursued. The Resident requested instructionsSl• In fact, the 
Political Agent's most interesting report of 14 June drew attention, in the event of 
such an appointment, to the question of the Suri dhows granted the French flag. 
That "one phase which it is possible that this question may assume would be a 
pretention on the part of the French Vice-Consul to exercise protection over those 
Arabs of Sur who have accepted the French flag and papers". Twenty-eight Suri 
dhows raised the French flag, of which nineteen were owned by Jenebeh and nine 
by Bani bu Hasen. The Sultan, said the Political Agent, had taken absolutely no 
50. F.O. 54/27, Sadler to PoliL Res. (Cont), 11 June 1894. 
51. F.O. 54/27, Political Resid. to GovLlnd. (Cont), 30 June 1894. 
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steps against this, and with six or seven of these dhows visiting Muttrah every 
year, he had never attempted to ascertain in anyone instance by what right use 
had been made of the foreign flag. The Political Agent warned of indications that 
the Jenebeh tribe and possibly some of the Beni bu Hasen would be willing to 
consider themselves as French sUbjects. The French flag was hoisted over the 
house in which M. Chapuy stayed when he visited Sur. He was most favourably 
received there and French flags were flown from the dhows in his honour52 . 
The Government of India in response to the Resident's report instructed 
him to tell the Sultan he should "refer the French Vice-Consul at Muscat to the 
Declaration. dated the 10th March 1862, respecting the independence of Muscat 
and Zanzibar. and to inform him that the assertion of French protection over Suri 
boats in Oman waters would be a contravention of that Declaration"53. Informed 
of their action the home Government approved but were more concerned about 
the consular appointment54. The question of the French flag could be exaggerated 
by the British Government to create a hard time for the newly appointed French 
Consul, but it was important only in relation to the general matter of a protectorate 
over Muscat. These developments, however, were interrupted by the events of the 
1895 revolt and its consequences. But the British wariness about French policy in 
Muscat would stay on the political agenda till 1902, part of this issue emerging 
strongly in 1897, 1898 and after, till finally this flag question was settled in the 
Hague Arbitration in 1905, as will be shown in the forthcoming chapters. 
Conclusion 
The French well understood the British aims in Muscat, and in response 
they lost no time in establishing themselves in Muscat as well, especially given 
52. F.O. 54(27, GovL Ind. For. Dep.to 1. 0., 18 July 1893.; Sadler to GovL Ind. For. Dept 
(Secret), 14 June, 9 Jul. 1894. 
53. F.O. 54(27, GovL Ind. to Resid., 29 August 1894. 
54. P.O. 54(27, GovL Ind. For. DepL to. H. H. Fowler, (Secret), 4 Sep. 1894. 
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their status as joint guarantor with Britain of Muscat independence, by the 18 
March 1862 agreement signed in ParisS5. 
The main reason why the French established a consulate in Muscat 
seems to date from the meeting of Lord Salisbury with the French Ambassador in 
London when the question of a protectorate over Muscat was raised. They seem 
to have taken the matter seriously and decided to act as soon as possible. Two 
otherreasons may be suggested FIrSt, they wanted to spoil the whole British game 
by a counter measure; if the British wanted to protect the Sultan they would in 
retmn. offer protection to his subjects, thereby helping to frustrate British policy in 
Oman. Secondly, after the diplomatic exchanges about alleged British 
interference over Sultan Faisal's succession, the French were convinced that the 
Sultan was expected sooner or later to accept a direct British protectorate. If that 
happened, the French protection to his people would place him in a difficult 
position. The British efforts would be worthless if they ended by protecting a 
Sultan without his people! 
55. See last para. in the conclusion of Chapter 2. 
Introduction 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MUSCAT AND BIRMINGHAM' 
The Birmingham arms trade with the Persian Gulf had begun in about the year 
1810, and increased year by year. In 1887 the trade had reached over £100,0001• 
The arms importation was Muscat's major commercial operation between 1890 
and 19122. Birmingham had been long known in connection with the arms trade 
all over the world. In 1708 the output of gun production in this city grew to over 
150,000 items a year3. In Britain around 1770 the gun industry had gained fresh 
importance because of the French wars and American wars. The British 
government made contracts with gun makers in Birmingham for its own arms 
supply, and there was a growing demand for gun exports from Britain to the 
American continent, and to the colonial and the tropicallands4• It is interesting to 
note that in 1708 guns were exported from Birmingham to Africa, where 
tribesmen were bribed with flint muskets. Many of the guns had reached there in 
the holds of ships carrying missionaries eager to convert the natives to 
Christianity5. If Birmingham's guns reached Africa as early as this period, there 
was a strong possibility of reaching Muscat via Zanzibar. East Africa formed a 
part of Oman's dominions since 1650s and until 1856. The trade in Africa, was 
seriously affected by the general act of the Brussels Conference of 2nd July 18906. 
Because the arms trade was associated with the taking of slaves it was restricted in 
Zanzibar in 18927• This made the interested bodies in Zanzibar pull out of their 
1. Hansard, 4th ser. vol LXIV. 4 to 11 Aug. 1898; Kynoch J. 1 (2), p. 33. 
2. Landen, Oman, p. 139. 
3. Joan Zuckerman and Geoffrey Eley, Birmingham Heritage, (1979), p. 95. 
4. Conrad Gill, History Of Birmingham, vol. 1 (1952), p. 97. 
5. Zuckerman and Eley, Birmingham Heritage, p.95. 
6. Translation of Protocols and General Act of Slave Trade Conference Held At Brussels, 
1889-1890, no. 7, pp. 29-30, Protocol, no. 9, pp. 33-34,174-175 (H.M.S.O. 1890). 
7. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 272. 
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trade and direct it all to the Persian Gulf by 1892. especially to Muscat. Even the 
steamer of Zanzibar's Sultan, for example. was largely involved in the shipmentS. 
In Oman it is not clear whether the Kingdom of Hurmus (9th to the 16th 
centuries) did introduce firearms to Muscat or not. But certainly canon were used 
to bombard Muscat in 1505 by the Portuguese under Alfonso De Albukerk before 
their occupation of the city. It is also not clear when the Omanis started using 
firearms. but certainly they used them during their campaign against the 
Portuguese in 1650, under the Imam Saif Bin Sultan. We are not now able to give 
a precise date at which the firearms industry began in Oman9. In 1834 the treaty 
between the U.S.A. and Oman spoke about the sale of muskets, powder and ball 
by the Americans to the Omani Government, and about selling munitions of war 
in the ports of the Sultan lO• 
In England at the end of 17th century William III employed certain 
manufacturers of the town of Birmingham to supply a quantity of arms for the 
Government service. From that day the arms trade had increased until it became 
one of the most important industries of the town 11. It became the prime factor 
which enabled Binningham to become the centre of gunmaking. The flint gun 
was introduced to Birmingham from Germany, whose origins may have been 
French or Dutch, early in William Ill's reign, and the craftsmen there eagerly took 
up its manufacture and it soon became in general use on most coaches for 
protection against highwaymen. In 1692 Birmingham received an order for arms 
at the rate of 200 muskets per month for a long period. They were used against 
8. Mahmood Ali Daud,BritishRelations with the Persian Gulf 1890-1902, (ph.D., Univ. 
London, 1957), pp. 340-341. 
9. Landen, Oman, p. 146 noticed that the import of European firearms destroyed the Omani 
local arms industry, but he did not mention when that local industry started. However the 
tradition of Omani gun making still exists in individual workshops in the Omani 
countryside today. See Oman daily news paper 9 December 1988, featuring a coloured 
photograph of Ssan,a Al-ttafakk (Gunmaker). 
10. W. S. W. Ruschenberger, M.D., A Narrative Of An Embassy To The Sultan Of Muscat 
And The King Of Siam, vol. 1, (1838), p. 152. 
11. For this account see Zuckerman, Birmingham Heritage, pp. 92-97 and Gill. History of 
Birmingham, pp. 58,98. 
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Louis XIV of France12• Another government order was made for 2,400 muskets 
two years later at a price of 17 shillings each, and five "Birmingham gunsmiths 
were named in that contract. They were: William Bourn, Thomas Moore, John 
West. Richard Weston and Jacob Austin. Between 1804 and 1815, in the latter 
phases of the Napoleonic wars, this town made some three million gun barrels and 
a similar quantity of gun locks for the government. 
Gun trade development in Birmingham did not come easily; its early 
struggling days were full of jealousy and intrigue between Birmingham and 
London. About 1709 a petition from Birmingham craftsmen reached parliament 
complaining of the London men making life difficult for provincial competitors. 
But, despite that, gunmaking in Birmingham grew in strength and became a 
striking example of the imponance of new industries which were setting up there. 
In fact, trade in arms was vital for Birmingham; for example, when wars in France 
caused trade depression and people suffered hunger and unemployment all round 
the country, the city was more fortunate than many others thanks to the gun trade, 
and to the great variety of goods in the small workshops. A small-arms factory 
was built, which extended over 25 acres of land. It developed into the largest 
private arms establishment in Europe. Birmingham's hand-made guns were 
exponed to America in hundreds of thousands at the time of the civil war from 
1861 to 1865, and during the 1860s Birmingham made a radical change in arms 
production methods. The introducing of the American system in arms production 
was regarded as a remarkable development. "The formation of the Birmingham 
Small Arms Co. (BSA) in 1861 initiated a transformation in the making of 
military small arms from a skilled handcraft to the factory production by 
machinery of weapons with interchangeable pans."13. The guns used in the war 
12. Ibid. 
13. Roger Lumley, '''The American System of Manufactures" in Birmingham: Production 
Methods at the Birmingham Small Arms Co. in the Nineteenth Century', Business 
History, 31 (I989),p. 29. This system "was based upon the notion of transfer of skill 
from human to machine, with a very high degree of specialisation and each worker 
responsible for only one or two operations". It had been developed in the American 
Federal Armourics over the fIrst half of the nineteenth century. But that did not mean 
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between Germany and France in 1870 were mostly made in Birmingham, from 
which also came the guns used in South Africa in Jameson's Raid of 1895 which 
precipitated the Boer War. In the twentieth century, Birmingham made an 
enormous contribution to national defence during the 1914-1918 war. The first 
tanks to be made came from Birmingham factories. The city seems to have been 
central to that transformation of world history represented by the universal use of 
firearms. 
As was noticed above, Birmingham initiated its gun trade links with the 
Persian Gulf in 1810. It is interesting to look at how great the impact of the trade 
was on the Gulf and in particular on the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. By the 
1880s the gun trade became the key point of the North-West frontier policy, and 
therefore in British policy-making in Oman during the reign of Sultan Faisal 
(1888-1913). It became the major issue in British international relations regarding 
Muscat. On what scale was it conducted and how did it affect Oman's and 
Britain's recent history? 
Section Two 
Early British Restrictions on Arms in India 
The British government became alarmed by the early 1880s. This official concern 
made the arms business in the Gulf difficult. The problem now was not London's 
jealousy of Birmingham but the Government of India's interest and intervention. 
This led to a policy which sometimes threatened the interests of its British 
subjects. Birmingham was in the lead in confronting this threat. It had to fight in 
the House of Commons and even in front of the British courts at home. Why was 
that? 
The Second Afghan War of 1879-1880 alarmed the Government of India 
concerning the arms from the Persian Gulf which might reach the tribes of the 
northern frontiers. In 1880 the Government prohibited the granting oflicenses for 
that Birmingham gave up the handi craft skills. 
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exporting heavy consignments of arms and ammunition to Persian Gulf ports. 
The British measures were supported by the Persian Government which became 
interested in arms suppression and issued a decree in 1881 restricting any trade in 
arms or ammunition from entering their territory14. "His Majesty the Shah has 
issued orders that no one shall import arms of any descriptions whatsoever into 
this country from abroad and any person in whose possession arms of foreign 
make are found will be liable to have them confiscated by the Government". 
However, we shall see in section three how serious the Persian Governmemnt was 
in this matter. 
One port involved in the arms traffic which lay outside the jurisdiction of 
the British and Persian authorities was Gwadur, which belonged to the Sultan of 
Muscat. Gwadur was situated between India and Persia, and geographically it 
fonned part of the Baluchistan region. The trade in Baluchistan caused concern to 
the British authorities as from there arms could go to the tribes. Another step was 
needed to impose a check on the trade there, and this was to seek the Sultan of 
Muscat's cooperation and to persuade him to prohibit the export and import of 
arms and ammunition at GwadurlS• According to Bannerman, in 1882 the British 
Government tried to persuade Sultan Turky to suppress the arms trade in Muscat, 
but the Sultan refused16• 
In 1888 the Persian Gulf Residency tried to encourage the Sultan to restrict 
the arms trade but, as shown in chapter three, no immmediate action was taken. 
In 1891 Sultan Faisal, perhaps as another price for his recognition by the British 
Government, agreed to issue a notification banning all arms trade at the port of 
Gwadur: "let it be known by this writing that we have forbidden the import into 
our territory of Gawader and its dependencies of arms and ammunition, nothing of 
the kind is to be landed there or taken thence to any place what ever". It was 
14. Tuson, British Policy, B 16, A 14. 
15. Ibid. 
16. M.Graeme.Bannennan, Unity and Disunity in Oman 1895-1920, (ph.D., Univ. 
Wisconsin,1976) p. 230. 
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stated that those who defied the prohibition would be liable to punishmentl7• 
Faisa! issued this proclamation at the time when the commercial treaty of 1891 
was negotiated (as was discussed in chapter four)IS. The timing of the 
proclamation and the treaty seems not to have been a coincidence. However it is 
interesting to note that the treaty of 1891, which was signed on March 19, was 
incompatible with the British desire to suppress the arms trade. The treaty stated 
that, "there shall be perfect freedom of commerce and navigation" between the 
high contracting parties and, "no article whatever shall be prohibited from being 
imported into or exported from the territories of His Highness the Sultan of 
Muscat "19. The British desire would also affect the Sultan's obligations under his 
commercial treaties with other powers, a question which will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters. In 1891 British and Persian policy made the arms traffic 
illegal along the whole littoral from the head of the Persian Gulf to the British 
border. But to what extent was that serious? 
It is interesting to note that although the British Government of India 
initiated the arms restrictions, the Persians seemed, however misleadingly, to act 
more seriously in the matter than the British themselves. In the same year as the 
Sultan of Muscat's proclamation of 1891 regarding the arms trade in Gwadur, the 
Persian Government noticed that the sale of arms was still going on in Tehran by 
British merchants. The Shah complained to the Governor of Bushire and gave 
"strict orders that the prohibition on imports should be maintained and all arms 
imported should be confiscated"20. This situation led to restricted measures taken 
by the Persian customs authorities against arms consignments brought for Muscat 
traders in 1893, a case which brought complications with the British authorities 
and their subjects in Muscat. 
17. Tuson, British Policy, B 16, E 2, A 14, appendix ix, iv; Daud, British Reiations, p. 341; 
Aitchison, Collection, p. 279. 
18. Bannerman, Unity, p. 230. 
19. Aitchison, Collection, (art. 4 and 7) pp. 311-312. 
20. Tuson, British Policy, B 16, B 1; Sir George Roos Keppel, Gun Running and the Indian 
North-West Frontier, (1911), p. 49. 
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Section Three 
The Question of the Persian Restrictions 
In 1893 a consignment of arms was shifted from London via Bushire for 
transhipment to Messrs. W.J. Towell & Co at Muscat, but the customs authorities 
of Bushire seized it21. In Muscat the consignees appealed to the British Residency 
at Bushire to intervene to secure the release of the consignment. They claimed 
that the arms were intended for sale in Muscat, in an ordinary way of business, 
and no treaty or law existed which prohibited the importation of firearms into 
Muscat from England. They claimed that "they have previously imported arms 
from Karachi, and on their applying to Her Britannic Majesty's Consul and 
Political Agent for letters to the collector of that port authorizing transshipment, 
such letters were always granted without difficulty". They pointed out that under 
existing treaties it was allowed to land firearms at Muscat directly from England. 
They warned that if the arms trade was prohibited to Englishmen, it could be 
carried out by the Americans and the French. They argued that Muscat was not 
under the scope of the Brussels conference act of 1892, and denied any desire of 
acting against any law22• On his part, the Political Agent at Muscat, Major 
IHayes Sadler, communicated with the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 
noticing that Messrs and W.J.Towell & Co would be correct in the contention they 
made, and only fIrearms landed in India for transshipment came under the the 
Indian AIms Act. But despite that, the Agency did not seem sympathetic towards 
the Muscat traders. Sadler, in his letter, enclosed a statement by Messrs. Towell 
which indicated that some of seven cases containing approximately 130 guns and 
rifles had been imported and that an accurate description of the arms had not been 
given. Sadler added that "as the consignments are classed as guns, and in two 
instances rifles are specifIed, it may be assumed that these arms were not what we 
know of as precision, they consist of rifles some apparently of a very modem 
21. F.O. 54/27, no. 197, J. A. Crowford, Polit. Resid. in the Persian Gulf to Govt. Ind., For. 
Dept., 18 Dec. 1893. 
22. F.O. 54/27, no. 330, Sadler Polit. Age., Muscat to Resid. 8 Dec. 1893 
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description". He described their number as about double the total of arms 
previously imported by the above companies. It was not in the British interest to 
allow such a consignment of arms to be landed at Muscat at that time and it would 
be better if it could be prevented. But he did not mention the actual reason behind 
that fear, although he warned that those arms might find· their way up to the Gulf, 
or to the West Coast of Arabia, by Y amen dhows, and might be smuggled on to 
the West coast of Africa, which came within the zone of the Brussels Act. He was 
not able to prove any practical threat to British policy, and also he did not mention 
the original reason for the British restriction policy on the North West frontiers, 
instead he raised the Brussels act in its relation to Africa. Sadler was absolutely 
right and precise in the suggestion that some good would be done if the home 
Government were to issue a similar prohibition, but it proved difficult. He 
thought it might be achieved only if the Sultan of Muscat put a stop to the arms 
trade and even in this case, there could be a problem. How could the Sultan's 
obligations be compatible with his treaties with other countries-France, U.S.A. 
and Holland. Sadler thought that perhaps a solution for that problem might be 
found by bringing Oman within the sphere of the Brussels Act23• However 
Sadler's suggestion was too early to be carried out, not before the Muscat 
arbitration between France and Britain in 1905, the Brussels Arms Conference of 
1908-9 and the British-French agreement over arms trade in Muscat in 1914, as 
will be shown in chapters seven and eight. 
However, the Residency in the Persian Gulf seems to have been 
encouraged by the Muscat Agency's suggestion. It did not find sufficient reason 
to intervene to obtain the release of the consignments of Muscat traders from the 
Bushire customs authorities to support the measures taken by the Persian 
authorities, and to back Sadler's suggestion. The Residency pointed out that the 
reply to the firms should be in that sense24• Being informed about the matter, the 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid. 
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Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Depanmen~ supported the 
Residency's opinion in Bushire of noninterference as regards securing the release 
of the arms consignment in Bushire, and asked that the firms concerned should be 
informed of this opinion. But the Government of India did not take any steps to 
bring the littoral of the Persian Gulf within the scope of the Brussels Act2S• By 
this stand Messrs. Towell and Co either lost their case because they were 
deprived of the British Government's suppo~ or they may have found their own 
solution with the Persian customs authorities. In fact it could be expected that the 
arms trade via Bushire would be totally stopped after the affair of the Muscat 
traders, but two years after that even~ the Political Agent in Muscat noticed in 
1895 that arms and ammunition were conveyed to Muscat from Bushire direct 
from England. It is surprising that the orders were sent from Bushire by Muscat 
traders; one of them was Messrs. T.J. Malcolm & Co, and the other Rutonsi 
Purshotam of Muscat, a British subject who was the Sultan's friend and the 
Sultan's customs farmer26• If that was true then why were those previous 
measures taken by the Persian customs authorities? The question as a whole 
seems to be strange and confusing. The traders did not seem to respect the 
Persian prohibitory measures. They carried on trade as if there was nothing to 
stop them at all. But what made the matter more strange is that in the same year 
1895 the British steamer Zulu landed at Bushire cases of arms for transshipment to 
Muscat, but the cases were seized by the Persians27• Why did that happen? The 
Persian demand was in fact to stop the arms being shipped via Bushire but, 
according to information given to a British court, when the Zulu landed at 
Bushire, "the Customs officials there detained the goods on the plea that the heavy 
duty on arms and ammunition imported into Persia must be paid. The owners of 
the goods were not intended for Persia, and were merely landed at Bushire in 
25. P.O. 54/27, encl. 2 in no. 422-E, A. Williams, Govt. 1. For. Dept. to PoliL Resid., 24 Feb. 
1894. 
26. P.O. 54/27, no 32, Sadler to PoliL Resid., 5 Feb. 1895. 
27. Tuson, British Policy. I. O. Memo. no. 2040/98 on State of [Gun] traffic 1891-1897; 
Durand to Salisbury, 10 June 1898, (16) Bl; Keppel, Gunrunning. p. 49. 
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transit for Muscat." The British representative in Tehran~ Sir Mortimer Durand 
and the Persian Government suspected the truth of this assertion; but ultimately 
the goods were released and unlike the previous case they were forwarded to 
Muscat28• But this fact might put all Persian arms restrictions under question. In 
the same year 1895 the Persian Government took another decision and issued an 
order that all firearms intended for Oman should be imported directly without 
passing Persian pottS~ and if firearms were found there they would not be 
considered destined for Oman, and should be confiscated by order of the Persian 
Government. For this reason, Sir Mortimer Durand at Tehran wrote to the 
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign department, urging him to give 
orders to those who imported fIrearms intended for Oman that they should not use 
the Persian ports, in order that they might not be interfered with by the Persian 
authorities29• But the reply which he received to his letter was disappointing. The 
home government denied responsibility for the issue raised by Sir Mortimer. It 
was for the Persian Government alone to take action in that matter, to adopt any 
measures which might be considered necessary in respect to the introduction of 
arms through Persian ports. But the most significant point was that the home 
government was cautious to take a decision in the matter and reluctant to act 
directly. The reason was that the Government of India preferred to avoid any 
action which might tend, directly or indirectly, to stimulate the trade in arms with 
Oman, so the Government did not propose to move in the matter30• From this 
situation three points may be concluded. First, the British Government preferred 
not to encourage direct arms shipments to Oman and this indicates that they did 
not like to see Muscat transformed into an arms shipment centre. They may have 
kept in mind that the Muscat situation could develop in ways that would be 
against British policy. In addition to the possibility of shifting arms to the North 
28. J. P. Aspinall and Butler Aspinall. Reports of cases relating to Maritime Law. vol. viii .• 
(1900) p. 418; F. O. Robinson and R. H. Balloch. Barristers-at-Law. Reports Of 
Commercial Cases. vol. iii. 1897-98. (1898). p. 232. 
29. F.O. 54/27. encl. 4 Durand to Govt. Ind. For. DepL. 10 Apr. 1895. 
30. F.O. 54/27, encl. 5 in 1383-E. Cunningham to Durand. 15 Jul. 1895. 
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West frontier tribes, Muscat's close relations with East Africa might result in 
shifting arms again to that continent and thus upset the Brussels Act of 1892 
which formed an important part of British policy and that of other powers in 
Africa. Muscat's position regarding the arms trade might involve other European 
powers in treaty with Muscat, so prevention was better then cure- although it is 
going to be found that prevention was impossible. Secondly, the British 
Government wanted to avoid any complications which might emerge at home 
with interested bodies in this matter, lest it appear that the British Government 
was carrying out the Persian Government's policy against the arms trade even 
when that trade was compatible with British law. Thirdly, the British Government 
did not wish to reveal to the British public that the arms trade restriction was 
purely its own policy. Especially in the latter case the Government even tried to 
wash its hands of the matter totally and make it a purely Persian interest and, 
therefore, decision. 
However, it seems that the Persians were good enough at issuing orders 
but showed little capacity to make them effective. The order of 1895 by the 
Persian government to stop using Persian ports for anns transshipment did not 
stop the anns transshipment. The traders of Muscat carried on their business as 
usual. This indicates that the Persian Government itself was not serious in the 
orders it issued31 • This does put a big question mark against the entire matter. If 
the Persians were not serious then why did they issue all those restriction orders 
against the anns trade? Why did they confiscate anns consignments on some 
occasions only? The reply to these questions came three years later, in a British 
domestic court. It appeared that local authorities in Persia obtained anns in return 
for conniving at the trade. The demand for the anns was so extensive "that the 
central government considered that there was room for another partner in it, and a 
special official was appointed from Tehran nominally to enforce prohibition 
31. F.O. 45/27, encl. 6 in no. 30, Colonel F. A. Wilson, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf 
to Govt. Ind. For. Dept., 17 Mar 1896; no 49, Sadler, to the Polit. Resid. 25 Feb. 1895. 
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against the impon of arms; but as the official in question paid for his post in the 
usual fashion~ it is certain that neither he nor the Government had any intention of 
carrying out the orders. In fact the trade showed an increase of ten lakhs32 and 
there was no real prohibition at al4 and no one engaged in the trade imagined 
certainly that there was any danger so long as duties were forthcoming in answer 
to the demands of the Government officials33. But why then were there 
prohibitions and what did it all mean? "Theoretically the trade was prohibited by 
the Persian government, but like all similar prohibitions in Persia, this practically 
only substituted an arbitrary impost for a fixed duty"34. But did the traders know 
that, and what was their reaction to it? They knew that there was a nominal 
prohibition against the importation of arms3S, but the fact was that it was never 
acted upon, and the traders never heard of any attempt to enforce it so long as the 
duties which were arbitrarily imposed were paid. If that demand was accordingly 
met by the Persians, the trade was open and notorious36• In fact the prohibition 
was merely effective for only one purpose and that was to enable the 
representative of the Shah, who apparently farmed his office from the 
Government, to levy heavy and arbitrary duties on imported goods31. This person 
was an official who had the largest power, and while holding his office he could 
do practically what he pleased38. But the question is did the British Government 
act in full knowledge of this situation? The answer is that it did. A report was 
addressed to the Government of India for the year 1896/97 sent by Major Mead to 
the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and there was also a report by the 
British Consul-General Fred A. Wilson, for the year 1895 on the trade at Bushire. 
32. Aspinall, Reports. p. 419. 
33. Ibid; Robinson et al, Reports, p. 229. 
34. Aspinall, Reports. p.419. 
35. Hansard 4th setS., vol LXIV, 10 Aug. 1898, p. 358. 
36. Aspinall, Reports. p. 419. 
37. Ibid; Arthur Russell (ed.), The Times Law reports. vol. XVI, (1899-1900), p. 405; 
Hansard. 4th SelS., vol. LXIV, 10 Aug. 1898, p 855. 
38. Aspinall Reports, p. 419. 
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The Persian way of suppressing the arms trade seems to have attracted the 
Sultan of Muscat's admiration. Perhaps His Highness's delight in that unique 
Persian policy expressed itself in the sparlcing of similar ideas in his own mind or 
may be, in his customs farmer's, in a similar way to that of the Persian official 
who worked under the Shah. The Sultan's idea was to increase customs duty on 
imported arms in Muscat. But how could he convince the British authorities? To 
what extent would they accept in Muscat what they accepted in Persia? Unlike the 
Persians, how far was the Muscat Sultan free in taking decisions of this kind and 
what would the consequences be? It is this position which we now consider. 
Section Four 
The Question of Arms Duty in Muscat 
In Muscat, Sultan Faisal, unlike the Persians, developed a direct practical way to 
increase his income from arms importation. He thought of imposing a 15 per cent 
custom duty, without issuing any prohibition39• When the Sultan suggested this 
increase to the British Political Agent, Major IHays Sadler, he found opposition. 
The Political Agent told the Sultan that this could not be done and the Sultan 
should not levy from British subjects without special sanction of the British 
Government as it would be opposed to the tenns of article 6 of the 1891 treaty 
between Muscat and Great Britain. By this, Faisal and Britain had to enter into a 
long new series of engagements which involved other international powers. The' 
British Political Agent believed that the Sultan had intimated to his subjects 
involved in the trade that a higher rate of import duty would be levied. The 
Political Agent believed that the consequence of this would be to throw the 
monopoly of the arms trade into the hands of Ruttonsi Parshotam, a British Indian 
and the Sultan's customs farmer. The Political Agent suggested to the 
Government authorities that if this duty were imposed, the British commercial 
treaty with him should be amended as well as other treaties with other powers. 
39. F.O. 54/27, no. 49. Sadler to Resid., 25 Feb. 1896. 
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But he believed that the percentage suggested by the Sultan, 15%., would not be a 
prohibitive one, and also he warned of the consequences of levying a heavy duty 
on anns because the Sultan could only exercise control at the two cites of Muscat 
and Muttrah, so the traffic would be diverted to other places on his coasts, where 
his authority was too weak and where no means of collecting the duty would 
exisrID. 
Despite the British home Government's warning against making Muscat a 
centre for the anns trade, from 1890 to 1912 Muscat became an anns transit 
station41• During this time the city took over some of Bushire's role in anns 
selling. though the flow of anns into Bushire did not stop entirely. But Muscat 
dealers started to make their orders direct from England. Ruttonsi Parshotam had 
the monopoly of this trade42• A statement of the anns trade into Muscat shows 
that between 30 March 1895 and the 30 January 1896 a total of 87 cases of rifles 
and 151 cases of cartridges were shifted to Muscat from Bushire and England by 
Messrs. Malcolm & Co of Birmingham and by Najaf bin Ghalib of Bushire. 
However. from that date on, a number of Faisal's subjects became involved in the 
trade and were commencing to compete. As was mentioned above, Zanzibar, 
which started shifting anns to Muscat about 1892, participated in the trade during 
this period and took a large portion. Between the years 1896 and 1897, 20,000 
rifles and 750 cases of ammunition were imported into Muscat. The Naval 
Intelligence Department noticed that Muscat received in 1896 itself between 23 
June and 25 August a total of 906 rifle cases of the old kind (Long· Enfield 180), 
and 200,000 safety cartridges43• The percentage of anns distributed over the Gulf 
and Arabia was as follows; about 60% for Persian territory, 25% for the Turkish 
and the rest for Arabia The kind of weapons were Martini-Henry rifles. Of the 
Enfield rifles and other weapons 5% were estimated as going to Arabia, 20% for 
40. Ibid; and [the writer's chap. 3 Sec. 2, about Zakat collection] 
41. See text above. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid; F. O. 54(27 Govt.lnd. For. Dept. (Secret ext) to Hamilton, 4 August 1897; Daud, 
British Relations, p 348 
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Oman itself, 10% for El Hasa Kowait, and 20% to Makran and South Eastern 
Persia44• 
By 1897 the arms coming into Muscat reached a considerable significance. 
It made Muscat a distributing source of arms to various quarters and the value of 
arms imported was 900,000 dollars from Birmingham in Great Britain and only 
10,000 dollars from France. In the same year Sultan Faisal requested permission 
from the British authorities to increase duty on arms and ammunition imported 
from 5% to 7.50%. In fact it is not clear why Faisal changed his mind, since one 
year before he suggested a 15% increase in duty, though probably he thought that 
was too much to be accepted by the British authorities, and, misunderstanding the 
British desire, he reduced the duty by a half so as to be accepted by them. On 26 
Shawwal 1314, 30th March 1897, His Highness wrote a letter to the Political 
Agent at Muscat regarding the importation of arms and ammunition into his 
dominions saying "we are of opinion that the duty of 5% should not be made to 
apply to these articles which were formerly not considered merchandise, and were 
not imported from Europe as they have been in recent years". It is also obvious 
that Faisal did not regard the arms as merchandise goods. He also raised the point 
that his treaties with the European countries did not apply to goods which came 
from Bushire or Zanzibar for example, which were not European ports. He 
repeated that the continued importation of large quantities of arms and 
ammunition was likely to cause serious trouble to himself. He said "and we 
therefore trust that the Great Government will agree to permit us to levy an 
additional duty of 2.50% on these articles. The duty on arms and ammunition will 
then be 7%. By agreeing to this the Great Government will confer a favour upon 
US"45. In fact, the Sultan seems to have been encouraged by the enormous pouring 
of arms into his port. He was right in this case to benefit from this situation but to 
link that request with his security proved shortsighted. The Sultan may have 
44. F. O. 54(27 Sultan of Muscat to the Political Agent. 26 Shawl [Shaw"wal] 1314=30 
March 1897. 
45. Sadler to resid 25 Feb 1896. 
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thought that the Persians took advantage of the British policy for suppressing arms 
trade in the Persian Gulf, by the way in which they dealt with the trade in their 
country. The British never stopped them, so why could he not do it? If the 
Persians used the British fear of the tribes of the North West frontiers why could 
he not use the same fear from tribes, loyal to France, close at hand and 
occasionally in revolt against him at home in Oman? If Persian measures towards 
suppressing arms trade were accepted by the British why should his not be? The 
tribes which he had at home could be not only dangerous to him but also 
dangerous to British policy. His objective, as was the case with his Persian 
counterparts, was to increase the customs income which his fanner (a British 
SUbject) looked after for him. By this also he would increase his fanner's income 
since the latter was the leading arms trade merchant, and this would return benefit 
to the Sultan himself, allowing him to acquire more cash. The increase of duty 
would consequently increase the price of the anns sold in the market or re-
exported, a matter which would result in doubling both partners' income. This 
additional income seemed more important for the Sultan than the question of his 
security since economically he was totally dependent on the Zanzibar subsidy 
which he received via the British Government. From the security point of view, 
the British Government was in doubt whether the Sultan's allegations that the 
continuous and large importation of arms into his dominions might involve 
serious danger to him, since they knew that the Sultan's authority was already 
little more than nominal away from the sea coast, and also they believed that an 
addition of 2.50% to the duty on anns was not likely to act as a deterrent46• They 
did not believe that Faisal was serious about putting down the arms trade because 
His Highness appeared to make a profit from the trade. They were thinking of 
prohibiting the trade instead of benefiting from it. So they reached a point that the 
trade could only be checked if the Sultan himself prohibited it47• Despite that 
46. Ibid; Tuson British Policy B16, Bl. 
47. F. O. 54{27, F. G. Benville, Polit Resid. to Govt. Ind. For. Dept., 31 Mar 1897; Lovat 
Frazer 'Gun Running in the Persian Gulf P. C. A. S., 17 May 1911,3-16. 
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point. the British official's reaction to Faisal's desire to increase duty on arms 
varied according to their more precise concerns. It also caused some confusion 
about the real British stand in the matter. For example. the British Residency in 
the Persian Gulf found that the increase of duty could be possible if the assent of 
other powers allowed it to be of general application, and that the interests of 
British manufacturers and merchants should not suffer48. The trade was in the 
hands of English companies such as Messrs. Joice and Kynoch, and any increase 
in the import tax would act in a manner detrimental to British trade49• At the same 
time. the Residency in the Gulf realized that if heavy taxes were placed upon 
imports of arms into Muscat, one of the ports on the Pirate Coast could become a 
future imperium of the arms trade, and the Sultan then would have to face heavy 
loss of revenue which he could ill affordso• Meanwhile, the Residency considered 
a 15% tax would be necessary to put a stop to the import of arms into the Persian 
Gulf and the 2.50 %. would not materially affect the tradeSl• In London, the India 
Office gave a reminder that the Muscat commercial treaty of 1891 provided that 
the duty should not exceed 5%. It also stated that there should be no prohibition 
of any item of trade and that the treaty was not to be reviewed before twelve 
yearsS2• In India, in fact, the Government seemed to agree that the continued 
import of arms might very likely cause trouble in Oman. However, they did not 
agree that the Sultan's percentage suggestion could prevent it, and disagreed with 
the 15% increase suggested by the Persian Gulf Residency. In addition the British 
officials found that treaties which the Sultan had with other powers presented 
another obstacle both to the raising of duty and the check on arms. However. the 
India Office found another solution for the problem, namely that the Sultan should 
give his adhesion to the Brussels Act. But the Government of India was not 
prepared to take steps to apply that act, in respect to all circumstances. To stop 
48. F. O. 54!27,Ibid. 
49. Ibid. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid. 
52. F. O. 54(27, no. 62, 1. O. to F. 0.,2 Sep. 1897. 
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the trade a really prohibitive rate should be proposed but the Government of India 
could not insist on it, until the expiration after twelve years of the Muscat 
commercial treaty which would occur in 1903. The India Office imagined the 
possibility of concessions involving all the parties' interests. But before taking 
any action the Office advised reference to the treaties with Muscat and wanted 
enquiries made on the question of duties in Paris, The Hague and Washington. 
On the same matter Lord George Hamilton ordered Sir Mortimer Durand in the 
Sistan Department to be consulted53• Sir Mortimer, for his part, agreed with the 
idea of stopping the trade and he pointed out the advantages of a joint declaration 
between the states concerned, U.S.A, France, Holland, and Muscat. (He did not 
mention Great Britain). He suggested bringing the countries concerned into 
agreement for the increase of duty on imported arms into Muscat from 5% to 
15%, so the Sultan then could free himself of personal responsibility for 
introducing the tax of 15%. Sir Mortimer Durand warned of the dangers of 
diverting the trade to the pirate coastS4• However until 2 September none of the 
different suggestions was carried out by the British Government. The Sultan, 
however, took his own initiative. The India Office reported to the Foreign Office 
that proposals of the Sultan of Muscat to raise duty on arms from 5% to 7.50% 
had already been made to the French Government. But the India Office was not 
sure whether the Foreign Office had received any information about that and 
whether the Sultan had approached the U.S. Government as well with regard to 
any modification of their treaties. The India Office however agreed with the view 
that a 7.50% duty increase on imported arms into Muscat would not diminish the 
importation 55. Despite that, the British Government seemed slightly to be coming 
to accept the 7.50%, from the point of view that any check on the trade, no matter 
how modest it was, would be a positive step in suppressing it56• Accordingly, 
53. Ibid. 
54. Ibid. 
55. Ibid. 
56. Tuson. British Policy. 1. O. Memo. no. 802/92. Govt Ind. to F. o. (on increase of import 
duty on arms at Muscat) 4 Aug. 1897. B16. Bl. 
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Faisal's action, no matter what his real desire was, should be encouraged in this 
right direction. So the Sultan should receive some help in his communication 
with treaty powers. 
With the U.S.A, Oman had concluded a treaty during the reign of Faisal's 
grandfather (Saeed bin Sultan) and the Presidency of Andrew Jackson in 1834. 
The President delegated Edmond Roberts to sign the treaty with Sayed Sa,eed. 
The agreement was the first and longest-lasting treaty in U.S. diplomatic 
historyS7. Article ill of the treaty stated that "vessels of the United States, entering 
any port within the Sultan's dominions, shall pay no more than five per cent duties 
on cargo landed, and this shall be in full consideration of all import and export 
duties, tonnage, license to trade, pilotage, anchorage or any other charge 
whatever .... 58". But, despite that, the U.S. Government gave their positive 
diplomatic response to the matter, accepting the 7.50 % duty increase if the 
Government of the Sultan should be in a position to collect such a tax generally 
from the other treaty states trading with Muscat. Probably they knew that the 
Sultan was not in that position. However, by this clever response, they cleared 
their position and sat watching developments. They were convinced that one 
country's rejection could be enough to spoil the game. Amending commercial 
treaties proved an uneasy task for the Sultan as well as for the British 
Government. France refused to consider any modification in their commercial 
treaty (of 17 November 1844) with Muscat which stated that trade should be 
perfectly free in the said territories of the Sultan of Muscat subject to duty at 5%. 
Accordingly, the Sultan seems to have given up the 7.50% proposals, but his own 
interest, it seems, forced him after that lengthy effort to increase import duty by 
his own decision to a new percentage, 6%, without amending any of the treaties. 
57. J. D. Porter (ed.), Oman and the Persian Gulf 1835-1949 U,man wal khaleej Ai Farisy 
(U.S.A 1982), p. ii. 
58. w. S. W. Ruschenberger Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between The United States Of 
America. And His Majisty Syed Syeed Bin Sultan of Muscat and His Dependencies', 30 
June 1834, in , Narrative of a Voyage Round the World 1835, 36, 37, including A 
Narrativeo/anEmbassy to the Sultan O/MuscatandThe King o/Siam pp. 151-154, 
(1938). 
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Such a figure was of course less than the one proposed before by (1.50%) but 
would probably avoid strong rejection from the powers concerned who were not 
going to regard the increase as very great. though it would be seen as an 
infringement of the treaties. However. there was no significant objection to that 
increase either from the states in relation with Muscat or from dealers native to 
those states. However. after all. the Sultan had won only one per cent to increase 
his income59• From the British side~ there is nothing to show that they objected or 
acknowledged the Sultan's step in raising duty, but the question with the British 
Government still was not over. The arms customs duty in Muscat. it seems, 
focused the attention and interest of the Government of India on Muscat customs, 
the place at which the arms entered into the country and from which they were re-
exported, and from which the Sultan derived the assistance necessary for his 
survivaL The Sultan's customs were administered by a powerful British subject. 
but one whose interests were with the Sultan more than with those of his own 
government; a matter which will bring complication between the British 
Government and its own subject on the one hand and the Sultan on the another. 
And, as will shortly be made clear, these two parties, could not settle this matter 
on their own: others will be involved. 
Section Five 
The British Government and Muscat Customs 
The British government made three attempts to take over the Muscat 
Customs. The first was on 21 January 1898 when the Viceroy of India was 
encouraged by reports from Muscat that the Sultan was likely to consent to giving 
Government of India control over the Customs Department for 10 years. But it is 
still not clear how that had happened Was this new suggestion from the Sultan 
himself or was it an initiative from the British Political Agent? However, the 
Viceroy asked the Secretary of State for India's permission to offer as inducement. 
59. Tuson, British Policy, 1. O. Memo B16, Bl. 
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if necessary, the advance to the Sultan of Muscat of one year's customs revenue, 
an~ if it could be done, to control Muscat customs without infringing the 
provisions of the declaration of 1862, between France and Britain to respect 
Muscat and Zanzibar independence. In regard to this request the India Office 
agreed that, if that was achieved, it would give to the Government of India not 
merely a control over traffic in arms but it would add other powers which would 
be of advantage to the Indian authorities. But the India Office was not sure how 
far the joint declaration of 1862 with France would cause problems. So the matter 
was referred to Lord Salisbury to give his view on the point concerned60 • Lord 
Salisbury's opinion was that actual and direct control of the Sultan's customs by 
the Government of India was scarcely compatible with the independence of the 
Sultan of Muscat, which was assumed by the declaration in question. Therefore, 
if this proposal was suggested, it would be certainly rejected by France. Instead 
of that, he suggested a plan for the employment of a British official by the Sultan 
himself in order to superintend his customs. And that, according to Lord 
Salisbury, might give the same security for good administration without being 
vulnerable to objection on the part of France61• He agreed that an advance of 
money to the Sultan on the security of the customs would be worthwhile. He also 
suggested that the officer of the customs in question should not be under British 
Government control but under the Sultan's direction. The Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs asked the Viceroy if he agreed with his views. If the Viceroy did, 
Salisbury would approve the arrangement62• But from February 1898 till 
November of the same year serious steps were not taken to proceed in this matter 
by the Government of India and details of the reason for that delay are still 
unknown. It seems that the Government of India did not agree with Lord 
Salisbury's suggestion and decided to carry out their original suggestion of 
establishing direct control despite the British-French declaration of 1862 and 
60. F. O. 54/28,1. O. to F. 0.,29 Jan. 1898. 
61. F. 0 .54/28, F. O. to 1. O. (Conf), 7 Feb. 1898. 
62. F. O. 54/28, Hamilton to Viceroy, 18 Feb. 1898. 
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despite the advice given by Lord Salisbury in that question. This may give some 
explanation why the procedure in the matter was delayed 
The second attempt was in November 1898, when the Government of 
India authorized Consul Fagan, the Political Agent in Muscat, to make an advance 
to the extent of one year's purchase money for Muscat customs if he could thereby 
induce the Sultan to let the British run the costoms directly. The Government of 
India were anxious to get Muscat customs into their own hands63• It is interesting 
to notice whether the Government of India communicated with the Foreign Office 
in London before taking this decision and whether the Home Government 
approved it. It is also interesting to notice that Fagan, on this matter, did not 
communicate with the Persian Gulf Residency or India, but directly 
communicated with London. We will discuss this matter later in this section. 
However Fagan approached the Sultan to carry out what he had been ordered by 
the Government of India, but the Sultan refused to accept his proposals. He was 
most reluctant to do anything of that sort, and was suspicious of the Government 
of India's desire64• For this, Consul Fagan blamed angrily, not the Sultan but some 
British subjects who helped him with money and advised him not to surrender his 
customs to the Government of India This assistance gave the Sultan some 
strength to refuse India's proposals. Consul Fagan acted angrily against that 
alliance of the Sultan and the British subjects against the British authorities. If the 
Sultan was on his own he might give up his resistance and surrender his customs. 
The Political Agent accused those British subjects of being the cause of conflict 
between the Sultan and the British Government. In his letter to the India Office 
dated 26 November 1898 he said that the Sultan, for the severe economic 
circumestances he was in, would agree with the proposals. Fagan said that " our 
Bania subjects, who purchase the right to farm the customs, and by advancing 
sums of money to the Sultan... get a certain hold over him, and persuade him to 
63. F. O. 54/28, no. 1, Lee Warner to Sanderson 19 Dec. 1898. 
64. F. O. 54/28, encl. in no. 1, Fagan to Lee Warner, 26 Nov. 1898. 
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sanction or, at any rate, to wink at illegal and excessive taxation and other 
irregularities which result in endless correspondence and constant friction of a 
petty, but not the less irritating nature between the two govemments"65. The 
refusal of the Sultan and the support of British subjects for him in the question of 
the customs also made Fagan even angrier because he regarded it as a challenge 
against him or his authorities and he stated firmly, "it seems absurd to me that we 
should quietly allow ourselves to be defeated in any object we may have in view 
of the selfish action of one or two of our own subjects, which can be so very 
easily put a stop to". Therefore Mr Fagan drafted, on his own, rules to limit the 
freedom of British subjects to farm the Sultan's customs66• Every British subject 
intending to enter "into contract for purchase of the right to farm the customs of 
any town or port within the said dominions shall without unreasonable delay, 
furnish to Her Majesty's consul at Muscat a true and complete copy of the terms 
of such contract"67. In addition to the authority he had over British subjects he put 
himself as the sole judge as to what constituted unreasonable delay in furnishing 
him with full infonnation in the matter concerned. And he warned those who 
failed to do so that they would be liable on conviction before Her Majesty's 
Consul at Muscat, to a fine not exceeding 500 dollars or to imprisonment for a 
tenn not exceeding three calendar months68 (articles 1.4,5). Reading the rules, it 
seems that the original reason (to keep an eye on arms flow in the town) was 
diverted to something different, namely to get his hands on the Muscat customs. 
For example, Articles 1 and 4 gave the British Consul a strong hold over British 
subjects, especially those who were of the business class and in partnership with 
the Sultan. Articles 2,3,and 5 stated that nothing more then taxes should be 
collected from Her Majesty's subjects within the dominions of the Sultan by any 
one of his subjects. The most important were articles 1, 4 and 5 mentioned above. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Ibid. 
67. F. O. 54/28, draft notification by Fagan, 21 Nov. 1898. 
68. Ibid. 
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On 21 November Fagan posted his proposed rules of five articles with a letter 
addressed direcdy to the Foreign Office in London. The Foreign Office received 
the letter on the 12 December69. In fact, in order to ensure that his rules should be 
adopted, Fagan cut out the accepted diplomatic channels of communication which 
the Muscat Political Agent should follow; A, with the Residency in the Persian 
Gulf~ B, with the Government of India and C, with the India Office, by 
communicating directly with Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State of Foreign 
Affairs. By this unusual move it seems that Fagan was seeking quick support for 
his rules in order to bring about an immediate punishment for those who 
challenged him in Muscat. He wrote to Lord Salisbury, "I have the honour to 
transmit for your Lordship's consideration a copy of the rules and regulations 
made by me in exercise of the power and authority vested in Her Majesty's consul 
at Muscat by Article 1 of the Muscat Order in Council dated 4th November 
1867''70. Anticipating approval of his rules, Fagan followed his letter to Lord 
Salisbury with another one on 26th of the same month, this time to the India 
Office in an another unexpected diplomatic communication which seemed to go 
behind Lord Salisbury's back and deal with the matter in his own way and give the 
appearance of mastering the situation. He wrote to William Lee Warner in the 
India Office informing him about the rules he drafted and which were sent by him 
to the Foreign Office in London. He said "Lord Salisbury will send on the rules to 
the India Office, I am just sending you a few explanatory lines about them ". He 
was sure that Lord Salisbury would not take a decision on his own without 
consulting the India Office, but in fact he did nothing more then brief the India 
69. F. O. 54/28, no. 8, Fagan to Salisbury, 19 Nov. 1898. 
70. F. O. 54/29, British Order in Council, 4 Nov. 1867; London Gazette, Nov. (1867) vol. 
XXXI P. 984. This Order was, "an Act made and passed by the parliament holden on the 
6th 7th years reign, entitled an Act to remove doubts as to exercise of power and 
jurisdiction in Her Majesty's dominions, and to render the same more effectual,or may at 
any time here after have within any country of place out of Her Majesty's dominions in 
the same and as ample a manner as if Her Majesty had acquired such power or 
jurisdiction by the cession or conquest of territory:and whereas Her Majesty hath power 
and jurisdiction in the Dominions of his Majesty the Sultan of Muscat and its 
dependencies" . 
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Office with the same ideas which he reported to Lord Salisbury at length, about 
the Muscat Customs question. More important was his urging and appealing for 
support from the India Office to ensure approval of his suggestion. But it is 
interesting to question whether Fagan's latest effort was known by the Residency 
in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Government. Fagan's rules were passed by the 
Foreign Office to the Eastern Department which noticed that they had been 
forwarded on 23 December. This department had not been consulted earlier on 
the matter. It was found by this department that the rules were to come into force 
by 21 December and normal procedure had still not been followed. Accordingly, 
the Sistan department suggested that Fagan should be instructed by telegram to 
defer the operation of the rules until he received further instructions. The matter 
was referred back to the India Office on the same date71• On 19 December W. 
Lee Warner of the India Office was already referring Consul Fagan's proposed 
rules (with his letter of 26 December to the India Office which was mentioned 
above) to Sir Thomas Sanderson in the Foreign Office. But Sanderson directed 
that Sir W. Lee Warner of the India Office should be asked whether they would 
first consider the matter or leave the Foreign Office to do so and then pass on their 
views to them. On the whole Sir W.Lee.Warner thought that the matter should 
first be considered in the Foreign Office, but he was doubtful whether Consul 
Fagan was right in referring the matter direct to the Foreign Office in the first 
instance instead of working through India. He pointed out, however, that these 
regulations had now been posted for a month and therefore became law unless 
disallowed72• The Foreign Office agreed with the India Office73• However, the 
Foreign Office understood that the main object of these rules was to place the 
customs of Muscat practically under the control of the Government of India. The 
Foreign Office persisted in its earlier stand on the matter, and they advised 
71. F. O. 54/.28, encl. 1 in no. 7, Fagan, 'Rules and Regulations issued for the observation by 
British subjects at Muscat', 19 Nov. 1898. 
72. F. O. 54128, minute by R. N. M., 23 Dec. 1898. 
73. F. O. 54128, minute by W. E. D.,nd. 
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cautiousness in obtaining that control owing to the British engagement with 
France of 1862. The Foreign Office reminded the India Office about its letter of 7 
February74. 
However, Fagan seems to have been encouraged and pleased by direct 
contact between him and the Foreign Office on 17 August 1898. As a result, the 
Residency in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Government ceased to be his 
primary reference in the Muscat question. Yet this question started with the 
Residency of the Persian Gulf, when the Residency sent the letter on 27 January 
1898 to the Government of India based on Fagan's report about arms traffic, 
stating that the traffic from Muscat was to be stopped and registration of arms 
should be declared compulsory for British subjects 7S. For its part, the 
Government of India sent a letter to the Secretary of State for India on 4 February 
1898 enclosing the Residency's proposals for the compulsory registration of anns 
at the British Consulate at Muscat on the basis that Article 1 of the Muscat Order 
in Council 1867 was sufficient to enable the Consul to make rules providing for 
such registration. But the Government of India made it clear that with regard to 
compulsory registration of anns the idea did not commend itself to Lord 
Salisbury, and they advised that the Consul in Muscat should not move in the 
matter of framing a rule until the Government of India was in a position to instruct 
him as to the views of Her Majesty's Government76. But despite that, on 17 
August, Lord Salisbury directly sent a letter to the Muscat consulate asking them 
to submit fresh approved rules regarding the registration of anns77• Being asked 
directly by Lord Salisbury to do so, Fagan was encouraged to find himself with 
another chance to make other rules and if, in the first case, it had proved possible 
to contact the Foreign Office directly, why not in the second? If the arms issue 
was interesting to the Foreign Secretary why should not the customs issue also be? 
74. F. O. 54/28. minute by R. N. M .• 24 Dec. 1898. 
75. F. O. 54/28. encl. 1 in no. 56. Tel. Polit. Resid. to Govt. Ind. For. DepL. 27 Jan. 1898. 
76. F. O. 54/28. no. 56 GovL lnd. For. Dept (Secret Ext) to Hamilton. 4 Feb. 1898. 
77. F. O. 54/28. no. 5. Fagan to Salisbury. 23 Sep. 1898. 
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However, Fagan's report about the Muscat customs position to Lord 
Salisbury is an important historical document. As was noticed above, Fagan was 
very angry about the obstruction by the Sultan and his British subject allies of the 
plan to control the Sultan's customs by the Indian Government. So he was 
determined to challenge them and so he released to the Foreign Office details of 
the most private commercial relations between the Sultan and British subjects, in 
particular those who purchased the Sultan's customs. His aim was to guarantee 
approval of the rules he drafted. 
Fagan wrote enclosing a long report to Lord Salisbury claiming that the 
whole of the Persian and import trade of Oman was in the hands of the Banians 
(British subjects). Such men also had the right to farm the customs at various 
ports because they were the only traders in the place possessing sufficient capital 
and therefore able to carry out one of the most important functions of a customs 
farmer. In that position they been acting as the Sultan's bankers, a position which 
carried with it the obligation to honour cheques for considerable sums on an 
already overdrawn account. Fagan went on to explain the system of farming the 
customs of Muscat as follows: "the right to collect the customs is sold to the 
highest bidder and when the bargain is completed, the privilege of collecting the 
dues belongs or ought to belong to the purchaser for one year, at the end of which 
period the same method is repeated"78. The contract was a onesided affair and 
was not binding on the Sultan but only on the Banian. The purchase money was 
not paid in a lump sum, but usually in monthly instalments. The arrangement was 
granted on the condition that the Muscat farmer had to be prepared at any time to 
make considerable advances whenever required to do so. Fagan explained the 
system on which the customs duties were collected. It was done by the private 
employees of the Farmer and the whole arrangement was carried out in any 
manner he might think proper. But what was then the Farmer's profit in all that? 
It was considerable and consisted of all money collected in excess of the amount 
78. F. O. 54/28, no. 7, Fagan to Salisbury, 19 Nov. 1898. 
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payable to the local Government. In some cases, however, the Sultan drew on the 
Farmer for a larger sum than the latter had stipulated to pay for the customs, so 
there was an overdraft to be recovered. Because the Sultan's financial position did 
not enable him to repay the money he borrowed, it was necessary for him to find 
ways to satisfy his farmer by indirect means, sufficient to compensate for the risks 
run and to make the position generally worth keeping79• As illustration, Fagan 
related the history of the Customs purchase since 1896-97 by Rotancy Parshotum, 
a British Indian subject. Using his official position and his close relation with the 
Sultan, he was obstructing the business of his trade competitors and thus unduly 
and unfairly supporting his own interest. The Sultan himself was so situated that 
he could not afford to offend his farmer80. The farmer, Fagan said, could always 
"have resort to expedients for increasing his income, which are detrimental to the 
interest of the Country to which he owes allegiance, and it enables him to carry 
them out under cover of a pretext which will not bear examination, namely,"81he 
said that he was a servant carrying out orders of his master the Sultan, as it was 
the practice to look upon the customs Farmer in Muscat. But he was imposing 
illegal taxation even against British subjects. Fagan considered the relations 
between the Sultan and the customs farmer were purely commercial. If the 
Sultan's partner was a British subject, he must be held, according to Fagan, 
"responsible and liable for acts committed by him in that capacity. calculated to 
infringe our treaty rights and to cause friction between the two Governments". 
For all those reasons and others he sent his rules which have been discussed above 
to the Foreign Office, warning "if this were not done it would be easy for a Banian 
to purchase the customs in the name of some local subjects whom he would 
fmance". Fagan's rules would tighten the grip on such Banians. 
However, Fagan's rules, after transfer to the India Office, did not seem to 
proceed further. It seems that the Foreign Office's caution managed to convince 
79. Ibid. 
80. Ibid. 
81. Ibid. 
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the India Office of possible conflict with France because these rules would be in 
conflict with the joint declaration of 1862. However the customs question seems 
to make another fresh start after the failure of the second attempt of 1898. The 
third attempt by the Political Agent was to take place in 1899 and be supported by 
the Residency in the Persian Gulf. 
The third attempt was on 16 March 1899. Fagan sent a telegram to the 
Foreign Office expressing the hope that the Sultan would place control of the 
customs in the Government of India's hands. However the Foreign Secretary 
refused direct control of the customs. It repeated its previous opinion that the 
Sultan might apply for the services of British offlcials82• But Fagan insisted on his 
idea of controlling Muscat's customs as of the utmost importance. He said "we 
should obtain a control over the customs, as doing so will remove the only 
security the Sultan can offer for a loan from any other power, and secure our 
preponderance for the future"83. The Persian Gulf Resident thought that if he 
applied for the services of a British person to manage the customs it could be of 
advantage, and to induce him to do so was advisable. It seems that Fagan 
worsened the Sultan's relations with the British authorities and led the Sultan to 
show his disloyalty to the British Government, which in turn forced them to 
jeopardise his subsidy. Colonel Mead, the Political Resident, expressed to the 
Sultan his disappointment at the level which the Sultan's relations with the British 
authorities had reached. He mentioned to the Sultan that he had informed his 
Government "that you had resolved to walk: along the path of loyal friendship to 
the British, and would in future accept the advice of Her Majesty's representative 
at Muscat". Mead said to the Sultan "you should desire to carry out the wishes of 
the British Government". Concerning the subsidy, which was linked with the 
Sultan's attitude, Mead said that he was surprised to find that fresh difficulty had 
arisen. The Sultan should convince Major Fagan that he intended to be loyal, and 
82. F. O. 54{29, Tel. no. 477. E.A, Govt. Ind. For. Dept to the PolitResid., 20 Mar. 1899. 
83. F. O. 54{29, no. 45, Fagan to Resid., 20 Mar. 1899. 
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that he would resolve in the future to treat him as the representative of Her 
Majesty's Government should be treated. After that he said "I feel sure the 
Government will order that your subsidy, along with the arrears shall at once be 
paid". Regarding the relation between the Sultan and Major Fagan, Mead advised 
the Sultan to regard him as his friend and to show that he regretted past 
mistakes84• 
But did Mead succeed in assisting Major Fagan in Muscat? In fact no. In a 
letter dated 28 March 1899 Fagan wrote to Colonel Mead that he had 
communicated with the Sultan and pointed out to him that the Government of 
India wished to see his government on a sound stable footing. It would be 
therefore necessary for His Highness to institute considerable refonn in the matter 
of finance, which would enable him to get rid of his debts to the Banians (customs 
farmers) which amounted to about 170,000 Rupees and thus ease himself of the 
burden of interest which such debts involved. There was a considerable sum 
yearly going into the farmer's pocket which could go to the Sultan himself. Fagan 
suggested to the Sultan that a wise policy on his part would be to ask the 
Government of India for the service of a trained official to manage his customs. 
But he found the Sultan was not inclined to follow his advice, and he could not 
see any chance of any refonn being undertaken by His Highness. He said ''His 
Highness suddenly veered round"8s. On 28 April 1899, Colonel Mead wrote to 
the Sultan saying "I now write to advise Your Highness to apply as soon as you 
can to the Government of India for the service of an experienced official to 
manage your customs", and His Highness should understand that the Government 
of India had no thought of interfering with his customs or of taking them over. He 
said "the official you ask for will be lent to you and be in your highness's service, 
for the time being. As your friend I can without hesitation advise you to do what 
the Government wish without delay." He went on "you need not ask that the 
84. F. O. 54/29, no. 106, Mead to Sultan of Muscat. 9 Apr. 1899. 
85. F. O. 54/29, Fagan to Mead, 28 Mar. 1899. 
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officer lent should be employed permanently, but a fixed time, say two or three 
years." Pointing out the advantage of such a course, he said "at the end of that 
time you will know for certain what your customs are worth, and can either 
continue working them direct or revert". This step would improve the Sultan's 
income and relieve his financial difficulties. But, above all, he said "you will 
thereby please the Government and show that you really intend to work in future 
along the path of loyal friendship towards them"86. But the Sultan's attitude 
towards the Government of India was suspicious, especially after the case of the 
seizure of the Baluchistan, in January 1898. (which will be discussed in the next 
chapter). The Sultan's reply to Mead was frustrating. He said "I regret to say that 
this country is not fit for such an arrangement, I have often informed Major Fagan 
that I cannot accept it". He went on, "in view of the kindness and good feeling 
which the high Government bears towards me," he said, "they will not like to see 
the peace of my country and people disturbed"87. So all the effort, which was 
made from February 1898 to May 1899 to convince the Sultan concerning the 
control of his customs, was wasted. Mead believed that the Sultan's stand could 
be explained not by the influence of his customs farmer but as a result of French 
influence. The Sultan's answer to his letter, he believed was made on the advice 
of the French Consul, if it was not actually dictated by him. It is important to 
recall Mead's military background rather than diplomatic position. In regard to 
the British agreement with France of 1862 and to the new French influence over 
the Sultan, Mead suggested that if France were to take control over Muscat or to 
obtain any other advantage in return for a loan or subsidy Her Majesty's 
Government should denounce the agreement and establish a British protectorate 
over Oman. And if the Sultan continued to insist on not obtaining British help for 
better management of his customs and affairs generally, he must be informed that 
his subsidy would not be paid and that would result in his downfall. Britain 
86. F. O. 54(2.9. Mead to Sultan of Muscat. 23 Apr. 1899. 
87. F. O. 54(2.9. Sultan of Muscat to the POliL Resid. (A. H. 28 Zilhaj 1316),19 May 1899. 
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would not take any measures to defend him88• After that, it was needless to speak 
about the level which the relations between the British officials in the Gulf and the 
Sultan of Muscat had reached. It would lead the Sultan to grant the French a coal 
station in Bander Jessah. This event should be considered separately89. By 1901 
it seems that the Sultan was convinced by the Britrish authorities to reform his 
Customs and take over their management as will be discussed in chapter seven90• 
The later reforms were to affect all aspects off the administrative, financial, 
military and educational position in Muscat. This will take place. during the 
twenties, the thirties and the forties of the century in several stages91. In terms of 
the customs, the peak of reform was reached by the issue of The Muscat_Customs 
Manual in 1942 approved by the Sultan of Muscat and Oman (Sa,eed bin Taimur), 
and which controlled all customs activities in Oman until 1970.92 
Conclusion 
Birmingham and Muscat had something in common in respect to the gun trade 
despite the fact that Birmingham was exporting and Muscat was importing. Both 
cities were highly dependent on that trade. But the object here is not to make 
simply that comparision so much as to draw attention to the political impact of the 
trade on Muscat's recent history. A scholar will not be surprised that the impact of 
the gun trade was great on Birmingham, simply because this city became the most 
important centre for arms making in the world by the late nineteenth and early 
88. F. o. 54{29, Mead to Govt. Ind. For. Dept., conf., 21 May 1899. 
89. For the full story of this event see Landen, Oman, pp. 49-54. 
90. The Times, 25 Oct. 1901 p. 9, colI. 
91. For these reforms see J. E. Peterson, Oman In The Twentieth Century: Political 
Foundation Of An Emerging State (1978), pp, 31, 91-92,175-176,30,; W. D. Peyton, Old 
Oman, (nd.) 3, pp. 52, 56, 57; Bartram Thomas, 'Arab Rule Under The Albussaid Dynasty 
of Oman' 1741-1937,Proceedings of The British Academy XXIV (1938), p. 51; Ronald 
Wingate, Not In The Limelight, (1959), P 82; John Townsend, Oman The Making, p. 50; 
K. H. Mead (ed.)" The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman', Asiatic Review XXIV (1928) pp. 
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twentieth century, culminating in the world war of 1914. But the impact of that 
trade on a distant country is very dramatic. 
However, as we have seen, the arms question in the Persian Gulf caused 
alarm to the British authorities in India because of trouble caused by tribes on the 
northern frontiers of India. This alarm brought strict measures by the British 
government of India to suppress the arms trade in the Persian Gulf so that the 
arms could not reach the tribes. The Persian government unfortunately abused 
that British policy in order to increase its own income by imposing arbitrary taxes 
on the trade. The British authorities certainly knew about the intention of the 
Persian government but they kept quiet, waiting for the appropriate moment. 
When the Sultan of Muscat decided to use the same Persian method, the British 
authorities found that the local ruler's desire was not to stop the trade but to 
benefit from the British policy. It was only nominally that the trade was to be 
checked; but in practice it was encouradged. In Muscat this method was to benefit 
the Sultan's customs fanner by increasing duty on imported arms and 
consequently increasing the Sultan's income from illicit trade, as it was described 
by the British authorities. This tendency by the Sultan to increase his income by 
raising duty led the Government of India to think of controlling the Sultan's 
customs, which in turn led to a variety of other issues, events and developments 
which were significant in Oman's recent history. The case of the Baluchistan was 
one of them and it is this case involving both Oman and Great Britain to which we 
now turn in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CASE OF THE BALUCHISTAN IN OMAN 
Introduction 
This case was about the seizure of the British steamer Baluchistan on 24 January 
1898 by H. M. S. Lapwing, in the territorial waters of Muscat, and of confiscated 
arms aboard. It became one of the longest legal cases concerning the arms trade, 
lasting from 1898 to 1903. It caused dispute between the Sultan Faisal of Muscat 
and the British Government, and resulted in damage to relations between him and 
the British authorities. 
At home, the British Government faced another long debate and opposition 
by members of Parliament representing the arms trade companies in Birmingham to 
the action taken against the Baluchistan l • The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Mfairs, Mr Curzon, on 21, 24 February, 4 April, 4 and 28 July, and 1 August 1898 
had to reply to several questions in the House of Commons. On 10 August there 
was an extensive debate regarding the question, but Curzon was absent and the 
question was referred to the First Lord of the Treasury2. The interested parties also 
took this case to the British courts and several organizations and bodies were 
involved3• Eventually the case was forwarded to the House of Lords Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council which debated the case4• 
While this was proceeding at home, in Muscat a different political 
development was taking place, since Muscat became, largely, part and parcel of 
British policy on the north-west frontiers of India. The French became involved 
directly in the arms trade in Muscat and took over a great proportion of it and its 
profits. This mUltiplied the French interests and allowed them to share with the 
British influence over the formation of Muscat's policy, a matter which the British 
1. Hansard, 4th ser., vol. LXIV, 10 Aug. 1898, pp. 851-860. 
2. Hansard, 4th ser., vol. LXIII, 21, 24 Feb. 1898, pp. 1200, 1520; vol. LVI, 4 Apr. 1898, pp. 
38-39. 
3. Russell, The Times Law, vol. III, (1897-98), p. 229; vol. XVI, (1899-1900), p. 229. 
4. Frederick Pollock (ed.), The Law Reports, House of Lords (1902), p. 176. 
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had long tried to preven4 as shown in chapter four. But now the Omani people 
themselves increasingly required French protection~ and French flags for their 
vessels, a situation which the British had been worried about since June 1893 when 
a French Consul was "appointed5. The French challenge to the British even went 
further and was beyond the British expectation. Their protected Omanis managed to 
influence the Sultan, and share in his administration, and in the decision making of 
the Muscat Government. This had an important impact on the direction of British 
policy in Muscat from 1898 till 1905. 
Section Two 
The Origins of The Case 
The case of Baluchistan originated from general British efforts to suppress the arms 
trade in Muscat and in the Persian Gulf from 1880, as was discussed in the previous 
chapter. But the arms suppression was not taken very seriously, either by the 
British or by local. Governments in the Persian Gulf. In the Persian Gulf, for 
example, the Shah of Persia and the Sultan of Muscat tended to exploit the British 
policy of arms suppression to increase both their customs income and to profit from 
rather than to suppress it. They were joined by their officials in sharing the benefits. 
In Muscat it was the Customs farmer, and in Persia it was not only the Customs 
officials of the Shah but the Minister of War himself (Naa'ib Ass-sultaneh) who was 
importing Austrian-made Werndle rifles and made a good profit from that. For 
example a rifle purchased for 15s in Vienna sold for £8 in Persia6• In Britain there 
was fear of losses for the British firms, and the possibility of other countries' firms 
entering the arms market and replacing the British if the suppression policy was 
taken seriously. The situation became complicated and very difficult for the British 
authorities. In the south of Persia the tribesmen were buying weapons (Lee 
Metfords and Martini Henrys) shipped via Muscat, often by British companies and 
vessels. 
5. See Chap. Four (French reaction). 
6. R. M. Burrell, 'Arms And Afghans in Makran: An Episode in Anglo-Persian Relations, 
1905-1912', Bull. S.OA.S., XLIX (1986), p.lO. 
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This indicates that the early British effort with the Sultan of Muscat and the 
sultan's order of 1891 to stop traders carrying on their activities in Persia and India 
had not worked7• No wonder that during 1897. 30.000 breech-loading rifles were 
imported to the South 'of Persia through Bushire8• This port in general received in 
that year arms and ammunition valued over £100.000 almost all of which came 
from Great Britain9• It is another example of the Persian attitude towards the arms 
trade. as explained in the previous chapter. and of making business out of the 
suppression policy. But the lack of determination on the part of the British in 
suppressing the trade was also an interesting matter. The British were aware of the 
complicated situation but they kept quiet for a while waiting for better opportunities 
to promote British policy. 
By the end of 1897 new steps for suppressing the trade were taken seriously 
for the first time in Persia. On the 7th December. "suddenly and without any 
warning being given. and without any reason being assigned. a considerable 
quantity of anns and ammunition belonging to British merchants and manufacturers. 
stored at Bushire. which had actually passed the Customs. and upon which duty had 
been paid to the Persian officials. were seized by the British Consul or his 
subordinates. and were handed over by them to the Persian Government "10. The 
number of rifles seized in this operation was 7.00011; of that number. 2.000 rifles 
were of Belgian origin. but imported by the English finns Messrs. Francais and Son 
Ltd12• At the same time Muzaffer aI-Deen Shah ofTran. feeling some concern about 
the arming of the Southern tribes. gave ships of the RoyaI Navy authority to stop 
and search the cargoes of all Persian vessels ,requesting that any weapons found 
should be seized and turned over to the Persian Customs authorities13• 
7. See Chap. Five, sec. two for the Sultan's notification of 1891. 
8. Burrell, Arms And Afghans. p. 10. 
9. LovatFraser, 'Gun Running in The Persian Gulf,Proc. Cent. As. Soc., 17 May 1911, P 5. 
10. Mr. Lowe (Birmingham, Edgbaston), speech on 4 August 1898, in Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 
LXN., p. 854; Captain R. SL P. Parry, 'The Navy in The Persian Gulf, J. R. Un. Ser.Inst., 
LXXV (1930), p. 319. 
11. Fraser, GunRunning, p.5. 
12. Daud, British relations,p. 355. 
13. Tuson, British Policy. B16 B2; R. M. Burrell,Arms and Afghans. p.lO. 
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The Shah's concern probably ran parallel to the latest situation on the North-
West Frontier of India which caused great alarm to the British authorities. That led 
them to make every possible effort to close any source of arms supply to the Indian 
frontier tribes. Those tribes were in a state of conflict with the British army of the 
Government of India. But this time the conflict became very serious. On 9 
December General Westtnacott was ordered to occupy a crest commanding points 
leading to the Raigul valley on the Indian Northern frontier. On 10 December a 
British Messenger was attacked by the tribesmen~ beaten and robbed. On the 14th 
and the 15th the British army under General Westmacott engaged in heavy fighting 
with the Afredies tribes from daylight till dark. The tribesmen were persistent and 
bold in attack. Lieutenant West of the 3rd Gurkhas and the Jemadar who was 
leading General Westtnacott's horse were shot dead. Lieutenant Champain and 
Captain Scott were wounded. The Gurkhas lost five killed and seven wound~ and 
the Borderers two killed and five wounded. In this engagement from the British 
side there were 150 Scottish Borderers, 130 Sikhs, and 150 Gurkhas, two companies 
of the Royal Scots Fusiliers and two companies of the Northhamptonshire Regiment 
forming the rear fighting line14• 
So the situation had developed into unusually large scale serious fighting on 
the North-Western frontiers. That tension may well explain British action to 
suppress the anns trade becoming more serious than any time before, and their 
search for any possible centres which might supply the tribesmen with arms so as to 
check the anns traffic. 
But the joint measures which were taken by the British and the Persian 
authorities in Bushire together with Persian arbitrary extortion at the expense of the 
traders caused the latter to open wider another gate of the arms trade. Muscat, from 
which the arms traders had operated before, could supply the tribes with arms. 
Muscat again became a centre for supplying arms in the area. During 1896-1897 
that city received 20,000 rifles and 750 cases of ammunition from Messrs., Joyce 
14. The Times The Indian Frontier', 15, 16, Dec. 1897. 
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and Kynoch of BinninghamiS• In f~ it was in November of 1891 that it was 
discovered that Martini Henry rifles were on sale at Kurram on the North-West 
Frontier. This raised speculation about the possible source of supply, whether it was 
Persia or Afghanistan." It was also believed by the Political Residency in Bushire 
that the arms had been purchased in Muscat although this matter was disputed by 
the British Military Attache in Tehran 16. However, serious measures would have to 
be taken with respect to Muscat as well. 
In Muscat the first tough measures were taken against a British arms trader. 
He was Mr Messulam, residing in Manchester, who was a travelling agent of 
Carling Company, and he had stayed in Muscat from June till December 1897. He 
became deeply involved in arms importation and intended to introduce machine 
guns. In a letter dated 31 December 1897 to the Political Agent in Muscat, the 
Viceroy of India proposed to urge the Sultan to expel Mr Messulam. In case of 
failing to do so the Viceroy gave the Political Agent the power to order his 
deportationI7. It is not clear whether Mr Messulam was expelled or not but it is 
obvious that the British authorities in India were aware of the danger of allowing 
further fInns involving British subjects to enter the arms market in the region. It 
shows also the Government of India's concern about the type of arms which might 
be introduced. The machine guns were obviously far more complicated and 
developed than traditional fIrearms. But the British Government was also to bring 
about a different kind of pressure on the Sultan of Muscat to make arms suppression 
more effective. They joined Persia in an effort to persuade the Sultan of Muscat to 
co-operate with themiS. The British and Persian Governments sent a joint 
delegation to Sultan Faisal of Muscat with a letter to him dated 5th January 1898, 
expressing their concern about arms shipments from Muscat territory to tribes 
subject to Persia and those on the frontier of India who were engaged in hostilities 
with the British Government. That could be regarded as an action against both 
15. Daud. British Relations, p. 348. 
16. R. M. Burrell. Arms and Afghans, p. 9. 
17. F. O. 54/28, Viceroy to I. 0., 31 Dec. 1897. 
18. Burrell,ArmsandAfghans. p. 10. 
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Governments' laws for suppressing the arms traffic. Because of that the letter asked 
the Sultan to warn his subjects and any person resident in his territories to stop 
exporting arms to both countries from His Highness's dominions. Finally they 
invited him to authorize British and Persian ships of war to stop the illicit traffic, 
and to seize and confiscate any cargoes of arms owned by British subjects in Muscat 
waters destined for illicit importation into the ports of Persia and India19. But, it 
seems, Faisal did not give an immediate response to this overture, possibly confused 
by the co-operation of Persia with Great Britain. Since it was very well known by 
the Muscat arms merchants what were the Persian measures of suppressing arms, it 
was probably doubted whether they were any more serious this time about 
suppressing the trade or whether they would continue tending to profit by involving 
themselves in the arms suppression20. At Bushire, for example, after the remarkable 
arms seizure of December 1897, Malik a'Ttujjar was appointed officer to prevent 
the arms trade, but with the agreement that one third of the confiscated arms should 
be given to him as reward!21 If that was true, it would raise the question of what 
Malik would do with his third share. The Sultan certainly would be aware of the 
value of his customs revenue from the arms trade. But Britain in practice dealt with 
the Sultan alone and directly, though the commitment the Sultan gave was to both 
governments, Britain and Persia, just as it was demanded. 
However the main concern of the British authorities with regard to arms 
suppression was the fresh uprising of the Afriedies tribes on the North-West frontier 
in December 1897. But this policy also affected other areas under British influence, 
Muscat and Persia for example. In Muscat this policy was to create the 
circumstances of the Baluchistan affair. In fact it was quite possible that another 
ship than the Baluchistan might have become involved at some different date and 
perhaps in Persian or Indian territorial waters with quite different consequences. 
However, the outcome of the Baluchistan case was important in respect to both 
19. F. O. 60/603, Translation of the Persian text ofletter to the Sultan of Muscat, 5 Jan. 1898. 
Sited in Dam:!. British Relations, Appendix VIII. 
20. Chap. Five, sec. two. 
21. Daud, British relations. p. 357 
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Muscat and Great Britain. 
Section Three 
Towards tbe Case of tbe Baluchistan~ 1898 
In the year 1898 political events seem to have developed rapidly in Muscat, 
Birmingham and London. Mter the British-Persian joint letter of 5 January to the 
Sultan of Muscat, he received a similar letter on 12 January from Colonel Meade~ 
the Political Resident. The letter enclosed a notification drafted by him which the 
Sultan was requested to adopt and declare. Next day, quickly, on the 13th the 
Sultan replied; "your esteemed letter of yesterday's date has arrived together with 
the draft copy of the notification; we have accepted it and we shall publish it. A 
copy of it is (herewith) sent to you". Faisal expressed his compliance with what the 
British desired in respect of preventing the traffic of arms and ammunition to India 
and Persia. In fact. he was cautious and precise in his reply in mentioning India and 
Persia. That meant there was not any commitment to include Oman in the 
suppression project. He only assured his willingness to co-operate with both Britain 
and Persia in arrangements to suppress the trade in their territories22• It is also 
important to note that Faisal's willingness was not without conditions. He made it 
clear in his reply to the Political Resident that "with regard to what you have hinted 
to us about representing this matter to the great government in the best way 
possible, so that we should be (not only) guaranteed against any loss but (also) 
derive benefit l7y what we are doing, we firmly believe that the Government [the 
British Government] and yourself will not be pleased with any loss to US23. 
Sultan Faisal made three important points. First. he excluded Oman from 
any measures of anns suppression, second, he wanted to be guaranteed against any 
loss and to benefit instead, and third, he issued a diplomatic warning about possible 
consequences if he suffered losses. And if his wishes were taken into consideration, 
he said to the Resident, "we shall thank the Government and yourself for that ". In 
22. Tuson.BritishPolicy. B161E4. 
23. F. O. 54/28, Sultan of Muscat to the Political Resident. 19 Shahan 1325 A.H.{13 Jan. 1898). 
writers emphases. 
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other words it would avoid any complication in his relations with the British 
Government. It seems that Faisal was not fully sure that his wishes would be 
considered,. though he was showing confidence in his reply by making those points. 
But Faisa! would have been encouraged by the news of December 1897 of arms 
seized in Bushire by Her Majesty's Consul-General, who handed them over to the 
Persian authorities (see text above), while a third of the confiscated arms were to go 
to the officer in charge (Malik a'Ttujjaar) as reward for his wonderful services. So 
why could this not be done for the Sultan? What did he really gain from his 
willingness to co-operate? The following will provide the answer. 
Colonel M.J.Meade sent a letter to the Government of India about his 
meeting with the Sultan, which made the Sultan's proposition clearer. The Sultan 
had asked him whether he would be given the arms seized in his territorial waters. 
The Sultan was apprehensive, saying that he would suffer in a pecuniary way from 
the proposed arrangement. Replying to the Sultan's points Meade said, "I impressed 
on him that his own authority would certainly benefit if he could prevent the arming 
of the Arab tribes [the Omanis] in the interior and that, that alone was in my opinion 
a strong reason in favour of his joining the British and Persian Governments in 
putting an end to the traffic in arms". Regarding the handing over of the arms he 
mentioned to the Sultan that he had received no instructions and could not guarantee 
his Highness against loss. But, he said, "in view of the advantages which would 
result from the early conclusion of an agreement with the Sultan, I felt justified in 
telling him that I was prepared to make recommendation on his behalf if he readily 
complied with the wishes of the British Government ". He said to the Sultan that 
the British Government was" kindly disposed towards him and did not wish that he 
should suffer in any way, but on the contrary, that he should benefit by carrying out 
their views". But Faisal was practical in putting forward to Meade his possible total 
loss of $24,000 a year revenue from the duties levied on the import and export of 
arms24, if the British measures against the arms trade took place. 
24. F. O. 54(28, Meade to Govt.Ind. For. Dept, 22 Jan.1898. 
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It is clear however that Faisal was not concem~ as Meade impli~ about 
any threat to his authority but simply concerned about his revenue. The Sultan 
probably was satisfied with Colonel Meade's view that he would benefit by carrying 
out the British Government's policy. He was probably pleased to know that the 
Government did not wish him to suffer, if he was willing to co-operate. So he took 
that as a diplomatic signal that something could be done either by handing over to 
him any seized anns or by compensation for his possible loss. If he could benefit in 
the same way as the Persians had in the previous December and if the trade was not 
to be touched in Muscat, he would be satisfied. Muscat then would be the only 
place which could carry on the anns trade with profit. When Meade drafted the 
Sultan's proclamation he was trying to influence the Sultan's own thinking in this 
way and to show that his role was simply a cooperative one. He knew if he 
included Muscat in the supression policy it would be refused by the Sultan. Meade 
drafted the proclamation so as not to be rejected. The quick responce of the Sultan 
shows that Meade achieved what he had put into Faisal's mind. At the same time it 
reveals the Sultan's ambitions to profit by and to monopolize the trade. It appeared 
to be a a diplomatic game between the Resident and the Sultan, the Resident to 
pursue his Government's policy and the Sultan to meet his own interests. Both 
appeared to have different desires. The Sultan's ends were to gain the seized arms 
or to be compensated if losses occurred. The Sultan's negotiation with the Resident 
and his reply is an interesting issue in itself. The way the Sultan dealt with the 
proclamation indicated his awareness of the dangerous consequences of that issue, 
but he accepted on condition that he should be guaranteed by his opponent to win 
the game! The Resident's idea of winning that game was simply the issuing of that 
proclamation, by which the arms trade would be suppressed, unaware of what might 
happen, if the Sultan's wishes were not taken seriously. In fact it was a great 
political gamble between the two great players, the Sultan of Muscat and the British 
Resident. Normally in gambling there are winners and losers, but who won this 
game, the Sultan or the Resident? 
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Mter meeting with Colonel Meade2S, the Sultan issued his notification on 13 
January 1898, as follows: "Be it known to such of OIU subjects as see this that 
,whereas the British and Persian Governments have represented to us that they are 
desirous of preventing· introduction of arms and ammunition into India and Persia, 
and that there is reason to think that many are exponed from Muscat and taken to 
those two above named countries, we have resolved to join them and to assist them 
as far as it lies in OIU power in suppressing this trade in arms and ammunition 
between Muscat and India and Persia .We therefore warn (OIU subjects) that all the 
arms and ammunition sent to those two countries will be confiscated ,and those 
engaged in the trade will be punished, as the introduction of arms and ammunition 
into India and Persia is prohibited l:Jy the Government of these two countries, and 
therefore illegal. 
Infuture our Maskatflag will be no protection to vessels carrying the said 
arms and ammunition from our dominions to India and Persia (This is written) that 
it may be known ''26. Bannerman noticed that discussion between Faisal and the 
Political Resident over the issuance of the proclamation was not recorded, but 
Colonel Meade's repon to the Government of India of 22 January, mentioned above, 
may be enough to show the major points of concern raised by the Sultan and the 
conditions under which he did issue his proclamation. Meade's letter could be 
sufficient to indicate the way the negotiation went on. However, on the same date 
th.e Sultan also issued his proclamation giving the right for British and Persian ships 
of war to search Muscat's vessels for anns. "We have given permission to British 
and Persian vessels of war to search vessels carrying their and our flag in our 
territorial waters, to confiscate all arms and ammunition (weapons of war Yin 
them". This referred to anns intended for India or Persia and belonging to British, 
25. The date of the meeting between the Sultan and Colonel Meade is not clear but it seems it 
took place between the 5th and the 13th. 
26. Tuson, British Policy, B 161B2, E4-48; F. O. 54f28, Translation of notification of the Sultan 
of Muscat. 13 Jan. 1898; Bannennan, Unity, p. 231; Fraser, GunRunning, p. 5; Keppel, Gun 
Running, p. 50; Law Times Reports, voL LXXXll, 1902; The Law Reports, 1902 'House of 
Lords, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and Peerage Cases', (1902), p. 699. 
Busch,Britain Persian Gulf, p. 273. Writer's emphasis. 
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Persian or Qmani subj~ on all waters belonging to the three countries27. The 
proclamation did not state any punishment for the offenders; it was left for the 
Notification to deal with that. It could be pointed out that the Sultan's notification 
and the Proclamation camed a significant weakness. In both of them it was stated 
that the Muscat flag would be no protection to vessels carrying arms, and that 
vessels of war would search vessels flying British, Persian and Muscat flags. The 
flag question was going to be an issue in itself and would not be solved before 1904. 
If the Omanis were to feel that their flag would no longer be protection to them 
when threatened by Persian or British ships of war how could they be expected. to 
behave? It was for them a good reason for seeking protection under the flag of 
another country not covered by the Muscat-British and the Persian Agreement. But 
which country would that be, and how would the Qmanis proceed for that purpose? 
Section five will discuss this question. However there is still nothing to show any 
direct reaction in Muscat to the Sultan's notification and proclamation, and that may 
be because the arms traders in Muscat thought that their business was unaffected 
since both the notification and the Proclamation mentioned only Persia and India 
and not Muscat. Despite that, the arms traders took precautions and prepared 
themselves in the matter of the flag just in case. But, so far there was nothing to 
fear and no reason for any panic. The traders certainly knew about the Sultan's 
commitment to treaties with other states than Great Britain. Those states were not 
suppressing the arms trade and were trading freely in it, such as U. S. A. and France. 
Just about ten days after the notification and the Proclamation the steamer 
Baluchistan was seized by H. M. S. Lapwing. 
Section Four 
The seizure of Baluchistan, 1898 
Before the latest efforts for suppressing the arms traffic of December 1897 in 
Bushire, and the Sultan of Muscat's declarations of January 1898, the steamer 
27. Richard W. Brant (ed.), 'Muscat Proclamation' in, A Collection of Treaties and 
Conventions. Between Great Britain and Foreign Powers, vol. XXV, (Hertslet's 
Commercial Treaties 1910), p 947. Writer's emphasis. 
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Baluchistan had sailed from England. It left London on 26 November 1897 on its 
trip to Bahrain via either Bushire or Muscat. It was loaded with four cases of 
cartridges valued at 125L. and one case of rifles and one case of cartridges valued 
at 2()()L28. On 24 January 1898 when Baluchistan was within the Muscat's territorial 
waters and making for the harbour of Muscat, H. M. S. Lapwing signalled her to 
stop and fired a shot across her bows29. The ship Baluchistan was boarded by an 
officer" Carr, from H. M. S. Lapwing who told her master to consider the cargo 
under arrest. He seized all the cargo of rifles and ammunition and took them to 
Muscat3o• This was done on the grounds that the arms were intended for 
importation into Persian territory and that this was forbidden by Persian law31• 
The case of the Baluchistan developed in two ways, one in London and 
Birmingham, and the other in the whole of Oman (Muscat, Batinah, interior of 
Oman and Sure). At home the case went to the courts, the House of Commons, the 
House of Lords, the Guardians of the Birmingham Proof House. The Times, The 
Economist, covered most of those events32• 
In Oman the seizure of the Baluchistan and its arms cargo brought a fresh 
dispute between the Sultan of Muscat and the British Government. It appeared that 
the Sultan's willingness to adopt the Political Resident's notification of 13 January 
was based on the belief that any confiscated consignment of arms would be turned 
over to him. He perhaps thought of equipping his soldiers with these modem arms, 
or he may have intended to sell them with a good profit. It appeared that he 
seriously meant what he said in his reply of 13 January to the Political Resident that 
he should benefit from his co-operation in the suppression of arms traffic to Persia 
28. Aspinall, Reports.pA18; The Law Times Reports voL 79 (1898), p. 28. 
29. The Law Times Reports, vol. 82 (1902), p.700. 
30. Ibid; F. Barry, (ed.), The Times Law reports voL XVII. (1900-1901), p. 658. 
31. Solicitor's Journal (& Reporter), 42, (1898) p. 635; F. O. Robinson and R. H. Balloch. 
Reports of Commercial Cases vol. ill, (1897-98), p. 230; Fraser, Gun Running, p. 5; 
Russell, The Times Law Reports, vol. XVI, (1899-1900), p. 406; Law Journal Reporters 
(new series) vol. 71 (1902), p. 361; The Law Times Report. vol. LXXIX (1898), p. 28. 
32. The Times, 3, 4, May, 6, 7,8,9, 19,20,23,30 Jun., 5 Jul., 5 Nov. 1898; 17 Jan., 8 Feb., 1, 
4, 6, 9 May 1899;Report of the Guardians of the Birmingham Proof House. 1899. (31 Dec. 
1898); The Birmingham Daily Mail, 15 June 1898; The Birmingham Daily Gazette, 16 June 
1898. 
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and India. That belief could be a reasonable justification for the Notification and 
the Proclamation. But what had happened after the seizure of the Baluchistan? The 
captured arms were handed over by the Lapwing officers to the British Political 
Agent and no~ to the Sultan. Faisal was confused and became angry. He asked to 
be given the seized arms. He protested and claimed to the British Political Agent in 
Muscat that by this seizure alone he lost $MT 25()()()33. But the Political Agent 
denied that any agreement had been reached with the Sultan whereby the seized 
arms should be given to him. This caused tension between the Sultan and the 
British authorities. The strain in relations between the two parties began to 
overshadow the situation34• 
It was noticed above that there was not any reaction against the Sultan's 
Notification and Proclamation since the Muscat trade was not touched. But after the 
seizure of the Baluchistan~ the situation immediately took a new turn. That was 
because of the fears and doubts among the arms traders in Muscat about the British 
attitude and maybe doubts about the Sultan himself even from his own subjects. For 
example, three days after the seizure of the Baluchistan, on 27 January the British 
Political Agent in Muscat reported that quantities of arms in Muscat were being 
removed and concealed in dhows, so that detection by British men-of-war at sea 
would be- extremely difficult35• The trade did not stop because the traders found 
their own ways to deal with an uncertain situation. So most of the arms dealers 
diverted their traffic to other ports. Consequently the Muscat arms trade decreased 
to less then a third in 1898 compared with the previous year36• This was to mean a 
considerable loss of revenue to the Sultan. 
The French, however, found it a wonderful chance to promote their own 
interests by offering flags and security for the arms dealers' dhows37• 
Sultan Faisal soon discovered that his willingness to co-operate with the 
33. Bannennan, Unity, p.232. 
34. Ibid. 
35. F. O. 54128, Tel., POliL Agent to For. DepL, Govt. Ind., 27 Jan. 1898. 
36. Bannennan, Unity, p. 232. 
37. Ibid. 
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Persians and the British had been short-sighted. He was unable to prevent the 
consequences. His prestige as sultan was severely damaged amongst his own loyal 
subjects who took refuge in French protection. and he became unable to prevent this 
disastrous consequence even amongst his own officials. Perhaps the assault by 
some of them against seamen of the British cruiser Cossack on 10 February 1898 
indicated some hostility towards the British though it did not have any direct 
relation with the arms trade38• But the Sultan himself became unhappy with the 
British. 
In the Persian Gulf, Colonel Meade reported that the Sultan's attitude had 
become very unsatisfactory. The Sultan refused the British request to hold a court 
of Judicature without prior assurance that the seized arms should be at his absolute 
disposal if the Court found that arms of the steamer Baluchistan were lawfully 
seized39• The Sultan also refused to co-operate with the British Government for a 
preliminary inquiry in the case of Baluchistan. since the arms were seized by the 
British ship Lapwing without the presence of any Muscat officials empowered to 
inquire and seize in the Sultan's name40• Given this changed attitude of the Sultan 
Faisal. he was warned by the Persian Gulf Residency that payment of his subsidy 
would be suspended pending orders of the Government41• But the Sultan's position 
presented the British Government with a problem. 
It appeared that the Sultan's co-operation was essential. This was necessary 
from the jurisdictional angle, since, if he was willing to give his authority to the 
seizure of the Baluchistan. he would vindicate H. M. S. Lapwing's action, which 
would be seen as an action taken by him, but carried out by H. M. S. Lapwing. So 
as far as he was a sovereign ruler, both his position and the action of the British 
man-of-war would be seen as legal. That became clear when several complaints 
and applications were received by the British Government and law-suits by 
interested bodies at home became possible. The Home Government advised the 
38. The Times, 11 Feb. 1898. 
39. F. O. 54/28, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 21 Mar. 1898. 
40. F. O. 54/28, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 22 Mar. 1898. 
41. F. O. 54/28, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 21 Mar. 1898 
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Viceroy of India not to be impatient with the Sultan. Instead they found it desirable 
to conciliate him. They warned that it was a grave mistake to threaten the Sultan 
with suspension of his subsidy and regarded that threat as impolitic. In f~ it was 
very important given that the British authorities were seeking collaboration with a 
foreign ruler against the interests of British citizens. 
What was needed was a courteous request to the Sultan to appoint an officer 
to hold an inquiry in the case of Baluchistan. The Consul in Muscat, Major Fagan, 
was told that he should regulate his action in this matter according to the 
instructions to be given him by the Home Government. The Home Government's 
request for details about the arms seizure was only for reference42. 
However this question remained unsolved between the Sultan and the British 
authorities till April 1898 when Colonel Meade, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, 
visited the Sultan. It was his second visit in one year, the first being for the 
Notification of 13 January. The Sultan seems to have softened his stand and asked 
for assurance of British support, in the event of enquiries involving anns belonging 
to subjects of other European powers. However Meade was instructed by the 
Viceroy to say to the Sultan that the object of the procedure laid down was to secure 
full opportunity for all claimants to prove their claims, and that the Government 
would deal with claims and questions of final possession. So His Highness should 
have no anxiety on those points43. There was nothing to show that the Sultan's 
demand for the seized anns was accepted, but it seems that Meade's visit to 
persuade the Sultan to hold a court was successful because the Sultan's wishes in 
respect of the seized anns were quietly satisfied. 
On 15 April 1898 a High Court by order of the Sultan was held in Muscat 
under Sa'eed bin Muhammed, the Wazeer of His Highness, and Bader bin Seif for 
inquiring into the circumstances under which certain munitions of war from the 
steamship Baluchistan of Swansea, were confiscated. The court examined 
Lieutenant-Commander G.Carr, R.N., captain of the Lapwing, heard his evidence 
42. F. O. 54/28, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 22 Mar. 1898. 
43. F. O. 54/28, Viceroy to Meade, 13 Apr. 1898. 
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and examined the bills of landing, manifest and papers, and telegrams produced by 
the captain. The coun found that (1) munitions of war from the steamship 
Baluchistan had been seized by the British man-of-war Lapwing; (2) the seizure 
was in every respect legal and in accordance with the permission given by His 
Highness to British men-of-war at the request of the British and Persian 
Governments; (3)the munitions of war were intended for Persian ports; (4)" The 
alteration in the port-marks of destination on the cases took place during the stay of 
the steamship Baluchistan at Port Said on or about the 12th Shaban 1315 A.H.(6 
Jan.1898) with the intention of misleading as to the true destination of those cases; 
but such alteration did not provide any immunity on them from seizure in 
accordance with the above -mentioned permission";(5) the munitions of war seized 
were the very ones mentioned in the original manifest which was attached to this 
decision44• The Sultan signed the court decision. He stated, ''1, Feysal bin Turki, 
Sultan of Muscat, having carefully considered this decision of my High Coun, 
approve of it and agree with it. In witness whereof I have put my signature and seal 
to it". On behalf of the British Government Major Fagan was present in the court of 
Muscat. Presumably this court was needed essentially to anticipate any problems 
which Lt.Commander Carr might have at home and to confinn the legality of his 
action by decision of the Sultan of Muscat's court. The Sultan's desire was to have 
the seized anns for himself. According to his court's decision, the ship Baluchistan 
was heading for Persian ports, and the change of destination conferred no immunity 
from seizure, which was legal in every respect according to his proclamation of 13 
January 1898. Whether the Sultan had the right as a sovereign ruler to set up a 
coun to decide on the legality of seizing anns aboard a foreign ship was another 
question. The anns were seized not according to Omani law but Persian law. The 
courts would have to decide whether this court was compatible (1) with the British 
Parliamentary Act of 184345 and (2) with the regulation of British consular 
44. The Law Times, vol. LXXXll (1902), pp. 698-99. 
45. Act of Parliament 6th 7th Vict 1843, (an act to remove doubts as to exercise of power and 
jwisdiction by Her Majesty in divers countries and places out of Her Majesty's Dominions 
and to render the the same more effectual, 24th August, 1843) XCIV pp. 957-962. 
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jurisdiction in Muscat of 186746 and (3) with the treaty of 1873 between the Sultan 
of Muscat and Great Britain for the jurisdictional rights of the Political Agent in 
Muscat47• 
However it was not until 1900 that the British authorities decided to hand 
over to the Sultan the seized arms, after all legal actions had been decided in Britain 
and Muscat regarding the matter. But the Sultan's court did not help to improve his 
relations with the British. He also did not recover the loss to his customs revenue. 
Section Five 
The Consequences of the Baluchistan Case in Oman 
Eight months after the Sultan's court decision his subsidy was cut by the Political 
Agent in Muscat, especially damaging after his loss of arms revenue. B. C. Busch, 
in his book, Britain and the Persian Gulf concluded that the suspension of the 
Sultan's subsidy was a consequence of his refusal to hold a court of inquiry and 
declare that the seizure of arms was legal48. As shown above the Sultan in fact 
agreed to hold the court but on condition of his being given the seized arms if the 
court found that the arms had been seized on a legal basis. But then he agreed to 
hold the court after Colonel Meade's visit to Muscat in April 1898, and probably 
after he had been convinced that he might receive the arms after all legal procedures 
had been completed. The Sultan's court decision came before the British courts and 
the House of Lords in 1898 and 1902. The reason for his subsidy's suspension was 
his granting the coaling station to France when this became known on 23 
November. Mter the seizure of Baluchistan, Busch said, "The arms were taken to 
Muscat in the hope that the Sultan would declare the seizure legal by court of 
inquiry. Faisal did nothing of the sort, and Fagan, once again acting in the heat of 
the moment, announced to the Sultan that his subsidy was suspended, pending 
Indian government approval, until his attitude should become more 
46. F. o. 54{l9, British Order in Council. for the Regulation of Consular jurisdiction within the 
Dominions of the Sultan of Muscat. (Windsor), 4 Nov. 1867. 
47. Aitchison. Collection. p. 309. 
48. Busch. Britain Persian Gulf. pp. 66-fJ7. 
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accommodating". It seems that Busch built his assumption on Fagan's first 
suggestion which was refused by the Home Government. It was still too early to 
state that the arms seized had been taken to Muscat for the sake of declaring the 
seizure legal. This was not considered before it had become clear that action could 
be taken by arms dealers against the naval officer Lt. Carr before a British court. 
First legal proceedings for the arms seizure in a Muscat court took place in Apri4 
about two and a half months after the seizure. However, after the seizure of the 
BaIuchist~ Muscat's imports of arms fell from $900,000 to $200,000 from Great 
Britain, and from France fell from $100,000 to $60,()()()49. This drove the Sultan 
towards bankruptcy, as his indebtedness jumped to $MT 190,000 in 18985°. This 
led him to take various measures which brought him into difficulties with the British 
authorities. 
To cover some of his losses, on 4 July 1898 Sultan Faisa! announced without 
any warning that an extra tax of 5%. would be levied on all goods reaching the coast 
from Rostak and Wadi AI Ma,aawil in the Omani interior, ostensibly to punish the 
tribes of those places for the trouble which they had been giving him. But how did 
His Highness proceed to impose this tax ? The Political Agent reported that it was 
done in the same manner as with all other taxes. It was put up to auction and 
purchased by Purshotum, the Sultan's customs fanner, for 9,000 dollars. But during 
the year 1898 the crop of dates grown at those places had already been bought up 
and paid for by British Indian traders. So the punitive tax fell not on the tribesmen 
but on the British subjects. Because of that the Political Agent requested the Sultan 
to repeal this obnoxious tax, but His Highness expressed his intention of imposing a 
similar punitive tax on the same tribes' production in 1899. 
This issue raises several points. First, the Sultan's disappointment in not 
receiving the seized arms of the Baluchistan and in the reduction in his customs 
revenue led him to impose an additional tax on goods traded within his own 
country, (a) to recover some of his losses by making British subjects suffer this 
49. Fraser.Gun Running. p. 6. 
50. Landen. Oman, p. 380. 
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additional tax at least for that year; (b) to use his political difficulties as an excuse 
for increased income. indicating thereby the kind of person the British were dealing 
with; (c) to insist on the same sanction for the next year. thus giving the British 
authorities no alternative but to support him in his attempt to punish his political 
opponents. even though it caused some inconvenience for British subjects. 
Secondly. although the taxes raised by the Sultan affected British subjects in 
the first instance. they would remain to affect the Omanis of the interior. even those 
of his most loyal subjectsSI. This tax later caused such hardship to the Omanis that 
it can be seen as one of the root causes of the revolution of 1913. 
However this was an important issue for the British Goverment since goods 
belonging to British subjects sent from one port to another were taxed at both. This 
matter caused another problem between the Sultan and the British authorities. 
Moreover, a payment [U'shoor] of from 1 to 10 Paisa per package at Muscat and 
from 3 to 15 Paisa per package at Matrah was levied for weighing all goods landed 
at those ports, contrary to Article VI of the 1891 treatyS2. Though Muscat traders 
were not excluded from that, Mutrah City was. and even today it is still the 
acknowledged mart for the date trade overland or by sea. This city's traders have 
their establishments [Wekaleh] and storehouses [Bakkhar] there. The sultan's 
customs fanner persuaded him to close down the weighing of dates at Mutrah, by 
which arrangement the traders there, mostly British. were forced to bring their dates 
to Muscat for weighing. The customs fanner himself was a date broker and had a 
strong position in the trade in Muscat. By being forced to do their business at 
Muscat they were subjected to obstruction and delay which conflicted with article X 
of the 1891 treaty, framed to protect them 
. "By this ingenious device, Matrah traders were compelled either to utilize the 
services of the customs fanner in his capacity as date broker for the purpose of 
disposing of their dates at Muscat or to incur the extra expense of taking them back 
51. F. O. 54/28. Fagan's report to the Foreign Secretary. 19 November 1898. 
52. Ibid; Aitchison. Collection. p. 31l. 
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to Matrahs3". So the Sultan found his own way of compensating himself from the 
losses of the arms revenue he suffered after the case of the Baluchistan. Whether or 
not he gained all he hoped for, the purpose of proceeding in that way seems to be 
clear. But this put him face to face with the British authorities and his customs 
became an additional subject of interest to the Government of India (as was 
discussed in the previous chapter). However, the Sultan's financial position and his 
reaction to it was not the only aftermath of the Baluchistan affair. Muscat became a 
place of international concern in other ways. The major players in that were France 
and Britain during this period before the 1914-18 war. 
France in fact gained a golden opportunity to interfere in Muscat's affairs. 
Omanis, whether they owned ships or not, by their own will were asking for French 
protection. Britain's dominant influence in Muscat was thereby becoming 
undermined. For several reasons Britain's influence had always been greater than 
that of any other states there. It was very important that French protection should 
appear to be as a kind of hospitality for the Omanis, and that it was not imposed by 
the French but demanded by the Omani people. The situation was novel and 
unusual. The British government had long had a commitment to protect Muscat's 
Sultans for their own interests. But the French now became involved in protectiri.g 
the interests of the Sultan's subjects. And in so far as they proved successful they 
could through the Sultan's subjects seek influence on the Sultan himself and draw 
him away from the British. Part of this issue will be discussed in the next section. 
Section Six 
The French Question at Muscat 
The case of the Baluchistan caused severe damage to British policy in Muscat. It 
opened wide the way for other powers to interfere in Muscat affairs and offer 
protection to the Omanis. Some of Muscat's people, as well as those in other parts 
of Oman, desired French protection. This had been true for a long time but it 
increased rapidly after the seizure of the Baluchistan. The Omanis, though some 
53. F. O. 54(28. Fagan to Salisbury. 19 November 1898. 
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were involved in fraud cases may have looked to French protection as an escape 
from British policy and may have lost confidence in the SultanS4• It became quite 
common practice for inhabitants of Sur and those of the Batinah coast, who owned 
dhows and wished to navigate their vessels under French protection, to send them to 
French settlements for registration as if they belonged to inhabitants living in those 
places so as to obtain French papers and the right to fly the French flag55. For a 
long time the French in Obokh, Madagascar, and the Comoros had granted French 
ship's papers and flags to subjects of the sultan of Muscat, as was done by the 
French consul at Aden, Muscat and Zanzibars6• The situation became complicated 
since it was not part of any agreement, or any formal relationship between the 
Sultan of Muscat and France. It was through the direct contact and mutual interest 
between the Omani people and the French Government, which developed over the 
years since the 30s of the century. This put the French in a position to protect the 
Omani people's interests and could be expected to give them a very good local 
reputation. Even people from the interior of the country, who had nothing to do 
with seafaring, demanded French protection. Early in 1898, several Sheiks of Beni 
Ruwahhah sent a message to Ottavi, the French Vice-Consul, asking him to put 
them under French protection. They stated that 10,000 of them were seeking it. 
The Government of India urged the Home Government to secure the discontinuance 
by the French authorities of a practice which served to stimulate an illegal trade of 
arms which was likely to hinder action to check it in the Persian Gu1f57. There was 
certainly fear amongst the British authorities of the traffic in arms being 
encouraged, but there may have been also a political fear of the French increasing 
their influence in the Gulf in this way. Most of the Omanis who received French 
papers belonged to the area of ralan and the town of Sur. The situation could be a 
delicate one in terms of interests. French influence could challenge that of the 
54. F. O. 54(28, Fagan to Resid., 20 Jan. 1898; Meade to GOVL Ind., For. Dept., 29 Jan. 1898. 
55. F. O. 54(28, 1. O. to F. 0.,23 May 1898. 
56. F. O. (9161) [4920]. 'Political Memo., respecting British Interests In the Persian Gulf. 
Conf.- Jan. 1914; Tuson, British Policy, B 15, (B 129), F 12, G9. F. O. 54(29, Muscat 
PoliL Agentto Resid., 23 Mar. 1898. 
57. F. O. 54(28, Govt. Ind. For. Dept to Hamilton, (secret), 31 Mar.1898. 
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British in Muscat and could hardly be removed. This created a totally new situation 
which could embarrass the Sultan hjmself however much he detested the British 
policy of arms suppression. Those Omanis who held French papers for their dhows 
were neither of French nationality nor naturalized French citizens and had no 
authority from the Sultan to change their allegiance to France. According to British 
sources the Omanis were not permanent residents in French territory. They only 
paid fleeting visits there to renew their navigation licenses58• In fact the Sultan had 
disliked for some time the French policy towards his people regarding the granting 
of flags. For example, on 28 May 1897, he wrote to the French Consul, that his 
subjects living at Soor and in the Batineh, who were usually sailing to the coasts of 
Africa and Aden were requesting French flags, and "to become French subjects by 
purchasing some little immovable property in those places and living there". The 
Sultan complained in his letter that the matter was against the rule observed in all 
countries and against the custom. He claimed that every one should return to his 
original nationality and asked that they should be prevented from following in their 
countries a course contrary to the rule59• The French consul, Mr Ottavi, did not 
agree with the points raised by the Sultan. In his reply the French consul regretted 
that it was impossible to comply with the Sultan's desire, and he told the Sultan that 
he was misled regarding the points he raised. The protection could be obtained 
from a country by anyone who complied with certain known conditions which 
varied from country to country. The French consul mentioned that many dhows 
belonging to Arabs, Omani and others had been visiting French colonies for forty 
years. They had decided to live there and obtained protection and flags legally, 
according to the rules of those colonies. The orders were issued by the French 
Minister of Marine Affairs and no one had the right to dispute the matter. Ottavi 
reminded the Sultan that His Highness had confirmed that arrangement by France 
publicly and privately. France would only go against custom if it required their 
officers to change the rules for protection and the granting of flags specially for 
58. F. O. (9161) [4920], Conf. no.l, 'Political Memo . .'. 
59. F. O. 54/28, Sultan of Muscat to French Consul. A. H. 25 Dhilhijjah (28 May 1897). 
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those who came originally from Soor and Batineh. They would oppose the custom 
if it stopped any person under their protection from visiting any particular port, and 
possessing many dhows on account of his origins. Ottavi pointed out to the Sultan 
that what would be against the custom would be to put obstacles in the way of 
voyages and mercantile transactions for those from French protectorates. Ottavi 
resented the Sultan's claim that French protection to Omanis caused him injury; "as 
to injury which you mentione~ if it were (real) injury, how is it that others than 
yourself have not complained of it, and how is it that you yourself did not mention it 
during all this long period until now ?"6O. 
That was the situation about the end of 1897 between the Sultan and the 
French. It was probably due to the assistance which the Sultan received from the 
British to beat the rebellion of Dhofar of 1897. It was also because of the influence 
of his pro-British Wazeer Sayyd Sa'e~ but the latter was dismissed from his post61• 
One would not, however, expect the Sultan to become a friend of the French so 
quickly since relations on both sides had been so. strained62. But by the beginning of 
1898, he was reponed as having" come under French influence, according to British 
sources. On 5 January, there were signs of the Sultan's new unfriendly attitude 
towards the British Government. The superintendent of Karachi telegraph station 
wrote to the Foreign Secretary in Calcutta that the Sultan had been persuaded by the 
French Consul not to hoist the British flag on 1 January, but only to fire 31 guns63. 
This was the usual honour for the assumption of the title of Empress of India by Her 
Majesty the Queen. By doing so he showed that he considered himself as 
independent and not under the control of the Government of India. When he was 
asked for an explanation of the change, he replied that the salute had been a New 
Year's day compliment to all Christians, and not to the Queen Empress. This was 
60. F. O. 54/28. Ottavi to Sultan of Muscat. 15 Jul. 1897 (14 Safar 1315). 
61. Tuson, British Policy, B 15. 
62. Tuson, British Policy, B 76, (7). Some tough letters had been exchanged between the 
Sultan and the French Consul during this period: Sultan of Muscat to Ottavi, 27 Rabee'a II 
(26 Sep. 1897.); Ottavi to Sultan of Muscat, 11 Oct 1897; Sultan of Muscat to Ottavi, 27 
Jemadi I (25 Oct 1897); Ottavi to Sultan of Muscat. 7 Dec 1897 (1st Rajab 1314). 
63. F. O. 54/28, Tel., Assis.Superintlndo-Euro.Tel. (Karachi) to GoVl Ind. For. Dept,S Jan. 
1898. 
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regarded as creating an impression unfavourable to British prestige. He was told 
that stopping a compliment always hitherto accorded could only be regarded as 
unfriendly. The salute must be fired at once with the British flag flying all day 
according to custom. He complied with the request and the salute was fired on 3 
January and the flag hoisted all day. The British officials considered that in view of 
the Sultan's recent behaviour, it was Itdesirable to make the Sultan express his regret 
in writing that he omitted compliment at proper time. and to give assurance that the 
occasion will be properly observed in future". The Sultan agreed with that without 
difficulty64. But they started to believe that the Sultan of Muscat had come to be 
much under French influence and it was improbable that he would readily consent 
to their proposals regarding arms. customs and other things and there was call for a 
stronger line than that adopted. They advised that the British should impress upon 
him that their interests were paramount and he must attend to their advice. 
Regarding the flag question the Foreign Secretary in Calcutta wanted no public 
dispute with either the Sultan or the French. To deal with the flag question at the 
New Year required a restrained reaction as far as possible. Though they approved 
the action taken by the telegram Superintendent, Colonel Meade was advised that 
Her Majesty's Government specially desired to maintain friendly relations with 
France as well as influence over the Sultan. The Foreign Secretary said " you 
should therefore do your utmost to secure his [the Sultan's] confidence and good.-
will. You might remind him of assistance we have given in financial matters and at 
Dhofar"65. This kinder treatment for the Sultan was needed at that time because he 
was due to meet the joint delegation, on 5 January, of the Persian and British 
Governments for his co-operation and for his two declarations of 13 January in 
regard to the arms traffic. But British officials in the Gulf may have exaggerated 
the flag hoisting question, because the Sultan agreed to co-operate with the British 
Government in connection with arms trafficking after their report that he had come 
under French influence. This seems to be not true, since there was nothing to prove 
64. Tuson. British policy. B 15. 
65. F. O. 54/28, Tel., Govt. Ind. For.Dept. to Assist. SuperinL, Indo-Eurn. Tel., 8 Jan. 1898. 
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that allegation. Not hoisting the flag alone was not enough to prove France's 
influence upon him at that stage. If the Sultan was under French influence he would 
not have co-operateed with the British and issued his declarations giving British 
ships the right to confiscate arms in his territorial waters. However there was a 
feeling from early 1898 among the British officials that the French might benefit at 
the expense of British prestige66• 
The Omanis had started to believe that Britain feared France. since they 
were convinced that French colours secured for them absolute immunity from 
interference by British maritime patrols. They realized that protection from ships of 
war of a power known to be strong could be obtained by flying the flag of another 
power. The non-interference must be due to the superiority of the power under 
whose protection they had placed themselves. This also applied to their personal 
safety. The importance of this lay in its political impact on the relations between 
the Sultan and the British authorities. The case of Abdul Aziz bin Mohammed a1 
Ruwahhhy (to be discussed in the next section) was a prime example. The British 
Agency in Muscat was angry that such a state of affairs was allowed to continue. 
given the damage it did to British prestige. Two suggestions were made. First, that 
the Sultan could be asked to adhere to the General Act of the Brussels Conference. 
though this depended on the Sultan having the power to enforce his authority which 
at present he did not. Secondly, the Sultan might institute a distinctive flag for the 
use of the vessels of his subjects. But. again. the Sultan had no power to force his 
subjects to fly his flag, and any orders from him would be certainly inoperative. 
This is clear from a review of events from the end of 1897 to early 1898. 
At that time measures putting a stop to arms running up to the Gulf were 
expected to work by securing the co-operation of Persia and Muscat. From the 
middle of January 1898 it was expected that after a few months. vessels flying 
British. Persian and Muscat flags and containing cargoes of arms for Persian or 
Indian ports would be seized and confiscated by British men-of-war67• But side-
66. F. O. 54/28, Fagan to Resid., 14 Jan. 1898. 
67. Tuson, British Policy. B 15. 
165 
effects of that operation were also expected in that vessels under flags of the three 
co-operating countries.. deprived of protection in the matter of loading arms~ would 
consequently transfer their vessels to the French flag. Accordingly there would be a 
great increase in the nUmber of applicants for the French flag and protection not in 
Oman only but in the Gulf as well68• Therefore the trade in, arms was expected to 
flourish unchecked with simply the diversion of profits from English into French 
hands~. This was exactly what happened and Major Fagan's expectations proved 
correct. A suggestion for a diplomatic solution by the Persian Gulf Residency had 
also already been presented70• The sultan's undertaking to assist Persia and the 
Government of India in preventing the arms traffic had become meaningless by 
his own reaction and by the French protection to his subjects71• But the Sultan's 
attitude towards the British was the key point of the whole issue, especially after the 
case of the Baluchistan. 
The Sultan welcomed French supporters in his administration and shared 
with them the decision-making of his government. This created a new situation in 
Muscat and was of great concern to the British. This situation was exacerbated by 
the granting to the French of a coaling station by the Sultan. This created a major 
dispute between the British on the one hand and the Sultan and the French on the 
other. It reached its peak when the British navy faced the prospect of a disastrous 
clash with the French. The British ships of war were also in a position to bombard 
the Sultan's palace and warning had been given to bombard the city of Muscat. The 
next section will discuss this matter. 
Section Seven 
The Case of Abdul Aziz al-Ruwahhy 
The British had been informed by a secret diary submitted to the Political Resident 
in the Gulf of an important development in Muscat after the seizure of the 
68. F. O. 54/28. Meade to Govt. Ind., For. Dept. 22 Jan. 1898. 
69. F. O. 54/28. Fagan to Resid., 14 Jan. 1898. 
70. Ibid; F. O. 54(28. Meade to Govt. Ind. For. Dept., 22 Jan. 1898. 
71. F. O. 54(28,1. O. to F. O. (secret), 31 Mar. 1898. 
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Baluchistan. That "as soon as the seizure of arms and ammunition on the 
Baluchistan was effected the Sultan appears to have repented of the agreement he 
had entered into. He was heard to say that this was not what he intended, and now 
he is going to throw himself and his family into the arms of the French 
Government". The diary also mentioned a practical action taken by the Sultan right 
after the seizure of the Baluchistan indicating his desire to tighten links with the 
French. "On the 25th or 26th January 1898, His Highness paid a visit to Mons. 
Ottavi (French Vice consul) with the object of consulting him as to what he had 
better do about the seizure of arms by British". The Sultan carried on consulting the 
French in everything through the medium of Abdul Aziz72• In addition to that he 
felt suspicious about British aims in the matter of his customs administration. He 
refused any offer for farming his customs by the Indian Government, and refused a 
proposal for appointing a British official to manage his customs. That coincided 
with the Sultan's new local taxes on dates which was seen by the British Political 
Agency in Muscat as an arbitrary and heavy burden on British subjects and a 
violation of the 1891 treaty. Despite demands from the Political Agent the Sultan 
declined to remedy the matter73• 
The general situation was certainly no longer favourable to the British in 
Muscat74• While Britain thus was deeply concerned throughout 1898 in respect to 
French flags and protection to Muscat vessels· and subjects, which increased rapidly 
after the seizure of the Baluchistan,75 the registration of arms by British subjects, 76 
72. F. O. 54/29, extract from the Secret Diary of the Political Agent to the PoliL Resid (nd.). 
73. See Chap. Five, sectsA and 5; Tuson,BritishPolicy. B15. 
74. Tuson,BritishPolicy, B 119. 
75. F. O. 54128, Govt.Ind. For. DepL to Hamilton, (secret), 31 Mar. 1898; F. O. 54/28, I. O .. to 
F. 0.,23 May 1898, in which suggestions were made that the Sultan of Muscat must 
institute his distinctive flag for his subjects' ships, so that he would then have the right to 
prohibit them from using the French flag; F. O. 54/28, Hamilton to Govr. Genl., Ind. on 
Slave trade and Grant of French flags to Suri dhows (secret), 30 Dec. 1898; F. O. 54/28, F. 
O. to I. 0 .• Conf., 20 Dec. 1898, after orders issued by the Sultan to his subjects forbidding 
them from holding French flags; those who used French flags after that would disobey 
ruler's orders, and the French would be in the position of challenging the law of the Sultan. 
That would put the British Government in a position to deny Validity of the French flag to 
Omanis and therefore protection; F. O. 54/28, F. O. to Law Ofr. Crown, 12 Jul. 1898; F. O. 
54/28, F. O. to.I. O.,conf., 20 Dec.1898. 
76. F. O. 54128, Govt. Ind. For. DepL, to Hamilton (secret) 10 Feb. 1898. 
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the Muscat customs administration and the Sultan's taxation on British subjects,7T 
other significant issues did emerge. 
This occasion was to result in one of the most remarkable events in the 
modem history of Muscat and Oman. On 7 March 1898, the Sultan granted the 
station to the French, but nothing was heard about it until 20 November 1898 when 
the JoW7UJl des Debars released the news. This meant that the Sultan made his 
arrangement with the French secretly. On 13 December the Government of India 
started to take action. The Sultan did not admit the arrangement until 17 January 
1899, but he said that the actual location was still unsettled78• However before that 
controversy developed, the inclusion in the Sultan's administration of a figure 
regarded by the British authorities as a dangerous person because of his background, 
came into focus. 
This figure was Abdul Aziz bin Mohammed bin Salim-al-Rruwaihi, of Samayil 
origin in Oman (interior) from the Ruwahhah tribe and valy79. It is worth while first 
looking at this person's career. He emigrated from Wadi AI Ma'awi! in Oman to 
Zanzibar and then Pemba island in 1879, where he was first employed by Nasser bin 
Khalef and as secretary by Salim bin Ali. Mter some time he returned to Zanzibar 
to work: with the Qadhi (Judge) Hamed bin Sa'eed, by whose good offices he 
obtained an appointment as assistant to Muhammed bin Salim, the Clerk of Sultan 
Bargash bin Sa'eed of Zanzibar (uncle of Faisal, Sultan of Muscat). Mter the death 
of Muhammed bin Salim, Abdul Aziz was promoted to chief clerk and received a 
salary of $20 per month. After the death of Barghash the Sultan Khalifah confirmed 
him in his position and raised his salary to $4080• It was during this period that he 
first began giving trouble to the British in Zanzibar. He started to use his influence 
to prejudice the Sultan Khalifah against the British authorities. When Sultan Ali 
came to power after Khalifah, he first dismissed Abdul Aziz, but then withdrew his 
77. See Chap. Five Sect. 5; F. O. 54(29, Meade to Govt Ind., For. Dept., 1 Jan 1899; Fagan to 
Meade, 5 Dec. 1898. 
78. TUSOD,BritishPolicy, B 119. 
79. F. O. 54(28, Fagan to Meade, coDf., 26 Oct. 1898. 
80. F. O. 54(29, Fagan to Mead, 21 Jan. 1899. 
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decision because of intervention by some leading Arabs in his favour. He continued 
to act as chief writer to the Sultan, and to oppose by all the means in his power the 
influence of the British Agent. On the death of Sultan Ali in 1893 it was through 
the work of Abdul Aziz, that Khalid bin Barghash, the son of Sultan Barghash, 
obtained possession of the palace until he was forcibly removed. Khalid then 
escaped to the German embassy81. Abdul Aziz's deportation from Zanzibar on 27 
March 1893 was ordered by Sultan Hamed bin Thuwaini, cousin of Faisal, Sultan of 
Muscat and son of former Sultan Thuwainy bin Sa'eed of Muscat8Z• Zanzibar had 
been the French Consul Ottavi's previous posting, and he and Abdul Aziz had been 
acquainted there83• In Muscat he became a writer in the employ of the French Vice -
consulate. He naturally came under French protection according to the French-
Oman Treaty of 184484• The British claimed that he and the French consul were 
behind the failure to hoist the British flag on 1 January 1898 when the salute of 31 
guns was frred8S• The rise of French influence in the Sultan's court was facilitated 
when he was appointed as the Sultan's Secretary in 1898. " This man had far more 
influence with the sultan than the Wazeer Sa'id ibn-Muhammad, pro-British as he 
was, and the latter eventually was dismissed in 1898"86. Abdul Aziz's position was 
described as more like confidential adviser to the Sultan than a secretary87. In 
addition to that he was a prominent merchant on good business terms and in friendly 
relationship with Sur traders88• The case of Abdul Aziz aroused British interest in 
81. For more details about this occasion see Gooch and Tempedey (ed.), British documents on 
the origins of the war 1898-1914, (1927), I p. 327. 
82. About Sultan Thuwainy see Chap. Two. 
83. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 63. 
84. F. O. 54(18, Mead to Salisbury (con!)., 14 Nov. 1898; Treaty of commerce between His 
Highness the Imum of Muscat and the King of the French, 17th November 1844. An 
English version of the treaty can be found in R.Hughes Thomas (ed.), Arabian Gulf 
Intellegence, New Series, No.x:XN, (Cambridge, 1856), p. 266, and a French version in F. 
O. 54(19. Article IV of the treaty says, "The subjects of Syud Sueed bin Sultan of Muscat. 
actually in the service of the French. shall enjoy the same privileges which are granted to 
the French themselves ;but if such subjects of His Highness shall be convicted of any crime 
or infraction of the law, they shall be discharged by the French, and delivered over to the 
authorities of the place." Writer's emphasis. 
85. F. O. 54(19, Extract from the Secret dairy of the Polit Agent to the Resid. 
86. Landen, Oman. p. 381. 
87. See F. O. 54(18, Mead to the Govt. Ind.,7 Nov. 1898. 
88. Mahmood Ali al-Daud ,(Arabic book) Alkhalyj AI Arabi wal Alakat AI-duwaleyh Jame'a Al 
Dual Al Arabiyeh. (Ma'ahd al Derasat Al Arabiyeh Al A'aalieh, Dar Al Ma'refah) [The 
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the nature of the Sultan's administration in Muscat and their reaction affected further 
administrative development in the country and the question of whom the Sultan 
should employ. R. G. Landen noticed that 'The British became particularly 
disturbed over the fact that Abdul Aziz, Ottavi's dragoman, also occupied a key 
position as the Sultan's confidential secretary, while other anti-British Omanis also 
were welcomed at court." He found that the "Sultan Faisal, for his part encouraged 
French interests in Oman in the hope that they could balance British interests and 
thus allow Oman to enjoy some real measure of independence". Meade, the British 
Consul-General in the Persian Gulf, suggested that some effort be made to induce 
His Highness the Sultan to dismiss Abdul Aziz from his service. As an adviser to 
the Sultan he could obstruct the actions of British representatives at Muscat, and 
prevent anything like confidential relations between them and the Sultan89• 
According to the British authorities in Muscat, every letter written to the Political 
Agent in Muscat was drafted by Abdul Aziz. The British Agent said that the Sultan 
himself was almost illiterate, and was very much under the influence of Abdul 
Aziz." Every letter sent to me by the Sultan", he said, "is drafted by the French 
Consulate. Every letter also sent by me to the Sultan is read by Abdul Aziz, and it 
is at the present time impossible for me to say anything to the Sultan which he does 
not repeat to Abdul Aziz, or to write to His Highness any letter, however 
confidential, the contents of which are not immediately seen and communicated by 
the Munshi to M.Ottavi " Consul Fagan was irritated by the political direction of the 
Sultan's administration. He pointed out to Resident Meade that the existence of 
such a state of affairs could only be allowed to continue if the British were prepared 
to see their interests at Muscat entirely subordinated to those of the Government of 
the French Republic. He urged that some kind of pressure be brought to bear on the 
Sultan to dismiss Abdul Aziz from his work, so as to ease a situation which would 
certainly result in complications between the Sultan and the British Govemment90• 
Arabian Gulf and International relations (The Arab League. The Arabic High Institute 
Studies)] (Cairo.nd.) p. 97. 
89. Landen. Oman, p. 248. 
90. F. O. 54/18. Fagan to Meade, Conf .• 21 Jan. 1899. 
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Meade took the Abdul Aziz question very seriously and proposed to visit Muscat to 
urge the Sultan very strongly to dlismiss Abdul Aziz from his service. Also he 
would warn the Sultan that "failure to do so will be regarded as evincing a want of 
the friendly feeling which the British Government has a right to expect from the 
Ruler of Muscat. "He would tell him that he "cannot expect kindly and generous 
treatment from Her Majesty's Government if he continues to employ in a 
confidential post, one who is avowedly hostile to the British". Meade said that he 
would "point out to the Sultan that it is impossible for Major Fagan to maintain the 
cordial and confidential relations that should exist between His Highness and the 
British Representative as long as he has Abdul Aziz for his Confidential Adviser, 
who reads all letters to his address and writes his replies". And Meade suggested 
that to ensure that the Sultan complied with the British demands he himself might 
be empowered to bring pressure to bear on the Sultan, in case of his refusal, by 
withholding his subsidy or by any other means that might be available. But Meade 
was aware of the difficulties of removing Abdul· Aziz from his post and the 
opposition which might be caused by the French as well as by Abdul Aziz himself. 
It would be regarded as a blow to the Sultan's authority, and it would not, therefore, 
be easy to persuade His Highness to carry out the British wishes. It would probably 
be better to moderate the toughness of this approach to the Sultan and" not to bring 
the matter prominently forward, and that I should merely tell His Highness that I 
regret to fmd Abdul Aziz still in his employment, as it is impossible for her 
Majesty's Representatives to address him freely and in the friendly spirit they would 
like as long as he has this man for his confidential adviser91• 
As mentioned above the British government learned in November 1898 
about the coaling station granted by the Sultan. And from then on the British 
government began to realize more the effect of Abdul Aziz and perhaps to link both 
cases together. 
On 20 November 1898, Journal des Debats released the news of the 
91. F. O. 54/28. Meade to Govt. Ind.,7 Nov. 1898. 
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granting of a coaling station to the French in Bander Jessah,. about 15-20 miles south 
-east of Muscat. The British authorities regarded this as a violation of the Franco-
British declaration of 1862 regarding Muscat's independence,. and violation of the 
1891 treaty between' the British government and the sultan of Muscat. The 
commander of liM.S Sphinx therefore, received an order to sail to Jessah and hoist 
the British flag if a French man-of-war appeared in the harbour. At the same time 
the payment of the Sultan's subsidy was stopped. On 21 January 1899 Major Fagan 
wrote a letter to the Political Resident in Bushire, informing him of the arrival of li 
M. S. Sphinx on 16 January. He reported that on their way to Jessah they had found 
it quiet and had seen no sign of any French occupation. But when he went to a 
meeting with the Sultan he informed him that a statement had appeared in the 
French papers to the effect that His Highness had leased the port of Jessah to the 
French Government, and that any such action would contradict the engagement of 
1891 and could not be permitted by the British government. The Sultan's answer 
was it would not infringe the agreement between himself and the British 
Government more than would a house gifted by him to the French government for 
the use of the French consul92. In reaction to the new situation in Muscat most of 
the ministers of the British government in London favoured the threat of deposition 
of the Sultan but "Salisbury refused. It looked as though another ultimatum,. backed 
by threat of naval force, would be delivered; for, as Godley observed ' it is the 
privilege of an independent sovereign to be bombarded, not deposed". Fagan 
accused Abdul Aziz as being responsible for what had happened. Abdul Aziz was, 
he said," doubtless the root of the present mischief and we can expect no peace as 
long he remains in Muscat" The sultan for some time past had consulted no one but 
Abdul Aziz. "His Highness's openly hostile attitude towards the British has been 
frequently brought to the notice of the Government and there is in my opinion no 
hope whatever of any improvement in this respect in the future"93. Muhammad bin 
Turky, the Sultan's elder brother, who was supporting the British authorities, 
92. F. O. 54(29, Fagan to Resid., conf., 21 Jan. 1899. 
93. David Dilks, Curzon in India. 2 (1970), p. 119. 
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disliked Abdul Aziz's anti British policy and probably was jealous of his influence 
and power over the Sultan. Muhammad recommended the Sultan to have Abdul 
Aziz sho~ on the ground that he was the cause of all the trouble between the British 
and the Sultan. He also pointed out that the murder of Abdul Aziz might easily be 
passed off as an accident94. On 28 January the India Office sent a long 
memorandum to the Sultan of Muscat reminding him about the history of support 
given to the Muscat Sultans by the British government and the special political 
support and financial assistance he had enjoyed. But the memorandum said "your 
Highness employs as a confidential adviser Abdul Aziz, who is the Munshi of the 
Vice-consul of France, and whose advice is inimical to the existence of peaceful 
relations with the British government, and to the welfare of the state". The 
memorandum put forward to the Sultan a list of demands which included all the 
concerns of the British government. FIrst was the dismissal of Abdul Aziz from all 
employment he was engaged in or may be engaged in at any future period either by 
the Sultan or by anyone under his authority. Secondly that His Highness should 
order his subjects to use a distinctive flag. In case that was not observed either by 
the sultan's subjects or by the French, His Highness must regard that as 
disobedience against the lawful order of his own sovereignty in the case of the 
Omanis, and infringement of the 1862 treaty in the case of the French. Thirdly, the 
memorandum asked for cancellation of the levy on the British of any tax not levied 
on Muscat subjects, and for reduction of import duty to 5%. The memorandum 
warned the Sultan, that if these demands were not complied with " no portion of 
your subsidy, which has been withheld since the month of December, shall be paid 
to your highness; and that in the event of continuance or repetition of an unfriendly 
attitude on your part, the support in money and assistance, whether diplomatic or 
military, which you and your predecessor have enjoyed, will be withdrawn from 
you ,and may possibly take another direction." The memorandum stated: "it is 
impossible for the British Government to continue their support to a ruler who 
94. F. O. 54{29, Extract from the secret diary of the Political Agent, (mi.). 
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habitually violates the solemn obligations into which he has entered with them"9S. 
The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf received instructions, on 12 February 
1899 from the Foreign Secretary in Calcutta, in which he was authorized to compel 
compliance with the demands above, to the length of employing naval force against 
the Sultan if necessary, but that he should avoid any collision with France. 
Dismissal of Abdul Aziz was one of the conditions of the Resident. But the British 
Government could not authorize his deponation from Muscat, because that might 
raise serious questions of intemationallaw. On 11 February 1899 Admiral Douglas 
left Bombay for Muscat in his flagship and the Resident was ordered to consult with 
him on the whole matter%. By that time the situation had taken a rapid and sharp 
tum in Muscat. On 14 February Admiral Douglas arrived there. Col. Meade 
requested that the Sultan should publicly cancel the lease of the French station but 
the Sultan did not answer. On 16 February Admiral Douglas ordered the Sultan to 
meet him aboard his flagship. Meanwhile he moved his ships " into position to 
open fire on the Sultan's palace and his fons off Muscat. At the same time "a 
warning was given to the town that bombardment was imminent. The Sultan 
capitulated. He came out to the flagship and agreed to all demands. Ironically, 
when Sultan Faisal rowed away Admiral Douglas fired the 21-gun salute reserved 
for an independent sovereign in the ruler's honour"97. 
But the problem of Abdul Aziz was still far from over. On I March 1899 
the viceroy of India sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for India, Lord George 
Hamilton, complaining that the attitude of the Sultan was still unsatisfactory. His 
Highness continued to receive Abdul Aziz by night and by day. Abdul Aziz was 
reported to be endeavouring to raise the tribes of Sharkiyeh in Oman's Eastern 
provinces, but this time raised against both the Sultan and the British, on the 
grounds of British intentions to occupy Oman. Fagan therefore withheld the 
Sultan's subsidy98. Hamilton asked the Viceroy; "If continued stoppage of subsidy 
95. F. O. 54/29, Memo.,!. O. for the Sultan of Muscat, 28 Jan. 1899. 
96. F. O. 54/29, Tel, Govt Ind. to Resid., 12 Feb. 1899. 
97. Landen, Oman. p. 252. 
98. F. O. 54/29, Viceroy to Hamilton, 1 Mar. 1899. 
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was not effective, what further pressure would you suggest ?". He went on to say 
that he had been advised that even deposition of the Sultan by the British for breach 
of engagement or of international law would not be contrary to the 1862 Franco-
British declaration provided that his successor was equally independent. The 
Secretary of State had also been advised that requiring Faisal to dismiss a particular 
adviser must depend on the special circumstances of the case. But, he went on, "it 
is hardly compatible with independence of Muscat that Sultan should be compelled 
to accept ministers and advisers who are acceptable to British Government"99. It is 
clear that there was some difference of opinion between Curzon and Hamilton. 
In the end it appeared that Abdul Aziz was not the only obstacle to British-
Omani relations, but also the British Political Agent in Muscat himself. Despite the 
Secretary of State's advice in regard to the question of Abdul Aziz, Major Fagan 
requested the Sultan again to dismiss himloo. The British authorities came to realize 
that before long they must have a change in their Muscat representation. Although 
Fagan was carrying out the Resident's directions under the supervision of the 
Viceroy of India, he appeared to Curzon to have become an obstacle to improved 
relations between the Sultan of Muscat and the British authorities. He was replaced 
by Major Percy Cox in September 1899. Cox was to initiate a new stage in British-
Muscat relations. Chapter Eight will discuss that stage which lasted from 1900 to 
1912. 
Conclusion 
The case of the Baluchistan not only raised new issues in Muscat but provoked old 
ones as well. The use of French flags was an old issue. It had been used since the 
time of Sa'eed bin Sultan during the 1830s when Great Britain imposed suppression 
of the slave tradelO l . The French offered the Omani traders their ships and flags. 
But the British supervision perhaps sometimes did not distinguish between those 
who were involved in the trade and those who were not. That may have persuaded 
99. F. O. 54/29, Hamilton to Viceroy, 10 Mar. 1899. 
100. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf. p. 88. 
101. See the Introductory Chapter. 
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many merchants to use French flags for their protection. In addition to that. in the 
year 1873 further measures were taken by the British Government to suppress the 
slave trade and a proclamation was issued warning British subjects in the Persian 
Gulf of penalties if they became engaged in it. Effective measures were taken to 
make them aware of the intention of the GovernmentlOZ• Accordingly those other 
than British subjects were free to engage in the slave traffic. This could include 
those who were under French protection. But the arms suppression policy affected 
even the local people because of the traders' relations with the people of the interior 
of Oman. This became more significant when the Omanis found that the British 
men-of-war were not only against the Omanis but also acted against their own 
subjects in the arms question. Some of their own British subjects moved away 
placing themselves under other powers. It was a complete failure of British policy 
in Muscat. However the case of the Baluchistan provoked further issues. The 
Sultan decided to increase his local customs revenues to recover his losses, and 
brought into his administration persons who were pro-French. Moreover when 
registration of arms was imposed on British subjects after the case of the 
Baluchistan the trade was entirely taken over by French protected persons. That 
was what happened in Muscat after the Baluchistan affair but the case caused also 
significant events in Britain itself. 
102. The Persian Gulf Administration Reports, 1873-1947, vol 1, 1873-1879, (Oxforo.1986), pp. 
8,74. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE CASE OF THE BALUCHISTAN IN BRITAIN 
We saw in the previous chapter the impact of this case on Muscat in international, 
economic and political tenns, and how it caused some of the most remarkable 
events in Oman's history. Meanwhile this case also had economic and political 
effects in Britain itself, becoming a major issue in the British courts, and in the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords. The events in the British courts have 
been covered by Mahmood Ali Daud 1, and the proceedings in the court at Muscat, 
held under British pressure by the Sultan, have been dealt with in the previous 
chapter. Our main concern is with the political and economic outcome of the 
case. With regard to the Commons debates, it is interesting here to question 
whether Curzon's replies were clear and compatible with the British policy of 
imposing controls on the arms trade in India, Persia and Oman, and whether he 
accepted full responsibility for that policy. The answer is in the next section. 
Section Two 
The House of Commons, 1898 
On 24 January 1898 HMS Lapwing seized the steamer Baluchistan in the 
territorial waters of Muscat and captured the consignment of arms on board. In 
Binningham the seizure of the arms had serious effects on the gun makers. 
In London, in the House of Commons the fIrst reaction came when Mr J. 
Dillon (Mayo,E) on 21 February 1898, asked the Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Mr.G.N.Curzon, whether he was aware that interference with the 
exportation of arms from Binningham to the Persian Gulf had seriously affected 
several of the gunmakers in the city, and if so, on what ground had the trade been 
interfered with? In his reply the Under-Secretary relied on the Sultan of Muscat's 
representation to the Government of India a year before "about the trouble 
1. Daud, British Relations, pp.371-386. 
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occasioned to him by the increasing importation of arms into Muscat, and in the 
same year the Persian Government mentioned to Her Majesty's Charge d' Affaires 
at Tehran, the great danger arising from the arming of the tribes in the south of 
Persia, notwithstanding the prohibition of the trade." Curzon said that, after 
enquiries into the manner in which the trade was being conducted, he had been 
"determined to assist the Persian Government in putting a stop to this illicit traffic 
in arms, which affected territories and tribes under British as well as under Persian 
influence, and which has already proved to be injurious to the British interests". 
He said that "the bulk of arms so imported ,though they have been 9arried in 
; A.,( 
British vessels are of foreign and not British manufacture". Mr Dalton asked 
again whether there was any reason to believe that any of the arms reached the 
frontier tribes with whom British troops had been in conflict. Curzon replied that 
such an opinion was not his but it was that of the officers on the spot who were 
conducting the investigation; "1 have not yet seen the evidence on which that 
opinion is based"2. 
On 24 February Mr T.C.H. Hedderwick (Wick Burghs) asked Mr Curzon 
whether the Government was making or was intending to make any enquiry into 
the alleged supply of guns by Birmingham gunmakers to the hostile tribes of the 
North- West Frontier? Curzon assured him that an enquiry had already been 
conducted into the entire question of arms importation into Persia3• But after 
about one month and one week later the report of these enquiries was still not 
ready. On 4 April Curzon was asked by Mr Lowe, (Birmingham, Edgbaston): 
whether the Government was yet in a position to state the result of its enquiries 
about the question above; or if not, whether at a later date, further information 
would be given on the subject? He replied that a full report was on its way from 
the Consul-General at Bushire; "and upon its receipt I shall hope to be in a 
position to convey to hon.Members who are interested in the matter the further 
2. Hansard. vol. Lnrr. col. 1200.21 Feb. 1898. 
3. Hansard. vol. LIm. col. 1520.24 Feb. 1898. 
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infonnation they desire". Mr Lowe raised another question, perhaps for the 
satisfaction of British gun manufacturers whose trade with Persia had been 
stopped. He asked whether "the right hon. Gentleman will be able to lay on the 
Table of the House Papers showing the reason for the action which the 
Government thought it necessary to take in this matter?" Curzon in his reply 
declined to justify the Government action: "I am afraid I can give no pledge at this 
moment, as obviously it is impossible for me to promise to lay before the house 
Papers I have not yet seen or read", but he hoped to have an opportunity later 
explaining the reasons for the action of the Government4• 
On 4 July 1898 Captain Grice Hutchinson (Aston Manor) asked Mr 
Curzon if any other Governments than that of Great Britain had agreed with the 
Persian Government to prohibit the importation of arms into Persia via the Persian 
Gulf? Curzon stated that the prohibition of the import of arms into Persia could 
only be the act of the Persian Government. But he said "in the case of the other 
Governments possessing territories on or in the Persian Gulf -namely the 
Government of India and the Turkish Government, a similar prohibition exists, 
whilst it is also being enforced in their own territories by the Sultan of Muscat and 
the Sheikh of Bahrain". Curzon added that special enquiries had been made on 
the subject whether the prohibition enacted by the Persian government was being 
equally enforced against arms of other origins. But he said "we learn by telegraph 
that the prohibition is universal, and that the import of foreign, no less than of 
British arms, has ceased"5. 
Till early July the actual case of the Baluchistan was not brought before 
the House of Commons. The questions were of a general kind, as the questioners 
had in mind both the Baluchistan case and earlier episodes such as the case of 
Bushire in December 1897. (see Chapter Five). 
4. Hansard, vol. LVI, col. 37,4 Apr. 1898. 
5. Hansard, vol. LX, col. 945-946,4 Jui. 1898. 
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On 28 July the case took another direction because by this time the case 
had already been presented to the commercial court and Mr Justice Bigham on the 
5th July had already delivered his conclusion (see text below), Mr Hedderwick 
(Wick Burgh) asked Mr Curzon whether his attention had been drawn to the 
judgement of Mr Justice Bigham in the case of Fracis, Times against the Sea 
Insurance Company Limited. In that judgement, he said, "the Judge found that the 
import of arms (into Persia) was not illegal according to the law of Persia as that 
law was administered in practice and enjoined that the export of arms from 
England to Persia was certainly not contrary to our law", Mr Hedderwick asked 
whether that judgement might be considered by Her Majesty's Government, and if 
that was done whether compensation to owners of the cargo seized, on 24 January 
1898, of arms and ammunition on board the Baluchistan would be considered. He 
also asked whether the owners of arms confiscated in December 1897 in Bushire 
also might be compensated. Curzon replied that he had seen the report of the 
judgement in question but he did not think that its purport could be correctly 
estimated by the quotation of a single sentence from it. The judge had found that 
there was something in the nature of a prohibition against arms importation into 
Persia, "and that the plaintiffs probably knew of it; but that the circumstances as 
known to them were not material to the defendants in estimating the risk". 
Curzon denied that the Consul-General had confiscated the arms in Bushire: "The 
facts are not correctly stated in the second question. The arms and ammunition 
stored in Bushire were not seized and not confiscated by her Majesty's Consul-
General", but by an official of the Persian Government. The British vice-Consul 
was present only because the goods were belonging to British subjects. And in 
the case of any of the arms seized either in Muscat or Bushire, Her Majesty's 
Government saw no ground for interference unless "the owners or consignees can 
prove that the arms were proceeding to or had entered Persia with the authority of 
the Persian Government, and the parties concerned have advised, if they can 
produce such proofs, to represent their claims to the Consular authorities". But 
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into Persia was not illegal according to the Persian law? The Speaker ruled Mr 
Lowe out of order, but Lowe went on saying "if that is the law as laid down, I 
wish to know on what ground--." The Speaker interrupted him again reminding 
him that if he wished further information regarding the question he must give 
notice. Replying to Mr. Hedderwick's enquiry as to whether he contested the 
lawfulness of the trade, Curzon replied that the Government "have always held the 
opinion which I have more than once stated in the House, that the importation of 
arms and ammuniton into Persia is illicit, and it is upon that assumption they have 
proceeded" 6. 
But Curzon's position was severely weakened by the reply of Sir 
R.Webster (Isle of Wight). On 1 August Mr J. Walton (Yorks, W. R., Barnsley) 
asked the Attorney-General Sir R. Webster whether the export of arms and 
ammuniton in the way of trade from Great Britain to Persia was contrary to the 
law of England? Webster's reply was that it was not7• Then Walton turned to 
. Curzon asking him whether the Government had warned the manufacturers 
engaged in the trade of exporting arms to Persia that this trade was illicit, and that 
arms and ammunition so exported would be confiscated by the Persian 
Government? Curzon referred to the history of the Persian Government's 
prohibitive measures since 1880; the notice of prohibition of 13 June 1891, for 
example, was given to British merchants in Persia. "There can be little doubt that 
the prohibition and the risks which were incurred by ignoring it have since then 
been known to the shippers and to the local firms engaged in the trade. The 
prohibition has on several occasions been mentioned in the British Consular 
Reports". And it was not the duty of the British Government to warn as to the 
steps might be taken for the enforcement of Persian law by the Persian 
Government. About the case of the Baluchistan, Walton asked 
6. Hansard, vol. LXIII, col. 281-282, 28 Jul. 1898. 
7. Hansard, vol. LXIII, col. 694,1 Aug. 1898. 
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"whether the nature of the cargo of the Baluchistan and the port of her destination 
were duly declared by the shippers to the proper Government officers before the 
Baluchistan put to sea; and if so why was she allowed to proceed upon her 
voyage?" Mr Curzon replied that the statements made in reference to that case 
were found to be not uniformly correct. Certain persons or firms named as 
consignees in the bills of lading denied any knowledge of the transaction. But. he 
said "there is no provision in the English law under which the sailing of the 
Baluchistan with arms intended for illicit import into Persia could have been 
prevented". Walton asked if the Under-Secretary was aware of the fact that a 
considerable branch of British industry had been damag~ and a number of 
workmen thrown out of employment because of the arms seizure at Bushire and 
on board the Baluchistan. He asked "whether the Government will consider the 
advisability of opening negotiations with the Persian Government with a view to 
the recognition and resumption of the trade ?" Curzon said that he did not have 
evidence supporting that claim to establish the contention, and the arms trade was 
injurious both to British interests in and beyond the Persian Gulf and to the 
security of British trade with Persia. Equally, if not more, the trade was injurious 
to the Persian Govemment."Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to enter 
into negotiations for its recognition and resumption." Mr Walton asked "whether 
the export trade of arms and ammunition from this country to Persia has been 
carried on for a number of years with the full knowledge of Her Majesty's 
Government; and whether consignments of arms and ammunition for Persia have 
for years been cleared at the British customs houses, and duties upon arms and 
ammunition so exported regularly exacted by and paid to the Persian authorities 
appointed for such purposes by the Persian Government; if so, whether he can 
state when and upon what grounds Her Majesty's Government arrived at the 
conclusion that such trade was illicit? "Curzon replied that the Government did 
not interfere with the matter at an earlier date because, "as long as the prohibition 
was not enforced by the Persian Government ,there was no reason to impede a 
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British trade which would by such action only have been diverted into the hands 
of other foreign nations. About the duties exacted by and paid to the Persian~ he 
said he could not admit that those have been regularly paid; on the contrary, they 
had been made in an irregular manner in many cases8• 
On 10 August in the House of Commons the case of Baluchistan was 
debated at great length. Mr Lowe gave first the history of arms manufacturing in 
Birmingham, by which the city's international connections and good reputation 
were known. From the beginning of the arms trade with ports in the Persian Gulf 
in 1880, it had been carried on in the most open manner without the slightest 
interruption, and with the full knowledge and consent of both the British and 
Persian Govewmments. He spoke about the arms trade with Bushire and Muscat, 
and about Muscat he said, "I cannot find that there does exist, or that there ever 
has existed, any prohibition against the importation of arms into that place or the 
country of which it is the capital". But the question in Persia was different 
because prohibition against arms importation was issued by the authorities in 
1881. Although that prohibition had not been formally repealed, it had never been 
acted upon. He said, "it has been universally regarded both in Persia and in this 
country, as merely nominal prohibition for securing a monopoly of the trade in 
arms to the Persian Government, and for enabling them to exact whatever rate of 
import duties they might think fit, however excessive and exorbative those duties 
might be". Mr Lowe proved to the House that fact by showing that the annual 
consular reports sent from Bushire did not make any reference to that prohibition 
indicating that the Persian prohibition was only a nominal one9• The trade was 
well known to and well recognised by the Governments of Persia and Great 
Britain. Under those conditions, he said "this so -called illicit trade had been 
carried on without interruption from the year 1881 down to December oflast year, 
a period of nearly 17 years, and those who were engaged in it had no reason 
8. Hansard, vol. LXllI, col. 697-698,1 Aug. 1898. 
9. See Chaps. Five and Six about the Persian suppression measures. 
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whatever to suppose that anything had happened to alter or vary these conditions 
in the slightest particular". Lowe explained to the House the manner of the arms 
seizure in Bushire on 7 December 189710 (discussed in the preceding chapter).Mr 
Lowe challenged the Under-Secretary of State reminding him of his answer on 28 
July to the question of Mr Hedderwick, when Curzon stated that arms stored at 
Bushire were not confiscated by Her Majesty's Consul-General. Now, Lowe said 
"I do not in any way wish to call into question the information upon which that 
answer was given, but it does not correspond with the facts which have been 
supplied to me"ll. In other words, Curzon's answers in the House of Commons 
were too vague. Lowe went on challenging the Under- Secretary of State with 
crucial evidence: he said, "I hold in my hand a statement made by a gentleman 
who was present when the seizure was made". That gentleman was Mr Dharwar 
,(a partner in the firm of Messrs. Fracis Times and Company, merchants carrying 
on business in London and at Bushire) who stated that a Persian official was 
present at the time of the seizure but "he took no part in the seizure ,that the 
Consul-General and his assistants took the initiative in the matter, and that the 
Persian official took a back place ... if it had not been for the part taken by the 
British officials, the goods would not have been delivered up, as the Persians had 
no right to enter the premises where they wee stored ". Dharwar was quite 
prepared to substantiate that statement upon oath, Lowe said. In the case of the 
seizure of the Baluchistan he noticed that the arms confiscated were handed over 
to the British Consul there. He asked, " now sir, the action of the Government in 
causing these seizures to be made was either legal or it was illegal. Either they 
were justified in taking this course, or they were not; and that is the direct issue 
which I wish to place before the House". Mr Lowe presented to the House the 
reason for the action taken by Fracis, Times and Company against the Sea 
Insurance Company, that to recover damages for loss of some of the goods 
10. Ibid. 
11. Hansard, vol.llXIV, col. 853-854.10 Aug. 1898. 
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shipped on the BaIuchiustan under a policy of marine insurance. The Sea 
Insurance Company refused to pay the damages, claiming that the trade was 
contrary to Persian law and that traders should have known about the risk of 
carrying on the trade in Persia. But the Judge decided that the trade was not 
contrary to the Persian law and had been conducted openly. The prohibition was 
merely for the purpose of enabling the Persian Goverment to levy heavy duties 
upon the trade, and the seizure of Baluchistan had been carried out by the British 
authorities. He gave his Judgement for the plaintiffs with costs, and refused a stay 
of execution, stating that he considered the underwriters oUght to pay for the 
damages. If that was the decision of the law, Mr. Lowe said "I fail to see upon 
what ground the British Foreign Office can justify their action in assisting the 
Persian Government to enforce a bogus prohibition against British subjects, who 
and whose trading interests it is their first duty to protect". He asked what right 
had the Persians to call upon the British to assist them in enforcing it against 
goods upon which they themselves had received duties. Regarding the case of 
Baluchistan, he said that the government was hasty and premature because no 
Persian prohibition could be applied to the high seas and it did not apply to 
Muscat. To prove his argument, Mr Lowe was holding in his hand copies of two 
letters from the Sultan of Muscat, in which he stated that no prohibition to the 
anns trade exists in his territory, and that the entry of anns and ammunition is 
perfectly free, open and welcome. Lowe said "the Government I think at least 
should have waited to see whether the goods would be landed in Persia or not 
before they seized them ". He would acknowlege any action against the trade if 
the anns were really fmding their way to the Afridis tribes fighting against the 
Government on the North- West frontier, as had been said, and he was certain that 
"the Birmingham gun makers whom I represent, would not have uttered a single 
syllable of complaint however much they might have lost or been damaged by the 
transaction". But there was not the slightest shadow of foundation for that 
allegation. The Under-Secretary had apparently abandoned that reason for the 
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course which he had pursued. If that was true. what were the reasons on which 
the Foreign Office now relied to justify the action which they had taken in this 
matter ? He concluded the answers given by Curzon to the House were 
unacceptable. arguing that the term 'illicit' could not be correctly applied to the 
arms trade. He repeated the Judgement of Mr Justice Bigham in the case of 
Fracis. Times. V Sea Insurance Company that the trade was not contrary to the 
law of England or Persia, and was carried on in an open manner and heavy duties 
demanded were cheerfully and readily paid. The rising of the Afridis at Mekran 
on the North-West frontier in early December 1897 in which Mr Graves of the 
Indo-European Telegraph Company had been killed. had been raised by Curzon. 
Mr Lowe denied that the arms trraffic could be the reason since the tribes there 
were poorly and imperfectly armed; they had no breech-loading guns and Mr 
Graves had been murdered with knives. and not with guns at all. He pointed out 
that if a fair and reasonable warning had been given. those reasons might have 
been considered sufficently valid for interference especially if the trade had been 
stopped gradually. The government at least should insist on that before they 
allowed British trading interests to be interfered with in this way. As to why that 
was not done. he said "there may exist some good and sufficient reasons which 
have yet been disclosed. some set of circumstances of which we are at present 
ignorant". He again explained that his object was not to bring an indictment 
against the Government so much as it was to ask them to see if some adequate 
remedy could be found for the injury which has been inflicted on the arms 
manufacturers. In explaining the condition of the arms manufacturars and the 
situation in Birmingham after the arms seizure operations. he said: "These 
manufacturers have had a large and remunerative branch of their trade entirely 
stopped and done away with. They have been deprived of property of very 
considerable value and a large number of their workpeople have been thrown out 
of employment Resolutions condemning the action of the Government and 
asking for redress have been passed by several large meetings of people interested 
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in the gun trade in Birmingham ,and similar resolutions have been passed by such 
influential bodies as the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce and the Guardians of 
the Birmingham Proothouse". 
Mer his long presentation Mr Lowe made three demands. FIrSt, calling 
on the Unionist Party to foster and encourage British trade in all parts of the world 
whenever it may be found rather than to hamper and to hinder it. Secon~ 
injustice had been commi~ and the Government had, it may be unwittingly, 
proceeded without sufficient regard to the interest of British trade; the Unionist 
Party must take the initiative themselves to remove that injustice in conformity 
with such a prominent feature of their policy. Third., to compensate those who 
had suffered losses, and to restore lost property to its rightful owners. 
Curzon being absent from the Commons on 10 August, Balfour, leader of 
the House and First Lord of the Treasury, replied to the points raised by Mr Lowe. 
Balfour replied that the arms trade did not concern Birmingham manufacturers so 
much as Belgian manufacturers. Arms illicitly imported were made not in this 
country but in Belgium. As for compensation, he asked upon what Mr Lowe 
based his claim? Mr Lowe, he sai~ "admits, as everybody must admit that the 
trade in arms is an illicit one, but he says though illicit it has been carried on ever 
since 1880, and though in 1890 there was some talk of prohibition, it was always 
found possible by merchants interested to get round prohibition by paying extra 
duty to the Persian Government". But Lowe denied that there was any prohibition 
in 1890, only in 1881 and that was purely nominal. The First Lord replied that Mr 
Lowe was mistaken and that there was prohibition subsequent to 1881. He 
pointed out that this was an exporter's rather than a manufacturer's question, that 
they knew that their trade was illicit, and that their giving those extra duties was 
clear evidence of this, as it was known that in the Orient a little expenditure may 
do a good deal to get round the best known custom. Those carrying on trade 
cannot complain when the law is enforc~ even if the trade has been carried on 
year after year without previous interference. Balfour put before the House some 
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cases showing ways of evasion by the exporters. In one case the goods were 
consigned to certain individuals who absolutely denied that they were the 
consignees. Rifles had been described as hardware in the bills of lading, and 
"although that may not be an absolutely inaccurate description nobody can say 
that it is calculated to give much information to the Customs House officers, and 
it cannot be said therefore that this trade has been carried on in the light of day 
under these circumstances". Applications for intervention on behalf of the people 
concerned would be entertained, if they could prove that the arms confiscated 
were not intended for Persia, or, if the arms were really for Persia, they could 
produce permission from the Persian Government But none of these people had 
given any such proof. At the same time he believed that export of arms into the 
Persian Gulf was inimical to British trade; "the Persian Government and the 
Sultan of Muscat both complain of the ill effects upon the order of their country 
through the easy access of arms, and our own information is that the introduction 
of arms does tend to those acts of piracy and highway robbery and general 
disorder which are some of the great obstacles to the augmentation of British 
interests in the Persian Gulf ". He asked the House to do all in its power to 
discourage the importation of arms which is against the well defmed laws of these 
countries and "under which our commercial interests have grown up in those 
remote regions". 
Section Three 
Birmingham Gun Traders' Reaction 
A number of developments took place between the debates in the Commons and 
the Lords. The arms seizures were discussed at the annual meetings of arms 
producers in May and June 189812• It was not only the problem of loss of arms 
and money that was discussed but the the problem of the seizure's impact on 
employment On 9 June a deputation of gun traders went to the Foreign Office to 
12. lronmonger, 7 May; 25 June; 2 Jul. 1898. 
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discuss the seizures with Curzon13• On 15 June, at the annual meeting of the 
shareholders of Kynoch's Ltd., held at the Grand Hotel in Birmingh~ Mr Anhur 
Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary's brother, attacked the Foreign Office, 
blaming them directly for the seizure, which had caused a loss to the Company of 
thousands of pounds. ''The business was done through merchants and 
manufacturers who were themselves being brought to the verge of the bankruptcy 
court. The matter had been prejudiced in the eyes of the country because of the 
statement put forward by the Foreign Office that the confiscated guns were going 
out to their enemies, the hill tribes of Afghanistan, and that English merchants 
were supplying the Afridis"14. Chamberlain said that this was absolutely untrue. 
He said: "The weapons of the hill tribes were kindly supplied by the War Office. 
the Lee rifles were stolen from our own soldiers, and the Martini-Henri sold by 
the military authorities of this country for a few pence. It seemed very bad that it 
was necessary to bolster up the Foreign Office by statements so untrue and 
prejudicial as that"15. The Foreign Office had given no warning of the intention of 
the Government, "and Mr Curzon said it was not the habit of the British 
Government to give notice when they were going to enforce the law, which it was 
alleged was contravened. .. Curzon might have said that it was not the habit of the 
Foreign Office to give notice that they were going to enforce a law to the 
detriment of the English taxpayer. He thought that these matters might receive at 
least more sympathetic attention than they appeared to have had and considered 
there was something very flippant and insulting in the answers given to 
manufacturers and representative on this head. It seemed to him that in a little 
time there would absolutely be no foreign trade whatever"16. Chamberlain went 
on: "Not that the reign of peace had come but the trade would be driven into the 
hands of the Belgians, the Germans, and the French. Lord Salisbury, who had 
13. Kynoch Journal, I 1899-1900. p. 33. Cited by Barbara Smith, in Bibliography of 
Birmingham Industrial History 1850-1910, (Binningham, 1966), item 140. 
14. The Birmingham Daily Mail, 15 June 1898. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid. 
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been receiving a deputation on another matter, at the conclusion of his remarks, 
said one thing- he thought it must have been spoken sarcastically, because Lord 
Salisbury was nothing if not sarcastic. He said they must not ask the Government 
to do things for the English trade, but said they must rely as their ancestors had 
done in the past on their own exertions, energy, and power to obtain trade"17. The 
Birmingham Daily Gazette, on the next day, gave a comment on Mr 
Chamberlain's speech: "Chamberlain seems to hanker after notoriety. When he 
cannot obtain it by persecuting publicans he may always rely upon the fact that his 
name, thanks to a more brilliant member of the family, is a household word, and 
that any extravagances of expression uttered by a bearer of that name are sure to 
attract attention "18. Yesterday, Chamberlain, the newspaper said, "presided over 
the meeting of Kynochs Limited, and he had to propose the adoption of a report 
which ought to be satisfactory to the shareholders, and which does not support the 
theory that British traders are ground down and ruined by the neglect of the 
Foreign Office"19. If Chamberlain "found it necessary to speak of the Foreign 
Office at all under the circumstances he might have done so in courteous terms. 
But he is aware that malignant rumours have been in circulation as to differences 
between his distinguished brother and the chief of the Ministry who is also 
Foreign Secretary. It would have been obvious to a less acute intellect than 
[Chamberlain] possesses that an attack upon the Foreign Office by the brother of 
the Colonial Secretary would at such a juncture attract far more than it seriously 
deserves"20• The newspaper said, 'We will say nothing of the grossly bad taste 
the speech displays. The fact that it was made by [Chamberlain] is perhaps a 
sufficient comment. Only on one subject is there the slightest excuse for the tone 
of the speech, and that is in reference to the Persian Gulf seizures, which threaten 
Kynochs with a loss of £1,000". Although the newspaper detested Chamberlain 
17. Ibid. 
18. The Birmingham Daily Gazette, 16 June 1898. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid. 
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for the way he spoke, it is obvious that it was sympathetic with the gun traders' 
loss. The newspaper accepted that "the seizures were arbitrary if not indeed 
wholly illegal, and that there is the flimsiest possible excuse for saying that the 
trade which has been carried on was of an illicit character." The arms trade was 
regularly reported upon by Her Majesty's Consuls, so it was treated as perfectly 
legitimate. The prohibition of the Shah of Persia was done for the purpose of 
extorting a higher duty than the treaties sanction. This was the "strongest 
argument the traders can put forward, and it is substantial enough to justify their 
demand for much more explicit information than has yet been given. It is also a 
conclusive reason against the method of the seizures, which were made without 
the slightest warning that the immunity enjoyed for seventeen years and openly 
recognized by our Government would be broken through". However the Gazette 
could not doubt that the Foreign Office had good reason for the action taken, but 
criticised the Government because the reasons had not been adequately disclosed; 
"surely there has been a cruel mistake in the way the change of attitude has been 
introduced and reparation should be made to those, who, without the slightest 
warning, have been deprived of their property"21. On 16 July 1898 The Economist 
contributed to the controversy over the Baluchistan affair, pointing out that "no 
Order in Council was issued prohibiting such shipments, and as a matter of law 
and practice, anybody could and can freely engage in them [arms trade] at his own 
risk. Arms to the Persian Gulf are not contraband of war, and their shipment then 
was, and to-day remains legal, and permitted"22. The Economist criticised the 
Government for inconsistency; it had always turned a deaf ear to belligerent 
representations, refusing to interfere with British trade in contraband of war. "By 
~ 
their action in the Bf uchistan case, however, they have introduced a quasi-
precedent in the opposite sense; a precedent which may one of these days prove 
very inconvenient in the event of similar representations"23. The Economist made 
21. Ibid. 
22. The Economist, 16 Jul. 1898. 
23. Ibid. 
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the legal and administrative points that "If it be necessary or desirable in the 
national interests that shipment of British arms to the Persian Gulf should cease, it 
is open to the executive to issue an Order in Council accordingly". But, in this 
case, The Economist said that "the action of the Government in seizing British 
goods on the high seas, ostensibly in support of a Persian proclamation, seems to 
us high-handed and illegal, as well as indiscreet. If, indeed, the ownership of the 
property seized in the case of the Beluchistan had proved to be vested for 
example, in German subjects, the Government might well have found itself placed 
by its own action in an untenable position. As it happens, no such question has 
arisen- the sufferers are only British subjects". It is yet to be seen whether the 
British subjects would "be content to sit down under such arbitrary treatment, or 
whether they will look for compensation to the naval officer who made the 
seizure, or to the officer of the Crown responsible for it"23. The Economist was 
interested "to learn whether shipments of arms to the Persian Gulf will henceforth 
be made under the German flag, to the prejudice of British trade; and, if so," asked 
The Economist "what course will be adopted by Her Majesty's Government in 
support of the Persian proclamations when German and not British traders are 
concerned"24. On 23 JUly 1898 the Ironmonger's leading article emphasized that 
the Brtitish Government's action against the arms trade and the seizure of arms in 
the Persian Gulf were unjustifed and that the trade was not illegal25. The Times on 
17 January 1899 expected a fresh development in connection with the seizure of 
arms. "Counsel's opinion has been obtained to the effect that the owners of the 
arms seized have a good claim against the Crown. or by action against the 
commanding officer of the Lapwing" [Lieutenant Carr,]. Counsel said he was III 
unable to understand by what law, Persian or English, it can be justified. 
Proceedings may be taken against the Governemnt on a petition of right or against 
the commander of the Lapwing for trespass'''. It was reported that Carr had 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Ironmonger, 23 Jui. 1898. Cited by Smith, Bibliography, item no. 128-131. 
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already been served with a writ at the instance of the merchants interested. "At 
the present time guns are being allowed to enter Muscat under certain conditions 
but this does not alter the position as regards the Persian Gulf trade. The 
statement is denied that large orders from Persia for guns are being received in 
Birmingham. No guns have left the city for the Persian Gulf during the past year, 
and the attitude of the Foreign Office is described as remaining the same as 
before''27. At the annual meeting held at Birmingham of the gunworkers in 
January, "the following resolution was unanimously adopted by a crowded 
gathering of gunmen:- [to write to Lord Salisbury] 'that this meeting testifies to 
the suffering caused among workmen by loss of wages through stoppage of trade 
resulting from the Persian Gulf seizures and humbly request your Lordship to use 
your influence with the Persian authorities to permit this trade to be continued". 
Salisbury was asked also to receive a deputation of employers and workmen. The 
appeal was sent on 28 January. On 6 February 1899 Sir Thomas Sanderson on 
behalf of Salisbury replied that "nothing has occurred to alter the views of Her 
Majesty's Government on this question since Mr Curzon received a deputation on 
June 9 last [1898], and that no unusual purpose would be served by a fresh 
interview on the subject. Any written statement which you may wish to make will 
receive attention"28. In May 1899 at the annual meeting of the Gunmakers in 
Birmingham "Mr Ward, the Chairman, stated that there was a loss of about £700 
in the trade which, he said, 'arose from the stoppage by the Government of guns 
being allowed to go to the Persian Gulf. It seemed very hard that a trade which 
was carried on openly and legitimately for 16 years should be suddenly stopped 
without any notice being given, and the arms seized by the authorities. The 
Government had been challenged to show that the guns had found their way into 
the hands of the Afridis or any other of the Queen's enemies, but they had failed to 
do so'." Mr Ward hoped that something could be done soon to revive the arms 
27. The Times, 17 Jan. 1899. 
28. The Times, 8 Feb. 1899. 
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trade. since it caused loss to the Proofhouse as well as to makers. "The 
Proofhouse returns for the year indicated that the loss of revenue on account of the 
seizure fo arms in the Persian Gulf ports was about £700. representing a loss of 
from 24 to 25 thousand rifles to the Birmingham guntraders"29. The courts heard 
two cases relating to the Baluchistan affair. One of them. Fracis. Tunes Company 
against the Sea Insurance Company was heard on 24.29 June and 4 July 189830; 
the judgement was for Fracis, Times as already mentioned in the Commons 
debates. In the case of Fracis, Times against Lt.-Commander Carr of Lapwing the 
original judgement on 19 June 1899 was for Carr. but this was reversed on appeal 
in May 1900. 
Section Four 
The House of Lords 1901 
Carr then appealed to the House of Lords and on 8 July 1901 his appeal was 
allowed31• The Lord Chancellor (Earl of Halsbury) explained to their Lordships 
the final judgement in the case between Lieut. Com. Carr and Fracis. Times & Co. 
held on 4. 5. and 8 July 1901 as to the former's action in seizing the steamer 
Baluchistan. There had been taken "an action in this country for a wrong 
committed abroad. The wrong must be such that it would have been actionable if 
committed in this country. and the act must not have been justifiable by the law of 
the place where it was committed." The court found that British goods on board a 
British ship within the territorial waters of Muscat were seized by an officer of the 
British navy under the authority of a proclamation issued by the Sultan of Muscat. 
The court decided that "the seizure having been shown to be lawful by the law of 
Muscat no action could be maintained in this country by the owner of the goods 
against the naval officer". 
29. The Times. 4 May 1899. 
30. See The Solicitors' l., 9 Jul. 1898.42 (1898) pp. 634-35; The Times Law. 3 Sep. 1898. 
vol. LXXIX (1898). pp 28-30; F. O. Robinson and R. H. Balloch. Reports of 
Commercial Cases vol. ill (1897-98) pp. 229-236. 
31. See Arthur Russell (ed.) The Times Law Reports, vol. XVI (1899-1900), pp. 405-410; 
Law Times Reports, vol. 82 (1900) pp.698-704. 
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As Halsbury said "this was an action in which the plaintiffs complain of a 
tort committed on their property in the territorial waters of the Sultan of Muscat". 
He explained that the case turned on whether the Sultan of Muscat was or was not 
entitled within his own territory to say what shall and what shall not to be subject 
of traffic. The Sultan, he said, "prohibited a particular class of traffic (arms) 
passing through his territory, and he had enforced his prohibition by armed 
intervention. The Lord Chancellor confessed he was surprised that the matter had 
been contested or any doubts raised. ''1 am afraid I have not yet quite appreciated, 
with reference to some supposed analogy between the justification for this and 
what is called a judgement in rem." He dismissed arguments for the respondents 
(the original plaintiffs) that the issue should be decided on the basis of whether the 
decision of the court of Muscat was a judgement in rem and concentrated on the 
question of whether Mr Carr's action in seizing the arms and ammunition was 
legally justified according to the law of Muscat. ''The Sultan has pronounced 
what his law is; and I may say at once that, looking at these two documents, upon 
the true construction of which, as it appears to me, the whole question turns, the 
Sultan himself pronounced by an authoritative declaration, that what was done 
was lawful". He said that an English jury can go behind that declaration of the 
Sultan and argue that those arms were not going where it was claimed they were. 
He asked; are we going to administer the law of Muscat and determine whether or 
not the Sultan was right in what he did? The Lord Chancellor emphasized that as 
the Sultan's authority in his own territory was unquestionable, his action should 
regarded as an act of State. To turn that issue into another one such as a 
judgement in rem could be only misleading. That act was not between one person 
and another, but was done by a lawful State. There was no doubt that, under such 
circumstances, the act was done with the complete authority of Muscat and could 
not be made the subject of an action here as to whether or not this act was 
unlawful in this country but lawful in Muscat. No tribunal in this country could 
go behind that declaration and argue that the Sultan of Muscat was wrong in his 
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exposition of his own law and will, even if this was carried out by a British 
subject and participated in by the British Government. 
Lord Macnaghten agreed with the Lord Chancellor in identifying two 
conditions in order to found an action in this country. 
First; the wrong must be of such a character that it would have been 
actionable if committed in England. 
Second; the act must not have been justifiable by the law of the place 
where it was committed. 
In the case of Baluchistan the whole issue turned on the second point. This case 
w~ not about whether a wrong was done which would have been actionable if it 
have been done in England or on the high seas, but whether wrong had been done 
within the dominions of the sovereign Sultan of Muscat. He agreed with the 
appellant Carr's representation about the legality of what was done under the 
authority and direction of the Sultan, and supported his reliance upon the Sultan's 
proclamation of 13 January 1898 and his court conclusion of 15 April32. He 
dismissed the respondent Fracis, Times & Coo's points of argument in regard to 
those documents of the Sultan. ''Her Britannic Majesty was welcome to seize 
munitions of war destined for Indian or Persian ports, if they were the property of 
British subjects, when found within the territorial waters of Muscat ". The Sultan 
would not resent such an act as an invasion of his sovereignty and after an enquiry 
he declared that he was satisfied that her Britannic Majesty had done no more than 
he had permitted her to do. 
Lord Macnaghten explained the true meaning of the Sultan's documents. 
He believed that the act was done under the authority of the Sultan, who had 
declared it to be legal, "that is according to the law of Muscat, which for any thing 
I know to the contrary may be nothing more than the will and pleasure of the 
despot who rules over that country. If this was the true meaning of these 
documents, if the act was legal in Muscat and, therefore, justifiable there, in my 
32. See previous chapter on the Case of Baluchistan. 
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opinion there is a conclusive answer to the action; and I ~ therefore of opinion 
that the appeal must be allowedtt33• 
Lord Lindley agreed with both the Lord Chancellor and Lord Macnaghten. 
He criticised the claim that the Sultan of Muscat had no jurisdictional rights of 
allowing anyone to seize arms out of a British ship passing through his territorial 
waters in time of peace, and that the seizure~ although sanctioned by Muscat, 
Persia and Great Britain, was unlawful by the law of the nations and oWght to be 
so treated by an English court of law. Replying to that point, he dismissed any 
idea that an English court could pronounce on general principles of international 
law as to whether the Sultan had exceeded his powers, but he did not dismiss the 
possibility of any demand by the British Government for reparation. 
The final conclusion of the House of Lords was ''judgement appealed from 
reserved, and judgment of Graham .I.,restored." Finally Fracis, llIDes, & Co 
(respondents) lost their case against Lt. Com. Carr (appellant) and they had to 
pay his costs in the House of Lords and in the other courts34 • 
Conclusion 
After those long debates in the House of Commons and the House of Lords, a 
brief discussion of the debates in general is necessary. Despite the differences in 
the timing and the procedure, in both Houses there was a common issue. That 
was the seizure of arms on board Baluchistan. The Commons' discussion 
provided the political and economic context and the Lords dealt with the legal 
issues. In the Commons Curzon avoided giving any explanation for the 
developments from January last regarding the Sultan of Muscat on the 5th and the 
circumstances in which the sultan issued his notification on the the 13th35• 
Curzon did not take direct responsibility for the arms suppression policy as first 
33. House of Lords. Weekly Report, 22 Feb. 1902. vol. 50 pp. 257-58; Law J. Reps., (new s.), 
King's Bench Division. Vol. 71. p. 361; The Times Law Reps., vol. xvn. (1900-1901) pp. 
657-660; The Law Times, 82 (1900) pp. 698-704. 
34. Ibid. 
35. See Chap. Six. 
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carried out by the Government of India in 188()36. He also did not give any 
impression that the government of India tried its best to persuade the Sultan of 
Muscat to order his subjects not to shift arms to Guwader in 1891 and if possible 
to suppress it in Muscat itself. He did not mention to the Commons the 
difficulties which were faced over the question of Muscat's commitment to other 
states when the Sultan decided to raise duties on imported arms. The Sultan's 
decision was finally supported by the British Government as a move in the right 
direction which could contribute to checking the trade. Curzon put Great Britain 
in the third place after Muscat and Persia as interested in suppressing the arms 
traffic although essentially it was a British initiative. Curzon's position seemed 
more a defence of Persian law than of compliance with British law, and although 
this implied official British support for Persian policy, he rejected the idea of 
giving formal notice to the arms traders not to trade with Persia In fact it seems 
that the increase of import duty was linked with the Persian prohibitions on the 
import of arms, while the Sultan of Muscat simply increased duty, but both of 
them aimed to convince Great Britain that they were committed to supression of 
the trade. Although the coin was minted in Britain, the British Government had 
stamped its head with a Persian decoration and the other side with an Omani one. 
However this what was needed for the House of Commons. In the matter of the 
Persian law, if the Persian authorities themselves did not respect laws issued by 
themselves then it was very likely that others would take advantage of that. If the 
law in eastern countries could be got round by paying money as Balfour put it, 
then 'getting round' was the hidden part of the law. The law, in effect, could be 
used like those gates which are closed or opened by tickets. 
In the Lords the focus was on the Sultan of Muscat's law for the 
prohibition on the arms trafficking in his territorial waters and not on the Persian 
36. See early British restrictions on arms to India. in Chap. Five. 
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law. However despite that, the Lords final judgement was in favour of Carr. 
relying on the Muscat Court's judgement37• 
The effects of this case would continue. It would provide clearer answers 
as to whether the arms suppression policy was according to the law of the Sultan 
of Muscat, or of the Persians, or to comply with the British policy of curbing arms 
trafficking in an area of strategic importance to British imperial interests in India 
and the Persian Gulf. The later chapters will provide the answer. 
37. For the circumstances in which the Muscat court was held see previous chapter. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
MUSCAT ARBITRATION 1899-1905 
Partly in consequence of the case of the Baluchistan, the period between 1899 and 
1905 wimessed a new kind of British diplomacy in Muscat. initiated by Captain P. 
Z. Cox. It was an effort to remove the effects of the Baluchistan affair and to 
establish a firm and better footing for the British in Muscat. So there was a 
tendency towards sofmess and negotiations instead of the toughness and 
uncertainty which dominated the previous period. 
Fagan, the British Consul in Muscat, seems not only to have had problems 
with the Sultan but even with his superiors. Either he was confused by some 
instructions or he was deliberately mixing them up. He embarrassed his own 
government's relations with the French, when he was instructed on 11 March 1899 
to inform the Sultan that, should the latter receive a request for a coaling shed 
from the French Consul, the Sultan should submit the proposals to Fagan in 
writing for his approval, which he would only give if it satisfied conditions laid 
down. Otherwise Fagan should refer to the Government of India. However Fagan 
himself altered these instructions. Instead of asking the Sultan to refer directly to 
himself, he referred the matter to the Government of India. This step was 
regarded by the Government of India as unauthorised, and was subsequently made 
a ground of serious complaint by the French Government. The Government of 
India's "intention was that, while Fagan was not to make difficulties and was to 
tell Sultan beforehand that no objection would be raised to demand by French for 
coal shed in Muscat", Fagan "should not address further written communication to 
Sultan, but should clearly understand situation in case of conversation on the 
matter with the Sultan". However Fagan did not stay to deal with the matter, 
which received another kind of diplomacy when Captain Cox arrived. The 
removal of Fagan and all his staff from the British consulate in Muscat could be 
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seen as a moral gesture, which would bring satisfaction to the Sultan, since the 
latter had had enough of Fagan's 'reign' in Muscat. This brought success to the 
British policy in Muscat, and Cox described his aim, saying, "all I want to do in 
Muscat is to get the dusky Arab [Sultan Faisal] who presides over that place on 
our side, and not in the French pocket"l. This appointment, however, gave Cox 
"great responsibility, a sporting chance of winning the doubtful Sultan to the 
British side, and a permanent post in the Political Department of the Government 
of India"2. But it was not Percy Cox, who himself had some weaknesses, on his 
own who eased tension either between the Sultan and the British Government, or 
between the British and the French Governments. 
This period witnessed a number of interesting issues, some of them 
continuations of the old ones and some of them new, for example, the question of 
an Arabic Newspaper Fathul Bas"'sa,er, [Opening the Eyes], the revision of the 
1892 Treaty with the effort to increase British commercial influence, and the 
French coaling station. There were several other interesting issues which cannot 
be covered by this chapter. The French coaling station can be regarded as a 
question which had its origins in the case of the Baluchistan and it was important 
to have it settled. The French flag question also dominated the politics in Muscat 
between Great Britain and France, though it too was not a new question. It 
became a serious issue especially after the case of the Baluchistan, since after that 
affair the Omani dhows sailed and traded in arms freely under the French colours. 
In addition to these two issues France's political position in the court of the Sultan 
became influential, and France's reputation in the eyes of the Omani was very 
high, especially after the case of the Baluchistan. So these two issues, the coaling 
shed and the flag, were finally settled, one at an early stage, and the other in an 
arbitration on 13 October 1904; in January 1905 an agreement was signed and 
published between Great Britain and France. However we must ask why it was 
1. Dilks, Curzon. vol. I, p. 134. 
2. Philip Graves, The Life of Sir Percy Cox. (1942), p.55. 
201 
important now for both Britain and France to try settling problems between 
themselves in Muscat. Was it because Germany started to knock on the doors of 
their sphere of influence? We must first of all consider the general relations 
between the two powers in Muscat3. 
Section Two 
'Fathul BasAsa,er' and Public Opinion 
France was frustrated by the British threat of bombardment of the Sultan's palace 
in 1899 when they attempted to lease a piece of ground for a coaling station. The 
incident caused considerable damage to the Sultan as sovereign ruler in the eyes 
of his people and of Arab and international public opinion. In the Arab world, for 
example the 'Fathul BasAsa,er' newspaper spread the news of the affair one year 
later CA. H. 25 Shawwal 1317 [A. D. 1900]). The newspaper, according to the 
Aden Residency, was posted from Beirut to Aden about a fortnight after the date 
of issue. It was published once a month. The Residency believed that the paper 
was Anglophobe in tone, and was probably printed in Paris. It was sent free to 
merchants and others in Aden and probably to Zanzibar and India. It was noted 
that "some ten years ago a similar paper was started in Egypt, by one Abu 
Nadarah (the father of spectacles), but he was expelled from Egypt and went to 
Paris, and edited his paper from there"4. 
In Muscat also the newspaper arrived, and was addressed to the Sultan 
himself, his brother Mohammed, his cousin Muhammed bin Hilal, the military 
Commander, Badur bin Saif, Sleiman bin Suailem Wali at Sohar, Ali bin Juma,h, 
a retainer of the Sultan, and Jemadar Sleiman Abdurraheem, who commanded one 
of the Muscat forts. Other important persons, Sheikhs and famous merchants, also 
received copies: Sheikh Muhammed er-Rejhi, Sheikh Mohsin Bin Aamer-el-
3. F. O. 54(29, tel., Govt. Ind. For. Dept. to the Polit. Resid., 18 June 1899; 1. O. to F. 0., 11 
July 1899. 
4. F. O. 54/30,1. O. to F. 0.,20 June 1900; Resid., in Aden, to Govt. of Bombay, 27 May 
1900; Extract from Fathal Basayyir (Arabic Newspaper) 25th Shawal, 1317. The 1. O. 
translation 'the father of spectacles' should be replaced by 'the Wise Man'. 
202 
Harthi, Sheikh Ali bin Aamer el Hinawy (both from the interior), Abdul Aziz er-
Ruahi (French Dragoman), Ali Hussein (a British subject), Saiyid Yousuf ez-
Zuwawy, an Arab merchant who came originally from Hijaz, Abdallah bin Akeel, 
a local Arab merchant, and Yusuf Jamals . 
Captain Cox believed that the newspaper was a device of the French 
consul or his myrmidons in order to undermine British influence. As already 
mention~ the newspaper wrote about the occasion of the bombardment threat by 
Admiral Douglas to the Sultan's palace and the humiliation which the Sultan was 
put under as a result of granting the French a coaling station. Surely he was acting 
within his sovereign rights in granting such a concession? According to the 
newspaper, "The Viceroy of India, however, grew jealous at this and made a 
protest to Saiyid Feysal, putting forward the argument that the gift was 
inconsistent with the. treaties in force between him and the English". The 
newspaper gave extensive coverage to the drama of the bombardment threat and 
the humiliation of the Sultan as a result being committed to abandon the coaling 
station to the French. As a result of this action the newspaper said, "the English 
made it appear that they were protecting Saiyid Fesal from foreign encroachment, 
but it was not at all the case. Their sole object was the annexation of Muscat and 
its dependencies, and if we want the simple truth it is that they took this action as 
furnishing a means for interfering in the affairs of the place and of quietly 
achieving their object". The English, said the newspaper, planted in the soil an 
iron flagstaff, 40 cubits in height, upon which to fly their flag, a procedure which 
was regarded by the Arab public as evidence of the annexation of the country. 
'F athul Bas"sa,er spoke about the subsidy paid by the British Government to the 
Omani Sultan which it had been customary for Zanzibar to make to Muscat. The 
British attitude in that matter was a strange one, according to the newspaper, "they 
now look upon the payment of this money as a piece of English charity and 
5. F. O. 54(30, 1. O. to F. 0., 3 July 1900; Cox to Govt. Ind., 21 April 1900; Cox to Mead, 
18 April 1900; translation of Articles from Fath-ul-Basayar [Opening the Eyes), 
published in Bairut, 7 Ramazan, 1317 H.(January 9,1900). 
203 
benevolence. an~ in fact. the Viceroy has frequently spoken of Muscat as being 
part of Bombay, and has stated. that his Government expended a lakh of rupees 
yearly on the place.'t The Political Agent looked upon himself as a roler of 
Muscat. which was regarded as piece of British territory. The newspaper 
mentioned the salute of guns which the Sultan had to fire on the occasion of every 
British festival for the Queen "Empress of India", the title assumed by Queen 
Victoria. Thirty-one guns should be fired in Muscat, whereas Royalties are not 
given more than twenty-one. so the extra ten said the newspaper. was for the 
claim of Great Britain. But the newspaper took the chance to remind the Omani 
public and intellectual opinion of the real power of Great Britain. that, "since the 
Transvaal (Boer) war starte~ the public of Asia and Africa have all taken the 
measure of Great Britain's power"6. It should be noted that not only news 
concerning Muscat was in the paper but there was also information about the 
Turkish Government, the Boer War and situation of the English troops there, the 
general position of English troops in India, the situation in the Persian Gulf and 
the British fear of any power interfering in it. Finally there was a call for 
Moslems to resist the seizure of the Moslem countries signed by "Abdu 
Muhammad" or perhaps [Imam Muhammad Abdu], a famous Egyptian nationalist 
and religious leader, a friend of Jamal-u-ddeen AI Huseiny. (AI Mghani) of 
Afghanistan. 
However. the paper noted that "in these days the English are showing 
mildness to Saiyid Feysal, Sultan of Muscat, and they have now paid the usual 
subsidy which he gets from Zanzibar". The newspaper seemed to annoy both the 
Government of India and the Sultan of Muscat, so measures had to be taken 
against it. According to Cox, the Sultan asked him to confiscate the newspaper in 
the Muscat Post Office, because it was managed by the British Agency. There 
was some difficulty about such a step because some papers were addressed to 
French proteges, and there was therefore the possibilty of news of such action 
6. transl., Fath-ul-Basayar , 25 Shawal1317 (-February 19(0) Muscat. 
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leaking out. Cox therefore solicited the sanction of the Government of India 
before taking any action. He was anxious to know the origins of the newspaper, 
from the fact that the paper put in some of the envelopes used was made in 
England! It bore the maker's name, "James Bolton, 39 and 40, St. George's Place, 
Hyde Park Corner" in London. He thought that might possibly furnish a clue7• 
The India Office in London made an enquiry into the matter and brought to the 
notice of the Foreign Office the distribution of the newspaper, which was regarded 
by the India Office as "mischievous and offensive". In London the India Office 
contacted the maker of the envelopes, Mr J. Bolton, in St George Place. Mr 
Bolton told the India Office that the envelopes were specially made for the French 
Embassy in Albert Gate, and he knew that they were not for their own use in this 
country. They were sent to Paris for use there, he said "beyond that I can give no 
information "8. It is interesting that examination of the paper at the Stationery 
Office, produced no definite identification that the paper was of English or 
oriental manufacture. It was common on the continent and it had no mark: of the 
maker, an indication by which the place of manufacture could be established. So 
the Foreign Office made an effort, via Mr Drummond Hay, who promised to let 
the Foreign Office know if he succeeded in finding out anything more about the 
newspaper on his return to Beirut9• Drummond Hay did not in fact go to Beirut 
himself but sent the envelope there. The answer came that no such envelopes 
were made there. Therefore, the India Office's conclusion was that the French 
Embassy was interested in the Fathul Bas"sa,er. The results of Sir Lee Warner's 
talk with Mr Bolton should be known in the proper quarterslO• Sir Thomas 
Sanderson considered that the newspaper's desire was to raise mischief, but he 
thought that the French Government had its own political aim, namely to 
7. F. O. 54130, Cox to Gov. Ind., 18 May 1900; Cox to Govt. Ind., 22 May 1900. 
8. F. O. 54130, Mr J. Bolton, to Lee Warner, 18 Aug. 1900; Lee Warner to Fairholrne, conf., 
25 Aug. 1900, 
9. F. O. 54130, Lee Warner to Sanderson, 25 Aug. 1900. 
10. F. O. 54130, I. O. to F. 0., conf., 25 July 1900; Sanderson to Lee Warner, 25 Aug. 1900. 
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undennine British influence in Muscatll . The Government ofIndia suggested that 
arrangement might be made for the examination and seizure of such papers before 
they could reach Muscat. These orders were to be treated as strictly 
confidential12. However the newspaper was stopped from reaching Muscat at 
Beirut, according to Sanderson's internal letter to Lee Warner on 27 August 1900. 
Whether the newspaper suppression was successful or not, damage had already 
been done. The newspaper had been read by Omanis who realized that Great 
Britain was less dominant internationally. The newspaper reported the emergence 
of another new power in Europe which could challenge the British position. It 
was not France, but Germany, and the Omanis, probably, had already some 
example of that in East Africa in the case of the marriage of Princess Salma 
(daughter of Sa,eed bin Sultan Imaum of Oman and Zanzibar, and sister of four 
Sultans in Muscat and Zanzibar !) to a German diplomat, Herr Reute, and her visit 
to Zanzibar on board a German cruiser. Another occasion was the escape of 
Khalid bin Bargash, her nephew, to the German Consulate in Zanzibar after his 
attempt to assume power during which he was bombarded by the British navy13. 
The British authorities pressed for his surrender, but the German consul refused to 
give him up, claiming that the case was covered by German extraterritorial rights. 
Khalid then was taken by the consulate on a German man-of-war to Dar-es-
Salaam. The British Government protested against this action and refused to 
admit that Germany was within her rights. On the mainland at Mombasa, German 
intrigues to undennine British influence were also going on 14. These events came 
to the knowledge of Omanis because of their strong link with the East African 
11. Ibid. 
12. F. O. 54(30, Govt. Ind. to Meade, 4 June 1900; Govt. Ind. to Dir. Genl. Post Off. India. 
13. See chapter six, The Case of Abdul Aziz Er-Ruwahi; Mudhldrrat Amira Arabeyeh of 
Princes Salma. 
14. Gooch & Temperley, British Docs., Vol. 1, pp. 323, 327, "In Zanzibar, the extra-
territorial rights conferred on Germany by her Treaty of 1885 with the sultan became a 
source of constant dispute. The exemption from search claimed by German vessels made 
it impossible for Her Majesty's Government to perform the duties which, in their opinion, 
devolved on them as a protecting power under the Brussels Act, but Germany maintained 
her claims none the less". 
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coast. F athul Bas"sa,er' brought the news of the seizing of six German trading 
ships by the British between Zanzibar and Delagoa Bay; they were Herzuk, 
General, Admiral, Huns, Janer, Bundesrath, and Coseller. The English took this 
action to display their maritime power to the Arabs, Indians, and the people of 
Zanzibar, so that they might know that the English had a long arm both at sea and 
on land, the newspaper said. For this reason lithe German Emperor wrote a strong 
threatening letter for interfering with his subjects. The English were frightened, 
and released the German vessels ". 
The newspaper brought to the Omani public knowledge of another 
intervening power, the Russians. The Indian Government became very uneasy on 
hearing that a small Russian steamer had entered the Persian Gulf. When the 
British saw the natives had become delighted at what they heard of the Russian 
vessel, the newspaper claimed, they became afraid lest a rising might take. place. 
The British at once falsified the news, added the newspaper, to assure the Arabs, 
Indians and others that no Government, except itself, had a navy. Whenever it 
hears that a vessel of a foreign Power has gone to the Persian Gulf it becomes 
afraid and alarmed15• Fathul Basl\sa,ers aim seems to be clear, not only to serve 
French desires but to explain that there was now more than one power which 
could challenge Great Britain; the French, the Russians and the Germans. In 
addition, the Arabs and the Indians could participate in that challenge. From the 
issues raised by the newspaper, it does not seem that it served completely French 
desires, rather expressing its own particular opinion. There was nothing in the 
newspaper which gave the French more advantage against the British than it gave 
the Germans, the Russians or the Turks. This was strange for a newspaper 
supported by the French. 
15. F. O. 54/30, extract from 'Fathul BasAsa.er' A.H. 25th Shawa11317. 
207 
Section Three 
Settling the Coalshed Question 
As was noticed in the introduction, the British Government now had no objection 
to granting the French a coaling station in Muscat. It seems to have been changes 
in the international atmosphere which necessitated this more conciliatory policy 
toward the French. They had sailed their warships to prevent this development 
yet they were willing now to accept it and even offered help to achieve it. 
although it was less than three months since they had threatened to bombard the 
Sultan's palace. In May they wrote to the Political Agent in Muscat telling him to 
enquire about the place needed by the French. On 3 June instructions were given 
to him to tell the Sultan there was no objection on the part of the British 
Government if the French applied to him for a coaling shed within Muscat 
Harbour under the same conditions as the British one, without flag or fortification. 
Also the Government of India instructed the Agent to maintain his right to be 
consulted by the Sultan, a claim which had previously been refused by the 
Sultan16• 
This new move, however, was based on diplomatic contact between the 
French and the British between February 1899 and June. On February 22 1899 
M. Cambon, the French Ambasssador, complained to the Marquess of Salisbury 
very earnestly of the excessive action which Admiral Douglas had pursued 
towards the Sultan of Muscat because of his granting a coaling station to the 
French. The Ambassador had complained also of the publicity which had been 
given to the affair, which induced the English newspapers to adopt a very 
disagreeable tone towards the French Government. He saw the Muscat incident 
announced upon the hoardings by an advertisement proclaiming "a new check for 
16. F. O. 54/29, Polit Resid. to GovtInd., com., 17 May 1899; Polit Agent to Resid., tel., 9 
May 1899, com.; Govt Ind. For. Dept to Polit Agent, tel., 13 May 1899; Polit Agent to 
Govt Ind., 3 June 1899; Govt Ind. For. Dept to Polit Agent, com., 9 June 1899; Polit 
Resid.to Polit Agent, 8 June 1899; Resid. to Sultan of Muscat, tel., 18 June 1899; Govt 
Ind. For. Dept to the Polit Resid., 27 April 1899; Polit Agent to Sultan of Muscat, (17 
Zilhaj 1316); Sultan of Muscat to Polit Agent, (28 Zilhaj, 1316) 9 May 1899. 
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France". Salisbury replied that he had gone into the matter and was compelled to 
adhere to the view that "the Treaty of 1862, which bound both France and 
England to respect the independence of the Imam of Muscat, was seriously 
threatened if either power, acting as sovereign State, could take from the Imam 
[Sultan] a lease of any portion of his territory. If it could be done for a small piece 
of ground it could be for a large piece". He said it was impossible to say that the 
practical independence of the Sultan would not, in regard to such portions of 
territory, be impaired. The French Ambassador declined entirely to admit Lord 
Salisbury's interpretation of the treaty, and the British view on that subject, which 
was open to discussion, need not have been asserted by a threat of bombardment 
against Muscat and the Sultan's palace. Lord Salisbury repeated his view of 
France's violation of the 1862 Treaty, but he admitted that the case had not been 
conducted as quietly as he thought it might well have been. He expressed his 
sorrow that the matter had publicly taken the fonn of an apparent controversy with 
France. Salisbury also admitted that in the matter of sentiment the French 
ambassador had a grievance, though in the matter of substance the British action 
was entirely right. Britain for years had special engagements with the Sultan of 
Muscat, which involved some payments of money, and a very rigid prohibition on 
the alienation of his own territory. The British were afraid of the lease France 
obtained. It was only, they thought, a step towards obtaining the littoral in 
pennanent possession. The French Ambassador assured Lord Salisbury that any 
such designs were very far from the contemplation of his Government and he was 
quite willing to make any declarations which were necessary to place the innocent 
intentions of his Government beyond doubt. But the Ambassador asked, whether 
after such declaration had been made, it would be possible to provide in some 
manner for the establishment of a coaling shed of which France had need. Lord 
Salisbury did not give a direct answer because the matter was entirely within the 
jurisdiction of the India Office, but he promised to convey his wishes to the Indian 
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Government and report back to him17. Five days after the first meeting took 
place, on 27 February, the French Ambassador called on the Foreign Office 
accepting. on behalf of the French Government, the British reading of the 1862 
Treaty, but also with a proposal to establish a coal depot on exactly the same 
terms as the British one, that is to say, on sufferance. He requested that the British 
agent at Muscat might be informed that this was being done with the assent of H. 
M. Government as otherwise Faisal might object to the arrangement. Lord 
Salisbury replied that he would at once request the Secretary of State for India to 
communicate with the Viceroy on the subject by telegraph 18. But before the 
coaling depot question was finally settled. the French seem to have attempted to 
clear up the situation between themselves and the British Government not in 
Muscat affairs alone but on an international basis in which they thought that the 
British would now be willing to make a positive reaction. On 15 March 1899, the 
French Ambassador had a lengthy discussion with Lord Salisbury, drawing 
general conclusions as to the present attitude of the two countries towards each 
other, a position not at all free from danger. "There was a tone prevalent in 
England which might have the effect of driving the pacific sentiments of France to 
despair, and leading Frenchmen to think that there was no hope of tranquil 
relations with this country". It was a nuance, but a nuance that might have very 
calamitous effects, he said, since France had no intention of taking any active 
policy against England. Lord Salisbury assured the Ambassador that he was 
mistaken in thinking that the British Government dealt with France on any other 
principle than that on which the British Government dealt with all other countries, 
and any encroachment or aggressiveness of tone was far from British thoughts and 
intentions. Lord Salisbury pointed out that menacing action by French officers in 
various parts of the world had forced upon the British Government considerations 
17. Marquess of Salisbury to SirE. Monson, 22 Feb. 1899 in Gooch & Temperley,British 
Docs., vol., 1, pp. 209-210. 
18. Gooch & Temperley, British Docs., vol. 1, p. 210. 
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of self protection19• However both sides wished to show themselves victims of 
the other side's policy, and to have been unfairly treated in different parts of the 
world, while at the same time offering better treatment in the future. But it was 
not yet clear what lay behind the latest French move, and what was their 
information about the British situation round the world in the face of the Germans. 
It does seem that they were confident that their initiatives would succeed. The 
British willingness to negotiate the coaling shed in Muscat with them might give 
them an indication that the British also would do the same on the international 
level. Such a step would no doubt help both countries prepare themselves for the 
new international atmosphere caused by the appearance of the Germans and other 
European powers. The competition in Africa over territorial rights had already 
gone on for a decade. Probably neither France nor Britain wanted to see the other 
become too closely associated with the Germans overseas, but this possibilty 
might bring them to settle matters. If concessions could be made in Oman they 
could be made elsewhere but there was still a long way to go. At least, however, 
in Muscat, a practical step was being taken to normality despite a lot of 
difficulties and doubts in the aftermath of the Fashoda crisis the year before. 
On 2 June 1899 Hamilton telegraphed the Viceroy to instruct the Muscat 
Consulate to tell the Sultan at once that the British Government would have no 
objection if the French applied to him for a site for a coaling shed within Muscat 
harbour under the same conditions as the British, and the Consul was to be 
instructed to show every consideration to French susceptibilities and to meet their 
wishes as far as possible20• However, the French Ambassador in London 
communicated with Lord Salisbury on 7 June 1899, telling him that "in the 
harbour of Muscat itself there was not room enough for a French depot of coal, 
and therefore he proposed to take some other creek, at some distance from 
Muscat, naming, especially in the first instance, that of Bunder Jisl\sah, with 
19. Marquess of Salisbury to SirE. Monson, 15 Mar. 1899 in Gooch & Temperley,British 
Docs., vol. 1, p. 211. 
20. F. O. 54(29, TeL, Hamilton to Viceroy, 2 June 1899; Viceroy to Hamilton, 3 June 1899. 
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respect to which the controversy originally commenced." Salisbury replied that he 
thought, "there were many objections to such a course, and that it would give 
impressions as to the intentions of the French Government which neither they nor 
we would wish to be entertained". But, to solve this problem the India Office had 
told the Foreign Office that, "there were three coal-sheds occupied by the British 
Government, and that they had only need for two. They were prepared to sell the 
third to the French Government, if they should desire it". The Ambassador 
promised to refer the matter to his Government21• On 22 July 1899 Sir Thomas 
Sanderson sent to the India Office copies of two dispatches to the British 
Ambassador at Paris recording the communications above in regard to the offer to 
the French Government and requesting Lord George Hamilton's observations, 
especially on the proposal of the French Government to establish a coal depot in 
the Riyam bay between Muscat and Mutrah cities, about three miles from each. 
The French Ambassador in London reported to the British Foreign Office on 27 
July that the French Vice-Consul at Muscat had reported by telegraph 
communications which had passed between him and the British Consul on the 
subject above. He stated that the British Agent had asked to show him the creek 
proposed for the French shed. After seeing it, the British Consul had no objection 
and was ready to settle the matter with M. Ottavi, the French Vice-Consul. Ottavi 
asked whether the British Consul, Mr Fagan, had authority for that, and Ottavi 
understood that he considered he had. He communicated to his Foreign Office 
which passed the matter to the French Ambassador in London asking whether the 
British Consul's statement was correct. The Foreign Office replied that, so far as 
the reports from India showed, Fagan had no authority except to make enquiries 
of his French colleague and to report that to the Foreign Office. On the same date, 
the French Minister spoke to Salisbury about what he heard from the Vice-Consul 
in Muscat, asking whether the British Agent was authorised to settle the matter 
21. Salisbury to Sir E. Monson, 7 June 1899 in Gooch & Temperley, British Docs., vol. 1, pp. 
211-212. 
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either on the bases originally prepared, or on that of the cession of the English 
sheds. The French Government wished to know if that was correct. Lord 
Salisbury replied that he did not think that the Agent had received instructions to 
that effect22. It was probably for this reason that Meade, the Political Resident, 
had himself to depart to Muscat on 30 July 1899 to settle the matter, in respect to 
the Viceroy's instructions23. But Meade found that Riam bay was not suitable for 
a coaling shed for several reasons. It was inhabited and could be fortified. It was 
also close to Mutrah harbour. The Political Agent and the Government of India 
were of the same opinion. Meade suggested Mukalla (on the right side of Muscat 
bay beside the fort Myrani and in front of the fort Jalaly24) as the best place and 
saw no reason why the French claimed a lack of space in that place. They thought 
that the French had the same desire as before which had been refused by the 
British Government during the Jes"sah crisis. But the Foreign Office, it seems, 
wanted to resolve this question promptly. At the same time it was decided to let 
the French Government know about the British objections, because of the 
strategic position of the Riyam bay25. In the middle of August 1899 an interesting 
meeting took place beween Sir E. Monson, the British Ambassador in Paris and 
M. Delcasse, the French Foreign Minister on the latter's return from a visit to 
Russia. Though the British Ambassador was hardly expecting that the French 
Foreign Minister would give him any interesting information about his visit to 
Russia, it seems he was wishing to have some. However he was disappointed that 
Russia was not once mentioned during the hour and a half he spent with the 
Foreign Minister. Delcasse began to complain of the impossibility of keeping 
22. F. O. 54(29, F. O. to L 0.,26 July 1899; 27 July 1899. 
23. F. O. 54(29, tel., 1. O. to Viceroy, 25 Jul. 1899; tel., Viceroy to 1. 0.,29 Jul. 1899. 
24. Mahmood Ali AI-Dauood, in his Arabic book, Alkahlyj AI-Arabi (The Arabian Gulf), 
mentioned that, "Mukalla a,laa Sahil Hadramout" "MukalIa on the coast of Hadramout", 
seems to mix up Mukalla on the coast of Hadramaut (South Yaman) and Mukalla cove in 
Muscat bay. He also identified Bander Jes"sah as "Bandar Jeeseh"; a scholar could mix 
up the name Gysa of Egypt with Jes"sah, of Muscat 
25. F. O. 54(29, Viceroy to 1. 0., 6 Aug. 1899; F. O. to I. 0., 9 Aug. 1899; I. O. to F. 0., 9 
Aug. 1899; F. O. to 1. 0., 12 Aug. 1899; Viceroy to 1. 0., tel., 12 Aug. 1899; Hamilton 
to Govt Ind., 11 Aug. 1899; Viceroy to I. 0., tel., 23 Aug. 1899. 
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relations with England on a friendly footing, and of the way in which all the 
justifiable demands of the French were rejected in London. This attitude filled 
both himself and M. Cambon with profound discouragement. The British 
Ambassador was surprised at such a statement, noticing that he received on the 
same day despatches from M. Cambon himself respecting the coal depot at 
Muscat. But M. Delcasse looked upon the communications made by the Foreign 
Office to M. Cambon as most unsatisfactory, insisting that the conduct of the 
British Government seemed to show a deliberate intention to be unfriendly to 
France in every possible way. Sir Edmund Monson pointed out that the insistence 
upon such a theory was a most pernicious policy, and one calculated to bring 
about the very evils which he deprecated. The French Minister stated that he 
began to believe the politicians who argued that nothing satisfactory could be 
done with England. Monson replied that it was exactly the existence of such 
people and the influence they exercised which caused so much harm. He said that 
he honestly believed that no one in England desired to quarrel with France, but he 
had come to the conclusion after three years residence in France that many 
Frenchmen would like to quarrel with England. 
The meeting ended like this: according to the British Ambassador the 
French Minister appealed to him to do all in his power to facilitate the 
maintenance of a good understanding between France and England, begging him 
not to treat that controversial discussion as an official one, and the British 
Ambassador expressed to his Government his satisfaction at the French minister's 
attitude. At the same time he took the chance to list some French press opinions 
and added that lithe tone of the general press is at this moment hostile to England. 
The Transvaal question is the theme of constant notice in the Paris news papers, 
and the merits are completely transformed and disguised by French journalists. 
Then the adulation of Germany continues"26. 
26. Monson to Salisbury 14 Aug. 1899; 16 Aug. 1899 in Gooch & Temperley, British Docs., 
Vol. 1, pp. 212-213. 
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However, the previous discussion between the British Ambassador and the 
French Foreign Minister was not so different from the discussion between the 
French Ambassador and the Foreign Secretary. One month after the British 
Ambassador's meeting with the French Minister an important report came from 
Muscat on 17 September 1899, that a German named Herr Troeppen, known as 
Haji Mustafa, had arrived at Muscat as a trader. He resided formally in Zanzibar 
where he embraced Islam and married a native of the Angazeeja tribe. And, 
although he was doing no business there at al4 he appeared to have a good deal of 
money at his command. Here is an example. Herr Troeppen managed to reach the 
Sultan to persuade him to start a post office in Muscat and to institute local 
postage stamps, for which concession he declared his willingness to pay H. H. Rs 
6000 per annum. The Sultan hesitated for some time whether or not to grant this 
concession, but then he decided nolt to do so. But "the Sultan has placed a large 
house at the disposal of Herr Troeppen and has declared his intention of taking the 
customs under his own control and of appointing Herr Troeppen to the post of 
Superintendent of Customs on a salary of Rs. 200 a month as soon as the present 
customs farmer's contract expired"27. If that was true it could be enough warning 
to the French and the British, and their relations in Muscat will now be further 
considered. 
Till the end of 1899 the question was still under negotiation and the British 
Government maintained its position concerning Riyam bay, while at the same 
time the French Government found it difficult to accept the English offer which it 
considered an insult to French national feelings28. The French eventually applied 
to establish the station in Kalbooh, close to Reyam at the entrance to Mutrah bay 
(where AL-Insherah restaurant is now) but the British sent the Senior Naval 
Officer of the Persian Gulf Division, Captain John Denison of H. M. S. 
27. F. O. 54{29, Resid. to Bushire Cons. Gen., 17 Sep. 1899; Polit Agent to Resid., 5 Sep. 
1899. 
28. Salisbury to Monson, 7 Oct 1899 in Gooch & Temperiey, British Docs., vol. 1, pp. 213-
14. 
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Melpomene. to report about the place. He found that its position was similar to 
that at Reyam29• So the British insisted on their stand but at the same time they 
wished to bring this problem to an end. They suggested making changes at the 
cove of Mukalla in Muscat bay. where the British station was, in such a way as to 
meet French needs, by making a partition wall between the French and the British 
station30• Finally, the French accepted the offer in MukalIa in August 1900, and 
with it an exhausting question between the British and the French was solved31• 
But was that all? 
Section Four 
Cox's Efforts, and Success 
So far two successes had been achieved during the first year of Captain Cox's 
appointment (September 30th 1899). The Government of India authorized. 
resumption of payment of the subsidy to the Sultan from October 189932• That 
was the first success. The second, the coal shed question, though it began before 
his arrival, came to a successful conclusion during this time. On the diplomatic 
front Cox set out to maintain good relations between the Sultan and the British 
Government, and to try firmly to reduce the consequences of the Baluchistan 
affair. However, as he explained, he still had his difficulties with the Sultan. His 
Highness was still distrustful of the motives of the British Government and of its 
representative, through the influence of the French Consul and Omani persons 
against Britain. He said ''His Highness's illiterateness has had not a little to do 
29. F. O. 54/30. Cox to Capt. Denison. 31 Jan. 1900; Hamilton to Viceroy, 19 Jan. 1900; 
Viceroy to 1. 0.,9 Feb. 1900; Hamilton to Viceroy, 23 Feb. 1900; Denison to Resid. tel.. 
22 Jan. 1900; F. B. Prideaux, Polit. Agent. to the Officer commanding H. M. S. 
Melpomene in Muscat Harbour. 23 Jan. 1900; Denison to Polit. Agent. 31 Jan. 1900; 1 
Feb, 1900; Cox to Meade, 6 Feb. 1900; 1. O. to F. 0 .• 26 Mar. 1900; Meade to Cox. 19 
Feb. 1900; Hamilton to Viceroy, 23 Feb. 1900; Viceroy to L 0.,2 Mar. 1900; Hamilton 
to Viceroy, 6 March 1900; 1. O. to F. 0 .• 21 Mar. 1900. 
30. F. O. 54/30. 1. 0 .• to Viceroy, tel.. 20 Aug. 1900. 
31. F. O. 54/30.1. 0 .• to Viceroy. tel., 2 Aug. 1900; Viceroy to 1. 0 .• tel.. 27 Jul. 1900; [a 
picture of the plot can be seen with the document.] 
32. F. O. 54/30, Govt.Ind. to Hamilton. 25 Jan. 1900; Polit. Resid. to Govt. Ind. Oct. 1899; 
Cox to Polit. Agent. 5 Dec. 1899; Polit. Resid. to Govt. Ind.. 13 Dec. 1899; Govt. Ind. to 
Polit. Resid.. 2 Dec. 1899 . 
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with that result. It must be remembered that he can practically do no more than 
sign his own name and talk the local patois of Arabic: he is quite ignorant of the 
etymology of the language, and the consequence is that anything in writing has to 
be interpreted, or drafted, as the case may be, by other parties". He went on to 
explain that communications of importance passing between His Highness and the 
Agency were handed round to one person after another for interpretation or 
opinion. In nine cases out of ten, he said, "some word or phrase occurs which can 
be distorted and represented to his ignorant mind as carrying some meaning, or 
some insinuation, which was never intended". But he said "no effort of mine will 
be spared towards counteracting these inevitable outside influences, as far as may 
be; but cure, if achieved, can but be as slow as has been the progress of the 
disease". In his report to the Political Resident, Cox spoke about the Sultan's 
claim for compensation in the matter of the arms seized on board the steamer 
Baluchistan in 1898, but he said that the Sultan was not in any way entitled to 
compensation. "I think." he said, "it is conceivable that an individual of Saiyid 
Feisal's standard of intellect cannot look at the matter in any but a purely practical 
light, e.g.,that he was on the point of "netting" so many dollars, but that owing to 
his co-operation in the action taken by the British Government the haul was lost to 
him". He, therefore, could be easily persuaded by some evilly-disposed advisers, 
"and for his own uneducated mind to persuade itself into the idea that Government 
and its representative have broken faith with him over the transaction". But Cox's 
desire was not to harm the Sultan with his comment about His Highness, but to 
serve his diplomacy by a gentle policy which the Government of India should 
adopt in Muscat. Also to prepare the ground for the generous reconsideration of 
the question of compensation for the losses after the business of the Baluchistan, 
so that His Highness would start with something in hand33• 
However. it seems that there was another important issue in the mind of 
Cox. During an interesting meeting between him and the Sultan he reminded H. 
33. F. O. 54(30, Cox to Polit Resid., 31 Oct 1899. 
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H. of the great services the British Government offered to the Omani Sultans and 
the obligations which he and his forefathers had to the British Government. He 
asked the Sultan; what benefit you derive from displeasing my Government? The 
Sultan replied,"I assure you I have no wish to displease the English Government, 
but to what especially, do you now allude?". Cox reminded the Sultan about past 
Bander-Jesl'l.sah crises as violation of H. H.'s treaties with the British Government 
and about the French who did not give the Sultan any help in the revolt of 1895. 
About the Jesl'l.sah· crisis, the Sultan did not comment, but about the French he said 
that it was only bazaar gossip. However, Cox wished the Sultan to make a fresh 
start. The Sultan reminded Cox of the old British suggestion to control Muscat 
customs: " What can I say ? If Government have come to the fixed determination 
not to renew their 'favour' except under certain conditions one of which is my 
having an official to control my Customs, which it is impossible for me, in my 
own interests, to carry it out, I am powerless"34. Cox did not agree that this was 
the intention or desire, but said it was only a matter of advice, to accept the loan 
of a British official to manage the Customs in H. H.'s own interest. However, 
they were ready to listen to any argument which he had to put forward. H. H. 
expressed his willingness to listen to Cox's advice, and asked whether he had any 
cause to complain and whether Cox had given him any advice to which he had not 
paid attention. Cox expressed satisfaction at his relations with His Highness, but 
asked him if he would give some proof of bona fides. The Sultan replied, "what 
proof can I give you? You must prove me for yourself in the future". And here 
Cox came to the key point of the issue which was in his mind. He said to the 
Sultan, ''Well, one thing, at all events, suggests itself to me; that is, the matter of 
the distinctive flag for your subjects". Cox mentioned to the Sultan that he told 
Consul Fagan that the matter would take a couple of months to be considered, and 
that time had passed. Therefore he asked if H. H. had came to any conclusion. 
The Sultan understood why the British raised the flag question. They were hitting 
34. See Chapter Five for the Sultan's Customs. 
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at two targets; first, the use of the French flag by the Omani dhows, and second, 
the anTIS trade. The target which was most serious for the British was the anTIS 
traffic which found its way under the protection of the French flag. If the Sultan 
issued a distinctive flag for his subjects they would be vulnerable to British check 
on the seas. The ships could be seized because of his declaration giving the right 
to the British ship of war to seize and confiscate anTIS. The Muscat flag would no 
longer offer protection to anTIS trafficking ships. The Sultan certainly 
remembered this and probably understood that the target was not France but the 
anTIS trade when he remarked that he had communicated with the French 
Government on the matter but he still had not received any reply. He mentioned 
that what the British Government wanted in respect to the flag would be 
impracticable for him. If he had a flag of his own, and other people or another 
power dishonoured or seized it and he could not exact satisfaction, he would lose 
all his prestige35. 
In another interview which took place in Muscat on 2 December 1899 
between the Political Resident Colonel Meade and the Sultan Faisal, Meade 
assured the Sultan of the good intentions of the British Government in the 
question of the management of his customs. The Sultan described his difficulty, 
which lay in the views of his subjects who would misinterpret the Government's 
intentions and think that the British wanted to rule the customs in order to impose 
new and severe taxes. But he promissd to reconsider the matter and discuss it 
with the Political Agent. The Sultan then raised the case of the Baluchistan and 
the compensation which he must receive from the British Government for the 
losses caused to him by the seizure of anTIS, and also he complained of his not 
receiving the seized anTIS. Meade explained the reasons why they had remained 
in the British Consulate so long, that "the owners had been instituting law suits in 
London for their restoration, on the ground of wrongful seizure; that appeals had 
35. F. O. 54/30, Memo., regarding a conversation between H. H. Sultan of Muscat and the 
Political Agent, 14 Oct, 1899. The flag question was discussed in Chapter 6. 
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been made from one court to another and that the Government of India had not yet 
heard the final result". So if the British government won the case, the Sultan's 
claim to a share of the proceeds of the seizure would be considered. If not and it 
was finally ruled that the arms should be released, they would presumably pass 
through the Muscat Customs House before delivery and would have to pay duty36. 
Though it seemed that the Sultan's demand was not completely fulfilled, this 
meeting helped the Residency and the Political Agency in preparing a better 
foundation for relations with the Sultan. Since Cox had showed the Sultan his 
friendship, and was kind enough to help in resuming his subsidy, the Sultan, 
though he did not move quickly in the matter of the flag, (a question which was 
not raised by Meade) apparently decided to please both Meade and Cox in the 
matter of the customs, thus responding to Meade's sincere sympathy towards him 
in face of the Government of India, and put another success in Cox's way. The 
Sultan decided to take over the management of the customs himself for one year, 
in order to see what they were really worth, which pleased the British 
Government. The Sultan telegraphed to Bombay for two Muslim Indians who 
were said to have had practical experience in the Bombay Customs. He arranged 
to refund the advance which Rotansi Purshotam had made to him in order to 
cancel the provisional contract made with him. Cox regarded that as "decidedly a 
move in the right direction and is the immediate outcome of the timely resumption 
of the subsidy"37. This step by the Sultan in taking over the mangement of the 
customs was regarded by The Times as a refonn in a system which had existed 
from time immemorial. But that was not enough, according to The Times; still 
greater improvement might be effected if the Sultan followed the example of his 
neighbours and appointed a fully qualified official to organize his customs 
administration, and went on saying "it is the British flag which is far the most 
36. F. O. 54/30, Polit Resid. to Govt. Ind., 4 Dec. 1899. 
37. F. O. 54/30, PolitResid. to GovL Ind., 24 Dec. 1899; POliL AgenL to POliL Resid., 12 
Dec. 1899; William Cunningham to POliL Resid., 2 Jan. 1900; Polit Resid. to GovL Ind., 
22 Dec. 1899. 
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interested in the prosecution of these reforms and the peaceful furtherance of 
trade". "If the advice and the support given to the Sultan by the British Consul 
and Political Agent are distasteful to our contemporary we may point out that the 
maintenance of peace and tranquility in Oman and reform in its administration 
benefit the trade of all countries". It also pointed out that, "The Sultan is in treaty 
relations with the Government of India., and it has always been their policy to 
support his lawful authority and to encourage useful refonns"38. This ends one 
stage of a question associated with the arms trade since 1893, as discussed in 
chapter five. But to settle the question of the flag required further effort. 
Section Five 
The Sultan and the question of the Flag 
During the summer of 1900 definite diplomatic steps were taken over the flag 
question. The Sultan sailed to Sur on 7th June 1900 in H. M. S. Sphinx with 
Cap~ Cox, the Political Agent, and took serious steps in connection with the 
question39• But why did he decide to take this action now, and on board a British 
ship of war? Commander Phillips of H. M. S. Sphinx said that "Captain Cox 
informed me that it was the wish of the British Govennent that H. H. the Sultan 
should be conveyed to Sur in H. M. S. Sphinx". But how did the Sultan manage to 
persuade some holders of a French flag to give it up? Cox said in his reports that 
no force was used, they gave it up voluntarily. Even so the obvious questions 
remain. Why was the visit on a gunboat? Was the firing of 21 guns as salute to 
the Sultan's landing at Sur, by request from Captain Cox, a normal formality for 
the people in Sur or was it done to remind them of what they might hear if they 
did not respond to the Sultan's request? If it was a normal procedure why did 
Captain Cox not request the firing of a salute in Qureyyaat, where the Sultan also 
landed, and why not again when he came back from Sur and landed at Muscat4O? 
38. The Times. 25 OcL 1899. 
39. F. O. 54/30. Cox to GovL Ind., 2 Jul. 1900. 
40. F. O. 54/30, Admiralty to F. 0., 30 Aug. 1900; Commander Phillips. H. M. S. Sphinx 
Senior Naval Officer. Persian Gulf division. to Admir .• 16 June 1900. 
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At any rate on 12 June he received an undertaking from the Jennebeh and Bani bu 
Ali tribe that they would relinquish French protection as from June 1241. The 
Sultan replied to the undertaking that "whereas there appears to have been in time 
past a misunderstanding among you as to my wishes in this connection, there must 
be nothing of the sort in future; you must, therefore, clearly understand that from 
today. I neither recognize nor permit any subject of mine, no matter who he may 
be, should take so-called protection papers and flag from the French Government 
or any Government without my especial written permission, and in accordance 
with the Treaties existing between me and foreign powers" 42. But that was not 
enough. On 15 June the Sultan issued a Notification to his subjects that "we do 
not recognize in our territories in the hands of our subjects flags and protection 
papers, and will not forgive anyone who takes them otherwise than with our 
written permission "43. The Sultan went further and sent a letter to the French 
Consul informing him about the situation in Sur and the wish of his subjects to 
return the French flags and papers, sending him some of them, and asking him to 
take those back44. It seemed that the Sultan's relations with the French were 
entering into an unhappy period! The French Consul replied that he was not 
prepared to accept them, and he returned them to him. He said "The rest of what 
you have alluded to in the said communication has been before now explained to 
you, both in writing and by word of mouth, and no further explanation is called 
for now"45. Captain Cox had asked the Political Resident, in case the French 
declined to receive back papers and flags, how should he advise the Sultan to act 
At the same time he expected France to threaten force against the Sultan, so he 
asked Consuls at Aden and Zanzibar to warn him directly if any French gunboat 
41. F. O. 54/30, Cox to Govt. Ind., 16 June 1900; 1. O. to F. 0., 11 Aug. 1900; Translation of 
document voluntarily passed by the Jenebeh and Beni Abu Ali [tribes], 12 June 1900. 
42. F. O. 54/30, Translation of formal acceptance of undertaking passed by the Sultan to his 
subjects, 12 June, 1900; Cox to Resid., 15 June 1900. 
43. F. O. 54/30, Notification issued by the Sultan of Muscat, 15 June 1900; Sultan to Polit. 
Resid., 15 June 1900. 
44. F. O. 54/30, Sultan of Muscat to Ottavi, 15 June 1900. 
45. F. O. 54/30, Ottavi to Sultan of Muscat, 15 June 1900. 
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passed that way. 
In fact, it was a grave mistake by both H. H. the Sultan and the Political 
Agent Captain Cox to sail on an English gun boat for this purpose. The natural 
assumption would be that the Sultan was either acting on behalf of, or under 
compulsion from the British against the French. Sailing on a boat flying the 
British flag, from which a threat had been made to bombard his palace if he did 
not cancel his grant of the J essah coaling station to France, he was now behaving 
in the same way himself, but using a power which was not his own. 
However the French do not seem to have given up on the matter, and the 
apparent surrender by the Sultan's subjects of their flags and papers would 
probably be of short duration. Perhaps it was comparable to their guarantees at 
the time of his succession in 1888, which did not prevent them from revolting 
against him in 1895, and forcing him to escape to Jalali Fort to defend himself. 
Even the Sultan's apparent success in Sur was not matched elsewhere. At Sohar, 
for example, in the same month as his visit to Sur, he only succeeded in forcing 
three vessel owners to give up their French flags and papers, but the others 
rejected his advice46. This placed him in a position of severe embarrassment as 
regards France, and shook his personal prestige in the eyes of his people. The 
French now enjoyed great advantege in dealing with the Sultan himself, since he 
had told the French Consul that his subjects wanted to give up their French flags 
and papers and they knew perfectly well what had happened in Sohar. 
Cox seemed to have failed to resolve the flag question, but he had 
achieved two things overall: he had alienated the Sultan from the French and he 
had undermined Abdul Aziz Er-Ruwahi, the French Dragoman, towards whom the 
Sultan became more arrogant then ever. According to The Times, after the 
Sultan's failure in Sohar, he gave orders that A. Aziz should not allowed to cross 
the threshold of his palace. The Times cited the French paper Debats for this 
attitude of the Sultan which the paper naturally attributed to the insidious attitude 
46. The Times, 15 Oct. 1900. 
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of a foreign agent, whose sole concern was in every way to undermine French 
influence47• But the French did not surrender. To the annoyance of the British, 
they organized a local, diplomatic and Press 'front', one manifestation of which 
was La depeche Colonial and probably the issue of an Arabic newspaper Fathul 
Bas"sa,er48. The British themselves, even when taking a ftrm line on one issue, 
could be accommodating enough on some other matter. It was just two months 
after the flag occasion in Sur and Sohar, that they completed the transfer to the 
French of a portion of Mukalla Cove, within Muscat harbour, for their coaling 
shed, as discussed above. 
Finally the tone of the relations changed. The two governments found the 
persistent undermining of each other's influence in Muscat of dubious beneftt and 
preferred to expand commerce generally as much as possible~ Great Britain, for 
example, from August till November 1901, started to prepare for the revision of 
the commercial treaty of 19 March 1891, (discussed in chapter four) which was 
due to expire on 20 March, 1904 and there was something more to be gained from 
the Sultan. In May 1902, he made undertaking to the British Goverment that in 
respect of coal ftelds in Sur, he had no intention of entering upon the work 
himself. "In the future if any Goverment or Company asked [his] permission to 
embark upon the mining enterprise in question, [he] will not accord such 
permission without first communicating with [the British] Government, in order 
that they may themselves take up the work with me if they feel so inclined" 49. 
This might explain also why the British were so aware of France's influence in 
Sur, and why they wanted the consolidation of the Sultan's influence there. The 
Sultan's undertaking was a case of prevention being better than cure. The French 
47. Ibid. 
48. F. O. 54/30, Cox to Govt. Ind., 3 Jui. 1900; Sheikh Abdulla to Saeed bin Muhammad, 26 
June 1900; Cox to Govt Ind., 2 J ul. 1900; Memo. regarding Movements of M. Goguyer 
in Muscat, 18 May 1900; Cox to Govt. Ind., 18 July 1900; Cox to Govt Ind., 4 Oct 1900; 
Extract from La dipeche Colonial, 7 Sep. 1900; F. O. to 1. 0., 28 Dec. 1900; Govt Ind. to 
Polit Resid., 15 Oct 1900. 
49. F. O. 54/31, F. O. to 1. 0.,25 Oct. 1901; 1. O. to F. 0., 25 Oct 1901; Aitchison, 
Collection. p. 318. 
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for their part also started to think of the installation of a properly regulated Bazaar 
for the display and introduction of French goods as the method which was most 
likely to lead to successful results50. Muscat received a visit during 1903 from the 
Mission du Golf Persique of the Comire de L'Asie Franr;aise under M. A. Jouanin, 
which remained in Muscat for nearly a month5!. From the British side, on 13 
November 1903, the Viceroy of India himself initiated his tour of the Gulf by 
visiting Muscat. This visit was regarded by the Persian Gulf Residency as likely 
always to be "a memorable one in the annals of British relations with the Sultan of 
Oman as carrying the distinction of the First State visit of a Viceroy to Muscat"52. 
It was a great pleasure to Sultan Faisal, the fIrst Omani Sultan to be visited by a 
Viceroy. "His Highness Seyyed Faisal expressed with much cordiality the 
pleasure and honour it would afford him to welcome His Excellency to Muscat, 
and from that moment be set himself to prepare to receive him in a manner 
befItting such a great occasion.... His Highness spared no effort to satisfy himself 
that the town and approaches should at all events look their best"53. The 
Residency was gratified "to remark the readiness with which the Muscat public 
responded and did their best, each according to his lights, to put their houses in 
order" 54. "The Sultan's palace, his steamer Norr-ul-Bahr, the forts Jalali and 
Merani, were profusely decorated with bunting and at His Highness's wish, in 
order to place in special evidence the community of interests and sentiments 
which bind the two Governments, the flag-staffs of the Sultan's palace and the 
British Consulate were linked together by a graceful arc of bunting 300 yards in 
length"55. The French and the American Consulates in Muscat were dressed as 
well as several chief buildings. All that for the occasion of Curzon's visit to 
Muscat. 
50. British Consulate (Muscat) to F. 0., 13 Sept 1903. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Arch. Eds., Persian Gulf .. , vol. V, 1903-1904, p. 11-12. 
53. Ibid. 
54. Ibid. 
55. Ibid. 
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On 18 November 1903, about ten o'clock in the morning, R. L M. S. 
Hardinge, escorted by five Men-of-war, approached the mouth of Muscat harbour. 
"The Sultan's flag was saluted with 21 guns as the flotilla came abreast of the 
signalling tower and gun for gun was returned by the Muscat Battery. As soon as 
the ships had taken up their billets a further salvo of 31 guns was fired as a 
welcome to His Excellency the Viceroy"S6. After the ships had dropped anchor, a 
delegation sent by the Sultan, headed by his brother Muhhammed bin Turki, 
including the Sultan's son Taimoor bin Faisl, Mohhammed bin Azzan, Badr bin 
Saif, and Mohhammed bin Nasi, sailed to Hardinge to convey the Sultan's 
compliments and to welcome Curzon. Shortly after they had returned to the 
shore, the Sultan himself went to Hardinge accompanied by his suite and by the 
British Political Agent. "Mter steaming round the entire squadron and 
acknowledging the compliments of the crew of His Majesty's ships, His Highness 
drew up alongside the Hardinge, where he was received by the Foreign and 
Military Secretaries and members of the Viceroy's Staff, and was by them 
conducted into his Excellency's presence on the quarter-deck of the Hardinge, 
which had been fitted up as a state reception room"S7. Greetings were exchanged 
and a short conversation took place. Members of the Sultan's suite were presented 
to Curzon, and then refreshments were served. The Sultan took his departure after 
a few minutes under a salute of 21 guns. By one o'clock, there had followed a 
visit of the French and the American Consuls to pay their respects and to 
interview Curzon. At two o'clock Curzon, accompanied by Rear Admiral 
Atkinson- Willes and staff, landed at Muscat's Customs jetty and was received by 
Meade and Cox. From the jetty the "Viceregal party walked through the narrow 
but gaily decorated street to the British Consulate where the Political Agent was 
honoured by their-company at lunch"s8. At 3.15 pm Curzon received a deputation 
with an address from British subjects, and other communities who enjoyed British 
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid. 
58. Ibid. 
226 
protection, for example the Portuguese of Goa in Muscat. The address was read 
by Purshotam Dhanjee: ''We the entire community of British subjects, Hindu, 
Muhammadan, Parsi, and other British protected persons, settled in the towns of 
Muskat and Mutra, most repectfully beg, on behalf of ourselves and our fellow 
subjects residing in other parts of His Highness the Sultan's dominions, to offer 
Your Excellencies a most heartfelt welcome on the occasion of your visit to 
Muscat. " Dhanjee congratulated Curzon on being the first Viceroy to visit Muscat 
and he evaluated this as having "inaugurated a new and vigorous political 
departure in a sphere where so many Indian interests are involved"s9. He felt 
confident that "this happy undertaking will prove to be an epoch-making event in 
the progress and enhancement of British prestige and influence." He said "It will 
serve, too, as an abiding demonstration to the inhabitants of the littoral that the 
preponderating influence of Great Britain in these waters is no shadowy or remote 
force, but a lively and dignified reality"60. He thereby expressed the unqualified 
loyalty and devotion of the British subject to "the Great Government". In Muscat, 
he said, we enjoy "the rights and privileges of the most favoured nation, our 
interests are carefully guarded by our Consular authorities, and we experience 
complete toleration in matters of religion. There is an absence of unnecessary 
litigation amongst us, British subjects, and justice is readily and promptly 
obtainable in the Agency COurt"61. About the British subjects dealing with Omani 
of the interior, Dhanjee said: "In the matter connected with our dealing with the 
natives of Oman, while we are accustomed to receive a courteous hearing from 
His Highness, nevertheless we often experience difficulty in obtaining relief, and 
this is partly owing no doubt to the unsettled state of the interior... Strife and 
turbulence are within the nature of things, and when they are limited to the 
interior of the country do not immediately affect our welfare any more than that of 
59. Address presented to the Viceroy by the British subjects in Muscat. 18 Nov. 1903. in 
Arch. Eds., Persian Gulf, vol. V, 1903-1904, p. 12-19. 
60. Ibid. 
61. Ibid. 
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other peaceable members of the community ..• When, as is sometimes the case, 
the scene of the strife is transferred to the coast ports, our commercial interests do 
immediately suffer; and we are put to anxiety for the safety of the lives and 
properties of our fellow sUbjects..". Dhanjee drew Cmzon's attention to those 
British Indian subjects who resided at many of the coast towns of Oman, isolated 
from the capital in small communities, "in whose hands all the local trade is 
centred, and who, in however humble a capacity, are the pioneers of British Indian 
commerce in these waters". But he thanked "the vigilant activity of successive 
Political Agents and of British Men-of-war at seasons of unrest" which made the 
actual danger to the lives and properties of the British Indians very little. He 
hoped Curzon would strengthen the power of Sultan Faisal or, he said "by active 
interference on the coast where necessary for the preservation of British interests, 
to take measures which will deter the unruly tribesmen of Oman from disturbing 
the commerce of the country by their dissensions"62. The address "was then 
presented in a silver casket of local design and manufacture representing a led 
camel standing beneath the shade of a palmtree, the trunk of which formed the 
receptacle for the vellum"63. 
Curzon replied that the Muscat and India Coasts facing each other "at so 
inconsiderable a distance and the well-known aptitudes of the particular 
communities that you represent sufficiently explain the close mercantile 
connections that have grown up during the last century between Muscat and India 
and leave one no surprise at the commercial predominace of Great Bitain in the 
trade and shipping of this State". Curzon did not lose the chance to link the 
commercial interests with the political ones; he said that "the political stake of one 
country in another is sometimes measured by its commercial interests". He 
calculated the British portion of the trade with Muscat for the last five years to be 
on average 84 per cent., and the total number of steamers cleared in Muscat port 
62. Ibid. 
63. Ibid. 
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to be 97 each year. Therefore, he sai~ "I am satisfied that the predominance of 
Great Britain in the mercantile interests of the State [Muscat] is supreme and 
incontestable"64. Curzon praised the British Political Agents who had served in 
Muscat and he praised Cox especially. He disliked interference in any Omani 
internal disturbances, but he said that "undoubtedly if it were to reach a point that 
seriously menaced the interests or imperilled the lives and property of British 
subjects, lawfully trading upon the coast, we should feel called upon to intervene 
for their protection, and by no one I am sure would such intervention be more 
loyally welcomed or more cordially assisted by His Highness" [The Sultan]6S. 
In the afternoon Curzon attended a reception in the Sultan's palace, where 
he was accompanied by Sultan Faisal to the Audience Chamber and was seated on 
his right on a raised dais. In the Chamber a number of loyal inscriptions in 
English capitals on coloured ground freely adorned the walls. Around eighty 
Sheiks from various parts of the interior were invited for the occasion. Mter the 
exchange of formal greetings the chief Darbaries were brought up and presented 
by the Political Agent. Then an Arabic address of welcome was read on the 
Sultan's behalf by Sheikh Rashid bin Ozaiz, Governor of Samayel. Mter 
refreshment the Darbar broke up, and Curzon returned to the Hardinge66. On the 
same day Sir Arthur Hardinge, the British Minister at Tehran, arrived at Muscat in 
order to confer with the Viceroy before his entry into Persian waters. This 
brought the number of British vessels up to eight. Accordingly Muscat witnessed 
a joint British political and sea power demonstration. In the evening Curzon gave 
a large dinner party on board the Hardinge for Sir Arthur Hardinge, the naval 
Commander-in-Chief and staff, the senior naval officers belonging to the 
squadron and the Consular representatives of France and America - 70 persons in 
all. At night Curzon was entertained by fireworks from the high terraces of the 
Jalali and Mirani forts. This was the form into which British subjects "had chosen 
64. Curzon's address to the British subjects. Ibid. 
65. The Times. 20 Nov. 1903 carried summaries of these addresses. 
66. Ibid. 
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to put their welcome to Their Excellencies, and the general effect was the more 
picturesque and complete owing to the fact that his Excellency Admiral Atkinson-
Willes had thoughtfully arranged for the ships of the squadron to have the outlines 
of their hulls, masts and yards illuminated at the same time, so that an equally 
delightful spectacle was obtainable either from the shore or out at sea"67. This 
occasion, according to the Residency, was thoroughly enjoyed by the people of 
Muscat, along with other Omanis from the interior who crowded on the beach and 
the streets throughout that day. According to The Times Correspondent, "The 
Sultan of Muscat went on board the Hardinge to visit Lord Curzon, who returned 
the visit in the afternoon. The whole reception was markedly loyal on the part of 
the Sultan, and the demeanour of the Muscatis, who had crowded in thousands 
into the town, was friendly in the extreme. The town is decorated"68. On the next 
day Curzon held a Durbar for the Sultan on board the cruiser Argonaut. "On the 
Viceroy's right, on the large raised dais, was seated His Highness the Sultan, and 
on His Excellency's left the British Minister in Persia, the Naval Commander-in-
chief, and their respective staffs. Below the dais were seated the Naval Officers 
of the squadron and other British officers on duty in Muscat in full dress, and 
opposite to them an equal number of the Sultan's Officers of State and notables of 
Oman. In the centre of the arena on either side of a large gun were 
accommodated the non-official darbaris and spectators. The magnificence of the 
trappings and the galaxy of unifonns made the scene an exceedingly brilliant one, 
which must have impressed itself indelibly on the memories of those present" 69. 
The Foreign Secretary of the Government of India had formally opened the 
Durbar. The chief Arab Notables were brought up in turn and presented to 
Curzon by Cox, the Political Agent. Afterwards an Arabic address most heartily 
welcoming the Viceroy was read on behalf of Sultan Faisal by Sheikh Rashid bin-
Ozaiz: "I trust it will not be amiss if I take advantage of this auspicious occasion 
67. Ibid. 
68. The Times, 20 Nov. 1903. 
69. Arch. Eds .• Persian Gulf, Vol. V. 1903-1904. p. 13 
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to convey to your Excellency public expression of the pleasure and Honour which 
it affords to me and mine, in the' first place to be able to welcome Your two 
Excellencies and His Excellency the Admiral and your imposing and distingushed 
escort to our modest capital of Oman, and in the second place to be thus afforded 
an opportunity of manifesting our sentiments of sincere friendship and attachment 
to that Great Government of India which Your Excellency directs and to His 
Majesty the King-Emperor of happy name whose Viceroy and proxy you are in 
these far-off climes''7o. The Sultan spoke about the old relations between Great 
Britain and his forefathers. "Muscat had been in constant commercial touch and 
intercourse with the English through the trading ports of India"71. The rulers of 
Oman have been in the closest relationship with Britain who always was ready in 
time of need and difficulty. He said: "I and my forebears have been the grateful 
recipients, on innumerable occasions, of that moral and substantial support which 
the British Government in the person of the Viceroy of India has been ever ready 
to afford. 1 am therefore in no way different from my predecessors in owing a 
large debt of gratitude to the Viceroy of India". However, he stood alone among 
the Omani rulers in "experiencing the great honour and pleasure of being able to 
welcome a Viceroy of India in person to Muscat and to express my feelings to him 
face to face". The Sultan said, "I declare that at no time in Muscat history and 
from no viceroy has greater sympathy and kindness been extended to us than by 
this Great Viceroy, Lord Curzon, whom I am privileged to address today"72. The 
Sultan considered himself fortunate in being able to testify before Lord Curzon to 
the reality of his obligations and his sincerity. More than that Faisal said, "I beg 
your Excellency to believe me when I declare that neither I nor my brother nor my 
children should they be called upon to follow after me will ever cease to be 
mindful of that strong and ancient friendship which in time past kept secure the 
bonds of union existing between Great Britain and ourselves, and that we will at 
70. Arch. Eds .• Persian Gulf, pp. 16-17. 
71. Ibid. 
72. Ibid. 
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all time be loyal to those ties"73. The Sultan said he was afraid "that Muskat 
offers few attractions to the experienced traveller, and, except to put our houses 
and highways in order as far as circumstances have permitted and to proclaim a 
general holiday during Your Excellencies' August presence here, there been little 
that it has been possible for us to do in honour of this great occasion. In this 
regard I can only ask Your Excellency to call to mind the sentiments of the poet 
who sang:-'It is not every thing that a man wants that he can achieve; nor can the 
speeding barque command the wind that she listeth'tt. Finally Faisa! hoped that 
Curzon and his "fair and precious Lady, Her Excellency Lady Curzon," would not 
carry away with them from Muscat any but kindly recollections74. Dilks noted 
that "The Sultan made a most favourable impression. He did not plead for any 
further pledge, though he did say that he would gladly invite Britain to assume the 
protectorate. His demeanour was rather that of a loyal feudatory than that of an 
independent sovereign"7S. In his reply to the Sultan's address, Curzon reminded 
him that no fewer than nine treaties had been concluded between Muscat and the 
British Government, which have provided for the closest political and commercial 
relations, for the suppression of the slave trade and piracy, and for the extension 
of the electric telegraph. Curzon repeated what he had said to the British subjects, 
that "Muscat lies just opposite to the shores of India, that its trade is not only for 
the most part with India, but is largely in Indian hands, that a large number of 
British Indian subjects reside here, and that the prosperity of the State [Muscat] is 
mainly dependent on these conditions." So he said "it is not surprising, therfore, 
that the Government of India should feel a particular interest in this particular 
place"76. ''He rejoiced to learn from the Sultan that he and his children would ever 
remain loyal to those strong and ancient obligations", and that to them he said 
"you and they will always remain 10yal"77. "Your Highness has now ruled your 
73. Ibid. 
74. Ibid. 
75. Dilks, Curzon, 2 p. 63. 
76. Curzon's reply to the Sultan, Ibid. 
77. Ibid; The Times, 20 Nov. 1903 .. 
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State for fifteen years. I had the pleasure of visiting it when you had only just 
succeeded fourteen years ago, and I am glad to congratulate Your Highness on the 
progress that has since been made"78. Curzon praised the Sultan for "the wise step 
which the government of India so strongly urged on your Highness a few years 
ago, of taking over the customs of your state in preference to farming them to 
others, has been attended with largely increased profits"79. Curzon praised 
Faisal's permission for laying a telegraphic cable from Jask to Muscat which 
brought Muscat into closer connection with the outer world. Curzon did not 
forget to give Cox another credit in front of the Sultan, ttl also personally selected 
Major Cox, as an Officer in whose discretion and ability I had perfect confidence, 
to represent the Government of India at your capital, and your Highness has 
already assured me that you have found in him a prudent councillor and friend"so. 
With reference to Oman's protection Curzon assured the Sultan "that the British 
Government have extended a peculiar measure of protection in the past to the 
State of Oman and its Rulers. They have on more than one occasion intervened to 
save it from rebellion or disruption. Your Highness may rest assured that this 
policy will not be departed from. So long as the rulers of Oman continue to 
observe their treaty engagements and to administer the State with enlightenment 
and justice they will continue to receive the support of the British 
Government ... "S1. But about the Sultan's subjects Curzon said: "We cannot regard 
with satisfaction the attempts of discontented classes or persons among Your 
Highness's subjects to disturb the tranquillity of your state, because, in so doing, 
not only do they contest Your Highness's authority, but they are apt to injure the 
interests of British subjects also. These interests we are bound to protect for our 
own sake as well as yours"82. Finally Curzon announced to the Sultan "Only 
yesterday I received the gracious permission of His Majesty the King-Emperor to 
78. Curzon's reply to the Sultan, Arch Eds .• Persian Gulf. Vol. V. 1903-1904, p.18. 
79. Ibid. 
80. Ibid. 
81. Ibid; The Times, 20 Nov. 1903. 
82. Ibid. 
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confer upon Your Highness the high honour of the Grand Cross of the Order of 
the Indian Empire. This distinction will be a proof to Your Highness of the 
sincere sentiments of friendship which are entertained towards you by the British 
Government, and it is also a recognition of the loyalty to which Your Highness 
has given such fervent expression on more than one occasion in the course of 
yesterday and today. It will be my pleasing duty as Grand Master of the Order to 
proceed to the due and solemn investiture of your Highness" 83 • 
With this announcement the Darbar was declared closed, and Curzon 
moved to a robing room to prepare for the immediate investiture of the Sultan. A 
few minutes later he returned to the throne on the dais which had been prepared 
on board Argonaut, dressed in his robes of the Grand Master of the Order: "the 
Chapter having been formally opened, the Sultan was conducted before the 
Viceroy with the usual ceremony by the Foreign Secretary and duly invested with 
the Ribbon, Badge, Star, and Collar of the Order"84. 
In the same year, right after Curzon's visit, in December, Muscat received 
a Special British Commissioner of the Commercial Intelligence Committee, Mr H. 
W. Maclean, to make a special report on trade conditions there85• Mr Maclean 
prepared his report in February 1904 after his return to London, and one of the 
interesting elements he reported was the arms and ammunition imports, for which 
he compiled very useful statistics for the years 1896-97 to 1902-386• In 1905 an 
English company The Sponge Exploration Syndicate Ltd obtained from the Sultan 
a fifteen years concession for sponge fishing in the Omani territorial waters87• It 
is obvious that during the early twentieth century, especially between 1900 and 
1905, commercial attitudes dominated the situation, and Muscat witnessed an 
83. Ibid. 
84. Ibid. 
85. F. O. 54/30, B. O. T. to F. 0.,22 Oct 1903; F. O. to B. O. T., 24 Oct 1903; 1. O. to F. 0., 
31 Oct 1903; B. O. T.to 1. 0., 22 Oct 1903; 1. O. to B. O. T., 27 Oct 1903; B. O. T. to F. 
0.,6 Nov. 1903; A. E. Bateman (Commercial Intelligence Committee) to Maclean, 4 
Nov. 1903. 
86. H. W. Maclean, Report on The Condition and Prospects of British Trade in Oman, 
Bahrain, and Arab Ports in the Persian Gulf.[C D 2281], H. M. S. 0., 1904. 
87. Aitchison, Collection, p. 282. 
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essentially commercial competition between France and Britain, represented by 
commercial delegations, reports and agreements. 
Finally, although CUl'ZOn's visit helped to re-establish the British position 
in Muscat after the Baluchistan affair, and assisted Cox's diplomacy at the same 
time, Cox failed in the French flag question which still hung fire and was not yet 
solved. Despite the Sultan's expression of loyalty to the British Government, he 
was not able to convince his people not to use the French flags. So it was not for 
Bombay or Cox nor for the Sultan to solve that problem but a mutually 
satisfactory settlement directly between London and Paris was needed to put an 
end to this long dispute. 
Section Six 
Muscat Arbitration 
France and Britain agreed on 13 October 1904 to refer the flag question to the 
Hague Tribunal. In June 1905 before the Court of Arbitration, they discussed to 
what extent the right to fly the French flag could be granted to certain Omani. 
boats, thereby protecting those boats and their owners in the territorial waters of 
Muscat88• "King Victor Emmanuel, to whom France and England have referred 
the difference with regard to the French right of protection for owners of certain 
native dhows in the Sultanate of Mlllscat has nominated Profesor Lammasch, the 
" well known Austrian Jurisconsult, as supplementary arbitrator 89. On 20 July 
1905 the Hague Tribunal met and discussed the question above. Britain was 
represented by Mr. G. Mounsey, Secretary of the British Legation at the Hague. 
France was represented by M. Maurice Herbette, Secretary of Embassy, and M. 
Laronce, of the French Consular service90• The British case in the Court was that 
granting flags and papers by the French to Omani dhows was, 1, contrary to 
French law; 2, contrary to the Muscat-France Treaty of November 1844; 3, 
88. The Times, 6 May 1905. 
89. The Times, 29 May 1905. 
90. The Times, 20 Jul. 1905. 
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contrary to the clause in the Treaty of Brussels of 2 July 1890 in connection with 
the slave trade owing to the possibility that French protection might facilitate the 
trade, (but it should be noticed that they never made any reference to their arms 
suppression policy in connection with the French flag, the issue which provoked 
the question of the flag); and 4, an infringement of the independence of the rulers 
of Oman. Therefore the British conclusion was that the dhow owners were 
thereby withdrawn from their natural jurisdiction and rendered immune against 
search by Muscat (that is in effect, by British warships). The French reply was 
that, 1, the treaty of 17 November 1844 did not deprive them of that right, but on 
the contrary, granted them the right of protecting the French dhows, and Britain 
acknowledged that right in the case of Zanzibar; 2, the Anglo-French agreement 
of 1 June 1867 forbade the searching on the high seas of vessels flying the French 
flag; 3, the Brussels Treaty had been respected by the French; 4, the Sultan of 
Muscat had acquiesced in the practice in question, and the British were 
continually limiting the authority of the Sultan of Muscat, and trying to secure a 
privileged position for themselves there91• On 26 July 1905 the tribunal met 
again. Professor Lammasch, in his opening speech, referred to the progress 
between nations, and said the French appeal was a column added to the 
construction of the temple dedicated to peace and the community of nations. 
The day before the French presented further conclusions, the Court 
adjourned for one week to allow the British to consult their Government. The 
Court decided that the English and the French languages should be admitted on an 
equal footing in the discussions. On 2 August, M. Herbette submitted the case on 
behalf of his Government. He said that France had only accepted arbitration on 
one condition, that is the presence of the Sultan, and he was surprised to fmd the 
British claimed the Sultan's approval at the British action; he wished to know 
whether there was not any connection between the Sultan's engagement with the 
English defined by the treaty of March 1891, and that last chieftain's policy 
91. The Times, 25 Jul. 1905. 
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towards France. The French delegation asked permission to examine the text of 
the 1891 treaty, so the British reply could be made on the next day. On 3 August 
the British delegate Mr. Ronald Graham. stated that he had no fmthur reply to 
make with reference to the Notes read on the previous day by the French. The 
President of the Court, Prof. I.ammasch, formally closed the proceedings9Z. 
On 9 August 1905 in the Hague~ "the Court decided that as from January 
~. 189~ France has lost the right to authorize subjects of the Sultan of Muscat to 
fly the French flag unless it can be proved that such subjects were considered and 
treated by France as under her special protection before 1863". But the ruling was 
not entirely a defeat for France, as the Court decided, "Native craft (boutres) 
under French protection have within the territorial waters of Muscat the right of 
inviolability secured to them under the treaty of 1844 between France and 
Muscat", but this right is not transferable to other persons or vessels~ not even to 
vessels belonging to the same proprietor. Protected subjects and the crew and 
families on board such craft are not exempt from the jurisdiction of the Sultan of 
Muscat"93. 
Conclusion 
The Hague Arbitration proved that Percy Cox's diplomacy in the matter of the 
French flag had failed, although the Sultan was weak enough to try and persuade 
the Omanis not to use the flag. As shown in Chapter three the French flag 
question had been of major British concern in Muscat since the 189Os, and to find 
a solution soon was in British interests. The previous action by the Sultan in the 
flag matter seems to have been carried out on behalf of the British and not in his 
own interests. Although the British Government was undoubtedly on the winning 
side at the Hague, the French did not lose completely as they still had some 
freedom of action though hedged round with various restrictions. It is also clear 
92. The Times. 2. 3 Aug. 1905. 
93. The Times. 9 Aug. 1905; Award of The Arbitration Tribunal Appointed to Decide on the 
Question of the Grant of the French Flag to Muscat Dhows. [Cd.2736.] H. M. S. 0 .• 1905. 
Writer's emphasis. 
237 
that the British had given up the old policy of' all or nothing', and their willingness 
to allow the French some share of influence indicates a softening towards theM. 
Perhaps the situation in Europe made this change necessary. But in Oman the 
events were developing on a different scale from that of the nineteenth century. 
In fact the Muscat Arbitration closed an old chapter in relations between France 
and Britain. Only one last question still remained without solution. It was the 
arms trafficking, which was not ended before 1914 as will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
By The Hague Agreement, Muscat was to witness subsequently another 
kind of political development. The Sultan's good relations with the British were 
to collapse again, over the question of the arms trade, before finally he 
surrendered, but at the very high price of the 1913-1914 revolution in which the 
whole Albu Saeed rule in Muscat could even have perished, but for the help of 
Great Britain. In any case that brought to Oman an issue which remained 
important from 1912 to the end of the 60s of our century, namely the case of the 
dual Government system, the Imamate of Oman and the Sultanate of Muscat, 
which was to provoke an old religious and political dispute, one which had been 
renewed during the 60s of the last century when Imam Azzan bin kais took over 
(see chapter 3). Only seven years after the Muscat arbitration, the Omanis formed 
a general tribal union and elected their own ImaM. This developed under the 
influence of the Shaikh Hemyar en-Nabhany of the label el-akhdar (descendant of 
an ancient Omani ruling family, namely Banu Nabhan) and then the Chieftain 
Shaikh Eyseh bin Saleh EI-Harhty, whose father was the Sultan's allie (as shown 
in chapter three). It decided to replace the Sultan, and appoint the Imam Salim 
bin-Raashid AI-Kharussy. A case for the next chapter. 
Introduction 
238 
CHAPTER NINE 
THE OMANI REVOLUTION, 1913-14 
In 1912 occurred one of the most significant developments in Oman's history. 
The Omani people, both the Hinawi and Ohafri coalitions, united to elect an 
Imam Thereby they rejected the Sultan's sovereignty over them and thus joined 
in revolting to expel him. The reasons for this step had accumulated over a long 
time. Some of them were historical,- others social and economic, religious and 
political. But the direct reason which ignited the revolution was the establishment 
of a warehouse for arms and ammunition by the Sultan in 1912. This plunged 
Oman into a long civil war from 1913 to 1920. A dispute broke out, this time not 
between the Sultan and mere tribal leaders, or with one of his family but with an 
'elected'Imam. As a result, the Sultan was no longer acknowledged as sovereign 
over most of Oman other than Muscat and Mutrah. But that was not enough for 
the rebels who wanted to expel the Sultan from Muscat, his only remaining place. 
They desired to demolish the whole regime and its constitution as a secular 
Sultanate, and reestablish the religious Imamate over all Oman including Muscat. 
Although that aim was not completely achieved, the issue affected the Omani 
political situation and its international status for more than half a century, until 
1970. Throughout the fIfties and the sixties of the twentieth century the Omani 
people again revolted against the Sultan Sa,eed bin Taimur, Faisal's grandson. 
The Omani case was taken to the Arab League in Cairo and the United Nations in 
New York in a long dispute between the Imamate and its supporters, from several 
international organizatons and countries, and the Sultan and his support, the 
British Government. It is very signifIcant that most of the Omani argument 
concerned this revolution of 1913-14 and its consequences which resulted in the 
1920 Es-sseeb Agreement. However the Es-sseeb Agreement and its effect will 
be considered in the next and concluding chapter. 
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Here we will try to examine the main reasons for the revolution and its far-
reaching implications. We will also consider how far the Germans were involved 
in that conflict, because of its closeness to the world war of 1914, and in turn how 
the British made use of this coincidence. 
First, however, the arms trade will be discussed along with the British 
continued reaction to it, and the local Omani and international connections. 
Section Two 
Muscat and the Arms Traffic 
Two years after the case of Baluchistan in 1898, the trade of arms from Great 
Britain to Muscat saw an increase from 5,435 rifles in 1898 to 13,831 rifles in 
1900, and the total mumber from other sources in 1900-1901, declared by Muscat 
customs, was 25,000. The figure declined to 17,000 between 1901-1902 and even 
more in 1903. But the trade saw again a sharp increase in 1904-1905; rifles 
imported were estimated at not less then 20,000, and in 1906-1907 the number 
reached 44,927, and on to 87,680 in 1907-19081• 
In fact the trade from Muscat to the Persian littoral flourished during and 
after the year 1905-06, from which it seems that all measures taken to suppress the 
trade at the end of the century were not very successful. The British government 
decided to combat the trade by energetic action. "Captain F. McConaghey, 
Assistant Political Agent at Panjgur, was especially deputed to travel through the 
districts interested in the smuggling and to make a thorough investigation of the 
ramifications of the trade"2. Its value was $1,074,380 in 1905-06, against 
$1,664,900 in 1904-1905. This shows a decrease, but that does not mean any 
reduction in the number of articles imported but only a reduction in the current 
prices. That was due to the fall in the market price of a rifle, a matter which 
caused even the arms merchants to ask for a reduction in price for the imported 
arms from the manufacturers. Purshotum, the leading figure in the trade, received 
1. Tuson, British Policy, A4. 
2. Ibid; Arch. Eds., The Persian Gulf, 1905-1906 vol. 6 (1986), p. 2. 
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the following reply from Schwane & Hammer of London, dated 31 August 1906: 
''We are pleased to receive your specification of a further order for in all 500 
rifles, but very much regret to say, that it is quite impossible to do so at lower 
prices than previously' quoted and in fact makers are holding out even for higher 
prices now". So they offered him a price list which they thought very low; "we 
are therefore cabling you the following very lowest prices. 
No.1 H. M. No.5 - 150 Rifles with 28 barrels @ 3819 per rifle including 100 
Cartridges. 
No.2 100 Long Military Maroni Henry Rifles @ 3716 each, including 100 
Cartridges. 
No.3 200 rifles No.2. 25" Barrels, @ 381 each inc. 100 Cartridges. 
" No.4 50 Rifles as sample No.3 ex "Griqua" @ 341 each, inc. 100 Cartridges. In 
respect to that list they stated, "we sincerely hope, that you will after all be able to 
favour us with the order at the above prices. We might perhaps be able to do at a 
little less but only at the cost of quality"3. But on September 14 and 21 they 
suggested some reduction in prices in the above list, and in case of order a deposit 
of 33.1/ 3% should be sent, but Pwrshotum did not confirm the 450 Rifles with 
Cartridges at their price @ 37{3, and a deposit of 33.1/3%. They stated "we 
sincerely hope, that you have not taken objection to our demand of a deposit of 
33.1/ 3% with order and that this is not the main reason of you not having 
conrmned the order." They stated that their works also insisted on their paying 1/3 
of the value of an order on receipt of such an order, and they noted that, "as 
shipping of arms & ammunition to Muscat may at any time be interfered with 
3. Schwarte & Hammer (London) to Purshoturn, (Muscat), 31 Aug. 1906; Schwarte & 
Hammer to Purshoturn, 7 Sep. 1906. Purshotwn Private Papers; Purshoturn dealt with 
other fIrms for anns selling in England as well in Europe, namely: Joseph Winterhoff, 
London; H. Ch. O. Holstein, London; Times. Dharwar & Co., London; Eley Brothers, 
Limited, London; and later in 1907 he tried to communicate directly with the anns 
producers in Birmingham, Clabrough Johnstone, who replied that they already did a large 
trade with Muscat, asked him about the fIrm he did business with in England formerly, 
and about his suggestions for doing business with them. Clabrough Johnstone to 
Purshoturn, 29 Jul. 1907. On the Continent he dealt with: Comptoir national d'Escompte 
de Paris; Moritz Magnus Junr. Hamburg; Ernst Kretzchmar, Berlin; Georg Grotstuck, 
Berlin; August Francotte & Co., Liege; B. D. Zisman, Bucharest. 
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through unforeseen circumstances, we must really be sufficiently protected 
against any eventualities considering the very small margin of profit" 4. But 
Purshotum insisted on a lower price for a rifle of 37/- including 100 cartridge per 
each, and he got it frOm the same Company5. They also offered him cartridges 
which were originally made for the British Government, which then did not 
require them, with a low price of 50/- per 1000 c.ifnet, and the lot of 300 Rifles 
& 30000 Cartridges shipped for him from London in December 1906 by the 
Steamer Edenha1l; the delay in shipment was due to not receiving the deposit on 
the consignment and to a collision in the Thames experienced by the first 
appointed ship Guildhall and therefore a change of ship6. 
By 1906 exports to the Gulf had been maintained, but there were fewer to 
Mekran and the Persian coast during 1905-06. That was due to the patrol 
maintained by the Royal Navy between Muscat and that coast on the watch for 
any smuggling operations by Mghans and others7• 
On 30 November 1906 some Mghans arrived at Muscat, where the arms 
smuggling season had begun. In December the arms trade at the port showed an 
exceedingly large increase in volume. The total value of arms imported stood at 
Rs. 1,685,075 in 1906-07 against Rs. 1,074,380 for 1905-06, an increase of 
610,695, but most of the additional quantity was reexported to the Gulf area. 
Kuwait and Bahrain, for example, received large amounts of rifles and 
ammunition. Large quantities were also reexported to Mekran and the Persian 
coasts. In November 1906 British ships were engaged in checking arms 
4. Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotwn, 14 Sept. 1906; Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotum, 
21 Sept. 1906. Purshotwn Private Papers. 
5. Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotwn, 12 Oct. 1906; Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotwn, 19 
Oct. 1906. 
6. Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotwn, 2 Nov. 1906; Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotwn, 23 
Nov. 1906; Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotum, 7, 21, 28 Dec. 1906; Schwarte & 
Hammer to Purshotum, 21 Dec. 1906; Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotum, 28 Dec. 1906; 
Jones Price & Co. Steam & Sailing Ship and Insurance Brokers, (London) to Schwarte & 
Hammer,20 Dec. 1906; Schwart & Hammer to Dwarkadas Khimjee, 7 Dec. 1906. 
Purshotum Private Papers. 
7. Arch. Eds., Persian Gulf, vol.6, p. 70. 
8. Arch. Eds., Persian Gulf. 1905-1906 vol. 6 (1986), p. 60; F. O. 428/1, 1. O. to F. 0., 11 
Feb. 1907; F. O. 428/1, Extract from 1. O. Memo regarding Muscat Arms Trade, Dec. 
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smuggling by Mghans and Baluchis over to the Mekran coast and searching 
suspect dhows coming from Oman. At first the smugglers found it difficult to 
engage vessels for smuggling purposes in these circumstances. The route from 
Muscat to the Mekran Coast was almost closed. But smuggling resumed as soon 
as the gunboat was withdrawn because her presence was required elsewhere. If 
one of the smugglers succeeded in landing his cargo by one way or another, others 
would have the courage to follow. So the Royal Navy did not have much success 
) 
up to the end of March 1907. The smugglers narrowly escaped capture on two or 
three occasions, but during September and October 1906, about 1,500 rifles with 
large amounts of ammunition were smuggled over the Mekran coast9• But that 
was not all. Themail steamers became involved in the smuggling business to 
Gulf ports under cover of various kinds of lawful merchandise. But how? ''The 
goods [were] not, as a rule, booked by the agents ashore in the ordinary way, but 
taken on board privately and shipped, with the assistance of some ship's official, 
who is well paid for his services, the freight being settled with the commander or 
an officer deputed by bim"lO. It was difficult for the British officials in Muscat to 
suppress smuggling, because of the large share which the trade contributed to the 
income of the Sultan. Despite their awarenss of the trade they did not like to 
breach the cordial relations between them and His Highness. The British agency 
had also doubts whether any abolition, if carried out in Muscat, would afford any 
permanent or effective check to the importation of arms into the various ports 
close by. In the same year Monsierur P. Caracalla of Paris established in Muscat a 
business to be known as the Bazaar Francais, and among other things he 
proposed to deal in armsll. 
However, the arms trade issue started to be more serious during this period 
than it had been in the last century, when only disloyal tribes on the North-West 
1906; Tuson, British Policy, A7. 
9. Arch. Eds., Persian Gulf, vol. 6, p. 60; F. 0.428/1, Grey to Cox, 26 Nov. 1906. 
10. Ibid; F. O. 428/1, Grey to Govt. Ind., 26 Nov. 1906. 
11. Ibid; F. O. 428/1, Extract Memo., Muscat arms, Dec 1906. 
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frontiers had been involved. 
The opening of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of new 
Islamic movements, and the arms trade was to link with them for the first time. It 
is interesting to note that from Muscat Major Grey, the British Agent, wrote to 
Cox, "so far as can be seen into the future, judging particularly by the danger and 
the difficulties caused to the British Empire by the recrudescence of the Pan-
Islamic movement, the advisability of disarming savage and fanatical Moslem 
tribes will increase year by year. I1t He went on, "it is well known that frequent 
communication passes between Turkey and Mghanistan in connection with Pan-
Islamism and the favour with which the Mghan Government looks upon the 
arming of the tribes on the north-west frontier of India has been more than (once) 
hinted at in official reports from that quarter". Grey argued that there was no 
danger in arming the Arabs since the British were profiting so long as the tribes 
were dissatisfied with Turkish rule. But this argument, ifsound at present, which 
was doubtful, Grey said, would only continue to be such so long as Arab dislike of 
Turkish rule was not exceeded by their hatred of Christian interference in their 
affairs. "The agents of Pan-islamism are turning their attention to this very point, 
as I have remarked from a notable publication which has recently fallen into my 
hands, and which I am making the subject of a separate communication." He 
warned, "the danger involved here has to be taken into consideraton"12. The 
Political Agent of Muscat suggested that an arrangement should be made with the 
French, because they were themselves threatened with a fanatical outbreak in 
Morocco, and should be ready to help in limiting the power of Pan-Islamism. 
At the same time the British Agency considered that the increase in the 
importation of arms and ammunition into Muscat would weaken British influence 
at the court of the Sultan, because His Highness became able "to pay a portion of 
his debts, largely owing to the enhanced income obtained from the duty on arms, 
and although an improvement in his financial position will be appreciated by the 
12. F. O. 428/1, Grey to Cox, 26 Nov. 1906. 
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Government of India.. it is obviously better that such improvement should be 
effected with their assistance and with a simultaneous increase of political gain to 
them." So, he suggested that the British position in Muscat would be better if the 
Sultan was granted an" allowance which could compensate for the income which 
he would lose if arms importation into his capital were abolished 13. The question 
of Muscat and the arms trade was to come again to the top of the agenda. On 24 
November Captain Prideaux, the Political Agent in Bahrain, wrote to Cox that 
"arms and ammunition, of the "Martini Muscat" type; are purchased in Muscat 
from M. Goguyer, or from Ratansi Parshotum's [Rutunsee Purshotum] firm, or 
until recently from Saiyid [Seyyed] Yusuf-ez-Zuwawi. The greater number are 
sent to Bahrain in native craft via Doba [Doha] in Katar, but Yusuf-bu-fakhru 
[bin-Fakhru] and Ali-bin Musa are also in the habit of paying visits alternately to 
Muscat and smuggling up consignments probably small in steamers to Bahrain"14. 
The smuggling of arms between Bahrain and Muscat took place in a most 
experienced way, "professional arms-runners [were] shipping the arms in the 
British India steamers under false denomination, or by means of dissimulation in 
spicery, haberdashery, or other general merchandise". The steamship Company 
did not alto gather ignore this practice, but, with a policy of toleration, it 
overlooked it by accepting false names of commodities and mentioning them 
accordingly in the manifest. This was paid for by the smugglers in Muscat, in the 
fonn of a very high rate for the shipment to the steamer company's officers. 
When the lot landed at Bahrain, it cleared customs with the aid of 'Hamal Bashee' 
[porter; Bashee, meaning Lord, is ironic]. The arms, once firm and secured, were 
gradually flltered into Persia by native craft 15. In reaction to the smuggling 
activities betweeen Muscat and Bahrain Captain Prideaux asked the commander 
of H. M. S. Sphinx to examine the cargo and baggage of passengers coming from 
Muscat and Dubai on British steamers for the next week or two. And even if a 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid; F. 0.428/1, Prideaux to Cox, 24 Nov. 1906. 
15. Ibid; F. O. 428/1, M. Heynssens to Cox, 17 Oct. 1906. 
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draw Arabic letters on the rifles. At the same time it seems that the shippers did 
not like to lose their good customer, because they kept on the same old lower 
price of 37/- per rifle, under one condition that the shippers should add also "made 
in Belgiumtt, otherwise the Customs authorities in England would not allow the 
rifles to pass. They would consider the mark to imply English-made rifles20 • 
English rifles were very popular in Oman owing to the workmanship and finish, 
but Belgian rifles had a very large sale because they were cheaper. The French 
and the German were even cheaper: Rs. 35. for the English rifle, Rs. 30, for the 
Belgian, Rs. 18, for the French, and Rs. 15 for the German21• 
Unlike the-previous century, it must now be understood that there were 
more than two nationalities involved in the arms trade. All of them were 
European powers, and Romania joined the arms trade club in Muscat in 1908-09. 
The British arms trade suppression policy became even more difficult and 
complicated, unless all those powers were consulted. This also turned the arms 
issue in the case of Muscat into an international affair. 
In March 1907, the Foreign Office in London suggested to the India Office 
that it should collect infonnation and statistics on the arms trade. That might be 
useful for the Anns Conference which was due to take place in Brussels in the 
following year, 1908. In respect to the Persian Gulf, it was suggested also that 
since Persia was a party to the Brussels Act of 1890, and even if the Persian 
Government would not to be represented at the forthcoming Conference, they 
could be pressed to adhere to its conclusions22• But it is interesting to note that in 
April 1907, the British government decided to remove the restrictions of 1898 to 
which British traders at Muscat were subjected in connection with the sale of arms 
at Muscat23• The question is why the British Government took that step while 
20. Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotum, 26, 28 Feb., 1, 8, 15,22,28 Mar. 1907 Purshotum. 
Private Papers. 
21. Arch. Eds., Persian Gulf, 1907-1908, voL 6, P 88. 
22. F. 0.428/1, F. O. to I. 0., 18 Mar. 1907. 
23. Ibid; F. 0.428/1, I. O. to F. 0., 18 Apr. 1907; I. O. to F. 0.,27 Mar. 1907; Govt Ind. to 
Morley, 21 Feb. 1907; Poe to Adm. and to Govt Ind., 26 Apr. 1906; I. O. to F. 0.,15 
Apr. 1907; C. O. to F. 0., 3 May 1907; Comm. G. Warrender to Adm., 6 Apr. 1907; Cap. 
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they were preparing for the disarmament conference in Brussels. Was it because 
they wanted the British subjects to share some of the trade profit, or because the 
British traders in Muscat started to show some discomfort against the British 
policy, or because Britain feared that the trade would as a whole fall into the 
hands of the French or the Germans instead of the British at Muscat? In a 
memorandum the Foreign Office suggested that while the rules of 1898 were 
"stated to be prejudicially affecting British commerce in other directions, no very 
serious consequences would appeal' to have resulted during the ten years they 
have been in force. . .. Moreover, it appears that British traders manage to evade 
" the restrictions to which they are subject. .. 24. But the British warships went on 
pursuing the Mghan arms runners on the seas especially between Muscat and the 
Baluchi coast2S• But the Mghans found who could help them in Muscat: M. 
Goguyer, an old established French businessman, in Muscat, [since March 1899]. 
Col. C. E. Yate gives this description: "when I was last at Muscat 1902, a French 
trader was established at the place, through whom thousands of rifles and 
thousands of rounds of ammunition were annually imported"26. Goguyer 
encouraged and assisted numerous Mghans in their purchases of arms27. So the 
British Government decided to take action in the matter and communicated with 
the French Government. A French official, M. Lois, said that he would write to 
M. Laronce [at Muscat] and ask for a report on the subject, and promised that he 
would do all in his power to put a stop to M. Goguyer's objectionable activities. 
But M. Lois admitted that in the past M. Goguyer had proved a very difficult 
person to deal with because the latter had supporters in the French Government. 
However the French officals promised to see that everything possible was done to 
meet the wishes of H. M. Government. 
Rickly to Warrender, 3 Apr. 1907; Comm. Hose to Rickly, 12,22 Mar. 1907; Comm. 
James to Rickly, 1 Apr. 1907. 
24. F. O. 428/1, F. O. to I. 0., 15 May 1907. 
25. F. O. 428/1, I. O. to F. 0.,3 Jun. 1907. 
26. Yate, Col. C. E., 'Baluchistan', P. C. A. S., 14 (1906), pp. 1-39. 
27. F. O. 428/1, Grey to Lister, 25 June 1907. 
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By the summer of 19f17, it seems that the arms issue was a serious case not 
only with Great Britain but with most European colonial powers. On 15 July, the 
Germans issued an Imperial Decree, revoking the decree of 27 July 1895, which 
prohibited the export of arms and ammunition to Ethiopia from any part of the 
German Empire28. The British authorities requested from the German 
Government the reasons behind taking this step29. It seems that the Germans were 
annoyed by the arms passing through French territory [in East Africa] but they did 
not explain exactly the original reason for stopping the trade from Germany. 
Their complaint was against France because they informed the British that the 
French should co-operate loyally and thoroughly in checking the arms traffic30• 
The Italians also had some problems with the arms traders and became in 
need of British co-operation. Their Ambassador in London communicated to the 
Foreign Office, that, according to Italian Somaliland reports, an agent of the 
Mullah [tribe?] had gone to Muscat in order to obtain ammunition. The caravans 
of the Mullah then appeared in order to provide themselves with fresh arms and 
ammunition. "The Marquis of San Giuliano would be grateful to Sir E. Grey if he 
would be good enough to have immediate telegraphic instructions given to the 
proper British colonial authorities to exercise the necessary surveillance31" • The 
British Government co-operated in the matter and took action by instructing the 
British Agents in Muscat through the Government of India and infonned the 
Italians about it32• But that was too late. The consulate at Muscat stated that an 
"emissary from the Somaliland Mullah purchased ten months ago in Muscat arms 
to value of 15,000 rupees, which were conveyed in the "Khodra." [Khadrah] dhow 
under the French flag from Sur to Somaliland." It belonged to an Omani Arab, 
Muhammad bin Salim, who was under French Protection, under the agreement of 
28. F. O. 428/1, Count de Salis to Grey, 25 Jul. 1907. 
29. F. 0.428/1, Grey to de Salis, 2 Aug. 1907. 
30. F. 0.428/1, Hohler to Grey, 29 JuI. 1907. 
31. F. O. 428/1, The Marquis eli San Giuliano to Grey, 30 Jul. 1907. 
32. F. O. 428/1, F. O. to C. 0.,31 JuI. 1907; F. O. to I. 0., 31 Jul. 1907; Grey to San 
Giuliano, 2 Aug. 1907; Morley to Govt. Ind., 2 Aug. 1907. 
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1904 and its consequence, the Muscat Arbitration of 1905. The dhow however 
was captured and taken to French Jibuti, but not till after arms were safely 
delivered to agents of the Mullah, in Somalian. 
In August 1907 the Germans requested details from the British 
government in the matter of arms traffic suppression, in order to render possible a 
detailed examination of their own suggested plan before the meeting of the 
Conference. Particularly, that would allow them to decide whether to consider 
such control consistent with the territorial principle, Territorialitatsprinzip, 
carried into execution in the colonies of all the Signatory powers to the Brussels 
General Act34• The Italians wished to know in what sense the French and the 
Germans had replied to the British Government3S• They had already put their 
proposals for the Conference. They stated that large quantities of arms were 
brought into Africa, in ports situated within the actual prohibted zone according to 
the Brussels Act of 1890. The arms came from the west coast of Arabia, the 
Persian Gulf, and Oman. With regard to the arms trafficking they noted that 
Articles 68 and 69 of the General Act bore witness that the Sultan of Oman and 
the Shah of Persia had undertaken to keep an active watch on the west coast of 
Arabia and the Gulf in order to prevent the Slave trade. But did that relate to the 
arms trade? The Italians found that both Turkey and Persia had signed and 
ratified the Brussels Act of 1890, recognizing the necessity of preventing Africans 
from procuring arms, and it was further in their interest that their subjects in Asia 
should be unable to arm themselves to damage the sovereign Power. Therefore, 
they suggested that the next conference should extend the prohibition of arms 
importation to include not only the whole of Africa, but the Red Sea, and the 
Persian Gulf region36. But the British did not wait till the conference; they fully 
co-operated with the Italians to suppress the arms traffic by the Somalis from 
33. F. O. 428/1, Govt. Ind. to Morley, 4 Aug. 1907. 
34. F. 0.428/1, Mettemich to Grey, 5 Aug. 1907. 
35. F. O. 428/1, San Giuliano to Grey, 6 Aug. 1907. 
36. F. O. 428/1, Memo. on Italian Govt. proposals for Brussels Act revision regarding 
Africa's Arms traffic, referring to British Note of 28 Mar. 1907. 
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Oman with the help of the Sultan of Muscat. but this was not easy37. 
By November 1907 the British Government started to raise a strong alarm 
about the danger to British interests caused by the traffic in arms in Muscat. so 
that British firms shoUld take an appreciable part in the arms suppression. But 
they believed that no remedy could be found unless; 1- the Sultan agreed to 
impose restrictions on arms importation into his dominions. 2- "No steps in this 
direction can be taken without the consent of the French and other foreign 
governments, with whose rights under their Commercial Treaties such restriction 
would be inconsistent". During September, for example, 10,000 rifles and 
7,000,000 cartridges were shipped to Muscat from the U.K. alone38. The flow of 
arms to Baluchistan, despite all measures taken, did not stop. It continued to 
average 200 rifles weekly39. 
However from the summer of 1907 Britain, in addition to its own effort at 
arms suppression, added another additional task, on behalf of the Italians, to be 
carried out in Oman. It caused great irritation to the Omanis against the British 
and the Sultan. It was not yet known what the Italians would pay for that service. 
By December 1907 the Italians became more confident and went even further in 
their demands, and proposed checking arms trafficking in Muscat directly 
themselves40• In December the Foreign Office in London suggested to the India 
Office that it would be advisable to communicate with the French, German, and 
Italian Ambassadors in London in order to establish the basis for an informal 
preliminary discussion. They suggested an early date in February 1908 between 
Their Excellencies and representatives of the India Office, the Colonial Office, 
and the Foreign Office. That would enable the four Powers to enter the 
Conference with a more or less unanimous policy41. In the same month it was 
37. F. 0.428/1, F. O. to C. 0.,26 Aug. 1907; F. O. to 1. 0.,26 Aug. 1907; 1. O. to F. 0., 30 
Sep. 1907; Govt. Iod. to Morley, 27 Sep. 1907; 1. O. to F. 0., 14 Oct. 1907. 
38. F. O. 428/1, 1. O. to F. 0.,26 Nov. 1907. 
39. F. 0.428/1,1. O. to F. 0.,3 Dec. 1907. 
40. F. O. 428/1, Morley to Govt. Ind., 20 Dec. 1907. 
41. F. 0.428/1, F. O. to 1. 0.,7 Dec. 1907; C. O. to F. 0.,17 Dec. 1907. 
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proposed that information should be obtained with respect to arms and 
ammunition statistics, and for the import duties imposed from 1889- 1906. This 
was needed for the conference which was due to meet in April 190842. 
The preparation for the arms suppression conference made the arms 
suppliers aware of the consequences. On 24 January 1908 Schwane & Hammer 
of London wrote to Purshotum ''We understand that there are some negotiations 
amongst the governments to regulate the trade of arms & ammunitions to Muscat 
etc., but nothing definite has been decided. We shall of course be on the 'look out' 
& we will inform you as soon as something has been decided. We only hope 
however, it will not be stopped & that the business between us does not come to 
an end"43. On 31 January Hammer noted to Purshotum that "As regard the 
negotiation of the various governments on the relation of the arms- trade, it is very 
difficult to obtain any information on this side as we understand the actual 
negotiations are taking place at Muscat amongst the various consuls, and you 
should therefore be better able to hear, what the result will be. We only hope 
however that importation of arms and ammunition at Muscat will not be seriously 
interfered with, and that you will soon be able to send your further order"44. In 
March Hammer wrote that it was "very difficult to obtain any further information 
here about the conference relating to any restriction in the trade of arms and 
ammunition to Muscat and we do not think that anything defnite has so far been 
arranged. The general opinion here is that the native firms over there are more 
frightened about this than the European dealers but it is just possible that the 
importation will perhaps be somewhat restricted as the governments cannot of 
course prevent the Sultan of Muscat to import AnTIs etc. altogether. We think 
you should be able, to get better information over there than from here. In any 
case it would be best to place only smaller Orders as long as this question is not 
42. F. 0.428/1, Grey to Cave, 31 Dec. 1907. 
43. Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotum, 24 Jan. 1908. 
44. Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotum, 31 Jan. 1908. 
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finally settled"4s. In March. in another letter. Hammer informed PurshotuID that 
the "governments have dropped the intention of a conference and that the business 
will be allowed to go on as before"46. But it seems he was not quite sure of that. 
On 16 April Hammer "asked PurshotuID to ascertain from the officials in Muscat 
"whether according to the present regulations with the Sultan of Muscat any 
foreign Government ~ interfere in the importation of arms in Muscat." Hammer 
went on " -We here cannot really think that the Government can do so without at 
first giving sufficient time of notice. At all events in such case." he said. "they 
will we should think have to allow the landing of any parcels which are shipped 
and as it will surely take some time before any definite agreement between the 
Governments has been arrived at. we should say there would be not much risk: to 
order in small parcels, so as to get at least a few hundreds rifles imported before 
any restriction takes place. If you can cable us an Order for say 200 or 300 Rifles, 
we think they can be shipped within about 6 weeks after receipt of Order, but for 
any fresh Order we must have a cash deposit of 1/3 of the whole amount, before 
we can proceed with the same and the balance must be paid immediately after we 
cable shipment, as we could not take the Rifles & Cartridges back if once 
shipped"47. 
Section Three 
The Muscat Case at the Brussels Conference, 1908 
The Arms conference opened on 28 April 1908. The British delegation consisted 
of Sir A. Hardinge, Mr. Walrond Oark, and Mr. Read of the Colonial Office, with 
Captain Bowman, R. N. as technical delegate48• 
It was suggested that the arms trafficking could be taken under four main 
heads: increasing duty, extension of zones of prohibition, establishment of 
45. Schwane & Hammer to Purshotum, -- March 1908. (number of day illegible) 
46. Schwane & Hammer to Purshotum, 27 Mar. 1908. 
47. Schwane & Hammer to Purshotwn, 16 Apr. 1908. 
48. F. O. Coni. Print on the Brussels Conf., (9406) Memo. on Arms Traffic, Mar. 1909, p. 4. 
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international control. sanctions49• On 2 May. the Italians submitted at 
considerable length their proposals to extend the new regime. to be established by 
the conference. for anns prohibition to include the entire African continent. as 
well as Arabia and the Persian Gulf. The British accepted part of that proposal 
but refused another pan, and the inclusion of the Persian Gulf. Sir A. Hardinge 
replied to a request by several delegates for an explanation of the British reasons 
for restricting the zone only to Arabia. the Red Sea and the Hadramaut coasts 
when the British themselves originally contemplated extending it to the Persian 
Gulf. He said. "we had. however. come after fuller consideration. to the 
conclusion that it would be better to be content with a more moderate programme, 
comprising, for instance. the mere grant to the Sultan of Muscat of a freer hand in 
checking the arms traffic. partly because of the primitive organizaton of some of 
the Arab States of the Gulf, such as Oman and the territories of the Trucial Chiefs, 
and their lack of administrative machinery essential to the effective application of 
all proposed measures, and partly on account of the probability that certain 
Powers whose commercial interests deserved consideration would be less likely to 
accept increased restrictions if the zone to which they were to apply were made a 
very wide one "so. 
On the commercial side the arms traders were following the conference 
news. On 8th May 1908 Hammer enclosed a cutting from a London paper, dated 
7/5/1908, with reference to the Brussels conference, which does not seem to 
mention Muscat arms trafficking at all but only Africa. Hammer did not know if 
that touched also the importation at Muscat but he heard that orders had been 
received again recently from Muscat; therefore, he hoped that Purshotum would 
also soon be able to make a fresh order on the same terms as before51• On 12 May 
Hammer still wished to be certain whether there would be any risk to export arms 
49. F. 0.428/2, British Plenipotentiaries at Brussels to Grey, 28 Apr. 1908; 1. O. to F. 0., 28 
Apr. 1908; Customs to F. 0., 28 Apr. 1908. 
50. F. O. 428/2, Plenipotentiaries to Grey, 2 May 1908; Hardinge to Grey, 9 May 1908. 
51. Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotum, 8 May 1908. 
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to MuscatS2• 
At the Conference it is interesting to note that on 13 May 1908, the British 
Government faced criticism over their new and inconsistent stand over the arms 
trafficking. The Ottoman Charge d'Affaires opened the proceedings by reading a 
declaration in which he emphasized the importance attached by his government to 
extending the prohibition zone to the Persian Gulf, asking the British to explain 
more fully the reasons why H. M. Government, after having originally favoured 
this extension, had now changed their mind. Hardinge replied that H. M. 
Government was absolutely at one with those of Italy and Turkey in desiring to 
eradicate the arms trade on the coast of Persia and Arabia. But he said that "any 
extension to the Persian Gulf of the zone of prohibition would be futile unless it 
embraced Muscat, and that the peculiar political and commercial conditions 
prevailing in that state made it easier to deal with the evil there by circuitous than 
by direct measures". He added, "to call on the Sultan to adhere to the application 
to his dominions of the prohibition clauses of the Brussels Act would, in view of 
the decrease in his revenue and increase in his expenditure entailed by it, of the 
commercial interests of his Arab subjects and of foreign merchants, the former of 
whom were only under imperfect control, and of the perpetual and inelastic 
character of the prohibition, place him in a situation of some difficulty". The 
treaty powers, he said, should authorize the Sultan to take measures to suppress 
arms trafficking, as he deemed possible on his own initiative, or allow him to 
increase his duties on other articles as compensation. He suggested giving the 
Sultan the power to hold out to his own people the prospect that restrictions 
imposed by him, emanating from his personal decision and not from an external 
international authority might be subject to subsequent revision. The conference 
then called for the opinions of the delegates. "The Germans were in favour of 
widest possible extension of the zone; the Spaniards were prepared to agree to any 
extension in Arabia which commended itself to Great Britain or Italy; the Congo, 
52. Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotum, 12 May 1908. 
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the U. S. A., the Portuguese and the Netherlands Delegates were of the same 
opinion". So also were the Belgians who would acquiesce in any conciliatory 
compromise. The French were unable to view with favour any extension of the 
zone but they promlsed to report to their governemnt the new measures 
proposeds3• 
However, it is interesting to note that the German. French and British 
stands about the prohibition zone extension became very similar. The French 
Government would not approve the extension of the prohibition zone to involve 
the Persian Gulf. The Germans qualified their acceptance of the extended zone by 
stating that it was conditional on its coincidence with the narrower British rather 
than with the wider Italian one proposed. But for Britain this stand alone, at least 
as far as the French were concerned. was not enough, unless France and other 
treaty powers agreed to amend their treaty with Muscat. That alone would help to 
allow the Sultan to take his measures to check the arms trafficking. Otherwise 
even this positive stand from the Germans and the French regarding the question 
would not help to suppress the arms trade. However it is interesting that the 
Italians were more close to Britain in this matter before the conference than they 
became during it. It became clear to the British that the Italian proposal of 
prohibition zone extension would allow other European powers to interfere in 
their sphere of influence. It was a British interest to keep the other powers away 
from fonning policy in the Gulf. That made them prepared to deal with the arms 
trade by themselves despite all the consequences. So it was not the will of the 
Sultan of Muscat which the British defended, since the Sultan himself, except for 
raising duty during 1893 (see Ch. 5), never took any initiatives regarding the arms 
trafficking. They were taken by the British Government of India. The Sultan, 
who had a direct interest in the arms trafficking, was not represented at the 
conference, and it is not clear whether he had any say about it. His Highness 
found arms restrictive measures distasteful to him, but he always could be 
53. F. 0.428/2, British Plens. to Grey, 14 May 1908. 
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persuaded to do all that was needed in the way of repression54. But there is a 
question which still needs an answer. If that was the British position, then why 
were they one of the countries most enthusiastic for this conference to be held? It 
was advantageous to be close to other powers, watching their thoughts and 
therefore making it possible to take further steps on the spot, where easy 
communication with others was available. But the main point may be that the 
British did not at fIrst discover the possibility of an international involvement in 
the Persian Gulf affairs through the arms traffIc question. Even if they were 
aware, they were in need of an international stand on a basis which they had 
designed. But one has to ask what did remain of that desire? Britain had already 
exercized full influence on the Persian Gulf without need of any international 
acknowledgement. It had already initiated the arms suppression policy in the 
region, and already the Indian Army had established a station in Muscat in 190555. 
The answer is that Britain desired to establish an international acknowledgement 
of her excercising influence not only in the question of arms, but over the whole 
policy which she alone could carry out with very limited international 
interference. This also would grant the British Government the power, in the face 
of the local chiefs and the Sultan of Muscat, of acting on behalf not only of the 
British interest but now also, of an international interest. At the same time, they 
could possibly put the French into a diffIcult position if they were the only power 
refusing the international will. France was the only power which could spoil any 
step concerning Muscat in opposition to Great Britain. Why? Because it was 
only these two countries who had declared themselves as respecting the 
independence of Muscat in 1862. So one of the main aims of the British in 
Brussels was to keep France's position in Muscat under control. 
At the close of the 20 May meeting, the Italian minister informed Sir 
Arthur Hardinge confIdentially that he had been authorized to abandon the 
54. F. O. 428/2, Memo. by I. 0., 21 May 1908. 
55. Lorimer, Gazetteer, p. 395. 
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proposal to include Muscat and the Persian Gulf in the extended zone, if the 
British were willing to include Egypt and Tripoli within the extended zone. 
Hardinge replied that the British Government were considering this pointS6. 
On the busineSs side Purshotum, in a letter to Moriz Magnus Junr., a 
French firm dealing with arms, expressed his fear about the conference's results, 
and what seems to have been his fear about the British Government's desire with 
regard to the trade. The firm replied ''We have carefully noted what you are 
writing about the conference held in this moment in Belgium, but we rather think 
your apprehensions are going too far. There are so many interests connected to 
the Arms Trade, & English are to [sic] good businessmen, as to spoil this 
important commerce of which even their subjects are taking profit of in a 
considerable manner"S7. Hammer however expressed his fear of sending arms to 
Muscat until the situation became clears8• 
On 27 May, however, Sir Arthur Hardinge "proceeded to read the inclosed 
draft article which he had prepared for dealing with the question of the arms 
traffic at Muscat, and suggested that the conference should resolve itself into a 
Committee to discuss it". He also explained the nature of the commercial treaties 
between Muscat and the five powers directly interested in the matter, with respect 
to the trade and the duties imposed. The Dutch, one of the five powers having 
treaties with Muscat, suggested that a clause should be added to the British draft 
article, to prevent the Sultan of Muscat from granting in the future to some Power, 
perhaps not a Signatory of the Brussels Act (Japan, for example),a right to trade in 
arms. Hardinge expressed his willingness to accept an amendment to that effect. 
But the French regarded such a step as premature and could not agree to it. 
However, the arms question seemed to produce a good deal of desultory 
conversation which resulted in the establishment of a sub-committee, but no date 
was fixed for its meeting. The conference however spent several weeks without 
56. F. O. 428/2, Hardinge to Grey, 20 May 1908; Hardinge to Grey, 23 May 1908. 
57. Moritz Magnus Junr. to Purshotum, 22 May 1908. 
58. Hammer to Purshotum, 26 June 1908. 
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coming to any very definite conclusions. The French delegation were asked by 
the President whether they could be ready to take part in the discussion on the 
subject of Muscat. Their reply was that they were not able to express any opinion 
on the subject, or even'to say whether at any time they could join in the discussion 
of the question. The French, as they explained, "found themselves much 
embarrassed, in face of the statements which had been made by the Italians and 
British delegations to the effect that they considered the question of the extension 
of the zone to the Arabian shore of the Red Sea and of the regulation of the arms 
traffic at Muscat as inseparable from any other measures which might be decided 
on"S9. 
On 3 June 1908, the Netherlands and the USA gave Great Britain the offer 
it was waiting for. The first were prepared to grant to the Sultan of Muscat full 
liberty to deal with the arms traffic, provided that the other Powers having treaties 
with him concurred. The second declared to the same effect. This agreement of 
three powers out of four having treaties with Muscat, satisfied the President of the 
Conference. He asked the French whether they were yet in a position to express 
their views, but they delayed their answer until the next sitting60. However, on the 
. same day, the French informed the British that they were not authorized to discuss 
the question of Muscat in the Conference. But that did not mean they would not 
talk it over privately, not only with the British delegates but also top officials from 
both the British and the French Governments, though not in Brussels. For the 
British it became quite clear that the object of the French Government was to 
shelve the whole question without appearing openly to do so. So, the French did 
not discuss the Muscat question. 
There was fear of the conference on the commercial side, and on 12 and 26 
June Schwane & Hammer said to Purshotum that they could not book any orders 
for arms to Muscat; "unless you can make sure that you will have no difficulties 
59. F. 0.42812. Hardinge to Grey. 27 May 1908; British Plens. to Grey, 27 May 1908. 
60. F. o. 42812. Hardinge to Grey, 3 JWle 1908. 
259 
and risk in getting Rifles and Cartridges landed, then we are afraid, there will be 
no fresh business until this question has been finally settled". But he went on by 
saying "We understand however that orders for cartridges had been placed during 
the last few weeks for Muscat so that other houses appear to take the risk of 
having these delivered at Muscat without difficulty"61. But despite that the arms 
traffic increased in Muscat via other firms. 
On the diplomatic front it became clear to the British that the question of 
Muscat should be tackled via diplomatic channels but it became highly 
undesirable to continue by that method at the conference. The British became 
very concerned because the arms trade grew constantly at Muscat, which could 
cause danger to British India. At the same time, its value also grew, adding to the 
price which the French would ask the British Government for buying them out62• 
However as the question became more complicated the French seemed to soften 
their position and to be willing to discuss the Muscat arms question privately in 
Brussels with the British delegation. It was a good opportunity for the British 
Government, since the time was most significant. They agreed that an arrangment 
should be made to suit the interests of delegates from both countries. They should 
be given power to negotiate, since they had the benefit of expert advice and were 
conversant with all the details. At the same time the British should express in a 
friendly way and in confidence on behalf ofH. M. Government, that, "as the tribes 
on the Indian north-west frontier obtain supplies of arms from Muscat, and are 
thereby enabled to maintain incessant warfare against the Government of India, a 
most unfortunate effect would be produced here should it become generally 
known that France alone among the Powers represented at the Conference 
prevents the closing of the Muscat arms traffic. The Delegates of all the other 
Powers which possess Treaty rights with Muscat have consented to their being 
abrogated in so far as is necessary in order to secure that the arms traffic shall be 
61. Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotum 12,26 June 1908. 
62. F. 0.428/2, Hardinge to Grey, 5 June 1908; British Plens. to Grey, 4 June 1908. 
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stopped"63. 
However, the British delegate seemed to offer the French a compensation 
in money for any loss which might occur to their arms trade. It is surprising and 
interesting that unexpected matters between France and Britain in the question of 
Muscat were also discussed. One matter far exceeded the scope of the arms trade. 
On June 11, 1908 Hardinge, sent a telegram to Grey. ''The French delegation, 
whom we saw yesterday, refuse all money compensation, but in return for Gambia 
they offer to hand over Muscat to us in the same manner as we have given them 
Madagascar, Tunis, and to give us everything we want in regard to the zone". It 
was also reported that "the French Delegates added, and we believe correctly, that 
the conference must otherwise be a failure as far as France was concemed"64. But 
how serious were the French in the question of Muscat? Another interesting letter 
on the same date, sent to Sir E. Grey by the British Plenipotentiaries, made the 
points of the French stand in the question of Muscat very clear. They said that M. 
Lecomte, the head of the French Delegation, "proceeded in reply to certain 
questions by Sir Arthur Hardinge, to suggest that the "contre-partie" might be 
cession of the Gambia colony in return for her abandonment of the declaration of 
1862, under which both Governments agreed to maintain the independence of the 
Albusaidi dynasty in Oman and Zanzibar." They assured him that "if England 
would give France the Gambia, France would withdraw over the independece, 
guaranteed by her in 1862, of the Sultan of Muscat, and would give us a free hand 
in that state-in other words , the French proposed that, in return for our surrender 
of the Gambia, they should cancel the Declaration of 1862 and let us do what we 
like in Oman"6S. If that was true it would be a most significant and surprising 
stand on the part of France, which for half a century had stood on the necessity of 
preserving the independence of Oman. However, the Conference failed to reach a 
63. F. O. 428/2. Grey to F. Bertie. 11 June 1908; Bertie to Grey. 12 June 1908. 
64. F. 0.428/2. Hardinge to Grey, 17 June 1908. 
65. F. 0.428/2, British Plens. to Grey, 17 June 1908; Memo by the British Plens., 17 June 
1908. 
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general agreement in regard to the extension of the prohibition zone which could 
reach to the Persian Gu1f66. Britain seemed to gain a lot from the conference, and 
the new French stand towards the British position in Muscat was interesting. For 
the British it was most significant and of great interest, not only for the arms 
suppression but for their ascendancy over the Gulf in general. 
A Memorandum prepared by the British delegation to Brussels on 22 June 
1908 considered that the French abandonment of their position on Muscat 
independence was just what was needed. That would allow the British, as the 
Memorandum put it, "to establish a Protectorate or indeed, direct political control 
over the Sultan of Oman; and they would further agree to the zone of prohibition 
for the traffic in arms and ammunition being extended along the shores of Arabia 
as far as the southern limit of Muscat". The memorandum went on: "it is hardly 
necessary here to expatiate on the importance which has long been attached - and 
at no time, perhaps, more than of recent years - to the maintenance of British 
ascendancy in the Persian Gulf," and according to the sub-committee of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, Muscat occupied a commanding position at the 
entrance to the Gulf. "Indeed, so important is Muscat that it may be said that, 
while without it, it would be impossible to keep our hold on the Gulf, with it the 
control of the Gulf would cease to be so absolutely necessary to us as has hitherto 
been the case. Even apart, however, from its high value as a political asset, 
Muscat is far from being worthless from an economic point of view". Muscat 
possessed an excellent harbour, and its trade amounted in 1905-6 to 550,OOOL. It 
should grow enormously once the political conditions were stable, and 83%. of its 
trade was with England and India, and 92%. of shipping was British. The 
influence which the French once had in Muscat appeared to be coming to an end. 
Britain had no fear of any other power in Muscat, since their agreements were of a 
purely commercial nature. The Memorandum said "Once, therefore we were free 
so far as France was concerned, it would be possible for us to get the Sultan to 
66. Arch. Eds., 1986, Persian Gulf, Vol. 6, P 76. 
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sign an Agreement to the effect that he would place his foreign relations in our 
hands and so prevent any other country from establishing a footing in the place." 
The memorandum. was aware of the potentially dangerous Italian ambition to 
establish a consulate at Muscat. That project, however, was abandoned after a 
friendly British appeal. But a far more serious danger which threatened British 
influence was German ambition. ''The German Government has recently 
displayed a desire to play a role in the Persian Gulf, no doubt in connection with 
their Bagdad Railway." How did that relate to Muscat? The Memorandum. replied 
that the Germans had "already subsidized a line of steamers to Bushire, which 
calls at Muscat, and at any moment we may be confronted with the fact of a 
German demand for the establishment of Consular relations with Muscat, a step 
which would only too probably lead to the Germans proceeding to try and playa 
role in the politics of Arabia." 
As far as the the anns traffic was concerned the French offer to the British 
would provide "the inclusion of the Arabian coast as far as the frontier [writer's 
emphasis] of Muscat in the zone of prohibition, which, it may be observed, is also 
the second of the two items in the British programme of the Arms Conference to 
which the chief importance is attached, the first being the placing of the Sultan of 
Muscat in such a position as will enable him to prohibit the importation of arms 
and ammunition into his dominions." The French, if they agreed to the inclusion 
of the Arabian coast within the prohibition zone, would be bound to prevent the 
export of anns from Jibuti. Therefore, the trade would disappear, since there was 
no longer any port in the neighbourhood to which anns legitimately could be 
exported. Consequently any vessel carrying anns within the zone, could be 
regarded as guilty of smuggling. 
However the Memorandum. then came to the crucial point concerning what 
the British would give up in the case of Gambia against what the French would 
give up in Oman. "There is still one more objection to the proposed bargain 
which remains to be considered. It is this: that whereas the French would be 
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giving us only certain intangible rights, we on our side should be giving them a 
real tangible property". It went on, "but this objection seems rather specious than 
real. It is easy to conceive of a case in which a mere right would be of much more 
value than an actual property. It might, for instance, be well worth a landowner's 
while to surrender a considerable farm for the purpose of extinguishing a right of 
a way under his drawing-room windows". So what was the "landowner's" purpose 
as regards Muscat? The Memorandum said, "by taking advantage of the French 
withdrawal from Muscat to obtain from the Sultan, as part of the arrangement we 
should conclude with him, a perpetual lease of Ras Musandum, [on the Strait of 
Hormuz] to the possession of which the Government of India have always 
attached great importance, but which we have hitherto been prevented from 
acquiring by the existence of the Anglo- French Guarantee of Independence [of 
Muscat] of 1862. "The Memorandum concluded that such an arrangement with 
the French would follow up the policy which the British Government for some 
time past had been pursuing. It would remove all possible friction between the 
two countries. "Muscat is a thorn in our flesh; the Gambia in that of France- they 
would both be got rid of. The regularization of our position at Muscat by means 
of an agreement with the French would, moreover, form a very suitable corollary 
to the recent regularization of our position in Persia by means of an Agreement 
with Russia." The Memo. urged!. that agreement with France was of great 
necessity, otherwise the arms smuggling to the north west frontiers from Muscat 
and from Jibuty would continue67• 
However, the Arms Conference in Brussels adjourned on 22 July till 24 
November, and no significant measures were taken in respect to Muscat Even 
before that took place the business community expressed their pleasure. On 17 
July Hammer wrote to Purshotum that the conference had not taken any defmite 
descision so "In the meantime we hear that other houses still continue to ship arms 
and ammunition to Muscat so that apparently the risk cannot be so very great. We 
67. F. O. 428/2, Memo. by the British Plens., 22 June 1908. 
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however cannot take upon overselves any risk whatever considering the small 
profit on these transactions but sincerely hope that you will after all be able to 
send us some fresh orders1t6l:. But Moritz Magnus was absolutely happy for the 
end of the conference, and was more optimistic. On the same date he wrote to 
Purshotum: ''The only object of the present lines is to be the bearer of the good 
news, that according to a telegram received to-day from our representative at 
Brussels. the Gun-Trade-Conference was adjoum~ as officially advertised until 
automn [sic] next, but as we think to an undefinite period." He said ''Let us hope, 
they will. never meet again!, 
'We are convinced this news will be very welcome to you, & that on the 
other hand it will animate business by relieving all anxieties & pacifying [sic] the 
market"69• It was suggested that the conference would be resumed in November 
but on 10 and 20 November Count De Lalaing suggested that the Conference 
should be postponed until 16 March 19097°. Moritz Magnus commented 'We 
hope that the market in Arms will revive soon again and anticipating your further 
agreeable news"71. 
Section Four 
Arms Traffic: Developments in the Gulf 
While the Arms Conference was taking place in Brussels, the situation started to 
heat up, and serious developments took place in the Persian Gulf. In reaction to 
the British measures of suppression in 1908 the gun runners seemed to adopt a 
new method. Between 18 and 20 April, for the frrst time, fighting broke out 
between the British seamen of the cruiser Proserpine, who were on checking duty, 
and the Afghan gun runners. 'During the encounter one Blue jacket was mortally 
and another dangerously wounded, and the officer in charge had 
68. Schwarte & Hammer to Purshotwn, 17 July 1908. 
69. Moritz Magnus Junr. to Purshotum, 17 July 1908. Purshotum Private Papers. 
70. F. O. Coni. Print on Brussels Coni .• March 1909, (9406) Memo on Anns traffic; (9092) 
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narrowly escaped". It was not stated how many of the gun runners were killed or 
wounded. However, their dhow containing anns, mostly of French manufacture, 
was captured. On the 19th, shots were fired on the British seamen near the shore 
of Persia in Banji, north of Jasl4 from the beach under the shelter of sand hills and 
palm trees along the half-mile front. The British crew were ordered to return to 
their boats, and as they were pulling back one British rating was shot dead. In 
further fighting between the British ships and the shore, Lieutenant Hamilton's 
arm was wounded, and another rating was killed by a shot through his lungs72• 
The Times commented that, "the gun running in the Persian Gulf and the adjacent 
coasts seems to have more connexion with the interminable raids on the Indian 
North-West Frontiers than most people are aware of. If the gun runners were to 
rely on their ability to hold their own, and keep to the Persian and Afghan sides of 
the frontier line, it is difficult to see what preventive measures we could take". 
The Times suggested that it was "desirable to try to anticipate anns runners by 
additional cruisers along the coast rather than wait till they are lost in the 
wilderness of the interior of East Persia"73. 
The events on the Gulf waters were reflected in House of Commons debates. On 
29 July 1908, Mr Rees asked "whether the India Office had information to the 
effect that another large caravan of arms was in transit through Persian 
Baluchistan to the Afghan frontier; and whether it was proposed, by strengthening 
our patrol in the Persian Gulf, or by representation to the Sultan of Muscat, to deal 
with a state of affairs which was a menace to the North-West Frontier?" The 
Junior Minister at the India Office, Mr. T. Buchanan, answered the first question 
in the negative. He said "the last caravan of which the Secretary of State has 
information must have reached its destination some weeks ago. Every possible 
means is taken by action on the coast and otherwise to stop the traffic, and as was 
stated by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on June 30, the question of the 
72. The Times. 11, 19 May 1908. 
73. The Times, 23 May 1908. 
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traffic at Muscat is engaging the attention of the Conference now sitting at 
Brussels" . 
The gun running in the Persian Gulf, however, did not stop. The result of 
the successful smuggling of rifles and ammunition from the Persian Gulf was that 
prices had fallen remarkably in the towns of Mghanistan. The Times warned that 
the continuance of gun running would mean a fonnidable increase in the offensive 
strength of the Mghan nation in a few years74~ Throughout 1908 and 1909, gun 
smuggling went on, despite all measures taken by the British cruisers, and "private 
advice has been received from the Indian North-West Frontier, according to which 
the import of arms and ammunition from the Persian Gulf into the Mghan border 
is assuming such proportions that it is felt on the frontier that strong measures 
must be taken ... ". That brought the situation under official consideration 75. 
However the failure of the Brussels Conference to achieve any definite result, as 
was mentioned above, made the British Government take immediate steps. This 
made the government think of instituting more rigorous measures to prevent arms 
being imported into Asia by the Persian Gulf. The Times expected an increase in 
counter-activities, at an early date, as a result of discussion between the Home 
Government and the Government of India. It was expected that naval movements 
would have for their object the strengthening of the Persian Gulf patrol. Measures 
were also expected to protect the British Consulates and the telegraph stations on 
the Gulf Coast in case attempts to stop the importation of arms should give rise to 
excitement among the native population76. 
On 4 March 1910, in the House of Commons, Mr Rees asked the Under-
Secretary for India, "whether much of the ammunition shipped from Europe and 
from Muscat to Mekran coast of the Persian Gulf consisted of cartridges with 
expanding bullets; and if so, whether steps could be taken to check the export of 
such cartridges, the use of which was forbidden to our soldiers, upon whom they 
74. The Times, 29, 3IJuly 1908. 
75. The Times, 16,29 Mar.; 7 Oct. 1909. 
76. The Times, 18, 19,26 Jan. 1910. 
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would be used in the event of any disttJrbance on the North-West Frontier?" Mr E. 
Montagu replied that a "very small portion of the ammunition captured has been 
found to consist of cartridges with expanding bullets~" but he said ''I fear that it is 
not practicable to check the e~ but every possible precaution is taken to 
prevent them reaching their destination'·. On the same da.te~ there was some 
related concern among members of the Commons about the German Baghdad 
railway project expressed in questions to the Secretary of State, Sir E. Grey'TT .. 
On 2 November 1910, however, another fight took place in the waters of 
the Persian Gulf between the gun runners and ships of the East Indies squadron, 
patrolling the Gulf. A landing party from H. M. S. Proserpine was attacked by 
Mghans at Bris, more than 400 miles from Lingah, and two British officers were 
wounded. But more serious fighting took place at Dubai on the Omani coast, 
between the British seamen and Arab natives on the 24th, in which four Britons 
were killed. one was missing, and nine were wounded. Forty native persons were 
killed and wounded. This was a very dangerous and serious event. Major Cox, 
the Political Resident, did not rely completely on the reports he received. but he 
himself sailed to Dubai on 27 December with Rear Admiral Slade, on the cruiser 
H. M. S. Hyacinth to form an estimate of the situation78• So, the gun suppression 
business seemed to create another episode of frontier expansion for Great Britain 
not only with the Mghanis but with the Persians and Arabs of the Gulf. The 
conditions there grew even worse. Gun runners in the north and south of Shiraz 
repeatedly cut the British telegraph lines. They not only prevented workmen 
employed by the telegraph authorities from repairing the line but also they beat 
them up and grabbed their horses and property. The line from Shiraz to Bushire 
was cut19• In fact the situation became so complicated that it was very difficult to 
deal with. Lieutenant-Colonel C. C. R. Murphy, described the gun smuggling as a 
77. The Times, 4 Mar. 1910. 
78. The Times, 28 Dec. 1910. 
79. The Times, 27 Dec. 1910. 
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"jig-saw puzzl~ with pieces scattered about up and downltso• In fact gun-running 
control encouraged gun-smuggling business in the region. The smugglers found 
their own way of hiding their guns within the hull of the ship~ which was 
described by 'Haji' Wi11iamson~ one of the British secret agen~ as an "ingenious 
method of hiding things"81. 
The Tunes~ however~ though supporting the arms suppression policy, 
commented that fighting was not only affected by the political situation on the 
Persian Gulf but it was also linked with some developments in India which, 
seemed to put the British Indian Empire under grave examination. A challenge 
was not coming from Mghanistan~ this time, but from India itself. The Times 
said. "though the suppression of gun-running in the Persian Gulf has undoubtedly 
had its full provocative effect on the tribes of the North-West Frontier, yet there 
have not been wanting causes of unrest which~ independently of gun running and 
of each other, have gradually been leading up to a frontier crisis". The Times went 
on,. "Gun-running in its succeeding phases of toleration and of suppression by 
Government has provided first the means and then the pretext for a rising. In a 
sense, then it should be regarded more as the latest development in the situation 
than as the Fons et origo of the trouble". The Times based that on the judgement 
of the British political officers on the North-West Frontier and noticed "that an 
outbreak has, for the time being at least, been warded off reflects the highest 
credit on the tact and judgement of the frontier political officers. For not since 
1897 has such a favourable opportunity for combined action occurred 
simultaneously all along the frontier. In nearly every quarter disaffection has 
been rife". This trouble was not only with the Mghan tribes and the Muslim 
Mullas of the Waziri tribe in Swart and Bajaur, but there were significant signs of 
revived activity of the Hindustani fanatics, a politico-religious sect which for 20 
years now has been practically regarded as a cipher in Indian politics82• In fact 
80. C. C. R. Murphy, Soldiers of The Prophet (1921), pp. 207-208. 
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very early in this century unrest began in India itself and there was agitation 
among the educated Indians for a greater share in the Government of India. That 
was even reflected in England. The Liberal Party, when it formed the government 
in 1906, expressed sympathy with Indian claims as expressed by the Indian 
National Congress founded in 188583• On 28 December 1910 Congress urged 
early extension of local self-government to make all local bodies elective". In the 
Persian Gulf meanwhile there were other serious developments with the extension 
of the Islamic movement (based in Egypt). At the same time no agreement was 
yet achieved between Great Britain and France regarding the arms trade, and the 
zone of prohibition. The Brussels Conference of 1910 did not even discuss the 
Muscat arms question. On 24 December 1910, two other British seamen died 
because of their severe injuries, after the Dubai clash of the previous November. 
However, the clash in Dubai was taken by the Egyptian Pan-Islamic Press as an 
example of Arab resistance to H. M. S. Hyacinth's forces at Dubai. It also 
suggested, that, "the Arabs believe that a departure from the British policy of 
nonintervention is contemplated, and they fear a partition of Persia, followed by 
annexation in Arabia". The Times commented on that; "these apprehensions have 
induced an increasing anti-foreign feeling, which has been intensified by the 
belief that our measures against the arms traffic are intended to lead to the 
disarmament of the Arabs, who cling to their rifles as their most cherished 
possessions." It went on, "nothing else would have produced this unprecedented 
opposition to the British forces"8S. On 21 January 1911, at Dubai, another fight 
broke out between the British seamen and the natives when the British searched 
for arms which were found buried: "the demeanour of the Arabs then grew 
increasingly threatening, and fire was opened simultaneously on four branches of 
the landing party, who appeared in danger of annihilation. The Arabs were under 
cover, and used soft nosed bullets, while the British were in the open till they 
83. Landen, Oman, p. 266. 
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threw up rude entrenchments on the beach. When the flag-captain personally 
addressed the Sheikh and the Hyacinth shelled: the ~ the firing ceasec:L The 
Arabs laid out 37 deadr and their losses were probably heavier"86_ In Persia on 11 
March 1912,. and as reswt of arms· captures by British warships destined to the 
Persian co~ tribesmen from the hinterland were reported to be marching on 
Lingah to attack the British consuIate~ The British sent one hundred. and fifty men 
of the 7th Rajputs from Jask and Chahbar to be landed if necessary for the 
protection of the consulate and the European residentsB7:.. Only one year later the 
arms suppression policy caused a far more serious political development to take 
place in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf and that was, a revolution in 
Oman. 
Section Five 
The Revolution Against The Sultan: The Election of The Imam of Oman, 
1913-14 
The direct cause of the above events was the arms trade checking in Oman by His 
Highness the Sultan Faisal bin Turky. The Sultan established the Arms 
Warehouse in October 1912 for the regulation and control of the trade. But then 
he decided to suppress the trade. 
J. E. Peterson realised that,"the period of rebellion from 1913 to 1920 is 
important in the history of Oman for a number of reasons. The restoration of the 
Ibadi Imamate, periodically revived since the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
was an accomplishment of this period that lasted forty two years. It He went on , 
"but the method of its establishment presented a grave threat to the government of 
the Sultanate, weakened by fifty years of decline, and continually attacked by the 
religious zealots of the interior for its close relationship with the British." But he 
said, "the revolt of 1913-20 was essentially tribal in nature, with the institution of 
the Imamate superimposed on it in order to lend legitimacy and unity to the 
86. The Times, 21 Jan. 1911. 
87. The Times, 12 Mar. 1912. 
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uprising"88 . 
In the third week of May 1913, alarmist reports reached Muscat that 
Shaikh Abdullah as-SaaJirni, leader of the theological [Le-m-taawa,h] movemen4 
had set up his son-in-law, Salim bin Rashed el Khamsi, as Imam el Muslimeen 
[the Imam of Muslims]89. Sheikh As-Salimi regarded the arms warehouse as a 
subtle device of the English to deprive the Oma.ni tribes of modern weapons, so 
that they might reduce the tribes to impotence and then ride roughshod over them. 
It is important to note that this claim is nearly similar to that of the Egyptian Pan-
Islamic Press, above, that the suppression of the arms deprives the Muslims of the 
ability to defend their countries. However, at the beginning of the Imam election 
process, the major role was played by the Sheikh Himyar bin Naser al-Nabhani, a 
strong and influential prince of el-Jabel el-Alchdar [The Green Mountain] in 
Oman proper. He was responsible for calling an assembly of notables at his 
headquarters at Tanoo! near Nizwa (the capital of the Interior) in May 1913, for 
the election of the Imam Salim bin Rashid al-Kharoosi [his origins from Wadi 
bani Kharoos, near Awaaby town]. The latter was selected because of his 
personal character, and "his impeccable lineage from a line of medieval Imams, 
his relationship to al Saalimi, and the close relationship that his tribe, the Bani 
Kharus, had with the Bani Riyam' the tribe of Sheikh Himya.r90. These two Omani 
tribes could form a huge army which would be at the Imam's disposal. The 
rebellion spread rapidly, and Nizwa was their fIrst target. It fell about 5 June, and 
the Sultan's Wall at the town Saif bin Hamed al bu Sa,eedy, who refused to 
surrender, committed suicide, fearing to fall into the hands of the rebels91. The 
prestige that followed this success was enough to cause the Shaykhs [of El-
I,bbriyyin, El-ya,aakeeb Le-j-nebeh, EI-Hijryyin] to put themselves under the 
Imam. On 14 July 1913, in the House of Commons, Mr Mitchell Thomson asked 
88. J. E. Peterson. The Revival of the Ibadi Imamate in Oman and the Threat to Muscat', 
1913-1920. Arabian studies. 111 (1976). p. 165. 
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Grey whether he had any information about the rising in Oman against the Sultan 
and "whether any danger was apprehended at Muscat; and what steps are being 
taken to protect British interests?" Grey replied "there has lately been 
considerable unrest in "Oman which has now come to a head, the safety of Muscat 
itself being threatened. His Majesty's ships Philomel and Odin are at Muscat and 
His Majesty's ship Pelorus was expected to arrive there on the 16th instant. A 
detachment of the 2nd Rajputs has proceeded to Muscat, but men will not be 
disembarked execpt in emergency"9'l. On 29 August a British force of 400 men of 
lO2nd King Edward's Own Grenadiers had been despatched to Muscat. But 
August coincided with the fast of Ramadhan which seems to have affected the 
fighting. but it was expected that the fighting would resume when the fast ended 
and after the feast of E,eed el- Fetr which was due in Septem1Jer93. The Times 
commented on the Omani uprising that "Apart from other British interests, the 
affairs of Oman of considerable importance to us on account of Muscat's being the 
chief centre from which the tribes on the North-West Frontier of India draw thier 
supplies of arms and ammunition. So long as nothing could be done at Muscat the 
costly and laborious effons made by our sailors to stamp out the traffic were 
severly handicapped. A year ago the Sultan was persuaded to to issue regulations 
for the control of the trade in Arms. The importance of this question to the 
security of our Indian frontier explains the watchful care with which 
developments in Oman are followed by the Indian Government"94. 
Before going through the events of the revolution it seems necessary to 
have a look at events after the Brussels Arms Conference of 1908 in Muscat itself, 
before the Omani revolution occurred. 
The agreement between Britain and France regarding the arms question in 
Muscat took six years to be reached from the time of the conference. It was not 
until 14 February 1914 that the two countries, exchanged notes respecting the 
92. Hansard, vol. 55, 14 Jul. 1913, p. 240. 
93. The Times, 30 Aug. 1913. 
94. Jbid. 
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trade in anns and ammunition at Muscat. But, before that, some interesting 
developments took place in the matter of the trade there. 
The anns trade, despite all measures taken by British naval power, 
managed to find its way to the dealers in the Gulf, and even to the Southern 
Persian coast. We saw also some examples of the armed resistance of the 
traffickers in the section above. To prohibit the anns trade in Oman the British 
suggested an essential plan which should be carried out, and that was to 
concentrate the trade only in Muscat. For that,. on 10 February 1910 the mdia 
Office wrote to the Foreign Office that it was very important to regulate the export 
of anns by sea from Muscat. But it was not advisable to regulate the trade at the 
ports of Oman other than Muscat since the difficulties of effective control would 
be increased, and it would be impossible to secure the trustworthy agency 
required. It seemed essential to concentrate the legal export of anns at Muscat, 
and to endeavour to induce the Sultan not only to prohibit the export of arms from 
all other ports in his dominions except Muscat, but also to entrust the duties of 
issuing passes for· export from Muscat to an official in whom the British 
Government could place confidence. Such an official should be lent to His 
Highness the Sultan for the purpose. His Highness could be encouraged to accept 
this proposal, by securing him a pecuniary grant9S• However in December 1910 
the Sultan's relations with the British were overshadowed again with some doubts. 
An Omani boat (Baden), belonging to Pirandad Baluch, carrying date-leaf 
mattings &c. and dates belonging to the Sultan's subjects, was met at sea by a 
British man-of war on 18 November 1910, and was bumt together with all its 
cargo; cash that was on board was taken by the navy. Another Baden, belonging 
to Ramazan bin Shaker ez-Zedgali of Mutrah, was caught by one of H. M.'s ships 
in Khor Galak, and she too was bumt with all her cargo. The Sultan protested to 
Major Trevor, the Political Agent: "Are my subjects prohibited from dealing with 
95. F. O. 428/8, 1. O. to F. O. , 10 Feb. 1910; F. O. to 1. 0., 16 Feb. 1910; Viscount Morley to 
Govt. Ind., 20 Feb. 1910. 
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the ports of Mekran and Persia? If they carry goods which arouse suspicion they 
are liable to search and scmtinisation. But when they carry allowable goods and 
are coming from Mekran and Persian ports to this side, then for what reason 
should they and their cargoes be burnt, and on whom will be the consequent 
losses?" The Sultan said "this practice is in contravention to the terms of the 
treaty, as will appear from the provisions of the 4th article thereoF. His Highness 
concluded, "high- handedness like this has been continuously committed by His 
Majesty's navy, and this is what the Sircar's [phrase for the British Government of 
India%} justice will not allow. Reply as to the result of this communication is 
requested from you. I hope the Government will not like such loss being caused 
to our subjects"97. The Political Agent replied that "no dhow engaged in 
legitimate trade has been burnt, nor will be; only dhows which are proved to have 
landed arms have been burnt, and such dhows render themselves liable to 
punishment. The loss of the dhows is therefore due to the N akhudas [Captains] 
engaging in illicit trade, and the Nakhudas are responsible for the resultant loss98". 
It is not clear however how this conflict was solved between the sultan and the 
British authorities. 
Meanwhile in December 1910 both the Resident Cox and Admiral Slade 
urged on the Government of India "the importance of speedily coming to a 
permanent arrangement with France on the whole question." The argument 
adopted by them throughout was that the blockade had been very successful, both 
in checking the actual smuggling, and in reducing the dealers' business in Muscat 
to a barren one, but that the blockade was very costly, and it was desirable on this 
ground to be able to discontinue it as soon as possible. On the other hand, any 
relaxation of it before a permanent settlement was made would mean losing all the 
advantages gained by it, and it must therfore, be maintained till the settlement, if 
any, was effected. This, therefore, was a matter of continually increasing 
96. This name perhaps used as a brief phrase for Viceregal. 
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urgency99. The Government of India sympathetically considered Cox's and the 
Admiral's views, and communicated to the Foreign Office the request to reopen 
negotiations with France "at the first favourable opportunitylOO". The Foreign 
Office, on 29 December 1910, asked the Government of India to draw up their 
views as to how to proceed in the matter, in respect to four points: "(1.) The 
territorial concession they were prepared to make in India in return for French 
concession at Muscat. (2.) Whether any concession from France was worth 
having short of the Sultan's complete freedom to prohibit import of arms. (3.) If 
so, what? Would a State monopoly in Muscat, or control by the Government of 
India of customs suffice? (4.) Whether they consider any pecuniary compensation 
to the French Government or the French dealers in Muscat to be admissible"lOl. 
India consulted Cox, Trevor in Muscat, and Slade who proposed; " All our efforts 
in negotiating with France should aim at total prohibition of import and export; 
unless this were attained control of the customs by. the Government official would 
not much affect the traffic. State monopoly of the trade was impracticable, as the 
Sultan would probably farm it [the customs] to the highest bidder, who was quite 
likely to be a dealer" [of arms]; any effective measure should limit arms 
importation to the Sultan's and his subjects' requirements, which must be fixed by 
joint agreement between France and Britain; arms should be restricted to Muscat 
only and only by steamship; "Shipments from Europe and elswhere to be only in 
execution of bona fide orders issued and supported by a 'no objection statement' 
signed by both French and British representatives at Muscat" 102. For the 
compensation they suggested a purchase of all stocks of arms actually in Muscat, 
or paying a "lump sum" to the French Government to be distributed among their 
merchants, and no French firm was left dealing with arms except Goguer. Apart 
from that any claim for compensation for loss of prospective profit should be met 
99. Tuson, British Poiicy, B 196. 
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with the reply that "although shipment (of arms for export) has been legal, the 
destination of arms has been notoriously illicit, and that both dealers and 
manufacturers are lucky to have made such heavy profit as they have~ and are 
deserving of no sympathy"lOl. Cox disliked the idea of any further discussion of 
compensation because that would open wide a field "in which claims for equal 
compensation would be made by British and Muscati, and even Belgian and 
German dealers"l04. In January 1911 the Government of India reintroduced their 
ideas of June 1910 for mutual territorial concessions on the Indian subcontinent. 
They proposed ceding to France about 138 square miles near Pondicherry with an 
annual revenue of over £18,000, in return for the French sUITender of other 
settlements of about 88 square miles-including Chandemagore and the scattered 
"loges" with a value of £5,666 at 20 years' purchase lOS. The French could be 
empowered in India to refuse the surrender of their nationals as a condition of 
surrendering Chandemagore. The Government of Madras expressed its readiness 
to cede an increased area near Pondicherry of 216 square miles containing 140 
villages. "This area was comprised of 188 square miles with 113 villages in the 
Vilupuram taluk of the Southern Arcot district... and of 28 square miles in 
Cuddallor taluk with 27 villages"l06. When similar proposals to these had been 
made a year before the French Government had refused to sUITender 
Chandernagore, which was a sine qua non with the Government of India107• But 
this time the French share in India was to increase in a way attractive to the 
French in view of the railway which they had long wished to construct from 
Pondicherry to the British territory of Tirupapuhyur. This was to be on condition 
that "the rates should be below the South Indian Railway Company's maximum 
rates, construction and jurisdiction should be British in British territory, and the 
103. Ibid. 
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net earnings should be shared on a mileage scale"l08. The Foreign Office was 
informed about these proposals, and at the same time that in Muscat large 
quantities of arms were being imported in anticipation and by way of 
compensation101J• In January 1911 the French agreed to negotiate. M. Cambon 
put forward his reply to the British proposals: "'The French Government were 
disposed to make no concession without receiving compensation in the Gambia. 
An increase of terrritory in India near Pondicherry would not suffice. and in 
French public opinion,. would not compensate even for the cession of 
Chandernagore" 110. But Grey observed that "the cession of Gambia, or any part of 
it would raise as much outcry in England as the cession of Chandemagore would 
in France .• .His Majesty's Government was not prepared to bring Gambia into the 
question at all"l11. However, the British 'Pondicherry Card' in India did not seem 
to attract the French as much as the 'Gambian Card' in Africa. The British 
Government also tried to use the 'Morocco Card' to persuade the French to co-
operate in arms suppression in Muscat. They urged the French "that French 
consent to the suppression of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf would naturally 
be regarded as a fair set-off against the British consent (then given) to a renewal 
of the mandate to France and Spain to suppress the contraband trade in arms in 
Morocco" 1 12. The 'Morocco Card' did not help either, the French replied that they 
had no interest in Morocco, and "the question in the Persian Gulf resolved itself 
into one of compensation for the French Government" 113. As the British 
Government knew by this time, half of the arms stock in Muscat was now in 
French hands. In September 1911 the French proposals to exchange territories 
developed further. They asked for cessions "in Nigeria and the Gold Coast 
Colony, and according to the extent of the cession made there, she was prepared 
108. Ibid. 
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to make corresponding concessions in connection with Cheik-Sai~ Muscat, and 
certain islands in the Indian Ocean. and possibly also in the Pacific1t1l4• It was 
noticed that the French did not mention the compensation of Pondicherry in India. 
However nothing came of these proposals, and the negotiations failed. 
In Muscat a problem closely related to the arms trade, as we saw before. 
was the Sultan's customs. One of the main reasons which made the British 
Government try to control Muscat's customs was the arms flow through them. 
The British Government was alarmed by reports that the Sultan might give the 
lease of his customs house farm to two prominent arms dealers. Ali Musa Khan 
and Seyyid Yusuf-ez-Zuwawi. one of whom was mainly responsible for the 
Afghan traffic. This would be a strong source of displeasure to the British 
Government. It is interesting that the Muscat Custom House question of the last 
century again began to emerge.(see chap. 5). To deal with it might cause 
complications in the arms trafficking issue. To avoid that problem a proposed 
loan of 275,000 rupees, for three years. to the Sultan of Muscat might be given by 
the Government of ·India on condition that he should borrow an Indian custom-
house official. But the Government of India was conscious that His Highness was 
'very touchy' at that time on the question of customs. as he attributed the reduction 
of his receipts and his financial difficulties to the BritishllS• The Sultan's income 
because of the blockade of the arms trade at sea seemed to suffer. and when he 
was communicated with by the Political Agent in respect to the customs. the 
Sultan asked for 13,000 rupees urgently, He had no option but to give his customs 
to the new farmers. The Government of India agreed to transfer to the Sultan the 
amount he requested but the hope of getting the Sultan to appoint an official 
borrowed from the Government of India was doubtfull16. At the same time it was 
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115. F. O. 428/8, 1. O. to F. O. , 16 Jan. 1911; Govt. Ind. to Crewe, 8 Jan. 1911; Crewe to 
GOVL Ind., 9 Jan. 1911; 1. O.to F. 0., 16 Jan. 1911; Govt. Ind. to Crewe, 14 Jan. 1911; 1. 
O. to F. 0., 18 Jan. 1911; 1. O. to F. 0.,25 Jan. 1911; Cox to Govt. Ind., 30 Dec. 1910. 
116. F. 0.428/8,1. O. to F. 0.,9 Feb. 1911; Resid. to Govt. Ind., 30 Dec. 1910; Cox to Govt. 
Ind., 8 Jan. 1911; Govt. Ind. to Cox, 10 Jan. 1911; Cox to Govt. Ind., 6 Jan. 1911; Govt. 
Ind. to Cox, 11 Jan. 1911; Cox to GOVL Ind., 11 Jan. 1911; Govt. Ind. to Cox, 16 Jan. 
279 
believed by the Persian Gulf Residency that control of customs by India would not 
affect the arms traffic question until the prohibition of imports had been arranged,. 
after which some proper control over customs might be necessary to render the 
prohibition effective. So the aim should be total prohibition of import and export 
of arms. The Residency's most imponant suggestion was "management by a 
British official of Muscat and Mutrah custom-house~ and the establishment under 
same official of a regular bureau for the storing and issue of arms under an 
effective system of registration and marking." It was also suggested that payment 
of compensation to the Sultan for loss of revenue and for compliance with above 
measures should be made1l7• It was discussed whether the Governemnt of India's 
attitude towards the Sultan should remain friendly or the reverse~ and whether to 
proceed in suppressing the trade completely despite the Sultan's wia and to stop 
his subsidy if necessary. But the sultan should break off his relations with Ali 
Musa and Company, arms dealers, and co-operate with the British by introducing 
an effective sales registration system, and imports under the British 'friendly 
supervision and by other means'. Reports, however, reached the Government of 
India that Ali Musa Khan was using the Sultan's steamer for arms trafficking to 
other Omani ports. The arms trafficking was a source of income to the Sultan as 
was known to the Government of India. Now it had to decide which alternative 
policy it intended to adopt towards him118• The British policy towards the arms 
trafficking now started to take explicit shape. The Government of India had the 
idea of making "an endeavour to conclude negotiations with the Sultan of Muscat, 
in order that his co-operation in controlling the traffic may, so far as is compatible 
with treaty rights, be secured. The time is now opportune, and our proposal is to 
take action without regard in any way to the question of revising the commercial 
treaty". India's opinion was also that it was undesirable that the Political Agent 
1911. 
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should be associated with the representative of the Sultan who was in charge of 
the bonded house, that they would lend a British official, who should be in the 
service of Faisal and paid by ~ though the salary might be paid indirectly by 
India. If India thereby secured the cordial co-operation of Faisa4 they were 
prepared to make him an offer of a maximum one lakh a year, apart from the 
subsidy already paid, and if he could be induced to utilise the first payment for the 
liquidation of his debts, most of which were due to the dealers in arms, they would 
make payments annually in advance. But how could the arrangement be made? It 
"would be a personal one to the present Sultan, and it would be made clear that, in 
the event of His Highness not acting up to the terms of the arrangement, payment 
would be withheld. If His Highness can be induced to accept our terms, it is our 
hope that the necessity of purchasing the stocks of arms in Muscat at the time may 
be avoided"119. The Foreign Office approved the proposition to communicate with 
the Sultan to establish a warehouse for the deposit of arms. It was suggested also 
that it would be helpful to obtain from His Highness an undertaking to conclude 
no fresh treaties with foreign Powers without the consent of His Majesty's 
Government but this should stand over for subsequent consideration. It was an 
attempt to limit his foreign relationsl20• Percy Cox, the Sultan's old friend, went 
to Muscat, and met with the Sultan in November 1911. The Sultan expressed his 
complaints about the British blockade operations which caused him losses. He 
declared that as long as the attitude of the British towards him remained friendly, 
he had not the least idea or desire to pursue a course opposed to their wishes or 
calculated to disturb cordial relations. He would be prepared for absolute 
prohibition of arms, in spite of the French treaty, if the British Government would 
guarantee him against the consequences. He was also prepared to place his 
interests in British hands if both the British and the French Governments saw fit to 
settle matters between themselves. The British Government should agree as to 
119. F. 0.428/9. Govt. Ind. to Crewe. 10 Jut 1911. 
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financial and other conditions, which could be discussed. His Highness was ready 
to co-operate in respect to the latest British proposals, if they did not contravene 
the rights of other powers in treaty with Oman. On the arms question,. the Sultan 
suggested that he be allowed to address the French Government by himself,. to 
explain the hannfulness to his interests of the traffic. He expressed his desire for 
complete prohibition of imports, and hoped for the willingness of the British 
Government to compensate his losses,. urging them not to stand in the way of his 
wishes and interests. But Cox,. in his letter to the Government of India dated 11 
November, disliked the Sultan's idea because he thought that it would lead to 
claims by the French Government for compensation for their own subjects121• The 
Sultan accepted the British decision that one Lakh rupees per annum would be fair 
compensation for the future, but he asked for separate lump sums for the loss of 
about 80,000 dollars he had suffered during the last two years, or rather the debts 
which he had been obliged to incur. Also he asked for some relief to be given to 
his subjects trading in arms. To prepare for the arms suppression Cox suggested 
India use the press; some news could be leaked to Reuter about the arrangement 
for the suppression or regulation of Muscat arms traffic. Cox believed that this 
"will have the effect of deterring manufacturers from sending out further 
consignments, while dealers in Muscat will be frightened into quickly depleting 
their stocks by returning them to Europe, or sending them to Yemen or other such 
destinations", unobjectionable to the British Government. The British 
Government also should be prepared with a reply to any enquiry which the French 
Government might makel22• However, even before that suggestion of Cox's was 
121. F. 0.428/9, Cox to Govt. Ind., 11 Nov. 1911. Cox was the designer of the anns 
prohibition measures in MuscaL In January 1910 when he was on holiday in England he 
had suggested to the Government that the Sultan should be persuaded "by an offer of 
pecuniary compensation, to limit the export of anns from Muscat to consignments 
destined for other ports in Oman OJ[' other "non prohibited" ports; these to be guaranteed 
by a system of passes, the control of which should be in the hands of a British officer. 
Any Dhow failing to produce such a pass, whatever her destination, was to be ipso facto 
liable to seizure by British warships even in Muscat waters; see Tuson, British Policy, 
A7. 
122. F. O. 428/9, Cox to GovL Ind., 14 Nov. 1911. 
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carried ou~ His Excellency's presence in Muscat, and the frequent visits of His 
Highness the Sultan to the Political Agency gave rise to much conjecture among 
the arms dealers as to what the nature of the negotiations might be. The main 
dominating idea in Muscat was that, "the British and the French Governments have 
come to terms with a view to suppress the arms trade, that the French arms 
merchants will be compensated, whilst the remainder will probably have their 
goods confiscated." This caused a tendency among the native and other arms 
dealers to get rid of their surplus stock at any cos~ and the situation in Yemen had 
offered them an opportunity of disposing of a sma1l quantity to sundry boats of 
that territory 123. 
However, the Government of India agreed that the Sultan might address 
the French Government regarding the arms ~c, and agreed to the conditions 
which the Sultan attached to the proposal for a bonded warehousel24• So steps 
were taken to prepare for further negotiation with the Sultan to remove any 
obstacle, bearing in mind that the Sultan might accept a British official to manage 
the suggested warehouse or allow it to be managed by both the Political Agency 
and a high level person from the side of the Sultan. However, the India Office, 
though they were aware of the need to supervise the efficiency of the warehouse, 
did not want to wait till that could be achieved. Probably they did not regard it as 
that much of an obstacle since the principle was agreed about. So they suggested 
letting it be known to the press, which could say that: "It is understood that a new 
arrangement has been devised by the Sultan of Muscat for regulating the export of 
anus and ammunition, which it is believed will effectually stop the illegitimate 
trade with those countries which have prohibited it 125" • Cox asked the 
Government of India for details, to be submitted for the approval of the 
Government, of notices and regulations for the establishment of the special anus 
123. F. 0.428/9, Lieutenant Wauton (Naval Intelligence Officer) to Cox, 14 Nov. 1911. 
124. F. 0.428/10, Govt. Ind. to Crewe, 28 Dec. 1911. 
125. F. O. 428/9, Govt. Ind. to Crewe, 19 Jan. 1912; Govt. Ind. to Crewe, 29 Jan., 2 Feb. 1912; 
1. O. to F. O. , 6 Mar. 1912. 
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warehouse which were being discussed by him with the Sultan. The Sultan asked 
the British Government whether he could be permitted to notify a total 
prohibition~ subject to three months noticel26• However matters were all settled 
locally and internationally, and the British Government committed itself to 
undertake full responsibility to render the Sultan all necessary support in dealing 
with objections other powers might raise. The British Government did not obtain, 
any more than in the past, any right to take action in the Sultan's territory. 
Friendly understanding between the two parties was estabilshed as to suitable 
arrangements for supplying the bonafide requirements of the Sultan's subjects and 
his administration, and to confirm the promise to compensate himl27• It was 
hoped that these measures would stop the illicit traffic, as there was no other free 
port in the Gulf at which the European traders could land their arms l28• On 23 
May 1912 Cox submitted to the Marquess of Crewe the suggested notification 
which the Sultan would issue for the arms warehouse regulation, and accordingly 
the Sultan prepared to take the next step to issue it on 4 June 1912. 
"On and after the first September next all arms and ammunition 
imported into Muscat territory will be taken direct from the steamer to the 
Control, and all dealers in Muscat territory will be required to deposit in the 
Warehouse stocks remaining in their hands on that date. Any trader 
offending against this regulation will, in addition to other penalties, render all 
future consignments of arms arriving in his name liable to confiscation". The 
notification went on to explain the purpose of the warehouse as a matter only of 
regulation. "No arms will be allowed to issue from the Warehouse without a 
licence, nor until duty has been paid thereon in the usual way. The licences 
will be prepared by the superintendent, and countersigned by the Sultan, and 
will not be granted to traders, but only to approved individual purchasers or 
126. F. O. 428/9, Cox to Govt. Ind., 11 May 1912. 
127. F. O. 428/9, Cox to Govt. Ind., 23 May 1912. 
128. Arch. Eds., A Collection of First World War Military Handbooks of Arabia 1913-1917, 
Vol. 1. (1988), p. 49. 
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European alignments, but the French did not carry out their threat. The arms 
problem was not solved until 1913; when in June M. Poincare and M. Pichon 
visited London for negotiation with the British Government, it was believed that 
an arrangement would be reached by which the arms traffic could be controlled 
without injuring any legitimate interest of French industry 132. The Times 
announced on 2 October that an agreement had been practically reached between 
France and Britain according to the newspaper's own information. "A London 
telegram to le Temps says that the question may be regarded as all but settled". 
The Times welcomed the news, and pointed out that the "supply of arms to the 
tribes-men of the North-West Frontier of India has been carried on through 
Muscat, where French treaty rights made it impossible for Great Britain to 
suppress the traffic in the same direct way as at other places". The arms 
suppression, for peace, on the frontier, was urgently necessary. The Times went 
on: "various efforts were made to arrange matters with the French Government. 
They were unsuccessfuL and a state of things continued which at times threatened 
to diminish the cordiality of the Entente". As regards the Sultan of Muscat, The 
Times said "A way out seems to have been found". He was "persuaded to issue on 
12 July last year a proclamation regulating the traffic in arms .... an 'Arms 
Warehouse' was established in Muscat in which all anns and ammunition were to 
be deposited". Last December in the House of Lords, Lord Morley had explained, 
The Times said, that "the enforced depositing of imported arms in the warehouse 
was in the French view, tantamount to confiscation. In the English view the 
goods were merely bonded, ..... the British Government would continue to use 
every effort with the French Government to bring them actively into line with us". 
The principal difficulty in the negotiations was the nature of the price to be paid 
for French involvement in the regulation. "At one time the French Government 
seemed disposed to insist on territorial compensation for the surrender of what it 
regarded as its rights under the Treaty of 1862, but they do not seem to have 
132. The Times, 30 Aug. 1913. 
286 
pressed this view"133. On 3 January 1914 The Times announced an "Anglo-French 
agreement" regarding Muscat's arms trade. ''The French Government undenakes 
to offer no further opposition to the measures adopted some months ago by the 
Sultan of Muscat for putting a stop to this trade measures which that [the French] 
Government considered to be an infringement of the French Convention of 1844 
with Muscat". For those French firms whose interests had been affected thereby, 
the French Government would arrange an indemnityl34. On 4 February 1914 the 
agreement was signed in London between Britain and France 135. The latter agreed 
to be placed on the same footing as subjects of H. M. as regards the trade in arms 
and ammunition of war in Muscat. The French also eventually declared to the 
British that they "wished to give Great Britain a proof of their firm friendship, and 
also they have become convinced of the dangers which would be presented by the 
organisation of contraband of war in regions adjoining the distant possessions of 
the European powers"l36. Such an agreement had been the most probable 
outcome because of their continuing need to face the German challenge. Thus 
ends a very long and exhausting dispute over Muscat between the two countries. 
We now return to the effect of the Sultan's regulations on the domestic political 
position in his country. 
Section Five 
The Events of the Revolution 
The Sultan's regulations caused a serious rebellion against him in Oman, 
beginning with the election of El Imam el Kharusy, who was the first Imam of the 
twentieth century in Oman 137. 
133. The Times. 2 OcL 1913; see also Times. 16 Feb. 1913. 
134. The Times. 3 Jan. 1914; see also Times. 7 Apr. 1914. 
135. Arch. Eds .• Collection First World War. p. 49. 
136. Treaty Ss. no. 9. Exchange of notes between His Majesty's Government and the French 
Republic respecting the Trade in Arms and Ammunition at Muscat. 4 Feb. 1914, H. M. S. 
O. [Cd.7361]; The Times. 4 Feb. 1914. 
137. Phillips. Oman History, p. 156.Dr. Mahmood Ali AI Dawood. in his Arabic book 
AIKhaleej Al-A.rabi ...• (The Arabian Gulf. .. ) on p. 93 mentioned an Imam as Imam 
Abdullah bin Saleh [1], who led the revolution of 1895 against the Sultan. There was no 
such person of this name and the revolution of 1895 was not led by any Imam, but by the 
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The warehouse seriously began to affect the arms traffic in general. and 
the Omani of the interior in particular138• For the Omanis the arms trade was a 
matter of business. Its trafficking was a source of a considerable income. 
therefore beneficial for every one because it increased their ability to import 
essential and leisure commodities which improved their living conditions. The 
Sultan's warehouse gave him the monopoly of the import and export of arms in 
and out of Oman. thus depriving the Omanis of this income139• This caused 
Omani anger and fear; the spark which ignited the revolution against him 140. The 
entire Arab and international world became involved in this controversy. 
The revolution spread like fire in straw. After the fall of Nazwa on 5 June. 
Izky and Awabi fell on the 20th into the hands of the rebels. Five days later. the 
Sheikh E,yseh bin Saleh el Hanky arrived to join the rebellion. whose principal 
temporal leader so far was Sheikh Himyar bin Nasser En-nabhani, of Bani Riam. 
Sheikh E,yseh then took over the leadership and managed to persuade most of the 
Bani Ruwahah to join the rebellion 141. It was the first time since the Omani civil 
war of the eighteenth century, 1720 1740, that the Omani tribal factions, Hinawis 
and Ghafrys, had united against the regime in Muscat142• "The fall of Izky 
encouraged Sheikh Isa bin Saleh al Harthi, who was of Hinawi persuasion, to 
espouse openly the cause of the Imam." 
The Sultan's situation was strained because of the unexpected retreat of the 
Alharthy tribe leader, Sheikh Saleh bin Ali, father of Sheikh E,yesh, and there are some 
arguments that it was a plan by the Sultan of Zanzibar, Hamid bin Thuwainy, to 
overthrow Sultan Faisal in his desire to reunite Oman with Zanzibar under his rule. 
138. Diplomatic and Consular Reports ..• 19J2-13 on the Trade Of Muscat. [Cd. 7048-14] H. 
M. S. O. 1913, p. 7. 
139. R. W. Baily, (Ed.) Records 0/Oman.1867-1947. vol. 11 Arch. Eds., 1988, p. 558. 
140. Bannerman, Unity and Disunity, pp. 217-249. 
141. Peterson, Revival, p. 168; Arch. Eds., Persian Gulf, p. 104; Nabil M. Kailani, 'Politics and 
religion in Uman', Historical Overview, (Inst Mid. East Stu.) 10 (1979) p. 573; Ronald 
Wingate,Not In The Limelight, (1959), p. 77; Murphy, Soldiers, p. 129; Holden, Farewell 
to Arabia, (1966), p. 227; James Morris, Sultan In Oman, (1957), p. 23; D. G. Hogarth, 
Arabia, (1922), p. 124; Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, (1975); G. E. Hubbard, 
From The GuifTo Arat, (1916), p.28; Clement,in his book Oman Reborn Land (1908), on 
p. 46, identified The Imam AlKharusy as Imam 'a Khamisi', and also Sheikh Saleh bin Ali 
as 'Salil' bin 'Alil'. This has proved very misleading. 
142. Peterson, Revivai, pp. 165-167. 
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Bani Bu Ali (of the Sharqeyyeh JaJan) of the Sultan's forces from Bidbid to 
Wateyyah {lu-Teyyeh] and of the [Shuhuh] (of (Massendem]~ on the Strait of 
Hormus) from Nakhla to Sohar. Even so, despite this setback the Sultan's two 
sons, Saiyids Nader and Hamad, managed to hold out in the forts at Samail and 
Nakhal respectively"143. Samail, however, fell into the hands of the rebels in July. 
This town had a commanding position on the road between Oman proper and the 
el Batneh coast, a development which caused a real threat to Muscatl44. All the 
Sultan's efIons to resist the revolt failed despite his recruitment of 500 {Shihuh] 
and 600 of Bani Bu Ali. On 6 July the Bu Ali returned to Muscat without orders 
to do so, leaving the road into the capital dangerously open 145. On this occasion 
the British Government became directly involved in the defence of the Albu 
Sa,eeds regime, more than at any time in Oman's previous historyl46. Major 
Murphy, of the Intelligence Department, arrived from Bushire at Muscat on 2 
July, to study the situation, and if necessary to arrange for landing troops for the 
defence ofMutrah and Muscat. On 6 July, the Political Resident at Bushire and 
the Agent at Muscat, both received an official appeal for help from the Sultan. On 
9 July, on the fast mail, 256 soldiers of the 2nd Queen Victoria's Own Rajputs 
arrived at Muscat from Bushire. They disembarked and camped at Jabrooh in 
Mutrah 147. The command of the defence of Muscat was entrusted to Lt. Col. F. A. 
Smith, the Officer Commanding troops in the Persian Gulf, who, on the next day, 
stationed himself at Bait-al-Falaj fort between Mutrah and Ruwil48• On the 
following morning, the Sultan, accompanied by Major S. G. Knox, the Political 
Agent, visited the troops, and their commanders Hill, Mellor and Ballard, and the 
143. Baily, Records, vol 2, p. 559. 
144. Phillips, Oman History, p. 157. 
145. Murphy, Soldiers, p. 130. 
146. Peterson, Revival, p. 165. 
147. Peterson, Revival, p. 168. 
148. Arch. Eds., Persian Gulf, p. 104; Bait al Falaj Fort now includes the office of the present 
Deputy Prime Minister for National Security (Fahar bin Taimur), a College for Defence, 
and a Museum opened by His Majesty, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa,eed, the present Sultan of 
Oman on 11th December 1988; Oman Daily Newspaper, Mond. 12 Dec. 1988-No.2765. 
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naval and the military intelligence Officers 149. At the same time the British 
Government did not ignore the French on this occasion. "The political Agent 
called on the French consul and in conformity with the Anglo-French Declaration 
of 1862 on the independence of Muscat and ~bar, took his colleague into his 
confidence and informed him of the landing of British troops at the Sultan's 
request for the defence of Muscat and Mutrah. The intimation was well received 
and no hint of any objection was offered1SO't. However, letters on 11 July had 
been sent to the rebel leaders by the Political Agen~ warning them not to attack 
Muscat and Mutrah, in view of the important interests of the British subjects in 
those two towns. The Imam replied by a letter, received on the 21 July 1913, 
posted in Muscat the previous day. "Major Knox notes that this reply was dated 
14th July and deduces that the method of its delivery by post proved what had 
been suspected before, namely that the Imam had many friends and sympathisers 
in Muscat itself·. However, the Imam's letter stated that the Sultan had been 
deposed by the 'Ulema', but he refused to abdicate. He warned the Political 
Agent, "and you are a company (Le. associated) of this Government. It is 
incumbent on you to refrain from the affairs of the Moslems, and it is necessary 
you should not do us injurylSl". The Sultan established his headquarters, and a 
force of 250 men, under MozafJer bin Sulaiman bin Suwailim Wall of Sohar, at 
Sib on 15 July. His Highness was very confident of support from surrounding 
tribes. But soon, on 26 July, it became clear to him after returning to Muscat, 
leaving his son Taimur in charge of Seeb, that he could not depend on the support 
of some of these tribes. For example, the Bani J abir [J abry] tribe and es Syabyeen 
[Seyaby] supported the Sultan, because they wanted only money and ammunition, 
but after receiving them they refused to meet his enemies, and the position of the 
Le-Jenebeh and the Bani Bu-Ali was similar. The Sultan evidently had not 
realised the extent of his, and his son's unpopularity, but he did so when all his 
149. Gertrude Bell, The Arab War (1940). pp. 31-32. 
150. Baily,Records,p.559. 
151. Ibid. 
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hopes had been dashed! 
The Sultan however, communicated with the Imam and the revolt leaders 
to try to settle matters. The reply came that if peace needed to be achieved, "(a) 
the agreement on arms between the Sultan and the British must be scrapped; (b) 
Wadi Semail, Nakhal and Sur should belong to the Imam exclusivley; (c) Customs 
duties at all ports should be reduced to the rates in force in the days of Imam 
Azzan; (d) the Sultan and his sons should promote good and prohibit evil to the 
best of their ability"152. The Sultan rejected the Imam's terms, but he weakened 
his position still more in the interior of the country. On 4 August Nakhal was 
taken by the rebels, and Ahmed bin Ibrahim, of the Albu Sa,eed ruling family, 
was persuaded by his fathers's old ally E,yseh bin Saleh to make his allegiance to 
the Imam. Ahmed, who became Minister of Interior during the reign of Sultan 
Sa,eed bin Taimur 1932-1970), was the son of Ibrahim and grandson of Imam 
Azzan, (see Ch. 3, Sec. 2, 3)153. The situation became bleak and unmanageable. 
During the ceasefire, in August, 400 British troops arrived in response to the 
request of the Sultan as mentioned above. On 3 September men of 102nd King 
Edward's Own Grenadiers under the command of Lt. Col. S. M. Edwardes arrived 
to reinforce the British garrison 154. On 18 September, The Times made a lengthy 
article and regarded the revolution in Oman as to cause perplexity to the British 
Government which had all the picturesqueness of a minor rebellion in the Middle 
East. "It is one more symptom of the new stirring of the spirit and searching of 
heart which after centuries of isolation, is again bringing the Arabian peninsula 
into the arena of international politics" 155. The Times linked the Omani rising with 
that of Ibin Sa,ood victories in Arabia, "If Bin Saud could conquer half Arabia 
why should not old claimants revive their efforts to seize the tottering throne of 
Oman"156? But from the defence's side The Times said "The best defence of 
152. Ibid. 
153. Peterson, Revival, p. 169. 
154. Arch. Eds., Persian GUlf. p. 105; Baily, Records. p. 56l. 
155. The Times, 18 Sep. 1913. 
156. Ibid. 
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Muscat are still its own formidable mountains. They form an almost impregnable 
landward barrier to this Arabian Gibraltar, and only by one difficult path can 
access be gained to the regions beyond". The Times went on, ''We have very 
special interest at MuScat, based chiefly upon document drafted in 1891-2, the 
contents of which are well known to the foreign Governments concerned. 
Fourteen years ago a British squadron entered the harbour and threatened to blow 
the Sultan's palace to bits if the rights acquired under this agreement were 
violated.'t The Times said 'The Sultan at once gave the desired undertaking, and 
ever since has maintained the most cordial relations with the British Government. 
He had acquiesced in all our wishes about the pledges he has made to us. These 
very pledges have been used as a pretext to influence his subjects against him. He 
is now in a position of embarrassment and danger, and not unnaturally looks to us 
for aid"lS7. The Times wrote details about the Sultan's retreat in disarray to his 
capital. Despite that the rebels in the beginning did not dare to attack the coast, 
because they had a 'wholesome dread' of the British warships guns but they are 
not likely to refrain for ever from following up their victories. The Times 
regarded the concerns of this uprising as seeds of an awkward difficulty for Great 
Britian1S8. 
The Imam sent a letter to the Political Agent on 2 October, explaining why 
the revolution had occurred and making some interesting points: ''We inform your 
honour that the people of Oman have agreed by common consent to depose their 
Sultan, and have assembled to rise against him disliking the innovations he has 
brought about in Islam," the Imam said,"by contravening the Shari,a's [Islamic 
law] commands and committing what was forbidden therein and setting the people 
against one another". Thereby, His Holiness said, "disturbances are rife in the 
country and the order of things is disturbed, crimes have been committed, blood 
has been shed, property looted, legal punishment dispensed with and rights 
157. Ibid. 
158. Ibid. 
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destroyed". Thereupon. he said. "the Moslems felt shame for the sake of their 
religion and were angered on account of what they saw of corruption. So they 
assembled and agreed on this happy (rebellion) and hoped thereby to secure the 
reform of their countrY and people"lS9. 
In the midst of this revolt and in the evening of 4 October 1913 Sultan 
Fai~ after a dramatic life. unexpectedly died of dropsy. He was about 48 years 
of age and was succeeded by his son. His Highness Sayid Taimur. 
The Political Agent replied to the Imam. He first informed him of Sultan 
Faisal's death. saying that it had been a source of gratification to him to note from 
the friendly communication which His Highness the new Sultan. Taimur had 
shown him "that a pillar of the Abadhi religion. Shaik Abdulla bin Humaid As-
salmi. has not ceased to offer his counsels of wisdom and humanity. and this 
encourages me in the hope that the clouds which have unfortunately arisen 
between the people and the ruler in the latter days of Sayid Faisal bin Turki may 
be dispelled and the tribes may reach a good understanding with his successor16O". 
After the death of Faisal a new situation had emerged and some calmness 
returned. Sultan Taimur was not interested in confrontations with the rebels and 
decided to initiate some reforms in Muscat. for example, prohibiting prostitution, 
public alcohol drinking and smoking. He warned the local authorities at Mutrah 
of the consequences of corruption, for example, and taking bribes. Justice was 
promised for everyone in the society. These reforms were part of the rebels' 
demands161 • Despite this he did not touch the main reason for the rebellion. the 
arms selling. However, this gave a good chance for Abu Dhabi to playa positive 
role in the matter. On 3 November His Highness Sheik Hamadan bin Zayid [bin] 
Khalifah [AI Nehyyan] of Abu Dhabi arrived in Muscat to attempt mediation 
between the Sultan and the Imam. On 18 November Sheik Hamdan bin Zayid, 
accompanied by certain chiefs of Hhawasenah, and Bani bu HHasen. left for Seeb 
159. Peterson, Revival, p. 169. 
160. Arch. Eds.,Records, p. 561. 
161. Peterson, Revival, p. 170. 
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to meet Sheikh E,yseh bin Saleh for a peace conference there. But the remaining 
rebel leaders refused to join. However, Sheikh Hamdan's efforts to achieve peace 
negotiations broUght some resultsl62• On 9 December Sheikh E,yseh bin Saleh 
and his brother Ali paid a visit to His Highness the Sultan at Muscat and were 
treated with much honour and respect. A hollow truce was agreed to enable both 
sides to think: over matters, and it was agreed that neither party should break the 
peace for a period of two months. Abu Dhabi in fact succeeded in bringing calm 
to the situatio~ and peace for Oman. His Highness Sheikh Hamdan bin lad's 
efforts were so successful that the presence of the wing of the 2nd Rajput Light 
Infantry was no longer considered necessary at Bait al Falaj. They were sent to 
Bombay by steamer on 29 December. Sheikh Hamdan remained in Muscat till the 
end of the year 1913. 
Towards the end of January 1914, and about four months after the death of 
Sultan Faisal, the leader of the religious party, Sheikh Abdullah bin Humaid as-
Salmi, also died. Mter January 1914 no significant developments took place till 
April when H. M. S. Fox, and H. M. S. Dartmouth bombarded Berka and 
Qurayyat. This action may have provoked the rebels but it was not until August 
1914 that hostile activities started again. By the end of 1914, around November 
and December, the Imam worked to recruit men in a desire to attack Muscat, and 
the Sheiks who joined the movement undertook to supply quotas of men at their 
own expense. Now it looked as if the rebels did not mean merely to threaten; it 
looked as if they meant business at last. The authorities in Muscat regarded the 
situation as a serious threat requiring serious measures. What makes this event of 
great significance is its coincidence with the FIrst World War of 1914. How far 
was it a coincidence, and how did Britain react to it? 
162. Archs. Eds., Persian Gulf, Vol. VII. (1912-1920), p.105, has a misleading reference to 
Khalifah, who was grandfather of Shaikh Hamdan, giving him as a family title 'Hamdan 
al Khalifah', mixing up a title, which is not for the rulers of Abu Dhabi, but Bahrain. The 
title of Abu-Dhabi's rulers is AI-Nahayyaan; the mistake is repeated on p. 103; and in 
Baily, Records o/Oman vol. II p. 561, identifying the (Sultan) SaiyidFaisal as Saiyid 
'Fazal' bin Turley. 
294 
Conclusion 
The arms suppression policy in fact brought political loss to Britain all over the 
Gulf. The aim of limiting frontier conflict in the north of India fail~ while 
conflict was extended to the Gulf, and dangerously so in Oman. On the Indian 
subcontinent it appeared that the Indian National Congress had became far more 
dangerous than those nomad aggressive Mghan tribes and the Baluchis against 
which the arms suppression policy was aimed. The emergence of Gennany in one 
sense served the interests of British policy in the Gulf and India. The appearance 
of Gennan power threatened not only Britain but its two great opponents, France 
and Russia, whose interests forced them into general cooperation with Britain. 
Had it not been for events in Europe France and Russia could have been expected 
to exploit the dramatic events in the Gulf, Persia and Oman regardless of British 
interests. France stood to gain from the uprising in Oman, as did Russia from 
conditions in Persia and Mghanistan. So the First World War served Britain in 
the Gulf because her entente with her rivals France and Russia became an 
alliance. At the same time the German alliance with the unpopular Turks 
weakened their influence with the Arabs to Britain's advantage. All these 
coincident complications did something to reduce the dangers to which the British 
position in the Gulf, Oman and Persia had become exposed in the early years of 
the twentieth century. As one writer pointed out, British supremacy in the Gulf 
"was a flash in the pan; not the inevitable result of a steady program of historic 
advance, but an accident of war. Within a few years it had disappeared; Britain 
could not retain control over the regional powers" 163. 
163. Alvin J. Cottrell (ed.), The Persian Gulf: a General Survey, (Baltimore, Md. 1980), p.59. 
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CONCLUSION 
On 7 January 1915, 300 rebels gathered at Muthaddemat in Sayh-edhaby, (now 
called EI-Aamerat, w~ere a satellite station is currently situated), and on the 
following day Lu-wteyyeh was raided (where the Oman police stables and 
Khowlah Maternity Hospital are now). The Imam and Sheikh Himyar of the 
JabaI-el-AkJuJar (the Green Mountain) reached Bosher, and the Sheikh E,yseh 
made his way to Le-Khuwair (where most of the Governmental buildings are 
situated now). It was said that Himyar had been the sword arm while E,yseh had 
been the brains of Omani rule. As a result all the outposts of the capital Muscat 
came under rebel control, and from the land the city was surrounded, while the 
rebel forces increasingly concentrated at Lu-wteyyeh. Colonel Edwardes 
suggested to the Sultan that in order to protect Mutrah, a section of the outpost 
line nearest the sea should be taken by those of the Sultan's forces armed from the 
A,amree tribes. The rebel attack on the capital's outposts was started early in the 
morning of 10th January. The protection of Mutrah was assigned to a small picket 
of the A,amrees who took up position on the west hills of Daarsait, on the east of 
Saih-el-Maalah but soon fled in panic at the sound of gunfire. At 6.30 p.m. 
another small picket stationed on the heights of A,yint behind the Eastern hills of 
Darsait on the west of Mutrah, was driven out, after two hours shelling. The hills 
fell under rebel control at night and the situation became most dangerous. The 
following morning on the 11 th, early at 6.30, Colonel A. C. Edwardes gave orders 
for the hills to be retaken and cleared of rebels. A serious engagement took place 
between the Omani rebels and the British army. Captain S. B. Coates was 
wounded in the heavy fighting but managed to keep going. Due to the modem 
machine guns, and to better training of the British troops, the rebels, who were 
mainly tribal, were defeated after heavy fighting. The ridges and the passes were 
cleared and the rebels retreated to Sad Ruwi (now on the roundabout of two 
junctions from AI-Nahdah Hospital to Seyh-EI-Dhaby and to lu-wtayyeh). Sheikh 
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defeated4• The Sultan proposed pursuing the rebels~ but he was dissuaded from 
such a risky course by the Political Agent. A month later9 the Viceroy, Lord 
Hardinge, who had become very familiar with the Muscat question during the 
Brussels Conference of 1908, tried to persuade the Sultan to come to terms with 
the Imam This suggestion probably arose from the circumstances of the FIrst 
World War. The Viceroy offered the services of the Political Agent as mediator. 
The situation of the rebels in Oman, however, was still very strong and they were 
holding the key points in the country. Their defeat in Muscat was only partial, 
since they still ruled most the of the country, with the Sultan isolated in his two 
towns, Muscat and Mutrah. 
The rising moreover assumed a religious character with the Imam 
preaching a lilzadS. The rebels' heavy losses aroused resentment which would be 
difficult to allay6. Since, according to the Kur,aan, fighting was 'imposed on 
Muslims for the cause of God' and 'those who fight in the cause of God, and die 
are alive, and with their Lord', the Imam would not need much effort to convince 
the EI-Muslemeen to fight against the Al-kuffar (blasphemers), and to convince 
them that their death would constitute martyrdom. At the same time, during the 
First World War, British ships were not, as was usual in peace time, within a few 
hours call of MuscaP. The Omani Imam seems not to have relied only on local 
support but tried to cash in on the international situation during the war, and to 
search for alliances. British sources reported that early in the war, probably in 
1914, the Imam of Oman wrote to the Imam Yahya [Hameed-ud"deen?] of 
Yemen and to the Turkish Wali there, Sa,eed Basha, asking for their assistance. 
He wrote to them again in 1916, repeating his first request. The Imam of Yemen 
4. Murphy, Soldiers, p.135; Peterson, J. E., 'The Rival of The Ibadi Imamate In Oman And 
The Threat To Muscat 1913-1920', Arabian Studies, ill (1976), p. 171; G. J. Eccles, The 
Sultanate of Muscat and Oman' J. C. A. S. 14 (1927), p. 23. 
5. It seems that the Jihad was not always to defend Islam against other religions but it could 
be also used against local Muslim rulers if their government was believed to be based on 
injustice or breach of Islamic laws. 
6. Bell,Arab War, p. 22. 
7. Ibid 
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and the Turks replied to him that he might expect the arrival of 10,000 men from 
the Turkish army, stationed in Yemen, to come by sea. Three messengers from 
Yemen arrived in Oman via Mukalla in Hadramaut (now South Yamen) and then 
via Sur on the Eastern coast of Oman. In March 1917, it was reported that three 
Turkish Agents travelling in Oman tried to stir up the Omanis to attack the British. 
But it appeared that there were differences between the Turkish aims and those of 
the Omani Imams. 
Moreover German intervention and encouragement to the rebels in Oman 
were alleged9• The Germans who were in alliance with the Turks, were accused 
of provoking the disturbances and outrages against British authorities in the 
region, and of undermining British influence and prestige by every means within 
their power. They even claimed that William 11 had been converted to the Muslim 
faith and had changed his name to Haji GhuIoom!. 
German propaganda was so effective that it induced the Prime Minister of 
Persia to sign a secret treaty promising Germany the full support of the Persian 
government. This was so dangerous that it obliged the British Government to 
intervene in Persian affairslO. 
In Oman the unrest may have been assisted by German agents 11. The 
Germans soon began to exploit the situation. Their "agents were reported among 
the tribes originating, it was said, from Dar al Salam and distributing money 
through Sur and Sharqyyah"12. If that was true, then it is interesting to note that 
the Omani people had left behind their French friends and became allies of the 
Germans, but in fact the evidence for this is slight. Even if it was true the British 
would have to take some blame for it, as they did not realize the consequences of 
their policy. Their only method of persuasion was the exercise of power, and their 
interests were so manifestly selfish. 
8. Arch. Eels., The Persian Gulf, vol. vii, 1912-1920. p. 47. 
9. John Marlowe The Persian Gulf In The Twentieth Century, (1962) p. 76. 
10. Terence Creagh Coan, The Indian Political Service, (1971) pp. 228-229. 
11. Ibid; Murphy, The soldiers, p. 134. 
12. Peterson, Revival, p. 172. 
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In a confidential letter, dated 14 October 1920 to the Government of India, 
R. E. Wmgate, the Political Agent at M~ wrote that "a brief perusal of the 
treaties and engagements with the rulers of Muscat will show that our influence 
has been entirely self-interested, has paid no regard to the peculiar political and 
social conditions of the country and its rulers, and by bribing effete Sultans to 
enforce unpalatable measures which benefited none but ourselves, and permitting 
them to misrule without protest has done more to alienate the interior and to 
prevent the Sultans from re-establishing their authority than all the rest put 
together". He said, "it has been support wrongly applied, in money and not in 
essentials, interference in external affairs which must have seriously reacted upon 
internal peace and no palliative except money which was thrown into the sea or 
worse by those into whose hands we put it". He declared that. "the result was that 
we were reduced to the absurd position of supporting by armed force under our 
treaty obligations a ruler against whom most of his subjects were in open 
rebellion, who was theoretically independent and yet who would be driven into 
the sea in a day if it were not for USI3". 
But there was still time left for concession, and to do what was necessary 
to bring about agreement between the Sultan and the Imam after seven long and 
exhausting years. The Imam had lost one of his major supporters, Sheikh Himyar 
bin Nasser, whose son Sheikh Sulaiman bin Himyer, was an inexperienced boy 
(Sulaiman later fought against Sultan Sa,eed bin Taimur during the 50s at the time 
of the Jabel war). Moreover, the Imam's leadership of the revolution did not make 
him immune to political opposition in his own area, especially given characteristic 
Omani intolerance of their rulers. The Imam was murdered in AI Khadrah on 21 
July 1920. It was stated that the cause of his assassination was an insult to one of 
his guards. But it was said that the real reason was that he angered the tribes 
against his rule and that of his brother, by imposing penal zakats (taxes) on them. 
A new Imam was elected. He was Imam Mohammed bin Abdullah el Khalily, 
13. Baily, Records. vol. 3, p. 199. 
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(relative of the present high Mufty of Oman Sheikh Ahmed el-Khalily) and during 
his period of office a peace conference took place in es-Seeb in 1920, between his 
party and the Government of the Sultan. 
"This is what' has been agreed upon m the settlement between the 
Government of Sultan Sayid Taimur bin Faisal and Sheikh !sa bin Ali al-Harthi on 
behalf of the Omanis who sign their names here through the mediation of Mr. 
Wingate, I. C. S •• Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty's Consul. Muscat, 
who is authorized by his government in this respect to be a mediator between 
them." The Agreement stated four conditions for the Omanis. 1- On all 
commodities brought from Oman to Muscat, Mutrah, Sur and the coast towns 
nothing more should be taken than 5% .. 2- for all the Omanis there should be 
safety and freedom in all the coast towns. 3- All restrictions on entry to and exit 
from Muscat. Mutrah and all the coast towns should be removed. 4- The Sultan's 
Government should not protect criminals who flee from the justice of the Omanis 
and that they may be returned if asked for and that the Sultan's Government 
should not interfere in their internal affairs." 
The sultan's conditions;"1- All the tribes and sheiks should remain in 
peace and amity with the Government of the Sultan and that they should not 
attack the coast towns and should not interfere in his Government 2- All 
travellers to Oman on their lawful business should be free and there should be no 
restriction on trade, and travellers should be safe. 3- All criminals and evil men 
who flee to them should be turned out and should not be protected. 4- The claims 
of merchants and others against the Omanis should be heard and decided as is just 
according to the shar,a". 
The agreement was signed on 25 September 1920 by Sheikh E,yseh bin 
Saleh on behalf of Imam el Muslemeen Mohammed bin Abdullah el-Khalily, and 
other tribal leaders, and signed by the Wazeer Mohammad bin Ahmed on behalf 
of H. H. The Sultan14• This treaty seemed to establish implicitly two 
14. For more details about the Seeb treaty see Records o/Oman, vol. 3, P 198 f-211 , an 
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Governments, one for the Imam and another for the Sultan. The Times cald it 
"autonomy to the people of hinterland" 15. The Imamate was to exist in Oman till 
the fifties, when the last Imam Ghalib bin Ali, who had succeeded the Imam el 
Khalily, revolted agairist the Sultan Sa,eed bin Taimur, in a dispute because of an 
oil rights exploration concession by the latter to an oil company into an area 
regarded as belonging to the Imam, thus breaching the Seeb agreement. The 
Imam was forced into exile in Saudi Arabia. He used the Seeb agreement as 
evidence of Oman's independence, involving various foreign powers in long 
debates in the UN assembly in New York throughout the 50s and the 60s. 
An interesting point is that there was no mention in the agreement of the 
arms trade, probably because matters had changed in the seven years since the 
Omanis had revolted against the establishment of the warehouse. 
It may be recalled that in the 13th century the sea coast of Oman was part 
of the Kingdom of Hurmuz, while Oman proper remained under the local Imams, 
while from the mid-16th century till the mid-17th century the Hurmuzian 
kingdom was dominated by the Portuguese, while Oman proper remained 
unscathed. Greater Oman enjoyed unity only under the Ya,aarebeh Imams. Now 
in 1920 political conditions seemed to have reverted to the days of the 
Hurmuzians and the Portuguese. The Omani Sultans, like their earliest 
predecessors, were left to rule the coastal towns, and the Imams ruled the interior 
of the country till the 1950s, when Sultan Sa,eed bin Taimur of Muscat, with 
British assistance, defeated the Imam Ghalib bin Ali of Oman, and forced him into 
exile. Thus Oman was again unified under the sultanate. 
Britain realized the risks of continued turbulence in Oman from which 
altogether unexpected events might flow. The international situation after the 
First World War was transformed. New challenges to Britain had emerged, not 
France now but Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union and the U. S. A. There was 
Arabic version of which also can be found. 
15. The Times, 20 Jan. 1920. 
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also the expansion of the Sau,di State, and the modem fanatic Islamic and Arab 
national movements during the 208. Oman seemed to have become part and 
parcel of an extended North-West Frontier, active no less on the North-West of 
India (Mghanistan) than to the North of the Gulf, and then the Middle East as 
whole. The main danger was to come from Turkey and Germany, till after the 
Second World War, when the danger to British interests appeared to come from 
the Soviet Union during the 50s, and until the early 80s, in other words from the 
cold war to the Glasnost and Perestroyka of Mr Gorbachov. The Gulf itself now 
became important for Britain less for its strategic position in relation to IDdia than 
for its mineral wealth. Oil reserves were quickly tapped, the first Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company agreement having been signed in 1914. British policy in the Gulf 
started to concentrate on defending the oil wealth from any greedy power which 
might become interested in wresting it from British hands. Mter the Second 
World War, the danger to the oil reserves was seen as coming from the Soviet 
Union, despite the fact that the Soviets themselves had plenty of oil. However, 
despite oil becoming the first item on the agenda for Britain in the Gulf, the Gulfs 
strategic position between the West and the East, acquired further significance for 
Britain, especially after their withdrawal from India, and after the creation of 
Pakistan on the old North-West Frontiers of the Indian Empire during the late 4Os. 
So if there should be any danger from the Afghans, it would no longer threaten 
India but rather Pakistan. The Russians themselves were still far from the warm 
waters of the Indian Ocean but they were not so far from the Persian Gulf. On the 
whole eastern coastline of the Gulf is situated Iran, the country behind whose 
north-eastern border lie the southern Republics of the USSR, and we saw (in the 
introductory chapter) how the situation in Georgia affected Persia during 1630s 
and subsequently its position in the Gulf. This made the Gulf strategically 
important to Great Britain and even for all other European powers, on account of 
the sea and air routes between east and west throughout the whole period of the 
Cold War. Despite Britain's role in many progressive political changes in the 
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Persian Gulf countries during the Cold War, British influence was increasingly 
replaced by that of the USA~ in some parts. The Gulf countries, including Oman, 
followed Western policy in general against the USSR and were caught up in the 
Cold War era. Whether the Persian Gulf will remain imponant for Great Britain 
and the west as a whole after the end of the Cold War era and the German 
reunification, what the implication of the new international situation will be for 
the situation in the Gulf countries, and which of them will be crucial to 
international developments are questions for the future. One thing seems clear. 
The quasi-feudalism, absolute monarchies and dictatorships of the region offer a 
fertile breeding ground for religious, political, and national fanaticism alike, with 
potentially catastrophic effects at local and international levels. 
Continuance of the British-Omani relationship would be one stable 
element in a rapidly changing world, and would be of mutual benefit to the 
peoples of both countries in numerous ways. The British can learn from the 
Omani experience of the complexity of Islam and of a society with mixed 
religious and cultural traditions. The Omanis can learn from the British 
experience of the Welfare State and of democratic institutions at local and 
national level. 
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